Matière et Révolution

Le bolchevisme de Lénine n'est pas ce qu'en comprend… Lutte ouvrière

Robert Paris — 2026-05-21T22:11:00Z

Le bolchevisme de Lénine n'est pas ce qu'en comprend… Lutte ouvrière

Commençons par une citation bien significative d'Arlette Laguiller dans un exposé du cercle Léon Trotsky, à l'occasion du 80ème anniversaire de la révolution russe, Paris le 7 novembre 1997.

« Ce parti en Russie, c'était le Parti Bolchevik, moralement et entièrement préparé pour conduire le prolétariat à la conquête du pouvoir. Un parti qui avait fait profondément sienne la compréhension marxiste de l'évolution de la société, ce qui l'a rendu apte à discerner, même aux pires périodes de réaction ou de répression, les cheminements souterrains de la révolution. Un parti forgé dans de dures luttes pendant les 15 ans qui séparent l'apparition du Parti Bolchevik de la révolution ; un parti composé d'un nombre relativement faible de femmes et d'hommes, ouvriers mais aussi intellectuels, mais tous consacrant entièrement leur existence à la révolution sociale, et tous très liés aux masses ouvrières, dans lesquelles ils voyaient le seul levier pour transformer la société. »

https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/242817-laguiller-07111997-communisme-face-au-capitalisme-revolution-russe

Voici une autre citation :

« Le parti bolchévik, fort de la confiance des travailleurs, acquise au cours d'un long et patient travail, avait su éclairer les masses, démasquer le jeu des « socialistes » de la bourgeoisie ; il avait su, en juillet, retenir les ouvriers de Petrograd, les empêcher de se lancer seuls dans la lutte et de se couper ainsi de la grande masse du peuple qui n'avait pas encore pris conscience de la nécessité de l'insurrection ; il avait su, en août, mobiliser derrière lui, dans une juste politique de front unique, tous ceux qui voulaient lutter contre Kornilov et la contre-révolution ; il avait su, enfin, en octobre, lancer les travailleurs à la prise du pouvoir, après les y avoir préparés physiquement et moralement, au moment le plus opportun. »

https://www.lutte-ouvriere.org/clt/documents-archives-cercle-leon-trotsky-avant-1968-article-cinquantieme-anniversaire-de-la.html

La thèse de LO est que le parti bolchevique de Lénine était prêt et d'avance programmé pour cette révolution. Tout à fait faux ! Quand les partis sociaux-démocrates ont trahi la révolution de février, la direction bolchevique en Russie était de leur côté ! Quand Lénine et Trotsky ont fait le choix de la révolution d'Octobre, une partie non négligeable du parti bolchevique a choisi d'être adversaire de la révolution. Cela ne montre pas seulement que le parti bolchevique était démocratique mais que les plus proches dirigeants de Lénine avaient complètement rompu avec la perspective révolutionnaire.

Oui, le parti bolchevique était loin d'être parfaitement préparé à Octobre, vu que pendant des années Lénine avait combattu CONTRE la théorie de la révolution permanente, véritable base de la révolution d'Octobre…

Il aurait fallu écrire que, grâce à leur poids politiques personnels considérables, Lénine et Trotsky étaient parvenus in extremis à sauver le parti des erreurs où il semblait tomber irrémédiablement, notamment du fait d'erreurs de… Lénine (son opposition systématique à la thèse de la révolution permanente qui n'a cessé qu'en 1917, et plus nettement avec les « thèses d'avril ». Plutôt que de laisser croire que le parti bolchevique avait lui-même su trouver la juste politique… Ce qui n'est pas la vérité historique.

La vérité, c'est qu'aux moments cruciaux de la révolution russe, Lénine a été mis en minorité au sein de son propre parti et qu'il a eu du mal à remonter la pente, la grande majorité de son comité central étant contre lui. Et ce n'est pas une seule fois mais durant six périodes clefs de la révolution russe débutée en 1917 :

– À son début, quand il s'agissait de savoir si c'était « une révolution démocratique », c'est-à-dire bourgeoise, s'il s'agissait d'appuyer l'aile démocratique de la bourgeoisie et de s'unir aux autres partis de gauche, ou au contraire s'il s'agissait d'une révolution prolétarienne, donc d'une révolution permanente om c'est la classe ouvrière qui allait prendre la tête de la lutte démocratique, de celle des paysans, de celle des nationalités opprimées, toutes ces luttes devant nécessairement mener au socialisme en se liant à la lutte du prolétariat mondial (thèse dite de la révolution permanente de Trotsky). Pendant de longues années, Lénine avait combattu contre cette thèse « trotskyste » et avait formé sa direction politique dans ce sens. Il a eu un mal de chien (de février à avril) à lui faire prendre le tournant dit des « thèses d'avril » et ce ne sont pas les dirigeants ou les militants qui lui ont facilité les choses mais la classe ouvrière elle-même. Changement radical : le parti bolchevique, qui s'apprêtait à soutenir le gouvernement provisoire, a commencé à militer pour son renversement et pour « le pouvoir aux soviets » et le socialisme ! Rien ne permet de penser que, sans Lénine, il aurait redressé le tir…

https://www.marxists.org/francais/lenin/works/1917/03/vil19170322.htm

https://www.marxists.org/francais/lenin/works/1917/03/vil19170326.htm

https://www.marxists.org/francais/lenin/works/1917/04/vil19170410.htm

– Deuxième erreur grave : le parti n'a pas aisément accepté que la révolution de juillet était prématurée et un grand nombre de militants ont pris le large à cette occasion, trompés par les apparences.

« Vinrent les journées de juillet qui marquèrent un moment im¬portant dans la voie de la révolution et le développement des di¬vergences de vues à l'intérieur du Parti. Dans ces journées, la pression spontanée des masses petersbourgeoises joua un rôle décisif. Mais il est indubitable que Lénine se demandait alors si le temps n'était pas déjà venu, si l'état d'esprit des masses n'avait pas dépassé la superstructure soviétiste, si, hypnotisés par la légalité soviétiste, nous ne risquions pas de retarder sur les masses et de nous détacher d'elles. Il est très vraisemblable que certaines opérations purement militaires pendant les journées de juillet eurent lieu sur l'initiative de camarades sincèrement persuadés qu'ils n'étaient pas en désaccord avec l'appréciation de la situation par Lénine. Plus tard, Lénine disait : "En juillet, nous avons commis assez de bêtises.” En réalité, cette fois aussi, l'affaire se réduisit à une reconnaissance mais de plus vaste envergure et une étape plus avancée du mouvement Nous dûmes battre en retraite. Se préparant à l'insurrection et a la prise du pouvoir, Lénine et le Parti ne virent dans l'intervention de juillet qu'un épisode où nous avions payé assez cher la reconnaissance profonde effectuée parmi les forces ennemies, mais qui ne pouvait faire dévier la ligne générale de notre action Au contraire, les camarades hostiles à la politique de la prise du pouvoir devaient voir dans l'épisode de juillet une aventure nui-sible. Les éléments de droite renforcèrent leur mobilisation ; leur critique devint plus catégorique, par suite, le ton de la riposte changea. Lénine écrivait : “Toutes ces lamentations, toutes ces réflexions tendant à prouver qu'il n'aurait pas faIlu participer ou bien proviennent de renégats, si elles émanent des bolcheviks, ou bien sont des manifestations de l'effroi et de la confusion habituels aux petits-bourgeois.” Ce mot de renégat prononcé à un tel moment éclairait d'une lueur tragique les diver¬gences de vues dans le Parti. Dans la suite, il revient de plus en plus fréquemment. »

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/oeuvres/1924/09/19240915e.htm

Quand LO écrit que le parti a très bien su prendre cette décision, il y manque le récit réel. C'est ce qui est si bien rapporté dans « Le tourbillon » de Démidov :

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article8453

– Troisième erreur encore plus grave : quand c'est le moment de prendre le pouvoir, la direction du parti bolchevique est résolument opposée et, malgré des interventions véhémentes de Lénine, bien que Trotsky soit déjà en train de préparer politiquement et organisationnellement et de commencer à enclencher physiquement l'insurrection à la tête du comité militaire révolutionnaire avec l'accord de Lénine… Cela a été au point qu'une partie du comité central s'est désolidarisée publiquement de la révolution d'Octobre, dénonçant même dans la presse ses préparatifs secrets !

https://www.marxists.org/francais/lenin/works/1917/09/vil19170926.htm

https://www.marxists.org/francais/lenin/works/1917/10/vil19171018.htm

https://www.matierevolution.org/spip.php?article6837

– Quatrième erreur : une bonne partie de la direction bolchevique a participé aux manœuvre pour combattre et évincer Trotsky de la direction de l'Armée Rouge ! Là encore, c'était à deux doigts de réussir et c'est seulement grâce à l'intervention in extremis de Lénine que Trotsky n'a pas été mis à l'écart.

Trotsky : « Quand, dans certains cercles du Parti, non sans la participation occulte de Staline se manifesta une opposition contre mes méthodes de direction de la guerre civile, Lénine, en juillet 1919, de sa propre initiative et d'une façon tout à fait inattendue pour moi, me remit une feuille de papier blanc au bas de laquelle il avait écrit : " Camarades, ayant pris connaissance du caractère rigoureux des ordres du camarade Trotsky, je suis si convaincu, si absolument convaincu de la justesse, de l'opportunité et de la nécessité – pour le bien de notre cause, des ordres qu'il a donnés, que je donne à ses ordres mon entière adhésion ". Il n'y avait pas de date sur ce papier. En cas de nécessité la date devait y être apposée par moi-même. La prudence de Lénine dans tout ce qui concernait ses relations avec les travailleurs est bien connue. Néanmoins, il considérait possible de contresigner par avance un ordre venant de moi, bien que de ces ordres dépendait souvent le sort d'un grand nombre de gens. Lénine ne craignait pas que je puisse abuser de mes pouvoirs. Je dois ajouter que pas une seule fois je n'ai fait usage de la " carte blanche " donnée par lui. Mais ce document est un témoignage de l'exceptionnelle confiance d'un homme que je considère comme le plus parfait modèle de moralité révolutionnaire. »

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article405

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/livres/staline/lt_stal16.htm

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6825

– Cinquième erreur : avec la montée révolutionnaire, ce sont les communistes de gauche qui ont influencé le parti et l'internationale, au point d'être momentanément majoritaires dans les deux. Seule l'unité Lénine-Trotsky a pu éviter cette erreur d'avoir des conséquences fatales à la Russie des soviets.

– Sixième erreur qui a cette fois marché parce que Lénine n'est pas intervenu contre, ne sachant pas trop qu'en penser : certains dirigeants ont fait courir dans le parti bolchevique le bruit que Trotsky voulait instaurer la dictature de l'Armée rouge et la méfiance à l'égard de Trotsky s'est tellement étendue dans le parti qu'elle a un peu influence momentanément Lénine dans une phase où il polémiquait plus sévèrement avec Trotsky sur paix ou guerre avec l'Allemagne, sur l'économie de guerre, sur la NEP et la voie vers le socialisme. Staline en a tiré profit pour grimper et faire grimper ses sbires. Lénine n'a redressé le tir qu'en 1922-1923 mais le mal était fait : l'alliance Staline-Zinoviev-Kamenev allait faire du dégât…

– Et, septièmement, en 1922-1923, Lénine et Trotsky étaient ensemble mais contre une partie des militants et dirigeants bolcheviques…

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article2018

– Huitième erreur : le Politburo a bloqué les demandes politiques de Lénine, son testament…

https://www.marxists.org/francais/lenin/works/1922/12/vil19221229.htm

Tout cela démontre que le parti bolchevique ne peut pas être considéré, indépendamment des conditions extrêmement difficiles de la révolution en Russie, comme tout à fait au point, tout armé pour diriger la révolution prolétarienne. C'est une image fallacieuse.

Trotsky écrit : « La tâche de la conquête du pouvoir ne s'est posée devant le Parti que le 4 avril, c'est-à-dire après l'arrivée de Lénine à Petrograd. Mais, même à partir de ce moment, la ligne du Parti n'a pas un caractère continu, indiscutable pour tous. Malgré les décisions de la conférence d'avril 1917, une résistance, tantôt sourde, tantôt déclarée, au cours révolutionnaire se manifeste pendant toute la période de préparation.
L'étude du développement des divergences de vues entre fé¬vrier et la consolidation de la révolution d'Octobre non seulement présente un intérêt théorique exceptionnel, mais a une impor¬tance pratique incommensurable. Lénine, en 1910, avait qualifié d'anticipation les désaccords qui s'étaient manifestés au II° Congrès en 1903. Il importe de suivre ces désaccords depuis leur source, c'est-à-dire depuis 1903, et même depuis l'“écono¬misme ". Mais cette étude n'a de sens que si elle est complète et embrasse également la période où les divergences de vues furent soumises à l'épreuve décisive, c'est-à-dire Octobre.
Nous ne pouvons, dans ces pages, entreprendre un examen approfondi de tous les stades de cette lutte. Mais nous jugeons nécessaire de combler partiellement la lacune inadmissible qui existe dans notre littérature sur la période la plus importante du développement de notre Parti.
Comme nous l'avons déjà dit, la question du pouvoir est le nœud de ces divergences de vues. C'est là le critérium permettant de déterminer le caractère d'un parti révolutionnaire (et même d'un parti non révolutionnaire). Dans la période que nous étudions, la question de la guerre se pose et se résout en connexion étroite avec la question du pouvoir. Nous examinerons ces deux ques¬tions dans l'ordre chronologique : position du Parti et de sa presse dans la première période après le renversement du tsa¬risme, avant l'arrivée de Lénine ; lutte autour des thèses de Lénine ; conférence d'avril ; conséquences des journées de juillet ; émeute de Kornilov ; conférence démocratique et Pré-parlement ; question de l'insurrection armée et de la crise du pouvoir (sep¬tembre-octobre) ; question d'un gouvernement socialiste "ho¬mogène". »

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/oeuvres/1924/09/19240915b.htm

Trotsky : « Le 4 avril, le lendemain de son arrivée à Petrograd, Lénine s'éleva résolument contre la position de la Pravda dans la question de la guerre et de la paix : "Il ne faut accorder aucun soutien au Gouvernement Provisoire - écrivait-il - il faut expliquer le mensonge de toutes ses promesses, particulièrement de celle qui concerne la renonciation aux annexions. Il faut démasquer ce gou¬vernement au lieu de lui demander (revendication propre unique¬ment à faire naître des illusions) de cesser d'être impérialiste." Inutile de dire que Lénine qualifie de "fumeux" et de "confus” l'appel des conciliateurs du 14 mars, si favorablement accueilli par la Pravda. C'est une formidable hypocrisie que d'inviter les autres peuples à rompre avec leurs banquiers et de créer en même temps un gouvernement de coalition avec ses propres banquiers. "Les hommes du centre - dit Lénine dans son projet de plate-forme - jurent leurs grands dieux qu'ils sont marxistes, interna¬tionalistes, qu'ils sont pour la paix, pour toutes sortes de pres¬sion sur leur gouvernement afin qu'il "manifeste la volonté de paix du peuple”. »

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/oeuvres/1924/09/19240915c.htm

Trotsky : « Les adversaires de la lutte pour le pouvoir abordaient tout autrement la question. A la Conférence d'avril du Parti, Kame¬nev exposait ses plaintes : "Dans le n° 19 de la Pravda, des camarades (il s'agit évidemment de Lénine. L.T.) avaient pro¬posé une résolution sur le renversement du Gouvernement Pro¬visoire, résolution imprimée avant la dernière crise, mais ils l'ont rejetée ensuite comme susceptible d'introduire la désorga¬nisation et empreinte de l'esprit d'aventure. On le voit, les cama¬rades en question ont appris quelque chose pendant cette crise. La résolution proposée (c'est-à-dire la résolution proposée par Lénine à la Conférence. L.T.) répète cette faute." Cette façon de poser la question est significative au plus haut point. La reconnaissance une fois effectuée, Lénine retira le mot d'ordre du renversement immédiat du Gouvernement Provisoire, mais il le retira temporairement, pour des semaines ou des mois, selon que l'indignation des masses contre les conciliateurs croîtrait plus ou moins rapidement. L'opposition, elle, considérait ce mot d'or¬dre comme une faute. Le recul provisoire de Lénine ne compor¬tait pas la moindre modification de sa ligne. Lénine ne se basait pas sur le fait que la révolution démocratique n'était pas encore terminée, mais uniquement sur le fait que la masse était encore incapable de renverser le gouvernement provisoire et qu'il fallait la rendre au plus vite capable de l'abattre.

Toute la conférence d'avril du parti fut consacrée à cette question essentielle : allons-nous à la conquête du pouvoir pour réaliser la révolution socialiste, ou aidons-nous à parachever la révolution démocratique ? Par malheur, le compte rendu de cette conférence n'est pas encore imprimé ; pourtant, il n'y a peut-être pas dans l'histoire de notre parti de congrès qui ait eu une im¬portance aussi grande, aussi directe pour le sort de la révolution.
Lutte irréductible contre le défensisme et les défensistes, conquête de la majorité dans les Soviets, renversement du gou¬vernement provisoire par l'intermédiaire des Soviets, politique révolutionnaire de paix, programme de révolution socialiste à l'intérieur et de révolution internationale à l'extérieur : telle est la plate-forme de Lénine. Comme on le sait l'opposition était pour le parachèvement de la révolution démocratique au moyen d'une pression sur le Gouvernement Provisoire, les soviets de¬vant rester des organes de "contrôle” sur le pouvoir bourgeois. De là une attitude beaucoup plus conciliante à l'égard du défen¬sisme.
Un des adversaires de Lénine déclarait à la conférence d'avril : "Nous parlons des soviets ouvriers et soldats comme de centres organisateurs de nos forces et du pouvoir... Leur nom seul montre qu'ils sont un bloc des forces petites-bourgeoises et prolétarien¬nes auquel s'impose la nécessité d'achever les tâches démocrati¬ques bourgeoises. Si la révolution démocratique bourgeoise est terminée, ce bloc ne pourrait exister... et le prolétariat mènerait la lutte révolutionnaire contre lui... Néanmoins, nous reconnais¬sons ces soviets comme des centres d'organisation de nos forces... Ainsi, la révolution bourgeoise n'est pas encore close, elle n'a pas donné toute sa mesure et nous devons reconnaître que si elle était entièrement terminée, le pouvoir passerait aux mains du prolétariat." (Discours de Kamenev).
L'inconsistance de ce raisonnement est évidente : en effet, la révolution ne sera jamais tout à fait terminée tant que le pouvoir ne passera pas en d'autres mains. L'auteur du discours précité ignore l'axe véritable de la révolution : il ne déduit pas les tâches du parti du groupement réel des forces de classe, mais d'une définition formelle de la révolution considérée comme bourgeoise ou démocratique-bourgeoise. Selon lui, il faut faire bloc avec la petite bourgeoisie et exercer un contrôle sur le pouvoir bourgeois tant que la révolution bourgeoise ne sera pas parachevée. C'est Ià un schéma nettement menchevik. En limitant doctrinairement les tâches de la révolution par l'appellation de cette dernière révolution “bourgeoise", on devait fatalement arriver à la politique de contrôle sur le Gouvernement Provisoire, à la reven¬dication d'un programme de paix sans annexions, etc... Par parachèvement de la révolution démocratique, on sous-entendait la réalisation d'une série de réformes par l'intermédiaire de la Constituante, où le parti bolchevik devait jouer le rôle d'aile gauche. Le mot d'ordre : "Tout le pouvoir aux soviets” perdait ainsi tout contenu réel. C'est que, plus logique que ses camarades de l'opposition, Noguine déclara à la conférence d'avril : "Au cours de l'évolution, les attributions les plus importantes des so¬viets disparaissent, une série de leurs fonctions administratives sont transmises aux municipalités, aux zemstvos, etc... Considérons le développement ultérieur de l'organisation étatique : nous ne pouvons nier qu'il y aura une Assemblée Constituante et, à sa suite, un Parlement. Il en résulte que, progressivement, les soviets seront déchargés de leurs principales fonctions ; mais cela ne veut pas dire qu'ils terminent honteusement leur existence. Ils ne feront que transmettre leurs fonctions. Ce n'est pas avec les soviets du type actuel que la république-commune sera chez nous".
Enfin, un troisième opposant aborda la question du point de vue maturité de la Russie pour le socialisme "Pouvons-nous, en arborant le mot d'ordre de la révolution prolétarienne, compter sur l'appui des masses ? Non, car la Russie est le pays le plus petit-bourgeois d'Europe. Si le parti adopte la plate-forme de la révolution socialiste, il se transformera en un cercle de propa-gandistes. C'est de l'Occident que doit être déclenchée la révo¬lution... Où se lèvera le soleil de la révolution socialiste ? Etant donné l'état de choses qui règne chez nous, le milieu petit-bour-geois, j'estime que ce n'est pas à nous de prendre l'initiative de la révolution socialiste. Nous n'avons pas les forces nécessaires à cet effet ; en outre les conditions objectives font défaut. En Oc¬cident, la question de la révolution socialiste se pose à peu près de la même façon que, chez nous, celle du renversement du tsarisme.”
A la conférence d'avril, tous les adversaires de Lénine n'al¬laient pas jusqu'aux conclusions de Noguine, mais tous, par la logique des choses, ils furent forcés de les accepter quelques mois plus tard, à la veille d'octobre. Diriger la révolution proléta¬rienne ou se borner au rôle d'opposition dans le Parlement bour¬geois : telle était l'alternative dans laquelle se trouvait placé notre parti. La deuxième position était menchevique ou, plus exac¬tement c'était la position que les mencheviks furent forcés d'aban¬donner après la révolution de février. En effet, pendant des an¬nées, les leaders mencheviques avaient affirmé que la révolution future serait bourgeoise, que le gouvernement d'une révolution bourgeoise ne pouvait accomplir que les tâches de la bourgeoisie, que la social-démocratie ne pouvait assumer les tâches de la démocratie bourgeoise et devrait, “tout en poussant la bourgeoisie vers la gauche”, se confiner dans le rôle d'opposi¬tion. Martynov, en particulier, ne s'était pas lassé de développer ce thème. La révolution de février amena bientôt les menche¬viks à participer au gouvernement. De leur position de principe ces derniers ne conservèrent que la thèse portant que le prolé¬tariat ne devait pas s'emparer du pouvoir. Ainsi, ceux des bolcheviks qui condamnaient le ministérialisme menchevik tout en s'élevant contre la prise du pouvoir par le prolétariat, se re-tranchaient dans les positions pré-révolutionnaires des menche¬viks. »

« Mais alors que les mencheviks abandonnent leur socialisme for¬mel pour la démocratie vulgaire, la droite des bolcheviks passe au socialisme formel, c'est-à-dire à la position qu'occupaient, la veille encore, les mencheviks.
Le même regroupement se produisit dans la question de la guerre. A l'exception de quelques doctrinaires, la bourgeoisie (qui d'ailleurs n'espérait plus guère la victoire militaire) adopta la formule : "Ni annexions, ni contribution". Les mencheviks et les s.-r. zimmerwaldiens, qui avaient critiqué les socialistes fran¬çais parce qu'ils défendaient leur patrie républicaine bourgeoise, devinrent des défensistes dès qu'ils se sentirent en république bourgeoise : de la position internationaliste passive, ils pas¬sèrent au patriotisme actif. En même temps, la droite bolche¬vique glissa à l'internationalisme passif de "pression" sur le Gouvernement Provisoire, en vue d'une paix démocratique “sans annexions, ni contribution". De la sorte, la formule de la dictature démocratique du prolétariat et de la paysannerie se disloque théoriquement et politiquement à la conférence d'avril et fait apparaître deux points de vue opposés : le point de vue démocratique, masqué par des restrictions socialistes formelles, et le point de vue social-révolutionnaire ou point de vue bolche¬vique véritable. »

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/oeuvres/1924/09/19240915d.htm

Trotsky : « Lenine avait dit plus d'une fois que les masses sont plus à gauche que le parti. Il savait que le parti est plus à gauche que son sommet, la couche des " vieux bolcheviks ". Il se représentait trop bien les groupements intérieurs et les tendances dans le Comité central pour attendre de lui des démarches audacieuses ; en revanche, il appréhendait beaucoup une circonspection excessive, l'esprit de temporisation, la négligence d'une de ces situations historiques qui sont préparées par des dizaines d'années. Lenine ne fait pas confiance au Comité central... sans Lenine : là est le secret de ses missives écrites du fond de sa retraite clandestine. Et Lenine n'a pas tellement tort de manquer de confiance.
Obligé de se prononcer dans la plupart des cas après une décision déjà prise à Petrograd, Lenine critique invariablement, d'un point de vue de gauche, la politique du Comité central. Son opposition se développe sur le fond du problème de l'insurrection, mais ne se borne pas là. Lenine estime que le Comité central accorde trop d'attention au Comité exécutif conciliateur, à la Conférence démocratique, en général au remue-ménage parlementaire dans les sommets soviétiques. Il se prononce véhémentement contre les bolcheviks proposant un bureau de coalition au Soviet de Petrograd. Il stigmatise comme " déshonorante " la décision de participer au préparlement. Il est indigné à la publication en fin septembre de la liste des candidats bolcheviks à l'Assemblée constituante : trop d'intellectuels, trop peu d'ouvriers. " Combler l'Assemblée constituante avec des orateurs et des littérateurs, c'est marcher dans les sentiers battus de l'opportunisme et du chauvinisme. Cela est indigne de la III° Internationale. " En outre, parmi les candidats, il y a trop de nouveaux membres du parti non éprouvés dans la lutte ! Lenine estime nécessaire de faire une réserve : " Il va de soi que... personne ne contesterait, par exemple, une candidature comme celle de L. D. Trotsky, car, en premier lieu, Trotsky, dès son arrivée, a occupé une position internationaliste ; en second lieu, il a lutté dans l'organisation inter-districts pour la fusion ; en troisième lieu, pendant les dures Journées de Juillet, il s'est montré à la hauteur de la tâche et dévoué aux partisans du parti du prolétariat révolutionnaire. Il est clair que l'on ne peut en dire autant d'une multitude de membres du parti inscrits d'hier... "
Il peut sembler que les Journées d'Avril sont revenues : Lenine est de nouveau en opposition avec le Comité central. Les questions se posent autrement, mais l'esprit général de son opposition est le même : le Comité central est trop passif, cède trop à l'opinion publique des sphères intellectuelles, est trop conciliant à l'égard des conciliateurs ; et, surtout, considère avec trop d'indifférence, en fataliste, non en bolchevik, le problème de l'insurrection armée.
De la parole il est temps de venir aux actes : " Notre parti, maintenant, à la Conférence démocratique, a de fait son Congrès, et ce Congrès doit résoudre (qu'il le veuille ou non) le sort de la révolution. " On ne peut concevoir qu'une seule solution : l'insurrection armée. Dans cette première lettre sur le soulèvement, Lenine fait encore une réserve : " La question se pose non au sujet du " jour " du soulèvement, mais au sujet du " moment " dans le sens étroit du mot. Cela ne sera décidé que par la voix de tous ceux qui sont en contact avec les ouvriers et les soldats, avec les masses. " Mais déjà, deux ou trois jours après (les lettres de ce temps ne sont d'ordinaire point datées : non par oubli, mais pour des raisons conspiratives), Lenine, sous l'évidente impression de la décomposition de la Conférence démocratique, insiste sur le passage immédiat à l'action et formule aussitôt un plan pratique.
" Nous devons à la Conférence resserrer tout de suite la fraction des bolcheviks, sans rechercher le nombre... Nous devons rédiger une brève déclaration des bolcheviks... Nous devons diriger toute notre fraction vers les usines et les casernes. Nous devons, en même temps, sans perdre une minute, organiser l'Etat-major des détachements insurgés, répartir les forces, faire avancer les régiments fidèles vers les points les plus importants, cerner l'Alexandrinka [le théâtre où siégeait la Conférence démocratique], occuper la Pétropauline, arrêter l'Etat-major général et le gouvernement, envoyer aux junkers et à la division sauvage des détachements capables de périr, mais d'empêcher l'ennemi d'avancer vers les centres de la ville. Nous devons mobiliser les ouvriers armés, les appeler à une dernière bataille acharnée, occuper immédiatement les télégraphes et les téléphones, installer notre Etat-major d'insurrection au Central téléphonique, relier avec lui par fil toutes les usines, tous les régiments, tous les points de lutte armée, etc. " La question de la date n'est plus posée en dépendance de " la voix commune de ceux qui ont contact avec les masses ". Lenine propose d'agir immédiatement : sortir avec un ultimatum du théâtre Alexandra pour y revenir à la tête des masses armées. Le coup d'assommade doit être dirigé non seulement contre le gouvernement, mais aussi, simultanément, contre l'organe suprême des conciliateurs.
" ... Lenine, qui, dans des lettres privées, réclamait l'arrestation de la Conférence démocratique, - ainsi le dénonce Soukhanov - proposait dans la presse, comme nous le savons, un " compromis " : que tout le pouvoir soit pris par les mencheviks et les socialistes-révolutionnaires et, là, on verra ce que dira le Congrès des soviets... La même idée était obstinément préconisée par Trotsky à la Conférence démocratique et autour d'elle. " Soukhanov voit un double jeu là où il n'y en avait pas l'ombre. Lenine proposait aux conciliateurs un compromis immédiatement après la victoire remportée sur Kornilov, dans les premiers jours de septembre. Haussant les épaules, les conciliateurs le laissèrent tomber. La Conférence démocratique fut transformée par eux en un camouflage d'une nouvelle coalition des cadets entre les bolcheviks. La possibilité d'un accord disparaissait par là même définitivement. La question du pouvoir ne pouvait être désormais résolue que par une lutte ouverte. Soukhanov confond deux phases dont la première en date devançait l'autre de quinze jours et la conditionnait au point de vue politique.
Mais, si l'insurrection procédait irrésistiblement de la nouvelle coalition, Lenine, par la vivacité de son tournant, prit à l'improviste même les sommets de son propre parti. Grouper d'après sa lettre la fraction bolcheviste à la Conférence, même " sans rechercher le nombre ", était évidemment impossible. L'état d'esprit de la fraction était tel que, par soixante-dix voix contre cinquante, elle repoussa le boycottage du préparlement, c'est-à-dire le premier pas vers l'insurrection. Dans le Comité central même, le plan de Lenine ne trouva aucun soutien. Quatre ans plus tard, dans une soirée consacrée à des souvenirs, Boukharine, avec les exagérations et les mots d'esprit qui le caractérisent, raconta d'une façon assez juste au fond cet épisode : " La lettre (de Lenine) était écrite avec une extrême violence et nous menaçait de toutes sortes de châtiments (?). Nous en fûmes estomaqués. Personne encore n'avait posé la question si violemment... Tous étaient dans le doute d'abord. Après, s'étant consultés, on décida. Ce fut peut-être le seul cas dans l'histoire de notre parti où le Comité central résolut à l'unanimité de brûler la lettre de Lenine... Nous pensions bien que sans aucun doute, à Piter et à Moscou, nous réussirions à prendre le pouvoir en main, mais nous estimions qu'en province nous ne pourrions pas encore tenir, qu'ayant pris le pouvoir et ayant expulsé les membres de la Conférence démocratique, nous ne pourrions plus nous consolider dans le reste de la Russie. "
Provoquée par certaines considérations conspiratives, l'incinération de plusieurs copies de la lettre dangereuse fut décidée réellement non à l'unanimité, mais par six voix contre quatre, avec six abstentions. Un exemplaire fut par bonheur conservé pour l'histoire. Mais ce qui est vrai dans le récit de Boukharine, c'est que tous les membres du Comité central, quoique pour des motifs divers, repoussèrent la proposition : les uns s'opposaient à l'insurrection en général, les autres estimaient que le moment où se tenait la Conférence était le moins favorable de tous ; la tierce partie hésitait simplement et restait dans l'expectative.
Ayant rencontré une résistance directe, Lenine entre dans une sorte de conjuration avec Smilga, qui se trouve aussi en Finlande et qui, en qualité de président du Comité régional des soviets, a dans les mains pour le moment une autorité réelle considérable. Smilga se trouvait en 1917 à l'extrême flanc gauche du parti et, déjà en juillet, était enclin à pousser la lutte jusqu'à son dénouement : dans les tournants de la politique, Lenine trouvait toujours sur qui s'appuyer. Le 27 septembre, Lenine écrit à Smilga une longue lettre : " ... Que faisons-nous ? Nous adoptons seulement des motions ? Nous perdons du temps, nous fixons " des dates " (le 20 octobre - le Congrès des soviets, - n'est-il pas ridicule de différer ainsi ? N'est-il pas ridicule de compter là-dessus ?) Les bolcheviks ne poursuivent pas un travail systématique pour préparer leurs forces militaires en vue de renverser Kérensky... Il faut faire de l'agitation dans le parti pour que l'on envisage sérieusement l'insurrection armée... Ensuite, au sujet de votre rôle... créer un Comité clandestin, formé des militaires les plus sûrs, examiner avec eux la situation sous tous ses aspects, recueillir (et vérifier par vous-mêmes) les renseignements les plus précis sur la composition et l'emplacement des troupes sous Piter et dans Piter, sur les transports de troupes finlandaises vers Piter, sur le mouvement de la flotte, etc. " Lenine réclame " une propagande systématique parmi les Cosaques qui se trouvent ici, en Finlande... Il faut compulser toutes les informations sur les cantonnements de Cosaques et organiser l'envoi chez eux de détachements d'agitateurs choisis parmi les meilleures forces des matelots et des soldats de Finlande ". Enfin : " Pour préparer convenablement les esprits, il faut immédiatement mettre en circulation ce mot d'ordre : le pouvoir doit immédiatement passer entre les mains du Soviet de Petrograd qui le transmettra au Congrès des soviets. Car à quoi bon tolérer encore trois semaines de guerre et de préparatifs korniloviens de Kérensky ? "
Nous avons devant nous un nouveau plan d'insurrection : " un comité clandestin des principaux militaires " à Helsingfors, comme Etat-major de combat ; les troupes russes cantonnées en Finlande comme forces de combat : " la seule ressource que nous pouvons avoir, semble-t-il, complètement en main, et qui joue un rôle militaire sérieux, ce sont les troupes de Finlande et la flotte de la Baltique. " Lenine compte ainsi porter au gouvernement le coup le plus dur du dehors de Petrograd. En même temps est indispensable " une préparation convenable des esprits ", pour que le renversement du gouvernement par les forces armées de la Finlande ne tombe pas comme de l'imprévu sur le Soviet de Petrograd : celui-ci, jusqu'au Congrès des soviets, devra se montrer l'héritier du pouvoir.
La nouvelle esquisse de plan, de même que la précédente, n'eut point d'application. Mais elle ne resta pas inutilisée. L'agitation dans les divisions cosaques donna bientôt des résultats : nous l'avons entendu dire par Dybenko. L'appel fait à la participation des marins de la Baltique pour porter le coup principal au gouvernement entra également dans le plan qui fut adopté plus tard. Mais l'essentiel n'est pas là : une question devenue grave au dernier degré, Lenine ne permettait à personne de l'éluder et de louvoyer. Ce qui se trouvait inopportun comme proposition directe de tactique devenait rationnel comme vérification des états d'esprit dans le Comité central, comme un soutien des résolus devant les hésitants, comme une impulsion supplémentaire vers la gauche,
Par tous les moyens dont il pouvait disposer dans l'isolement de sa retraite clandestine, Lenine s'efforçait de contraindre les cadres du parti à sentir la gravité de la situation et la force de la pression des masses. Il faisait venir dans son refuge divers bolcheviks, les soumettait à des interrogatoires passionnés, contrôlait les paroles et les actes des dirigeants, expédiait par des voies détournées ses mots d'ordre au parti, en bas, en profondeur, pour placer le Comité central devant la nécessité d'agir et d'aller jusqu'au bout.
Un jour après avoir écrit sa lettre à Smilga, Lenine rédige déjà le document cité plus haut, La Crise est mûre, le terminant par une sorte de déclaration de guerre au Comité central. " Il faut... reconnaître la vérité : chez nous, dans le Comité central et dans les sommets du parti, il existe une tendance ou une opinion préconisant d'attendre le Congrès des soviets, s'opposant à la prise immédiate du pouvoir, à l'insurrection immédiate. " Cette tendance doit être surmontée coûte que coûte. " Remporter d'abord la victoire sur Kérensky, ensuite convoquer le Congrès. " Perdre du temps à attendre le Congrès des soviets, c'est " une complète idiotie ou une entière trahison... ". Jusqu'au Congrès, fixé pour le 20, il reste plus de vingt jours : " Les semaines et même les jours décident maintenant de tout. " Différer le dénouement, c'est renoncer lâchement à l'insurrection, car, pendant le Congrès, la prise du pouvoir deviendra impossible : " On amènera des Cosaques au jour " fixé " d'une façon nigaude pour l'insurrection. "
Le seul ton de la lettre montre déjà combien semble à Lenine fatale la politique de temporisateurs des dirigeants de Petrograd. Mais il ne se borne pas, cette fois, à une critique acharnée et, à titre de protestation, il démissionne du Comité central. Motifs : le Comité central n'a pas répondu dés le début de la Conférence à ses sommation concernant la prise du pouvoir ; la rédaction de l'organe du parti (Staline) imprime ses articles avec des retards intentionnels, en y biffant certaines indications sur " des fautes des bolcheviks aussi criantes que celle tout à fait honteuse de participer au préparlement ", etc. Lenine n'estime pas possible de couvrir cette politique devant le parti. " Je suis obligé de demander à sortir du Comité central, ce que je fais, et de garder pour moi la liberté d'agitation à la base du parti et au Congrès du parti. "
D'après les documents, l'on ne voit point comment, dans la suite, cette affaire fut réglée formellement. En tout cas, Lenine ne sortit pas du Comité central. En donnant sa démission qui, chez lui, ne pouvait être nullement le résultat d'une minute d'irritation, Lenine gardait évidemment par devers lui la possibilité de se dégager, en cas de besoin, de la discipline intérieure du Comité central : il n'avait pas à douter que, de même qu'en avril, un appel direct à la base lui garantirait la victoire. Mais le chemin d'une révolte ouverte contre le Comité central supposait la préparation d'un Congrès extraordinaire, et, par suite, exigeait du temps ; or, c'était précisément le temps qui manquait. Gardant en réserve sa lettre de démission, mais ne sortant pas entièrement des limites de la légalité du parti, Lenine continue avec une liberté dé plus grande à développer l'offensive sur les lignes d'opérations à l'intérieur. Non seulement ses lettres au Comité central sont expédiées par lui aux Comités de Petrograd et de Moscou, mais il prend des mesures pour que des copies parviennent aux militants les plus sûrs des quartiers. Au début d'octobre, passant déjà par-dessus la tête du Comité central, Lenine écrit directement aux Comités de Petrograd et de Moscou : " Les bolcheviks n'ont pas le droit d'attendre le Congrès des soviets, ils doivent prendre le pouvoir tout de suite... Tarder est un crime. Attendre le Congrès des soviets, c'est un jeu puéril pour la formalité, c'est un jeu infâme de formalisme, c'est trahir la révolution. " Du point de vue des rapports hiérarchiques, les actes de Lenine n'étaient pas tout à fait irréprochables. Mais il s'agissait de quelque chose de plus grand que des considérations de discipline formelle.
Un des membres du Comité du district de Vyborg, Svechnikov, dit dans ses Souvenirs : " Et Illitch dans sa retraite écrivait et écrivait infatigablement, et Nadejda Konstantinovna (Kroupskaïa) nous lisait très souvent des manuscrits au Comité... Les paroles enflammées du chef ajoutaient à notre force... Je me rappelle comme si c'était d'hier Nadejda Konstantinovna penchée, dans une des salles de la direction du district où travaillaient les dactylos, comparant soigneusement la reproduction avec l'original et, tout à côté d'elle, " Diadia " et " Génia " demandant à avoir une copie. " Diadia (l'oncle) et Génia (Eugènie), c'étaient, dans la conspiration, les noms de guerre de deux dirigeants. " Il n'y a pas longtemps - raconte un militant du district, Naoumov - nous avons reçu d'Illitch une lettre à transmettre au Comité central... Nous avons lu la lettre et on a fait " Oh ! " Il se trouve que Lenine pose depuis longtemps devant le Comité central la question de l'insurrection. Nous avons protesté, nous avons commencé à faire pression sur le centre. " C'était précisément ce qu'il fallait.
Dans les premiers jours d'octobre, Lenine invite la Conférence du parti à Petrograd à dire fermement son mot en faveur de l'insurrection. Sur son initiative, la Conférence " prie instamment le Comité central de prendre toutes mesures pour la direction de l'inévitable soulèvement des ouvriers, des soldats et des paysans ". Dans cette seule phrase, il y a deux camouflages, l'un juridique, l'autre diplomatique : sur la direction d'un " soulèvement inévitable ", au lieu d'une préparation directe de l'insurrection, cela est dit pour ne point donner trop d'atouts au Parquet ; la Conférence " prie le Comité central ", elle n'exige pas et ne proteste point - c'est un évident tribut au prestige de la plus haute institution du parti. Mais, dans une autre résolution, également, rédigée par Lenine, il est dit avec une plus grande franchise : "... Aux sommets du parti, on remarque des fluctuations, comme une crainte de lutter pour la prise du pouvoir, un penchant à substituer à cette lutte des résolutions, des protestations et des congrès. " C'est déjà dresser presque ouvertement le parti contre le Comité central. Lenine ne se résolvait pas à la légère à faire de tels pas. Mais il s'agissait du sort de la révolution et toutes autres considérations passaient à l'arrière-plan.
Le 8 octobre, Lenine s'adresse aux délégués bolchevistes du prochain Congrès régional du Nord : " On ne peut attendre le Congrès panrusse des soviets, que le Comité exécutif central est capable de différer jusqu'à novembre, on ne peut surseoir, tout en permettant à Kérensky d'amener encore des troupes korniloviennes. " Le Congrès régional, où sont représentés la Finlande, la flotte et Reval, doit prendre l'initiative " d'un mouvement immédiat sur Piter ". L'appel direct à une insurrection immédiate est adressé cette fois-ci aux représentants de dizaines de soviets. L'appel vient de Lenine en personne : il n'y a pas de décisions du parti, la plus haute instance du parti ne s'est pas encore prononcée.
Il fallait avoir une très grande confiance à l'égard du prolétariat, du parti, mais une très sérieuse méfiance vis-à-vis du Comité Central pour soulever, indépendamment de celui-ci, sous une responsabilité personnelle, du fond d'une retraite, au moyen de petites feuilles de papier à lettres couvertes d'une fine écriture, l'agitation pour l'insurrection armée. Comment donc put-il se faire que Lenine, que nous avons vu isolé aux sommets de son propre parti au début d'avril, semblât se trouver de nouveau isolé dans le même milieu en septembre et au commencement d'octobre ? Cela ne peut être compris si l'on ajoute foi à la légende stupide qui représente l'histoire du bolchevisme comme l'émanation pure et simple d'une idée révolutionnaire. En réalité, le bolchevisme s'est développé dans un milieu social déterminé, dont il a éprouvé les réactions diverses, parmi lesquelles l'influence d'un encerclement petit-bourgeois et d'un Etat de culture arriéré. A chaque nouvelle situation, le parti ne s'adaptait que par une crise intérieure.
Pour que la lutte aiguë, qui précéda Octobre, dans les sommets du bolchevisme, se présente à nous sous son véritable jour, il faut encore jeter un regard en arrière sur les processus dans le parti dont il a été question dans le premier tome du présent ouvrage. Cela est d'autant plus indispensable que, juste en ce moment, la fraction de Staline fait des efforts inouïs, même à l'échelle internationale, pour effacer de l'histoire tout souvenir de ce qui a été effectivement préparé et accompli par l'insurrection d'Octobre.
Durant les années qui précédèrent la guerre, les bolcheviks se donnaient le titre, dans la presse légale, de " démocrates conséquents ". Ce pseudonyme n'avait pas été choisi par hasard. Le bolchevisme, et lui seulement, avait la hardiesse de pousser jusqu'au bout les mots d'ordre de la démocratie révolutionnaire. Mais, dans la prognose de la révolution, il ne les dépassait pas. Or, la guerre, ayant lié indissolublement la démocratie bourgeoise avec l'impérialisme, montra définitivement que le programme de la " démocratie conséquente " ne pouvait être rempli autrement que par une révolution prolétarienne. Celui des bolcheviks qui n'avait pas trouvé cette explication dans la guerre devait être pris fatalement à l'improviste par la révolution et transformé en un compagnon de route à la gauche de la démocratie bourgeoise.
Or, une étude scrupuleuse des documents qui caractérisent la vie du parti pendant la guerre et au commencement de la révolution, malgré leurs lacunes extrêmes et non forfuites, et, à partir de 1923, malgré l'accroissement de l'esprit tendancieux, montre de plus en plus l'énorme glissement idéologique opéré par la couche supérieure des bolcheviks pendant la guerre, quand la vie régulière du parti avait, en fait, cessé. La cause du glissement est double : rupture avec les masses, rupture avec l'émigration, c'est-à-dire, avant tout, avec Lenine, et comme résultat : s'empêtrer dans l'isolement et le provincialisme. »

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/livres/hrrusse/hrr43.htm

« " Les Thèses d'Avril de Lenine - déclare une publication historique officielle - n'eurent vraiment pas de chance au Comité de Petrograd. En faveur de ces thèses qui faisaient époque, deux voix seulement se prononcèrent, contre treize, avec une abstention. " " Trop hardies semblaient les conclusions de Lenine, même à ses disciples les plus enthousiastes " - écrit Podvoïsky. Les déclarations de Lenine - d'après l'avis du Comité de Petrograd et de l'Organisation militaire - " placèrent.., le parti des bolcheviks dans l'isolement et, par là, bien entendu, aggravèrent la situation du prolétariat et du parti au dernier degré. "
Staline, à la fin de mars, se prononçait pour la défense nationale, pour le soutien conditionnel du gouvernement provisoire, pour le manifeste pacifiste de Soukhanov, pour une fusion avec le parti de Tsérételli. " J'ai partagé cette position erronée - écrivait lui-même, rétrospectivement, Staline, en 1924 - avec d'autres camarades du parti et n'y ai renoncé entièrement qu'au milieu d'avril, en adhérant aux thèses de Lenine. Il fallait une nouvelle orientation. Cette nouvelle orientation a été donnée au parti par Lenine dans ses célèbres thèses d'avril... "
Kalinine, même à la fin d'avril, tenait encore pour un bloc électoral avec les mencheviks. A la Conférence du parti, Lenine disait : " Je m'oppose vivement à Kalinine, car un bloc avec... les chauvins est inconcevable... C'est trahir le socialisme. " L'état d'esprit de Kalinine ne faisait pas exception, même à Petrograd. A la Conférence, l'on disait : " L'ambiance asphyxiante de l'union, sous l'influence de Lenine, commence à se dissiper. "
En province, la résistance aux thèses de Lenine continua beaucoup plus longtemps, dans un certain nombre de régions, presque jusqu'à octobre. D'après le récit d'un ouvrier de Kiev, Sivtsov, " les idées exposées dans les thèses (de Lenine) ne furent pas tout de suite assimilées par toute l'organisation bolcheviste de Kiev. Un certain nombre de camarades, dont G. Piatakov, étaient en désaccord avec les thèses... " Un cheminot de Kharkov, Morgounov, raconte ceci : " Les vieux bolcheviks jouissaient d'une grande influence parmi toute la masse des cheminots... Nombreux étaient parmi les vieux bolcheviks ceux qui n'appartenaient pas à notre fraction... Après la Révolution de Février, certains, par erreur, adhérèrent aux mencheviks, après quoi ils en rirent eux-mêmes, se demandant comment la chose avait bien pu se passer. " Les témoignages de cet ordre et de ce genre ne manquent pas.
Malgré tout cela, une simple mention du réarmement du parti effectué par Lenine en avril est considérée maintenant par l'historiographie officielle comme un sacrilège. Au critère historique les tout derniers historiens ont substitué celui du prestige de l'uniforme du parti. Ils n'ont même pas le droit de citer à ce sujet Staline qui, encore en 1924, était forcé de reconnaître toute la profondeur du revirement d'avril. " Il fallut les fameuses thèses d'avril de Lenine pour que le parti pût d'emblée s'engager dans une nouvelle route. " " Nouvelle orientation " et " nouvelle route ", c'est là le réarmement du parti. Mais déjà, six ans plus tard, Iaroslavsky, ayant rappelé, en qualité d'historien, que Staline, au début de la révolution, avait pris " une position erronée dans les questions essentielles ", fut traqué farouchement de tous côtés. L'idole du prestige est, de tous les monstres, le plus dévorant !
La tradition révolutionnaire du parti, la pression des ouvriers de la base, la critique de Lenine au sommet, forcèrent la couche supérieure du parti, dans le courant d'avril-mai, d'après les propres termes de Staline, " à s'engager dans une nouvelle voie ", Mais il faudrait ignorer totalement la psychologie politique pour admettre qu'un simple vote d'adhésion aux thèses de Lenine signifiait une renonciation effective et complète à " la position erronée sur les questions essentielles ". En réalité, les points de vue vulgairement démocratiques qui s'étaient organiquement renforcés pendant les années de guerre, bien qu'ils s'adaptassent à un nouveau programme, restaient en sourde opposition avec lui.
Le 6 août, Kamenev, malgré la résolution de la Conférence d'avril des bolcheviks, se prononce au Comité exécutif pour la participation à la conférence des social-patriotes qui se prépare à Stockholm. Dans l'organe central du parti, la déclaration de Kamenev ne trouve aucune riposte. Lenine écrit un article foudroyant qui ne paraît, cependant, que dix jours après le discours de Kamenev. Il fallut la pression énergique de Lenine lui-même, et d'autres membres du Comité central, pour obtenir de la rédaction, à la tête de laquelle se trouvait Staline, l'impression de la protestation.
Des mouvements convulsifs d'indécision se propagèrent dans le Parti après les Journées de Juillet : l'isolement de l'avant-garde prolétarienne effrayait bien des dirigeants, surtout en province. Pendant les journées korniloviennes, ces peureux essayaient de se rapprocher des conciliateurs, ce qui eut pour conséquence un nouveau cri d'avertissement de Lenine.
Le 30 août, Staline, en qualité de rédacteur en chef, imprime sans aucune réserve un article de Zinoviev, Ce qu'il ne faut pas faire, dirigé contre la préparation de l'insurrection- " il faut regarder la vérité en face : à Petrograd nous avons devant nous de nombreuses circonstances qui favorisent l'éclosion d'un soulèvement du type de la Commune de Paris de 1871... " Le 3 septembre, Lenine, dans une autre suite d'idées et sans désigner Zinoviev, mais le frappant par ricochet, écrit : " L'allusion à la Commune est très superficielle et même bête. Car, en premier lieu, les bolcheviks ont tout de même appris quelque chose depuis 1871, ils n'auraient pas laissé une banque hors de leur mainmise, ils n'auraient pas renoncé à une offensive sur Versailles ; et, si les conditions avaient été telles, la Commune même aurait pu vaincre. En outre, la Commune ne pouvait proposer au peuple du premier coup ce que pourront proposer les bolcheviks s'ils détiennent le pouvoir, précisément : la terre aux paysans, l'immédiate proposition de paix. " C'était un avertissement anonyme, mais non équivoque, non seulement à Zinoviev, mais au rédacteur de la Pravda, Staline.
La question du préparlement scinda en deux le Comité central. La décision de la fraction de la Conférence dans le sens de la participation au préparlement fut confirmée par de nombreux comités locaux, sinon par la majorité. Il en fut ainsi, par exemple, à Kiev. " Sur la question de... l'entrée au préparlement - écrit dans ses Souvenirs E. Boch - la majorité du Comité se prononça pour la participation et élut comme son représentant Piatakov. " En de nombreux cas, comme ceux par exemple de Kamenev, de Rykov, de Piatakov et d'autres, on peut discerner une succession d'incertitudes : contre les thèses de Lenine en avril, contre le boycottage du préparlement en septembre, contre le soulèvement en octobre. Par contre, la couche suivante des cadres bolchevistes, plus proche des masses et politiquement plus neuve, adopta facilement le mot d'ordre du boycottage et contraignit à se retourner brusquement les comités, dont le Comité central. Sous l'influence des lettres de Lenine, la Conférence de la ville de Kiev, par exemple, se prononça par une écrasante majorité contre son comité. C'est ainsi que, dans presque tous les durs tournants politiques, Lenine s'appuyait sur les couches inférieures de l'appareil contre les plus hautes, ou bien sur la masse du parti contre l'appareil dans son ensemble.
Les hésitations qui précédèrent Octobre étaient, dans ces conditions, le moins faites pour prendre Lenine à l'improviste. Il se trouva d'avance prémuni d'une perspicace défiance, il veilla aux symptômes alarmants, il partit des pires présomptions et considéra comme opportun de faire pression encore une fois plutôt que de montrer de l'indulgence. »

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/livres/hrrusse/hrr43.htm

« Le lendemain eut lieu, sur la demande de Lenine, la fameuse séance du Comité central, où la question de l'insurrection fut posée dans toute son acuité. De l'issue de cette séance Lenine faisait dépendre sa politique intérieure : par le Comité central ou bien contre lui. " O nouvelles facéties de la joyeuse muse de l'Histoire ! - écrit Soukhanov. Cette séance décisive des hauts dirigeants eut lieu chez moi, dans mon logement, toujours dans la même rue Karpovka (32, logement 31). Mais tout cela se passait à mon insu. " La femme du menchevik Soukhanov était bolcheviste. " Cette fois-là, des mesures particulières furent prises pour me faire passer la nuit ailleurs : pour le moins, ma femme se renseigna exactement sur mes intentions et me donna un conseil amical et désintéressé, celui de ne pas me donner trop de fatigue après un long voyage. En tout cas, la haute assemblée était complètement garantie contre une incursion de mon côté. " La réunion se trouva, chose beaucoup plus importante, garantie contre une incursion de la police de Kérensky.
Sur vingt et un membres du Comité central, douze étaient présents. Lenine arriva coiffé d'une perruque, portant lunettes et rasé. La séance dura environ dix heures sans interruption, jusqu'à la nuit profonde. Pendant une suspension, l'on but du thé avec du pain et du saucisson pour reprendre des forces. Et l'on avait besoin d'en prendre : il s'agissait de se saisir du pouvoir dans l'ancien Empire des tsars. Comme toujours, la séance commença par un rapport sur l'organisation de Sverdlov. Cette fois, les informations qu'il donna étaient consacrées au front et, de toute évidence, préalablement concertées avec Lenine afin de lui donner un appui pour les déductions nécessaires : cela répondait tout à fait aux procédés habituels de Lenine. Les représentants des armées du front Nord faisaient savoir, par l'intermédiaire de Sverdlov, que le commandement contre-révolutionnaire préparait " une affaire louche en ramenant les troupes sur l'arrière ". De Minsk, de l'Etat-major du front Ouest, l'on communiquait que se préparait là une nouvelle aventure kornilovienne. En raison de l'état d'esprit révolutionnaire de la garnison locale, l'Etat-major avait fait cerner la ville par des contingents de Cosaques. " Il se mène des pourparlers d'un caractère douteux entre les Etats-majors et le Grand Quartier Général. " Il est tout à fait possible de mettre la main sur l'Etat-major à Minsk : la garnison locale est prête à désarmer les Cosaques qui l'encerclent. L'on peut également expédier de Minsk un corps d'armée révolutionnaire sur Petrograd. Au front, on est bien disposé pour les bolcheviks, on marchera contre Kérensky. Telle est l'entrée en matière : elle n'est pas suffisamment nette dans toutes ses parties, mais elle a un caractère tout à fait réconfortant.
Lenine passe tout de suite à l'offensive : " Depuis le début de septembre, on observe une sorte d'indifférence à l'égard de l'insurrection. " On allègue un refroidissement et une désillusion des masses. Ce n'est pas étonnant : " les masses sont excédées de paroles et de résolutions ". Il faut prendre la situation dans son ensemble. Les événements, dans les villes, s'accomplissent maintenant sur le fond d'un gigantesque mouvement de paysans. Pour étouffer le soulèvement agraire, le gouvernement aurait besoin de forces colossales. " La situation politique est ainsi toute prête. Il faut parler du côté technique. Tout se ramène à cela. Or, nous, après les partisans de la défense nationale, sommes enclins à considérer la préparation systématique de l'insurrection comme une sorte de péché politique. " Le rapporteur modère évidemment ses termes : il en a trop sur le cœur. " Il faut profiter du Congrès régional des Soviets du Nord et de la proposition de Minsk pour engager une action résolue. "
Le Congrès du Nord s'ouvrit le jour même de la séance du Comité central et devait se terminer dans deux ou trois jours. Lenine considérait comme la tâche des tout prochains jours " l'engagement d'une action résolue ", On ne peut attendre. On ne peut différer. Sur le front – nous l'avons entendu de Sverdlov - on prépare un coup d'Etat. Y aura-t-il un congrès des soviets ? On n'en sait rien. Il faut prendre le pouvoir immédiatement, sans attendre aucun congrès. " Intraduisible, inexprimable - écrivait Trotsky quelques années après - resta l'esprit général de ces improvisations opiniâtres et passionnées, pénétrées du désir de transmettre aux objecteurs, aux hésitants, aux incertains, sa pensée, sa volonté, son assurance, son courage... "
Lenine s'attendait à une grande résistance. Mais ses appréhensions se dissipèrent vite. L'unanimité avec laquelle le Comité central avait repoussé en septembre la proposition d'un soulèvement immédiat avait un caractère épisodique : l'aile gauche s'était prononcée contre " l'encerclement du théâtre Alexandra " en tenant compte de la conjoncture ; l'aile droite, pour des motifs de stratégie générale qui, pourtant, n'avaient pas encore été médités à fond jusqu'à ce moment. Durant les trois semaines écoulées, le Comité central avait considérablement évolué vers la gauche. Dix voix contre deux se prononcèrent pour l'insurrection. C'était une sérieuse Victoire !
Peu après l'insurrection, à une nouvelle étape de la lutte à l'intérieur du parti, Lenine rappela, au cours de débats au Comité de Petrograd, comment, en séance du Comité central, il " avait eu peur de l'opportunisme de la part des internationalistes unificateurs, mais cela s'était dissipé ; dans notre parti, certains membres (du Comité central) n'ont pas été d'accord- cela m'a beaucoup chagriné ". Parmi les " internationalistes ", exception faite de Trotsky, que Lenine ne pouvait guère avoir en vue, le "Comité central se composait de : Ioffe, futur ambassadeur à Berlin ; Ouritsky, futur chef de la Tcheka à Petrograd ; et Sokolnikov, le futur créateur du tchervonetz : tous trois se rangèrent du côté de Lenine. Comme adversaires, se prononçaient deux vieux bolcheviks qui, par leur action passée, avaient été les plus proches de Lenine : Zinoviev et Kamenev. C'est d'eux qu'il s'agit quand Lénine dit : " Cela m'a extrêmement chagriné. " La séance du 10 consista presque entièrement en une polémique passionnée avec Zinoviev et Kamenev : Lenine menait l'offensive, les autres venaient à lui successivement.
La résolution rédigée en hâte par Lenine, avec un petit bout de crayon sur une feuille de papier quadrillé d'écolier, était d'une architecture très imparfaite, mais en revanche donnait un solide appui pour le courant dans le sens de l'insurrection. " Le Comité central reconnaît que, de même que la situation internationale de la révolution russe (le soulèvement de la flotte en Allemagne comme extrême manifestation de l'accroissement dans toute l'Europe de la révolution socialiste mondiale, ensuite la menace de paix des impérialistes dans le but d'étouffer la révolution en Russie), ainsi la situation militaire (indiscutable décision de la bourgeoisie russe, de Kérensky et cie de livrer Piter aux Allemands) - tout cela en liaison avec le soulèvement paysan et avec le revirement de la confiance populaire vers notre parti (élections à Moscou), enfin l'évidente préparation d'une deuxième aventure kornilovienne (évacuation des troupes de Piter, expédition à Piter de Cosaques, encerclement de Minsk par des Cosaques, etc.) - tout cela met à l'ordre du jour l'insurrection armée. Reconnaissant ainsi que l'insurrection armée est inévitable, et qu'elle est complètement mûre, le Comité central invite toutes les organisations du parti à se guider là-dessus, à discuter et à résoudre de ce point de vue toutes les questions pratiques (Coupés des Soviets de la région du Nord, évacuation des troupes de Piter, mouvements des troupes de Moscou et de Minsk, etc.).
Ce qui est remarquable, tant pour l'appréciation du moment que pour la caractéristique de l'auteur, c'est l'ordre même des conditions de l'insurrection : en premier lieu, la révolution mondiale mûrit ; l'insurrection en Russie n'est considérée que comme un anneau de la chaîne générale. C'est l'invariable position de départ de Lenine, ce sont ses grandes prémisses : il ne pouvait faire autrement. La tâche de l'insurrection est posée directement comme celle du parti : la question difficile d'un accord avec les Soviets sur la préparation du soulèvement n'est pas abordée pour le moment. Pas un mot pour évoquer le Congrès panrusse des soviets. En qualité de points d'appui pour l'insurrection, au Congrès régional du Nord et " au mouvement des troupes de Moscou et de Minsk ", sont ajoutés, sur les instances de Trotsky, les mots : " l'évacuation des troupes de Piter ". C'était la seule allusion au plan d'insurrection qui s'imposait dans la capitale par la marche même des événements. Personne ne proposa d'amendement du point de vue tactique à la résolution qui déterminait le point de départ stratégique de l'insurrection contre Zinoviev et Kamenev, lesquels niaient la nécessité même du soulèvement.
Les tentatives faites plus tard par l'historiographie officieuse pour présenter les choses de telle façon que tous les dirigeants du parti, sauf Zinoviev et Kamenev, se seraient prononcés pour l'insurrection, sont démolies par les faits et les documents. Sans omettre de dire que ceux qui votaient pour l'insurrection étaient fréquemment disposés à la différer jusqu'à une date indéterminée, les adversaires avoués de l'insurrection, Zinoviev et Kamenev, n'étaient pas isolés, même au sein du Comité central : leur point de vue était entièrement partagé par Rykov et Noguine, absents de la séance du 10, et Milioutine leur était proche. " Aux sommets du parti, l'on observe des fluctuations, une sorte de peur de la lutte pour le pouvoir " - tel est le témoignage de Lenine lui-même. D'après Antonov-Saratovsky, Milioutine, qui arriva après le 10 à Saratov, " parlait d'une lettre d'Illitch exigeant " qu'on s'y mette ", parlant des tergiversations du Comité central, de " l'échec " primitif de la proposition de Lenine, de son indignation, et, enfin, de ceci que tout s'orientait vers l'insurrection ". Le bolchevik Sadovsky écrivit plus tard au sujet " d'un certain manque d'assurance et de détermination qui régnait en ce temps-là. Même au sein de notre Comité central, en cette période, il y avait, comme on sait, des frictions, des conflits, on se demandait comment commencer et s'il fallait commencer ".
Sadovsky lui-même était, en cette période, un des dirigeants de la Section militaire du Soviet et de l'Organisation militaire des bolcheviks. Mais, précisément, les membres de l'Organisation militaire, comme on le voit par un certain nombre de Mémoires, considéraient avec une extrême prévention en octobre l'idée d'une insurrection : le caractère spécifique de l'Organisation inclinait les dirigeants à sous-estimer les conditions politiques et à surestimer les conditions techniques. Le 16 octobre, Krylenko disait dans un rapport : " La majorité du Bureau (de l'Organisation militaire) estime qu'il ne faut pas pousser pratiquement la question trop à fond, mais la minorité pense que l'on peut prendre sur soi l'initiative. " Le 18, un autre membre éminent de l'Organisation militaire, Lachevitch, disait : " Ne faut-il pas prendre le pouvoir tout de suite ? J'estime qu'il ne faut pas forcer les événements... Rien ne garantit que nous puissions garder le pouvoir... Le plan stratégique proposé par Lenine cloche des quatre pieds. " Antonov-Ovséenko raconte l'entrevue des principaux militants de l'Organisation militaire avec Lenine : " Podvoïsky exprimait des doutes, Nevsky tantôt le soutenait, tantôt cédait au ton assuré d'Illitch : j'exposais la situation en Finlande... L'assurance et la fermeté d'Illitch ont une action fortifiante sur moi et encouragent Nevsky, mais Podvoïsky s'obstine dans ses doutes. " Il ne faut point perdre de vue que, dans tous les Souvenirs de cette sorte, les doutes sont dessinés en couleurs d'aquarelle, les assurances avec de fortes touches de couleurs à l'huile.
Contre l'insurrection se prononça résolument Tchoudnovsky. Sceptique, Manouilsky répétait, en manière d'avertissement, que " le front n'était pas avec nous ". Contre le soulèvement s'élevait Tornsky. Volodarsky soutenait Zinoviev et Kamenev. Les adversaires de l'insurrection étaient loin de se prononcer tous ouvertement. En séance du Comité de Petrograd, le 15, Kalinine disait : " La résolution du Comité central est une des meilleures qu'il ait jamais adoptées... Nous sommes pratiquement arrivés à l'insurrection armée. Mais, quand cela sera-t-il possible ? Peut-être dans un an - l'on n'en sait rien. " Un " accord " de ce genre avec le Comité central des plus caractéristiques pour Kalinine, n'était pourtant point particulier à lui seul. Nombreux furent ceux qui adhérèrent à la résolution pour prendre ainsi des assurances dans leur lutte contre le soulèvement.
A Moscou, c'est dans les cercles dirigeants qu'il y eut le moins d'unanimité. Le Bureau régional soutenait Lenine. Au Comité de Moscou, les fluctuations étaient très considérables, l'opinion prédominante était de différer. Le Comité provincial prenait une attitude indéterminée, et, en outre, au Bureau régional, d'après les termes de Iakovleva, l'on estimait qu'au moment décisif le Comité Provincial pencherait du côté des adversaires du soulèvement. »

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/livres/hrrusse/hrr43.htm

« La victoire même de l'insurrection à Petrograd fut encore loin de briser partout l'inertie de l'expectative et la résistance directe de l'aile droite. Le flottement de la direction faillit amener par la suite l'effondrement de l'insurrection à Moscou. A Kiev, le Comité dirigé par Piatakov, qui menait une politique purement défensive, transmit, en fin de compte, l'initiative et, ensuite, le pouvoir même à la Rada. " L'organisation de notre parti à Voronèje - raconte Vratchev - hésitait extrêmement. Le coup d'Etat, même à Voronèje... fut accompli non par le Comité du parti, mais par son active minorité à la tête de laquelle était Moïsseev. " Dans bon nombre de chefs-lieux de province, les bolcheviks firent bloc en octobre avec les conciliateurs " pour combattre la contre-révolution ", comme si les conciliateur n'étaient pas à ce moment un des plus importants soutiens de celle-ci. Presque partout, il fallait très souvent une impulsion simultanée et d'en haut et d'en bas pour briser les dernières hésitations du Comité local, l'obliger à rompre avec les conciliateurs et à prendre la tète du mouvement. " La fin d'octobre et le commencement de novembre furent véritablement des journées " de trouble profond " dans les milieux de notre parti. Nombreux étaient ceux qui se laissaient rapidement gagner par l'ambiance " - rappelle Chliapnikov, qui paya lui-même un large tribut aux hésitations.
Tous ces éléments qui, comme par exemple les bolcheviks de Kharkov, se trouvèrent au début de la révolution dans le camp des mencheviks, et, ensuite, se demandaient avec stupéfaction " comment cela avait bien pu se faire ", ne trouvèrent pas, pendant les Journées d'Octobre, où se mettre en règle générale, hésitèrent, temporisèrent. Avec d'autant plus d'assurance, ils firent état de leurs droits de " vieux bolcheviks " dans la période de la réaction idéologique. Si considérable qu'ait été, en ces dernières années, le travail destiné à dissimuler de tels faits, indépendamment même des archives secrètes, inaccessibles pour l'instant à l'érudit, il subsiste, dans les journaux de ce temps-là, dans les Mémoires, dans les revues historiques, un bon nombre de témoignages prouvant que l'appareil même du parti le plus révolutionnaire opposa, la veille de l'insurrection, une grande force de résistance. Dans la bureaucratie s'installe, inévitablement, l'esprit conservateur. L'appareil ne peut remplir sa fonction révolutionnaire qu'autant qu'il demeure un instrument au service du parti, c'est-à-dire subordonné à une idée et contrôlé par la masse.
La résolution du 10 octobre prit une importance considérable. Elle assura du coup aux véritables partisans de l'insurrection le terrain solide du droit dans le parti. Dans toutes les organisations du parti, dans toutes les cellules, commencèrent à prendre la première place les éléments les plus résolus. Les organisations du parti, à commencer par celles de Petrograd, se ramassèrent, calculèrent leurs forces et leurs ressources, raffermirent leurs liaisons et donnèrent à la campagne pour l'insurrection un caractère plus concentré.
Mais la résolution ne mit pas fin aux dissentiments dans le Comité central. Au contraire, elle leur donna forme et les extériorisa. Zinoviev et Kamenev qui récemment, se sentaient, dans une certaine partie des sphères dirigeantes, entourés d'une atmosphère de sympathie, observèrent avec effroi combien rapide était le mouvement vers la gauche. Ils résolurent de ne plus perdre de temps et diffusèrent le lendemain même un long appel aux membres du parti. " Devant l'Histoire, devant le prolétariat international, devant la révolution russe et la classes ouvrière de Russie -écrivaient-ils - nous n'avons pas le droit maintenant de jouer tout l'avenir sur la carte de l'insurrection armée. "
Leur perspective était d'entrer, en qualité de forte opposition du parti, dans l'Assemblée constituante, laquelle " ne pourrait s'appuyer que sur les Soviets dans son travail révolutionnaire ", De là la formule : " L'Assemblée constituante et les Soviets, voilà le type combiné des institutions étatiques vers lequel nous marchons. " L'Assemblée constituante où l'on supposait que les bolcheviks seraient en minorité, et les Soviets où les bolcheviks étaient en majorité, c'est-à-dire l'organe de la bourgeoisie et l'organe du prolétariat, doivent être " combinés " dans le système pacifique de la dualité de pouvoirs. Cela n'avait pas réussi même sous la domination des conciliateurs. Comment donc cela aurait-il pu réussir avec des soviets bolchevisés ?
" Ce serait une profonde erreur historique, disaient pour terminer Zinoviev et Kamenev, si l'on posait la question du passage du pouvoir au parti prolétarien de cette façon : ou bien tout de suite, ou jamais. Non. Le parti du prolétariat grandira, son programme s'éclaircira pour des masses de plus en plus étendues. " L'espoir d'une incessante croissance du bolchevisme, indépendamment de la marche réelle des conflits de classe, contredisait irréductiblement le leitmotiv de Lenine à cette époque : " Le succès de la révolution russe et mondiale dépend de deux ou trois jours de lutte. "
Il n'est guère nécessaire d'ajouter que, dans ce dialogue dramatique, c'était Lenine qui avait entièrement raison. Il est impossible de disposer à son gré d'une situation révolutionnaire. Si les bolcheviks n'avaient pas pris le pouvoir en octobre-novembre, ils ne l'auraient vraisemblablement jamais pris. Au lieu d'une ferme direction, les masses auraient trouvé chez les bolcheviks toujours les mêmes divergences fastidieuses entre la parole et l'action et se seraient dissociées du parti qui aurait trompé leurs espérances pendant deux ou trois mois, de même qu'elles s'étaient détachées des socialistes-révolutionnaires et des mencheviks. Une partie des travailleurs serait tombée dans l'indifférence, une autre aurait consumé ses forces dans des mouvements convulsifs, dans des explosions anarchiques, dans des escarmouches de partisans, dans la terreur de la vengeance et du désespoir. Reprenant ainsi son souffle, la bourgeoisie en aurait profité pour conclure une paix séparée avec le Hohenzollern et pour écraser les organisations révolutionnaires. La Russie eût été de nouveau insérée dans le cercle des Etats capitalistes, à titre de pays à demi impérialiste, à demi colonial. L'insurrection prolétarienne eût été reportée dans un lointain indéterminé. La vive compréhension de cette perspective inspirait à Lenine son cri d'alarme : " Le succès de la révolution russe et mondiale dépend de deux ou trois jours de lutte. "
Mais maintenant, après le 10, la situation dans le parti s'était radicalement modifiée. Lenine n'était déjà plus un " oppositionnel " isolé dont les propositions étaient repoussées par le Comité central. Ce fut l'aile droite qui se trouva isolée. Lenine n'avait plus besoin d'acquérir sa liberté d'agitation au prix de sa démission. La légalité était de son côté. Par contre, Zinoviev et Kamenev, ayant mis en circulation leur document dirigé contre la résolution adoptée par la majorité du Comité central, se trouvèrent avoir violé la discipline. Or, Lenine, dans la lutte, ne laissait pas impunie même la moindre bévue de l'adversaire !
A la séance du 10, l'on élut, sur la proposition de Dzerjinski, un bureau politique de sept personnes : Lenine, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Staline, Sokolnikov, Boubnov. La nouvelle institution s'avéra cependant tout à fait non viable : Lenine et Zinoviev se cachaient encore ; en outre, Zinoviev continuait à mener la lutte contre l'insurrection, de même que Kamenev. Le Bureau politique constitué en octobre ne se réunit pas une seule fois et on l'oublia bientôt tout simplement, ainsi que d'autres organisations qui avaient été formées ad hoc dans le remous des événements.
Aucun plan pratique d'insurrection, même approximatif, ne fut esquissé à la séance du 10. Mais, sans le mentionner dans la résolution, il fut convenu que l'insurrection devait précéder le Congrès des soviets et commencer si possible le 15 octobre au plus tard. Cette date n'était pas acceptée volontiers de tous : elle était trop rapprochée, évidemment, pour permettre de prendre de l'élan dans Petrograd. Mais insister sur un délai, c'eût été soutenir les droites et brouiller les cartes. Au surplus, il n'est jamais trop tard pour différer ! »

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/livres/hrrusse/hrr43.htm

Trotsky : « A la Conférence du 16, Zinoviev, insistant pour faire rapporter la résolution prise six jours auparavant, déclarait : " Nous devons nous dire nettement que, dans les cinq journées qui vont suivre, nous n'organisons pas de soulèvement " ; il s'agissait des cinq journées qui restaient encore jusqu'au Congrès des soviets. Kamenev qui, à la même Conférence, démontrait que " fixer la date de l'insurrection, c'était courir à l'aventure ", rappelait encore : " Naguère, on disait que l'insurrection doit avoir lieu avant le 20. " Personne ne lui objecta rien là-dessus et ne pouvait répliquer. C'est l'ajournement de l'insurrection que Kamenev interprétait précisément comme la ruine de la résolution de Lenine. Pour l'insurrection, d'après ses propres termes, " en cette dernière semaine, l'on avait rien fait ", Il y a là une évidente exagération : la date fixée, tous se virent obligés de mettre dans leurs plans plus de rigueur et d'accélérer le rythme du travail. Mais il est hors de doute que le délai de cinq jours fixé à la séance du 10 se trouva trop court. Un délai s'imposât d'évidence. C'est seulement le 17 que le Comité exécutif central reporta l'ouverture du Congrès des soviets au 25 octobre. Cet ajournement tomba tout à fait à propos.
Alarmé par les atermoiements, Lenine, à qui, dans son isolement les frictions intérieures devaient inévitablement apparaître sous des aspects exagérés, insista pour la convocation d'une nouvelle assemblé du Comité central avec les représentants des principales motions de militants dans la capitale. C'est précisément à cette conférence, le 16, dans la banlieue de la ville, à Lessny, que Zinoviev et Kamenev formulèrent les motifs cités ci-dessus pour contremander la date précédemment fixée, en s'opposant à la fixation d'une nouvelle.
Les dissensions recommencèrent, deux fois plus vives. Milioutine estimait que " nous n'étions pas prêts pour porter le premier coup... Une autre perspective surgit : un conflit armé... Il grossit, la possibilité se rapproche. Et nous devons être prêts à cette collision. Mais cette perspective est différente d'une insurrection ", Milioutine se plaçait sur une position défensive que préconisaient plus nettement Zinoviev et Kamenev. Schotmann, vieil ouvrier de Petrograd, ayant passé par toute l'histoire du parti, affirmait qu'à la conférence de la ville et au Comité de Petrograd, et dans l'Organisation militaire, l'état d'esprit était bien moins combatif que dans le Comité central. " Nous ne pouvons pas marcher encore, mais nous devons nous préparer. " Lenine attaquait Milioutine et Schotmann pour leur appréciation pessimiste du rapport des forces : " Il ne s'agit pas d'une lutte contre l'armée, mais d'une lutte d'une partie de l'armée contre l'autre... Les faits prouvent que nous avons la prépondérance sur l'ennemi. Pourquoi le Comité central ne peut-il commencer ? "
Trotsky était absent de la séance : à ces heures mêmes, il faisait adopter par le Soviet le statut du Comité militaire révolutionnaire, Mais le point de vue qui s'était définitivement établi à Smolny pendant les derniers jours était défendu par Krylenko, qui venait de mener, coude à coude avec Trotsky et Antonov-Ovséenko, le Congrès régional des soviets du Nord. Krylenko pensait que, sans aucun doute, " l'eau avait suffisamment bouilli " ; rapporter la résolution sur le soulèvement " serait la plus grave erreur ". Il est toutefois en désaccord avec Lenine " sur la question de savoir qui commencera et comment commencer ". Il n'est pas encore rationnel pour l'instant de fixer nettement le jour de l'insurrection. " Mais la question de l'évacuation des troupes est justement le motif qui provoquera la bataille... Le fait d'une offensive contre nous existe ainsi et l'on peut l'utiliser... Il n'est pas utile de s'inquiéter de savoir qui commencera, car c'est déjà commencé. " Krylenko exposait et préconisait la politique qui servait de base au Comité militaire révolutionnaire et à la Conférence de la garnison. L'insurrection se développa ensuite précisément dans cette voie.
Lenine ne répondit rien aux paroles de Krylenko : le vivant tableau des six dernières journées à Petrograd ne s'était pas déroulé sous ses yeux. Lenine craignait les atermoiements. Son attention était dirigée sur les adversaires directs de l'insurrection. Toutes réserves, toutes formules conventionnelles, toutes réponses insuffisamment catégoriques, il était enclin à les interpréter comme un appui indirect à Zinoviev et à Kamenev, qui se prononçaient contre lui avec l'intrépidité d'hommes ayant brûlé leurs vaisseaux. " Les résultats de la semaine - argumentait Kamenev - démontrent qu'il n'y a pas en ce moment de données favorables à l'insurrection. Nous n'avons point d'appareil pour le soulèvement ; chez nos ennemis, l'appareil est beaucoup plus fort et, probablement, s'est encore accru pendant cette semaine... Ici se combattent deux tactiques : celle de la conspiration et celle de la confiance donnée aux forces actives de la révolution russe. " Les opportunistes donnent toujours leur confiance aux " forces actives " au moment où il faut se battre.
Lenine répliquait : " Si l'on estime que l'insurrection est mûre, inutile de parler de conspiration. Si, politiquement, l'insurrection est inévitable, il faut considérer l'insurrection comme un art. " C'est précisément sur cette ligne que se développait dans le parti le débat essentiel, effectivement de principe, dont la solution, en tel ou tel sens, déterminait les destinées de la révolution. Cependant, dans le cadre général du raisonnement de Lenine qui ralliait la majorité du Comité central, surgissaient des questions subsidiaires, mais extrêmement importantes : comment, sur la base d'une situation politique arrivée à maturité, en venir à l'insurrection ? Quelle passerelle choisir de la politique à la technique du soulèvement ? Et comment guider les masses sur cette passerelle ?
Ioffe, qui appartenait à l'aile gauche, soutenait la résolution du 10. Mais il faisait une objection à Lenine, sur un point : " Il n'est pas exact qu'à présent la question soit purement technique ; même maintenant, la question du soulèvement doit être considérée du point de vue politique. " Justement, la dernière semaine avait montré que, pour le parti, pour le Soviet, pour les masses, l'insurrection n'était pas encore devenue une simple question de technique. C'est précisément pour cela que l'on ne put retenir la date que l'on avait fixée le 10.
La nouvelle résolution de Lenine, appelant " toutes les organisations et tous les ouvriers et soldats à une préparation multilatérale et renforcée de l'insurrection armée " est adoptée par vingt voix contre deux, celles de Zinoviev et de Kamenev, avec trois abstentions. Les historiens officiels allèguent ces chiffres pour prouver la complète insignifiance de l'opposition. Mais ils simplifient la question. La poussée vers la gauche dans les profondes masses du parti était déjà si prononcée que les adversaires de l'insurrection, ne se décidant pas à parler ouvertement, se sentaient intéressés à effacer la ligne de division de principes entre les deux camps. Si l'insurrection, malgré la date auparavant fixée, ne s'est pas réalisée avant le 16, ne peut-on obtenir que, dans la suite, l'on se borne à suivre platoniquement " le cours vers le soulèvement " ? Que Kalinine ne fût pas si isolé, cela se manifesta .très clairement à la même séance. La résolution de Zinoviev : " Les manifestations avant d'avoir conféré avec la fraction bolcheviste du Congrès des soviets sont inadmissibles ", est repoussée par quinze voix contre six avec trois abstentions. Voilà où se produisit l'effective vérification des états d'opinion ; un certain nombre de " partisans " de la résolution du Comité central voulaient en réalité différer la décision jusqu'au Congrès des soviets et jusqu'à une nouvelle conférence avec les bolcheviks de province, pour la plupart plus modérés. Ces derniers, en tenant compte des abstentions, se trouvèrent au nombre de neuf sur vingt-quatre, c'est-à-dire plus du tiers. C'est encore, bien entendu, une minorité, mais, pour l'état-major, elle est assez considérable. L'irrémédiable faiblesse de cet état-major était déterminée par ceci qu'il n'avait aucun appui à la base du parti et dans la classe ouvrière.
Le lendemain, Kamenev, d'accord avec Zinoviev, remit au journal de Gorki une déclaration portant contre la résolution qui avait été adoptée la veille. " Non seulement moi et Zinoviev, mais un certain nombre de camarades-praticiens - ainsi s'exprimait Kamenev - trouvons que prendre sur nous l'initiative d'une insurrection armée au moment présent, étant donné les rapports des forces sociales, indépendamment et quelques jours avant le Congrès des soviets, ce serait une démarche inadmissible, périlleuse pour le prolétariat et la révolution... Jouer tout... sur la carte du soulèvement en ces prochaines journées, ce serait un acte de désespoir. Or, notre parti est trop fort, il a devant lui un trop grand avenir pour faire de tels pas... " Les opportunistes se sentent toujours " trop forts " pour s'engager dans la lutte.
La lettre de Kamenev était une vraie déclaration de guerre au Comité central, et sur une question à propos de laquelle personne n'avait l'intention de badiner. La situation prit du coup une extrême acuité. Elle se compliqua de plusieurs autres épisodes individuels qui avaient une source politique commune. A la séance du Soviet de Petrograd, le 18, Trotsky, en réponse à la question posée par les adversaires, déclara que le Soviet ne fixait point le soulèvement aux plus prochains jours, mais que, s'il se trouvait obligé de le fixer, les ouvriers et les soldats marcheraient tous comme un seul homme. Kamenev, voisin de Trotsky au bureau, se leva immédiatement pour faire une courte déclaration : il souscrit à chaque parole de Trotsky. C'était un jeu perfide : alors que Trotsky, par une formule de défensive en apparence, camouflait juridiquement la politique de l'offensive, Kamenev tenta d'utiliser la formule de Trotsky, avec qui il était en radical désaccord, pour camoufler une politique directement opposée.
Pour paralyser l'effet de la manœuvre de Kamenev, Trotsky, le même jour, disait dans un rapport à la Conférence panrusse des Comités de fabrique et d'usine : " La guerre civile est inévitable. Il faut seulement l'organiser de la manière la moins sanglante, la moins douloureuse. On peut y parvenir non par des tergiversations et des hésitations, mais seulement par une lutte obstinée et courageuse pour la conquête du pouvoir. " Au sujet des tergiversations, il était clair pour tous que cela visait Zinoviev, Kamenev et ceux qui partageaient leur opinion.
La déclaration de Kamenev au Soviet est, en outre, soumise par Trotsky à l'examen de la plus prochaine séance du Comité central. Dans l'intervalle, Kamenev, désirant avoir les mains libres pour l'agitation contre le soulèvement, démissionnait du Comité central. La question fut discutée en son absence. Trotsky insistait à dire que " la situation qui s'était faite était absolument intolérable " et proposait d'accepter la démission de Kamenev.[1]
Sverdlov, ayant soutenu la proposition de Trotsky, lut publiquement une lettre de Lenine qui stigmatisait Zinoviev et Kamenev pour s'être prononcés dans le journal de Gorki en " Streikbrecher " (briseurs de grève) et qui exigeait leur exclusion du parti. " La supercherie de Kamenev à la séance du Soviet de Petrograd écrivait Lenine - a quelque chose de bien vil ; voyez-vous ça, il est tout à fait d'accord avec Trotsky. Mais est-il difficile de comprendre que Trotsky ne pouvait pas en dire devant les ennemis plus qu'il n'en a dit, qu'il n'en avait pas le droit, qu'il ne le devait pas ? Est-il donc difficile de comprendre que... la résolution sur la nécessité d'une insurrection armée, sur son entière maturation, sur sa préparation de tous côtés, etc. oblige, dans les déclarations publiques, à rejeter non seulement la faute, mais même l'initiative sur l'adversaire... le subterfuge de Kamenev est simplement de la filouterie. "
En expédiant sa protestation indignée par l'intermédiaire de Sverdlov, Lenine ne pouvait pas encore savoir que Zinoviev, par une lettre à la rédaction de l'organe central, avait déclaré : lui, Zinoviev, avait des opinions " très éloignées de celles que discutait Lenine ", lui, Zinoviev, " se ralliait à la déclaration faite hier par Trotsky au Soviet de Petrograd ". C'est dans le même esprit que se prononça dans la presse un troisième adversaire de l'insurrection, Lounatcharsky. En surcroît à un confusionnisme perfide, la lettre de Zinoviev, imprimée dans l'organe central juste à la veille de la séance du Comité central, le 20, se trouva accompagnée d'une note exprimant la sympathie de la rédaction : " A notre tour, nous exprimons l'espoir que, grâce à la déclaration faite par Zinoviev (comme celle faite par Kamenev au Soviet), la question peut être considérée comme liquidée. La violence de ton dans l'article de Lenine ne change rien à ceci que dans l'essentiel, nous restons de la même opinion. " C'était un nouveau coup de poignard dans le dos, et d'un côté d'où on ne l'attendait pas. Alors que Zinoviev et Kamenev faisaient, dans la presse ennemie, une agitation ouverte contre la décision du Comité central sur l'insurrection, l'organe central blâme " la violence " du ton de Lenine et constate son unité de vues avec Zinoviev et Kamenev " dans l'essentiel ". Comme s'il y avait eu, à ce moment-là, une question plus essentielle que celle de l'insurrection ! D'après un bref procès-verbal, Trotsky déclara, en séance du Comité central, " inadmissibles les lettres de Zinoviev et de Lounatcharsky à l'organe central, ainsi que la note de la rédaction ". Sverdlov soutint la protestation.
Staline et Sokolnikov faisaient partie de la rédaction. Le procès-verbal dit : " Sokolnikov fait savoir qu'il n'est pour rien dans la déclaration de la rédaction au sujet de la lettre de Zinoviev et qu'il considère cette déclaration comme erronée. " On découvrit que Staline, personnellement - contre un autre membre de la rédaction et la majorité du Comité central - avait soutenu Kamenev et Zinoviev au moment le plus critique, quatre jours avant le début de l'insurrection, par une déclaration de sympathie. L'irritation fut grande.
Staline se prononça contre l'acceptation de la démission de Kamenev, en démontrant que " toute notre situation était contradictoire ", c'est-à-dire qu'il se chargea de défendre le confusionnisme que répandaient dans les esprits les membres du Comité central qui se déclaraient opposés à l'insurrection. Par cinq voix contre trois, la démission de Kamenev est acceptée. Par six voix, de nouveau contre Staline, une décision est adoptée, interdisant à Kamenev et à Zinoviev de mener une lutte contre le Comité central. Le procès-verbal dit : " Staline déclare qu'il sort de la rédaction. " Pour ne pas aggraver une situation qui n'était déjà pas si facile, le Comité central refuse la démission de Staline.
La conduite de Staline peut sembler inexplicable à la lumière de la légende créée autour de lui ; en réalité, elle correspond entièrement à sa formation spirituelle et à ses méthodes politiques. Devant les grands problèmes, Staline recule toujours, non point qu'il manque de caractère, comme Kamenev, mais parce qu'il a des vues trop étroites et qu'il manque d'imagination créatrice. Une prudence soupçonneuse le force presque organiquement, dans les moments de grave décision et de profonde dissension, à se retirer dans l'ombre, à attendre et, s'il est possible, à s'assurer pour deux cas éventuels. Staline votait avec Lenine pour l'insurrection. Zinoviev et Kamenev luttaient ouvertement contre l'insurrection. Mais, si l'on rejette " la violence du ton " de la critique léniniste, " nous restons, dans l'essentiel, de la même opinion ". Ce n'est pas du tout par étourderie que Staline plaça sa note : au contraire, il pesait soigneusement les circonstances et les mots. Mais, le 20 octobre, il ne croyait pas possible de couper sans retour les ponts vers le champ des adversaires de l'insurrection. »

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/livres/hrrusse/hrr43.htm

Boukharine, dans « Lénine théoricien » :

« Rappelez-vous l'époque où Lénine est arrivé en Russie pour la première fois après de longues années d'émigration. Rappelez-vous l'accueil réservé à ses célèbres Thèses d'avril. Une fraction de notre propre parti, importante au reste, y a vu, ou peu s'en faut, une trahison de l'idéologie marxiste habituelle ! Manifestement, il n'y avait rien là de contradictoire au marxisme. Force nous est aujourd'hui, au contraire, de constater que c'était un développement de la doctrine marxiste orthodoxe de la dictature du prolétariat.
La vie nous a administré la preuve éclatante que le pouvoir soviétique était la forme la plus stable d'existence de la dictature ouvrière, qu'elle possédait un certain nombre d'avantages pratiques immenses pour la classe ouvrière triomphante. Mais si, parallèlement, nous comparons cette reconnaissance universelle à l'accueil qui a été réservé initialement à la formule de Lénine même dans nos propres rangs du parti, sans parler de nos adversaires, nous comprendrons quel immense propos théorique et pratique avait alors tenu le camarade Lénine. C'est assez fréquent, eu égard aux rythmes effrénés de notre vie, que bien des éléments nouveaux finissent par être considérés comme allant de soi. Mais lorsque nous tâchons de porter une appréciation historique sur ces éléments nouveaux, il faut faire litière des habitudes, il faut se remettre en mémoire tout ce qui précède l'instant présent, comment ont été accueillies cette conception théorique et les déductions pratiques qui en découlaient.
Je le répète, loin d'avoir été accueillies avec reconnaissance, elles ont au contraire suscité des attaques très virulentes. Aujourd'hui, la notoriété est générale, et c'est bien l'indice que, du point de vue de la réflexion théorique sur les questions relatives à la dictature du prolétariat, à la théorie du pouvoir d'Etat, à ses normes, et d'un point de vue pratique, il y a effectivement ici quelque chose de grandiose. Il faut bien voir que ce n'est pas simplement une question pratique, même si j'ai dit que le seul élément décisif pour nous est en fin de compte la pratique. C'est aussi une immense question théorique, parce que la théorie des formes de domination des classes est, pour la bourgeoisie aussi, une question théorique et pratique ; la question des formes de sa domination est d'un intérêt majeur, tout comme pour la classe ouvrière. Mais pour cette dernière, elle l'est incommensurablement plus importante et suscite des difficultés bien plus considérables parce que les diverses variations du pouvoir d'Etat de la bourgeoisie trahissent une sorte de continuité historique, tandis que le prolétariat n'a jamais eu ce pouvoir. »

Lénine en septembre 1917 : « Oui, les chefs du Comité exécutif central appliquent une tactique juste de défense de la bourgeoisie et des propriétaires fonciers. Et il est hors de doute que les bolchéviks, s'ils se laissaient prendre au piège des illusions constitutionnelles, de la « foi » dans le Congrès des Soviets et dans la convocation de l'Assemblée constituante, au piège de l'« attente » du Congrès des Soviets, etc., - il n'y a pas de doute que ces bolchéviks seraient des traîtres méprisables à la cause du prolétariat.
Ils seraient, traîtres à cette cause, car par leur conduite ils trahiraient les ouvriers révolutionnaires allemands qui ont commencé à se soulever dans la flotte. Dans ces conditions, « attendre » le Congrès des Soviets, etc., c'est trahir l'internationalisme, trahir la cause de la révolution socialiste internationale.
Car l'internationalisme ne consiste pas en paroles, en expressions de solidarité, en résolutions, mais en actes.
Les bolchéviks seraient traîtres à la paysannerie, car tolérer qu'un gouvernement, que le Dièlo Naroda lui-même compare à celui de Stolypine, écrase le soulèvement paysan, c'est perdre toute la révolution, la perdre à jamais et sans retour. On crie à l'anarchie et à l'indifférence croissante des masses : comment les masses pourraient elles ne pas être indifférentes à l'égard des élections, quand la paysannerie en est réduite à se soulever, et quand la prétendue « démocratie révolutionnaire » supporte patiemment que ce soulèvement soit écrasé par les armes !!
Les bolcheviks seraient traîtres à la démocratie et à la liberté, car supporter la répression du soulèvement paysan en un tel moment, c'est permettre de falsifier les élections à l'Assemblée constituante, exactement comme l'ont été, de façon pire encore et plus grossière, la « Conférence démocratique » et le « préparlement ».
La crise est mûre. Tout l'avenir de la révolution russe est en jeu. Tout l'honneur du Parti bolchévik est en question. Tout l'avenir de la révolution ouvrière internationale pour le socialisme est en jeu.
La crise est mûre...
Que faire ? Il faut aussprechen vas ist, « dire ce qui est », reconnaître la vérité, à savoir qu'il existe chez nous, au Comité Central et dans les milieux dirigeants du parti, un courant ou une opinion en faveur de l'attente du Congrès des Soviets et hostile à la prise immédiate du pouvoir, hostile à l'insurrection immédiate. Il faut, vaincre ce courant ou cette opinion [6].
Autrement, les bolchéviks se déshonoreraient à tout jamais et seraient réduits à zéro en tant que parti.
Car laisser échapper l'occasion présente et « attendre » le Congrès des Soviets serait une idiotie complète ou une trahison complète.
Trahison complète à l'égard des ouvriers allemands. Nous n'allons tout de même pas attendre le départ de leur révolution !! Alors, même les Liber-Dan seront partisans de la « soutenir ». Mais elle ne peut pas commencer, tant que Kérenski, Kichkine et Cie sont au pouvoir.
Trahison complète à l'égard de la paysannerie. Alors que nous avons les Soviets des deux capitales, laisser écraser le soulèvement paysan, c'est perdre et, mériter de perdre toute confiance de la part des paysans, c'est se mettre aux yeux des paysans sur le même plan que les Liber-Dan et autres canailles.
« Attendre » le Congrès des Soviets est une idiotie complète, car c'est laisser s'écouler des semaines ; or, à l'heure actuelle, les semaines et même les jours décident de tout. C'est renoncer lâchement à la prise du pouvoir, car le 1er et le 2 novembre elle sera impossible (pour des raisons à la fois politiques et techniques : on réunira les cosaques pour le jour sottement « fixé » [7] de l'insurrection.
« Attendre » le Congrès des Soviets est une idiotie, car le congrès NE DONNERA RIEN, ne peut rien donner !
La portée « morale » ? A merveille ! ! La « portée » des résolutions et des conversations avec les Liber-Dan, alors que nous savons que les Soviets sont pour les paysans et qu'on écrase le soulèvement paysan !! Nous réduirions par là les Soviets au rôle de méprisables bavards. Battez d'abord Kérenski, puis convoquez le congrès.
La victoire de l'insurrection est assurée maintenant aux bolchéviks : 1) nous pouvons [8] (si nous n'« attendons » pas le Congrès des Soviets) frapper à l'improviste à partir de trois points : de Pétrograd, de Moscou, de la flotte de la Baltique ; 2) nous avons des mots d'ordre qui nous assurent le soutien des masses : à bas le gouvernement qui écrase le soulèvement paysan contre les propriétaires fonciers ! 3) nous avons la majorité dans le pays ; 4) le désarroi est total chez les socialistes-révolutionnaires et les menchéviks ; 5) nous avons la possibilité technique de prendre le pouvoir à Moscou (qui pourrait même commencer afin de frapper l'ennemi d'un coup imprévu) ; 6) nous avons à Pétrograd des milliers d'ouvriers et de soldats en armes qui peuvent d'un seul coup s'emparer à la fois du Palais d'Hiver, du Quartier Général, du Central téléphonique et de toutes les grandes imprimeries ; on ne nous chassera pas de là, - et l'agitation dans l'armée sera telle qu'il sera impossible de combattre ce gouvernement de la paix, de la terre aux paysans, etc.
Si nous frappons d'un coup, à l'improviste, à partir de trois points, à Pétrograd, à Moscou, dans la flotte de la Baltique, nous avons quatre-vingt-dix-neuf chances sur cent de vaincre avec moins de pertes que nous n'en avons eu les 3-5 juillet, car les troupes ne marcheront pas contre un gouvernement de paix. Si même Kérenski a déjà une cavalerie « fidèle », etc., à Pétrograd, en face d'une attaque venue de deux côtés et devant la sympathie de l'armée pour nous, Kérenski sera contraint de se rendre. Si avec nos chances d'aujourd'hui nous ne nous saisissons pas du pouvoir, tous les propos sur le pouvoir des Soviets ne sont que mensonge.
Ne pas prendre le pouvoir maintenant, « attendre », bavarder au Comité exécutif central, se borner à « combattre pour l'organe » (le Soviet), « combattre pour le congrès », c'est causer la perte de la révolution.
Le Comité Central ayant laissé même sans réponse mes instances là-dessus depuis le début de la Conférence démocratique, et comme l'organe central biffe dans mes articles les indications que je donne sur les erreurs criantes des bolchéviks, telles que la décision déshonorante de participer au préparlement, que l'attribution d'un siège aux menchéviks au présidium du Soviet, etc., etc., force m'est de voir là une allusion « délicate » au refus du Comité Central de débattre même la question, une allusion délicate au bâillonnement et à l'invitation à me retirer.
Je dois présenter ma demande de démission du Comité Central, ce que je fais, en me réservant de faire de la propagande, dans les rangs du parti et au congrès du parti.
Car ma conviction la plus profonde est que, si nous « attendons » le Congrès des Soviets et laissons tout de suite échapper l'occasion, nous causons la perte de la révolution. »

https://www.marxists.org/francais/lenin/works/1917/10/vil19171029.htm

Oui, Lénine avait longtemps (jusqu'en 1917) été en désaccord avec Trotsky sur le caractère de la révolution russe et cela signifie que le parti bolchevique était très loin d'être armé dès le départ pour la révolution prolétarienne :

« Lénine, de son côté, écrivait à la fin de 1904 :
"Il semble toujours à l'intellectuel russe que reconnaître notre révolution comme bourgeoise c'est la décolorer, la dégrader, l'abaisser... Pour le prolétariat, la lutte pour la liberté politique et pour la république démocratique au sein de la société bourgeoise est simplement un stade nécessaire dans sa lutte pour la révolution socialiste.
Les marxistes sont absolument convaincus, écrivait-il en 1905, du caractère bourgeois de la révolution russe. Qu'est-ce que cela signifie ? Cela signifie que ces transformations démocratiques... qui sont devenues indispensables pour la Russie ne signifient pas en elles-mêmes une tentative de miner le capitalisme, de miner la révolution bourgeoise, mais, au contraire elles ouvrent la voie, pour la première fois et d'une façon valable, à un développement du capitalisme ample et rapide, européen et non asiatique. Elles rendront possible, pour la première fois, la domination de la bourgeoisie en tant que classe...
Nous ne pouvons sauter par-dessus le cadre démocratique bourgeois de la révolution russe, insistait-il, mais nous pouvons élargir ce cadre dans des proportions colossales".
C'est-à-dire nous pouvons créer au sein de la société bourgeoise des conditions bien plus favorables pour la lutte future du prolétariat. Dans ces limites, Lénine suivait Plekhanov. Le caractère bourgeois de la révolution servait aux deux fractions de la social-démocratie russe comme point de départ.
Il est tout à fait naturel que, dans ces conditions, Koba (Staline) ne dépassa pas, dans sa propagande, ces formules courantes qui constituaient la propriété commune des bolchéviks comme des menchéviks.
"L'Assemblée Constituante, écrivait-il en janvier 1905, élue à la base du suffrage universel, égal, direct, et secret, c'est ce pour quoi nous devons maintenant lutter. Seule cette Assemblée nous apportera la république démocratique dont nous avons un si urgent besoin dans notre lutte pour le socialisme". La république bourgeoise, comme arène d'une lutte de classes de longue haleine pour le but socialiste, telle est la perspective.
En 1907 ; c'est-à-dire après d'innombrables discussions dans la presse à Pétersbourg et à l'étranger et après une sérieuse expérimentation des prévisions théoriques dans les expériences de la première révolution, Staline écrivait :
"Que notre révolution est bourgeoise, qu'elle doit se terminer par la destruction de l'ordre féodal et non de l'ordre capitaliste, qu'elle peut être couronnée seulement par la république démocratique, sur ces points, semble-t-il, tous sont d'accord dans notre parti".
Staline ne parlait pas de ce par quoi la révolution commence mais de ce à quoi elle aboutit et il le limitait d'avance et d'une façon tout à fait catégorique "à la seule république démocratique". Nous chercherions en vain dans ses écrits, ne fusse qu'une allusion de quelque perspective d'une révolution socialiste en rapport avec un renversement de la démocratie. Telle fut sa position, même au début de la révolution de février 1917, jusqu'à l'arrivée de Lénine à Pétrograd.

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/livres/staline/lt_stal23.htm

Trotsky : « Lénine lui-même, à vrai dire, n'avait pas remplacé la formule de la dictature démocratique par une autre, même conditionnellement, même hypothétiquement, jusqu'au début de la Révolution de Février. Était-ce juste ? Nous pensons que non. Ce qui se passait dans le parti après l'insurrection dévoilait d'une façon trop menaçante le retard du réarmement que, d'ailleurs, dans les conditions données, Lénine seul pouvait opérer. Il s'y était préparé. Il avait chauffé à blanc son acier et l'avait retrempé dans le feu de la guerre. A ses yeux s'était modifiée la perspective générale du processus historique. Les secousses de la guerre avaient brusquement rapproché les délais possibles d'une révolution socialiste en Occident. Demeurant, pour Lénine, encore démocratique, la révolution russe devait donner une impulsion à l'insurrection socialiste en Europe, qui, ensuite, devait entraîner aussi la Russie arriérée dans son tourbillon. Telle était la conception générale de Lénine quand il quitta Zürich. La lettre aux ouvriers suisses, que nous avons déjà citée, dit ceci : " La Russie est un pays de paysans, un des pays les plus arriérés d'Europe. Le socialisme ne peut y être directement et tout de suite vainqueur. Mais le caractère rural du pays, où se sont conservés d'immenses biens-fonds de propriétaires nobles, peut, sur la base de l'expérience de 1905, donner un formidable essor à la révolution démocratique-bourgeoise en Russie et faire de notre révolution le prologue d'une révolution socialiste mondiale, un degré d'accès à celle-ci. " En ce sens, Lénine écrivait alors pour la première fois que le prolétariat russe commencerait la révolution socialiste.
Tel était le point de jonction entre l'ancienne position du bolchévisme qui bornait la révolution à des buts démocratiques, et la nouvelle position que Lénine exposa pour la première fois devant le parti dans ses thèses du 4 avril. La perspective d'un passage immédiat à la dictature du prolétariat semblait absolument inattendue, contraire à la tradition, et, enfin, simplement parlant, ne rentrait pas dans les cerveaux. Ici, il est indispensable de rappeler que, jusqu'à l'explosion même de la Révolution de Février et dans les premiers temps après elle, ce que l'on appelait trotskysme n'était point l'idée que, dans les frontières nationales de la Russie, l'on ne pût édifier une société socialiste (l'idée d'une pareille " possibilité " ne fut en somme exprimée par personne jusqu'en 1924, et il est douteux qu'elle soit venue à l'esprit de quelqu'un) - ce que l'on appelait trotskysme, c'était cette idée que le prolétariat de Russie peut se trouver au pouvoir plus tôt que celui d'Occident, et qu'en ce cas il ne pourrait se maintenir dans les cadres de la dictature démocratique, mais devrait s'attaquer aux premières mesures socialistes. Il n'est pas étonnant que les thèses d'avril de Lénine aient été réprouvées comme trotskystes.
Les objections des " vieux bolchéviks " se développaient sur plusieurs lignes. Le débat principal consistait à savoir si la révolution démocratique-bourgeoise était complètement achevée. Étant donné que la révolution agraire ne s'était pas encore accomplie, les adversaires de Lénine pouvaient à bon droit affirmer que la révolution démocratique n'avait pas été conduite jusqu'au bout et, par suite, concluaient-ils, il n'y a point place pour une dictature du prolétariat, quand bien même les conditions sociales de la Russie permettraient en général cette dictature dans un temps plus ou moins rapproché. C'est précisément ainsi que la rédaction de la Pravda posait la question dans un passage que nous avons cité. Plus tard, à la Conférence d'avril, Kaménev répétait : " Lénine a tort quand il dit que la révolution démocratique-bourgeoise est parachevée... La survivance classique du féodalisme - la propriété foncière des nobles - n'est pas encore liquidée... L'État n'est pas transformé en société démocratique... Il est trop tôt pour dire que la démocratie bourgeoise a épuisé toutes ses possibilités. "
" La dictature démocratique - répliquait Tomsky - voilà notre base... Nous devons organiser le pouvoir du prolétariat et de la paysannerie et devons le séparer de la Commune, étant donné que là n'existe que le pouvoir du prolétariat. "
" Devant nous se posent d'immenses tâches révolutionnaires reprenait Rykov. Mais la réalisation de ces tâches ne nous conduit pas encore au-delà des cadres du régime bourgeois. "
Lénine voyait, certainement, tout aussi bien que ses contradicteurs, que la révolution démocratique n'était pas parachevée, ou, plus exactement, qu'à peine commencée elle refluait déjà en arrière. Mais de là précisément il découlait qu'il ne serait possible de la mener jusqu'au bout que sous la domination d'une nouvelle classe, et l'on ne pouvait en arriver là qu'en arrachant les masses à l'influence des menchéviks et des socialistes-révolutionnaires, c'est-à-dire à l'influence indirecte de la bourgeoisie libérale. La liaison de ces partis avec les ouvriers et particulièrement avec les soldats s'alimentait d'une idée de défense - " défense du pays " ou bien " défense de la révolution ". Lénine exigeait, par conséquent, une politique intransigeante à l'égard de toutes les nuances du social-patriotisme. Détacher le parti des masses arriérées pour ensuite délivrer ces masses de leur état arriéré. " Le vieux bolchévisme doit être abandonné - répétait-il. Il est indispensable de séparer la ligne petite-bourgeoise de celle du prolétariat salarié. "
D'un point de vue superficiel, il pouvait sembler que les perpétuels adversaires avaient échangé leurs armes. Les menchéviks et les socialistes-révolutionnaires représentaient maintenant la majorité des ouvriers et des soldats, comme s'ils réalisaient en fait l'alliance politique du prolétariat et de la paysannerie qu'avaient toujours prêchée les bolchéviks contre les menchéviks. Or, Lénine exigeait que l'avant-garde prolétarienne s'arrachât à cette alliance. En réalité, chacun des partis restait fidèle à lui-même. Les menchéviks, comme toujours, jugeaient que leur mission était de soutenir la bourgeoisie libérale. Leur alliance avec les socialistes-révolutionnaires était seulement un moyen d'élargir et de consolider cet appui. Par contre, la rupture de l'avant-garde prolétarienne avec le bloc petit-bourgeois signifiait la préparation d'une alliance des ouvriers et des paysans sous la direction du parti bolchévik, c'est-à-dire la dictature du prolétariat.
Des objections d'un autre ordre étaient basées sur l'état arriéré de la Russie. Le pouvoir de la classe ouvrière signifie inévitablement le passage au socialisme. Mais l'économie et la culture de la Russie ne sont point mûres pour cela. Nous devons pousser jusqu'au bout la révolution démocratique. Seule la révolution socialiste en Occident peut justifier chez nous la dictature du prolétariat. Telles étaient les objections de Rykov à la conférence d'avril. Que les conditions culturelles et économiques de la Russie fussent en soi insuffisantes pour l'édification d'une société socialiste - c'était pour Lénine l'A. B. C. Mais la société n'est nullement agencée si rationnellement que les échéances pour une dictature du prolétariat tombent juste au moment où les conditions économiques et culturelles sont venues à maturité pour le socialisme. Si l'humanité se développait aussi régulièrement, il ne serait pas besoin de dictature, non plus que de révolutions en général. Toute l'affaire est en ceci qu'une vivante société historique est profondément désharmonieuse, et cela d'autant plus que son développement est plus tardif. L'expression de cette désharmonie se trouve dans ce fait que, dans un pays arriéré comme la Russie, la bourgeoisie était arrivée à décomposition avant la complète victoire du régime bourgeois et que, pour la remplacer, en qualité de dirigeant de la nation, il n'y avait que le prolétariat. L'état économique arriéré de la Russie ne dispense pas la classe ouvrière de l'obligation de remplir la tâche qui s'est imposée à elle, mais conditionne seulement cette réalisation par d'extrêmes difficultés. A Rykov, qui répétait que le socialisme doit venir de pays où l'industrie est plus développée, Lénine donnait une réponse simple, mais suffisante : " On ne peut dire ni qui commencera, ni qui achèvera. " »

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article3415

Lire Lénine et Trotsky sur ces phases politiques où ils étaient minoritaires… au sein des bolcheviques…

https://www.marxists.org/francais/lenin/works/1917/04/vil19170410.htm

https://www.marxists.org/francais/lenin/works/1917/04/vil19170407.htm

Quelques récits de la révolution russe par LO :

https://www.lutte-ouvriere.org/clt/documents-archives-cercle-leon-trotsky-avant-1968-article-cinquantieme-anniversaire-de-la.html

https://www.lutte-ouvriere.org/clt/publications-brochures-1917-2017-la-revolution-russe-pour-changer-le-monde-les-travailleurs-au-pouvoir-97735.html

https://www.lutte-ouvriere.org/clt/documents-archives-cercle-leon-trotsky-avant-1968-article-cinquantieme-anniversaire-de-la.html

Pour Lutte ouvrière, l'organisation de Lénine, le parti bolchevique, est arrivée complètement armée devant la révolution russe.

Il y aurait juste eu besoin d'une rectification de Lénine, soutenue heureusement par la base ouvrière…

https://www.lutte-ouvriere.org/journal/article/2017-04-05-le-retour-de-lenine-et-les-theses-davril_85610.html

Le comité central bolchevique contre la révolution d'Octobre…

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/livres/hrrusse/hrr43.htm

A lire aussi :

Discutons avec Lutte ouvrière sur la Révolution de 1917 en Russie

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article8270

En guise de conclusion :

LO ne peut pas comprendre le bolchevisme parce qu'il est très loin du simple culte du parti révolutionnaire. Pour LO, c'est tout pour le parti, rien que le parti, tout par le parti. Mais, cela justement ce n'est pas un parti révolutionnaire. En définitive, ce que LO appelle le parti, ce n'est pas l'expérience prolétarienne mais la construction du petit groupe, exactement ce que Marx et Lénine combattaient. L'esprit de petit groupe, c'est seulement un conservatisme organisé comme la social-démocratie mais à petite échelle. LO est persuadé qu'il suffit « d'être dans les entreprises », « de militer dans les syndicats », « de faire de la propagande de classe dans les élections », mais être lié au prolétariat, c'est bien différent.

Les communistes ne peuvent rien réussir sans le prolétariat organisé dans ses soviets, sans son élan, sans ses idées, sans ses objectifs, sans son organisation autonome. Mais, en même temps, le parti communiste n'est rien sans une théorie vivante et combattante, sans courage politique, sans audace. Ce que l'on constate, c'est que les dirigeants bolcheviques eux-mêmes ont eu du mal à se mesurer à cette volonté-là. La perte de moral du prolétariat russe isolé et fatigué et la mort de Lénine ont eu raison aussi du parti révolutionnaire englué dans les tâches du pouvoir d'Etat. Ni le parti révolutionnaire, ni des syndicats révolutionnaires, ni le pouvoir d'Etat révolutionnaire ne suffisent si le peuple travailleur révolutionnaire a perdu son élan, sa confiance dans ses propres forces.

De vrais révolutionnaires savent reconnaitre que le prolétariat est capable tout seul de grandes avancées révolutionnaires. Marx considérait le parti dans un tout autre sens que LO.
Quand Marx écrivait « Le Manifeste du parti communiste », il n'existait aucune organisation dans aucun pays qui ait ce nom et lui-même n'a construit ensuite aucune organisation ayant ce nom. Ce n'était donc pas stricto sensus le programme d'une organisation ni même celui d'une révolution, mais le bilan de l'histoire des luttes de classe pour éclairer les tâches de l'heure, celles de la révolution de 1848 en Europe. De 1848, date de rédaction du Manifeste à la révolution russe d'Octobre, il n'allait exister aucune organisation de ce nom.

Il écrivait que « L'actuelle insurrection de Paris est le plus glorieux exploit de notre parti » (à Kugelmann, 12 avril 1871). Mais en quel sens la Commune fut-elle l'œuvre de ce parti ? Dans les Enseignements de la Commune de Paris, Trotsky ne craint pas d'affirmer que « le prolétariat parisien n'avait ni parti, ni chef » ? Les deux affirmations contradictoires en apparence, se complètent simplement. »

Voilà pourquoi « militer pour un parti bolchevique », ce n'est pas seulement construire un groupe politique… Et surtout pas un groupe qui ne milite pas pour des soviets et cautionne des bureaucraties syndicales et mène des campagnes aux élections bourgeoises qui ne font nullement frémir la bourgeoisie.

Lénine écrit dans "Le matérialisme militant" :

« Une des erreurs les plus grandes et les plus dangereuses que commettent les communistes (comme, d'ailleurs, les révolutionnaires en général qui ont mené à bien le début d'une grande révolution), c'est de se figurer que la révolution peut être accomplie par les mains des seuls révolutionnaires. Or, pour assurer le succès de toute action révolutionnaire sérieuse, il faut comprendre et savoir appliquer pratiquement l'idée que les révolutionnaires ne peuvent jouer un rôle que comme avant garde de la classe réellement avancée et viable. L'avant garde ne remplit sa mission que lorsqu'elle sait ne pas se détacher de la masse qu'elle dirige, lorsqu'elle sait véritablement faire progresser toute la masse. Sans l'alliance avec les non communistes dans les domaines d'activité les plus divers, il ne saurait être question d'aucun succès en matière de construction de la société communiste."

Trotsky, « La Chine et la révolution russe », juillet 1940 :

« La malédiction pour la jeune génération de tous les pays est qu'on a créé, sous l'étiquette de marxisme, une gigantesque fabrique de falsifications historiques, théoriques et autres. »

La religion du parti n'est pas le sens politique du parti de classe du prolétariat

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article4923

Le "trotskysme" en 1917

Robert Paris — 2026-02-09T23:05:00Z

Le « trotskysme » en 1917 :

Léon Trotsky

Depuis 1904, j'étais en dehors des deux fractions de la social-démocratie. J'avais vécu les années de la première révolution, 1905-1907, côte à côte avec les bolcheviks. Pendant les années de la réaction, je défendis les méthodes de la révolution contre les menchéviks dans la presse marxiste internationale. Je ne perdais cependant pas l'espoir de voir les menchéviks s'orienter vers la gauche et je fis une série de tentatives d'unification. C'est seulement pendant la guerre que je compris que ces tentatives seraient inutiles. A New-York, au début de mars, j'écrivis une série d'articles consacrés à l'étude des forces de classes et des perspectives de la révolution russe. En ce même temps, Lénine envoyait de Genève à Pétrograd ses Lettres de loin. Ecrits sur deux points du monde que sépare l'océan, ces articles donnent une analyse identique de la situation et expriment des prévisions toutes pareilles. Toutes les formules essentielles —sur l'attitude à prendre à l'égard des paysans, de la bourgeoisie, du gouvernement provisoire, de la guerre, de la révolution internationale, sont absolument identiques. Sur la pierre à aiguiser de l'histoire, vérification fut faite alors des rapports du « trotskysme » et du léninisme. Cette vérification eut lieu dans les conditions d'une expérience de chimie pure. Je ne connaissais pas le jugement de Lénine. Je partais de mes propres prémisses et de ma propre expérience révolutionnaire. Et j'indiquais les mêmes perspectives, la même ligne stratégique que donnait Lénine.

Mais, peut-être, à cette époque, la question était-elle claire pour tout le monde et la solution tout aussi bien prévue pour tous. Non ! Au contraire ! Le jugement de Lénine fut en cette période —jusqu'au 4 avril 1917, c'est-à-dire jusqu'à son apparition sur l'arène de Pétrograd,— un jugement personnel, individuel. Pas un des dirigeants du parti se trouvant alors en Russie, —pas un !— n'avait même l'idée de gouverner vers la dictature du prolétariat, vers la révolution socialiste. La conférence du parti qui avait réuni, à la veille de l'arrivée de Lénine, quelques dizaines de bolcheviks, avait montré qu'aucun d'eux n'allait en pensée au-delà de la démocratie. Ce n'est pas sans intention que les procès-verbaux de cette conférence restent cachés jusqu'à ce jour. Staline était d'avis de soutenir le gouvernement provisoire de Goutchkov-Milioukov et d'arriver à une fusion des bolcheviks avec les menchéviks. La même attitude fut prise (ou bien une attitude encore plus opportuniste) par Rykov, Kaménev, Molotov, Tomsky, Kalinine et tous autres dirigeants ou à demi dirigeants actuels. Iaroslavsky, Ordjonikidzé, le président du comité exécutif central de l'Ukraine, Pétrovsky, et d'autres, publiaient, pendant la révolution de février, à Iakoutsk, en commun avec les menchéviks, un journal appelé le Social-Démocrate, dans lequel ils développaient les idées les plus vulgaires de l'opportunisme provincial. Si l'on reproduisait actuellement certains articles du Social-Démocrate d'Iakoutsk dont Iaroslavsky était le rédacteur en chef, on tuerait idéologiquement cet homme, en admettant toutefois qu'il soit possible de l'exécuter idéologiquement.

Telle est la garde actuelle du « léninisme ». Qu'en diverses occasions, ces hommes aient répété les paroles et imité les gestes de Lénine, cela, je le sais. Mais, au début de 1917, ils étaient livrés à eux-mêmes. La situation était difficile. C'est alors qu'ils auraient dû montrer ce qu'ils avaient appris à l'école de Lénine et ce dont ils étaient capables sans Lénine. Qu'ils désignent seulement, parmi eux, un seul qui de lui-même ait su aborder la position qui fut identiquement formulée par Lénine à Genève et par moi à New-York. Ils ne trouveront pas un nom. La Pravda de Pétrograd, dont les rédacteurs en chef, avant l'arrivée de Lénine, étaient Staline et Kaménev, est restée à tout jamais un monument d'esprit borné, d'aveuglement et d'opportunisme. Cependant la masse du parti, comme la classe ouvrière dans son ensemble, se dirigeait spontanément vers la lutte pour le pouvoir. Il n'y avait pas en somme d'autre voie, ni pour le parti ni pour le pays.

Pour défendre, pendant les années de la réaction, la perspective de la révolution permanente, il fallait des prévisions théoriques. Pour lancer, en mars 1917, le mot d'ordre de la lutte pour le pouvoir, il suffisait, ce me semble, du flair politique. Les facultés de prévision et même de flair ne se sont révélées chez aucun —pas un !— des dirigeants actuels. Pas un d'entre eux, en mars 1917, n'avait dépassé la position du petit bourgeois démocrate de gauche. Aucun d'entre eux n'a passé convenablement l'examen de l'histoire.

J'arrivai à Pétrograd un mois après Lénine. Exactement le temps pendant lequel j'avais été retenu au Canada par Lloyd George. Je trouvai la situation dans le parti essentiellement modifiée. Lénine avait fait appel à la masse des partisans contre leurs tristes leaders. Il mena une lutte systématique contre ces « vieux bolcheviks —écrivait-il— qui ont déjà joué plus d'une fois un triste rôle dans l'histoire de notre parti, répétant sans y rien comprendre une formule apprise par coeur, au lieu d'étudier les particularités de la nouvelle et vivante situation ».

Kaménev et Rykov tentèrent de résister. Staline, en silence, se mit à l'écart. Il n'existe pas, pour l'époque, un seul article où celui-ci ait fait effort pour juger sa politique de la veille et s'ouvrir un chemin dans le sens de la position léniniste. Il se tut tout simplement. Il s'était trop compromis par la désastreuse direction qu'il avait donnée pendant le premier mois de la révolution. Il préféra se retirer dans l'ombre. Il ne prit publiquement nulle part la défense des idées de Lénine. Il éludait et attendait. Durant les mois où se fit la préparation théorique et politique d'Octobre, où s'engagèrent le plus sérieusement les responsabilités, Staline n'eut tout simplement pas d'existence politique.

Lorsque j'arrivai dans le pays, un bon nombre d'organisations social-démocrates groupaient encore des menchéviks et des bolcheviks. C'était la conséquence naturelle de la position que Staline, Kaménev et d'autres avaient prise non seulement au début de la révolution, mais aussi pendant la guerre, bien que, il faut en convenir, l'attitude de Staline en temps de guerre soit restée inconnue de tous : il n'a pas écrit une seule ligne sur cette question qui n'est pas d'une mince importance.

Actuellement, les manuels de l'Internationale communiste, dans le monde entier —pour les Jeunesses communistes en Scandinavie et les pionniers en Australie— répètent à satiété que Trotsky, en août 1912, fit une tentative pour unifier les bolcheviks avec les menchéviks. En revanche, il n'est dit nulle part que Staline, en mars 1917, prêchait une alliance avec le parti de Tsérételli et qu'en fait, jusqu'au milieu de 1917, Lénine ne parvint pas à dégager le parti du marais où l'avaient entraîné les dirigeants temporaires d'alors, actuellement devenus les épigones. Le fait que pas un d'entre eux ne comprit, au début de la révolution, le sens et la direction de celle-ci est maintenant interprété comme procédant de vues dialectiques particulièrement profondes, s'opposant à l'hérésie du trotskysme qui osa non seulement comprendre les faits de la veille, mais aussi prévoir ceux du lendemain.

Quand, arrivé à Pétersbourg, je déclarai à Kaménev que je n'objectais rien aux fameuses « thèses d'avril » de Lénine, qui déterminaient le cours nouveau du parti, Kaménev me répondit seulement :

— Je crois bien !...

Avant même d'avoir adhéré en bonne et due forme au parti, je contribuai à l'élaboration des plus importants documents du bolchevisme. Il ne vint à l'esprit de personne de demander si j'avais renoncé au « trotskysme » comme l'ont voulu savoir, à mille reprises, depuis, dans la période de décadence des épigones, les Cachin, les Thaelmann et autres parasites de la révolution d'Octobre. Si, à cette époque, on a pu voir le trotskysme opposé au léninisme, ce fut seulement en ce sens que, dans les sphères supérieures du parti, pendant avril, Lénine fut accusé de trotskysme. Kaménev en parlait ainsi, ouvertement et avec persistance. D'autres disaient de même, mais d'une façon plus circonspecte, dans les coulisses. Des dizaines de « vieux bolcheviks » me déclarèrent, après mon arrivée en Russie :

— Maintenant, c'est fête dans votre rue !...

Je fus forcé de démontrer que Lénine n'avait pas adopté ma position, qu'il avait simplement étendu la sienne et que, par la suite de cette évolution, où l'algèbre se simplifiait en arithmétique, l'identité de nos idées s'était manifestée. Il en fut bien ainsi.

Dès nos premières rencontres, et plus encore après les Journées de juillet, Lénine donnait l'impression d'une extrême concentration intérieure, d'un ramassement sur lui-même poussé au dernier degré —sous des apparences de calme et de simplicité prosaïque. Le régime kérenskyste semblait, en ces jours-là, tout-puissant. Le bolchevisme n'était représenté que par une « petite bande insignifiante ». C'est ainsi qu'il était traité officiellement. Le parti lui-même ne se rendait pas encore compte de la force qu'il allait avoir le lendemain. Et, cependant, Lénine le conduisait, en toute assurance, vers les plus hautes tâches. Je m'attelai au travail et aidai Lénine.

Deux mois avant Octobre, j'écrivais :

« Pour nous, l'internationalisme n'est pas une idée abstraite, n'existant seulement que pour être trahie à la première occasion (ce qu'elle est pour un Tsérételli ou un Tchernov) ; c'est un principe qui nous dirige immédiatement et est profondément pratique. Un succès durable, décisif, n'est pas concevable pour nous en dehors d'une révolution européenne. »

A côté des noms de Tsérételli et de Tchernov, je ne pouvais pas alors encore ranger celui de Staline, philosophe du socialisme dans un seul pays. Je terminais mon article par ces mots :

« La révolution permanente contre le carnage permanent ! Telle est la lutte dont l'enjeu est le sort de l'humanité. »

Ce fut imprimé dans l'organe central de notre parti, le 7 septembre et reproduit en brochure. Pourquoi mes critiques actuels gardèrent-ils alors le silence sur le mot d'ordre hérétique d'une révolution permanente ? Où étaient-ils ? Les uns, comme Staline, attendaient les événements en regardant de côté et d'autre ; les autres, comme Zinoviev, se cachaient sous la table.

Mais la plus grosse question est celle-ci : comment Lénine a-t-il pu tolérer ma propagande hérétique ? Quand il était question de théorie, il ne connaissait ni condescendance ni indulgence. Comment a-t-il pu supporter que le « trotskysme » fût prêché dans l'organe central du parti ?

Le 1er novembre 1917, à une séance du comité de Pétrograd (le procès-verbal de cette séance, historique sous tous rapports, est tenu secret jusqu'à présent), Lénine déclara que depuis que Trotsky s'était convaincu de l'impossibilité d'une alliance avec les menchéviks, « il n'y avait pas de meilleur bolchevik que lui ». Il montra par là clairement, et non pour la première fois, que si quelque chose nous séparait, ce n'était pas la théorie de la révolution permanente, c'était une question plus restreinte, quoique très importante, sur les rapports à garder envers le menchévisme.

Jetant un coup d'oeil rétrospectif, deux ans après la révolution d'Octobre, Lénine écrivait :

« Au moment de la conquête du pouvoir, lorsque fut créée la république des soviets, le bolchevisme avait attiré à lui tout ce qu'il y avait de meilleur dans les tendances de la pensée socialiste proches de lui. »

Peut-il y avoir l'ombre d'un doute qu'en parlant d'une façon aussi marquée des tendances de la pensée socialiste les plus proches du bolchevisme, Lénine avait en vue tout d'abord ce que l'on appelle maintenant le « trotskysme historique » ? En effet, quelle autre tendance pouvait être plus proche du bolchevisme que celle que je représentais ? Qui donc Lénine pouvait-il avoir en Vue ? Marcel Cachin ? Thaelmann ? Pour Lénine, lorsqu'il passait en revue l'évolution du parti dans son ensemble, le trotskysme n'était pas quelque chose d'étranger ou d'hostile ; c'était, au contraire, le courant de la pensée socialiste le plus proche du bolchevisme.

La véritable marche des idées n'eut, on le voit, rien de commun avec la caricature mensongère qu'en ont faite, profitant de la mort de Lénine et de la vague de réaction, les épigones.

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/livres/mavie/mv30.htm

Lire encore sur Lénine, « trotskiste » en 1917 :

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/livres/hrrusse/hrr16.htm

http://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article4206

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article143

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article3415

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article2919

Les thèses de Lénine en avril 1917, taxées de trotskistes par le groupe bolchevik conservateur

https://www.marxists.org/francais/lenin/works/1917/04/vil19170407.htm

https://www.marxists.org/francais/lenin/works/1917/04/vil19170422a.htm

https://www.marxists.org/francais/lenin/works/1917/04/vil19170410.htm

https://www.marxists.org/francais/cmo/n26/H_Lenine_en_avril_1917_22_.pdf

https://www.wsws.org/fr/articles/2017/09/rr5e-s16.html

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/livres/hrrusse/hrr15.htm

Trotsky en 1927 : « La crise du parti reflète la crise de la révolution elle-même. »

Robert Paris — 2025-12-30T23:03:00Z

Trotsky en 1927 : « La crise du parti reflète la crise de la révolution elle-même. »

Léon Trotsky

Nouvelle étape

Fin décembre 1927

La crise du parti reflète la crise de la révolution elle-même. Celle-ci a été provoquée par la modification des rapports de classe. Le fait que l'Opposition soit en minorité à l'intérieur du parti et ait à subir des attaques constantes reflète la pression de la bourgeoisie russe et de la bourgeoisie mondiale sur l'appareil du gouvernement, de l'appareil d'État sur celui du parti et de l'appareil du parti sur l'aile gauche, prolétarienne, du parti. L'Opposition est aujourd'hui le point sur lequel se concentrent les plus puissantes pressions contre la révolution à l'échelle du monde.

Le Danger de Thermidor

Dictature prolétarienne ou Thermidor ?
Boukharine pose la question de cette façon : si c'est une dictature prolétarienne, nous devons soutenir inconditionnellement tout ce qui est fait sous son nom. Si c'est Thermidor, alors nous devons mener contre tout cela une lutte sans merci. En fait, les éléments de Thermidor – en liaison avec l'ensemble de la situation internationale – se sont développés dans le pays au cours des dernières années bien plus vite que les éléments de la dictature. La défense de la dictature signifie la lutte contre les éléments de Thermidor, pas seulement dans le pays tout entier, mais dans l'appareil d'État et les couches influentes du parti lui-même.

Mais, même dans un processus de retour en arrière, il doit venir un point critique où la quantité se change en qualité, c'est-à-dire le moment où le pouvoir d'État change de nature de classe et devient un pouvoir bourgeois ? Ce point n'est-il pas déjà atteint ? Un ouvrier, individuellement et tirant les leçons de sa vie quotidienne, peut en arriver à la conclusion que le pouvoir n'est plus aux mains de la classe ouvrière : à l'usine, l'autorité suprême est le « triangle », la critique a été interdite et, dans le parti, l'appareil est tout-puissant ; dans le dos des organisations soviétiques, ce sont des bureaucrates qui donnent les ordres, etc. Mais il suffit d'examiner cette question du point de vue des classes bourgeoises à la ville et à la campagne pour voir tout à fait clairement que le pouvoir n'est pas entre leurs mains. Ce qui est en train de se passer, c'est la concentration du pouvoir entre les mains de ces organes bureaucratiques qui reposent sur la classe ouvrière, mais qui tendent toujours plus vers les couches supérieures de la petite bourgeoisie des villes et des campagnes et se mélangent partiellement avec elle.

La lutte contre le danger de Thermidor est une lutte de classe. La lutte pour arracher le pouvoir des mains d'une autre classe est une lutte révolutionnaire. La lutte pour des changements – parfois décisifs, mais toujours sous le règne de la même classe – est une lutte réformiste. Le pouvoir n'a pas encore été arraché des mains du prolétariat. Il est encore possible de redresser notre ligne politique actuelle, d'écarter les éléments de dualité de pouvoir et de renforcer la dictature par des mesures de type réformiste.

La prééminence, dans le parti et par conséquent dans le pays également, est aux mains de la fraction de Staline qui possède tous les traits du centrisme – et, qui plus est, d'un centrisme dans une période de recul, pas de montée. Cela signifie de petits zigzags à gauche et de grands zigzags à droite. Il n'est pas douteux que le dernier geste à gauche (le manifeste pour l'anniversaire) va obliger à apaiser la droite et ceux qui sont les vraies sources de son soutien dans le pays – en fait, pas en paroles.

Les zigzags à gauche ne s'expriment pas seulement par des manifestes bâclés d'anniversaire. L'insurrection de Canton est indiscutablement un zigzag aventuriste de l'I.C. à gauche, après qu'aient été pleinement révélées les conséquences désastreuses de la politique menchevique suivie en Chine. L'épisode de Canton constitue une répétition, en pire et en plus pernicieux du putsch d'Esthonie en 1924, après qu'on eût laissé passer la situation révolutionnaire de 1923 en Allemagne. Le menchevisme plus l'aventurisme bureaucratique ont porté à la révolution chinoise un double coup : il n'est pas douteux que le prix de l'insurrection de Canton sera un nouveau zigzag, beaucoup plus ample, à droite, dans le domaine de la politique internationale et particulièrement en Chine.

La tâche objective d'un régime thermidorien serait de transférer les leviers de commande politiques principaux aux mains de la gauche des nouvelles classes possédantes. La condition la plus importante – mais pas la seule – de la victoire de Thermidor serait un écrasement de l'Opposition tel qu'il n'y aurait plus à en avoir « peur ». Dans les appareils du parti et de l'État, les brasseurs d'affaires qui ont réussi, en utilisant tous les fils, à s'unir par toutes sortes de liens avec la société bourgeoise nouvelle, prendraient le pas sur les politiques purs, les centristes, les gens de l'appareil stalinien qui effraient les ouvriers avec l'opposition, préservant ainsi temporairement leur « indépendance ». Quant à ce que deviendraient alors les centristes de l'espèce stalinienne, c'est une question secondaire. Peut-être quelques-uns d'entre eux se détacheraient-ils pour se porter à gauche. Le reste, bien plus nombreux, se retirerait purement et simplement du jeu. Une troisième catégorie renoncerait à l'indépendance imaginaire actuelle du centrisme et ses hommes entreraient dans la nouvelle combinaison, purement thermidorienne. Voilà ce que serait la première étape de la marche au pouvoir de la bourgeoisie.

Qu'est-ce qui provoque le reflux ? La pression des forces de classe anti-prolétariennes sur l'État soviétique pouvait rencontrer une résistance organisée seulement de la part des vieux cadres du parti et de la partie ouvrière de l'appareil de l'État et du parti. Cependant, la partie ouvrière de l'appareil d'État qui, autrefois, se séparait nettement des cadres des anciens intellectuels bourgeois et n'avait pas confiance en eux, s'est, au cours des dernières années, détachée toujours plus de la classe ouvrière, se rapprochant, par ses conditions de vie et d'existence, des couches intellectuelles de la bourgeoisie et de la petite bourgeoisie, et elle est devenue plus complaisante à l'égard de l'influence des ennemis de classe. D'autre part, le gros du prolétariat, qui avait donné son avant-garde à l'appareil bureaucratique de l'État, après la formidable tension des premières années de la révolution, a manifesté une grande passivité politique. Au cours de la période de reconstruction, quand sa situation matérielle s'est améliorée rapidement, les défaites de la révolution au plan international ont pesé lourd dans ce sens. Il faut ajouter l'influence du régime du parti. Le prolétariat charrie encore largement avec lui l'héritage du passé capitaliste. Les premières années de la révolution ont porté au premier plan les éléments les plus actifs de la classe, les plus révolutionnaires, les plus bolcheviques. A l'heure actuelle, ceux qui sont devant, ce sont l'élite des domestiques, de ceux qui savent courber l'échine. Les éléments « remuants » sont mis à l'écart et pourchassés et c'est une source d'affaiblissement du parti et de la classe. Cela les désarme devant l'ennemi. Ainsi la pression grandissante des forces bourgeoises sur l'État ouvrier s'est-elle jusqu'à présent exercée sans se heurter à une résistance active de la masse essentielle du prolétariat. Une telle situation ne peut se prolonger indéfiniment. Il y a tout lieu de penser que l'intérêt manifesté par les masses des ouvriers sans-parti pour la discussion d'avant le 15e congrès en liaison avec la campagne des contrats collectifs, montre que de larges masses ouvrières commencent à s'éveiller et à s'intéresser aux problèmes politiques fondamentaux d'aujourd'hui en même temps que commence à s'emparer d'eux l'inquiétude pour le sort de la dictature prolétarienne.

Au fur et à mesure que grandira l'activité du prolétariat, la demande adressée à l'opposition dans les milieux ouvriers grandira également. Au cours des années où elle a lutté contre le reflux à l'intérieur du parti (1923-1927), l'Opposition n'a pu que freiner ce processus. On ne peut sérieusement arrêter semblable processus autrement que par le développement de la lutte de classe du prolétariat, dirigée contre la nouvelle bourgeoisie, contre les influences non prolétariennes qui s'exercent sur l'État ouvrier, et contre l'impérialisme mondial. Le prolétariat est habitué à prendre conscience des dangers et à réagir contre eux par l'intermédiaire de son parti. Le monopole dont le parti jouit depuis 1917 a encore renforcé son rôle. La gravité de la situation consiste en ce que le régime du parti freine et paralyse l'activité du prolétariat en même temps que la théorie officielle du parti le tranquillise et l'endort. C'est pour cette raison et dans de telles conditions que l'Opposition porte une grande responsabilité.

Oustrialovisme et menchevisme

Boukharine opère un rapprochement entre le point de vue de l'Opposition et celui d'Oustrialov. En quoi est-ce le clou du caractère charlatanesque de cette théorie ? Oustrialov parle ouvertement du caractère inéluctable de Thermidor, étape du salut dans le développement national de la révolution d'Octobre. L'Opposition, elle, parle du danger de Thermidor et montre la voie de la lutte contre ce danger. Comme il glisse vers la droite, le centrisme est obligé de se fermer les yeux devant le danger et de nier même sa possibilité. Il n'est pas possible de rendre à Thermidor un service plus grand que de nier la réalité du danger thermidorien. La tentative de rapprocher le point de vue de l'Opposition sur Thermidor de celui des mencheviks n'est pas moins charlatanesque. Les mencheviks estiment que le danger bonapartiste a sa source essentielle dans le régime de la dictature prolétarienne, que l'erreur principale est de compter sur la révolution mondiale, qu'une politique juste exige un repli dans les limites économiques et politiques de la bourgeoisie et que, pour se sauver de Thermidor et du bonapartisme, il faut revenir à la démocratie, c'est-à-dire au régime parlementaire bourgeois. L'Opposition, pour sa part, ne nie nullement le danger de Thermidor, mais, bien au contraire, s'efforce de concentrer sur lui l'attention de l'avant-garde prolétarienne, car elle pense que la source politique principale de ce danger réside dans le comportement insuffisamment ferme de la dictature prolétarienne, l'insuffisance des liens avec la révolution mondiale, un esprit de conciliation excessif à l'égard de la bourgeoisie, de l'intérieur comme de l'extérieur. La démocratie parlementaire n'est pour nous qu'une des formes de la domination du capital.

Le menchevisme est thermidorien d'un bout à l'autre. Oustrialov, dans son thermidorianisme, est réaliste. Le menchevisme est utopique d'un bout à l'autre. Est-il vraisemblable en effet qu'en cas de défaite de la dictature, celle-ci se transforme en démocratie bourgeoise ? Non. C'est la moins vraisemblable de toutes les variantes. Jamais encore dans l'Histoire la dictature révolutionnaire n'a été remplacée par la démocratie. Thermidor, par son essence même, est un régime de transition de kerenskysme à rebours. Le kerenskysme de 1917 a couvert la dualité du pouvoir, s'est débattu dans son cadre et, contre son gré, a servi au prolétariat pour arracher le pouvoir des mains de la bourgeoisie. L'avènement du régime thermidorien signifierait décréter à nouveau la dualité du pouvoir – avec prépondérance de la bourgeoisie – et, de nouveau, ce régime, contre son gré, aiderait la bourgeoisie à arracher le pouvoir des mains du prolétariat. Le régime thermidorien, par nature, ne pourrait durer indéfiniment. Son rôle objectif consisterait à couvrir l'accession au pouvoir de la bourgeoisie à travers les organismes soviétiques familiers aux travailleurs. Mais la résistance du prolétariat, ses tentatives de se maintenir ou de regagner les positions perdues, deviendraient inévitables. Pour venir à bout île telles tentatives et se renforcer véritablement, la bourgeoisie éprouverait d'urgence le besoin, non d'un régime thermidorien, mais d'un régime bien plus fort, beaucoup plus résolu, le plus vraisemblablement du bonapartisme, ou, plus actuel, du fascisme.

Les mencheviks, en tant qu'aile gauche de la société bourgeoise, combattraient sous le bonapartisme pour la légalité. Ce faisant, ils serviraient de soupape de sûreté pour le régime bourgeois. Les bolcheviks-léninistes, cependant, combattraient pour la conquête du pouvoir sous la forme de la dictature du prolétariat.

La question du « délai »

La question générale du danger thermidorien soulève des questions plus concrètes. Quelle est la proximité de ce danger ? Thermidor n'a-t-il pas déjà commencé ? Quels sont les indices réels sur son accomplissement ou non ?

La question du rythme auquel se produisent les divers changements est très importante pour notre tactique. Le rythme des nouveaux alignements politiques à l'intérieur des classes et entre elles est beaucoup plus difficile à déterminer que le rythme des processus économiques dans le pays. En tout cas, ceux qui s'attendent à ce que le processus de recul se poursuive au rythme actuel pendant des années font une grosse erreur. C'est, de toutes les perspectives, la plus improbable. Dans le processus de déclin, il pourra y avoir, et il y aura, des mouvements très brusques sous la pression des forces bourgeoisies de l'intérieur et de l'extérieur. Le temps qu'ils prendront, on ne peut le prédire. Ce pourrait être plus bref que nous le pensons. Ceux qui ne veulent pas s'en rendre compte, qui repoussent cette idée, seront inévitablement pris à l'improviste. Il n'est pas besoin de rappeler que la capitulation de Zinoviev et Kamenev les a confrontés, dès le tout début, à la nécessité d'enjoliver la situation, de minimiser le danger et d'endormir la gauche du parti. Quelques camarades ont lié la question du rythme de Thermidor avec la question de la composition du C.C. en tant qu'incarnation de l'autorité du pouvoir et de la révolution. Aussi longtemps que les Oppositionnels ont été tolérés au C.C., ils ont joué le rôle de frein sur ceux qui reculaient et la politique du C.C., selon les termes de Tomsky, n'était « ni chair ni poisson », c'est-à-dire que le recul vers Thermidor rencontrait de la résistance à l'intérieur. L'élimination du C.C. des Oppositionnels – c'est ce que pensaient les camarades que j'ai mentionnés – signifierait que ceux qui opèrent cette retraite ne pouvaient plus collaborer avec les représentants de la ligne prolétarienne internationale. Cela signifierait donc le début officiel de Thermidor. Cette manière de poser la question est pour le moins incomplète et, pour cette raison, ne peut conduire qu'à des conclusions fausses.

La force de l'Opposition consiste en ce que, armée de la méthode marxiste, elle peut prévoir le cours du développement et mettre en garde. La « force » de la fraction stalinienne consiste dans son abandon de l'orientation marxiste : la fraction stalinienne joue aujourd'hui un rôle que ne peuvent jouer que des gens qui portent des œillères, se dispensent de regarder à gauche et à droite et ne regardent pas devant eux les conséquences à venir. La fraction stalinienne considère les prédictions marxistes de l'Opposition comme des injures personnelles, des calomnies, etc., révélant en cela les caractères typiques de son étroitesse d'esprit petite-bourgeoise. Et c'est pourquoi elle attaque l'Opposition avec une fureur redoublée.

Cela signifie-t-il toutefois que l'exclusion et même l'amputation de l'Opposition tout entière constitue le passage à Thermidor, devenu un fait accompli ? Non, il s'agit seulement de la préparation à Thermidor dans le cadre du parti. La fraction stalinienne, en abattant la barrière prolétarienne de gauche, est en train, contre son propre gré, de paver la voie à la marche au pouvoir de la bourgeoisie. Mais ce phénomène n'est pas encore accompli, ni en politique, ni dans l'économie, ni dans la culture, ni dans la vie quotidienne. Pour assurer dans la réalité la victoire de Thermidor, il est nécessaire en premier lieu de supprimer (ou de limiter) le monopole du commerce extérieur, de réviser les instructions électorales, etc.

Les forces de pression thermidoriennes de même que les forces de résistance prolétariennes, pourront seulement se révéler dans le procès de la lutte réelle des classes. C'est pourquoi on ne peut pas considérer la mise de l'Opposition hors du parti comme l'accomplissement déjà effectué de Thermidor. A vrai dire, une telle appréciation pourrait être juste si la marche ultérieure des événements montrait que, de l'intérieur du parti, il ne peut plus venir de nouveaux éléments à l'Opposition et que, dans la classe ouvrière, il ne saurait surgir de nouvelles forces pour résister à l'assaut de la bourgeoisie, et que par suite, l'intervention d'une Opposition peu nombreuse ne serait que le dernier bouillonnement de la vague d'Octobre. On ne peut formuler une telle appréciation parce qu'il n'y a pas de causes pour penser que le prolétariat, en dépit des phénomènes de passivité et de luttes avortées, phénomènes qui se sont manifestés dans son sein au cours de la période écoulée, n'est pas capable de île fendre les conquêtes d'Octobre contre la bourgeoisie intérieure et extérieure, ce qui signifierait capituler avant la lutte et sans lutte. Il est absolument hors de doute que la poussée ultérieure à droite grossira le flux vers l'Opposition des éléments ouvriers du parti, et augmentera l'influence de ses idées sur la classe ouvrière. La question du délai dans lequel peut se produire Thermidor, et les chances de son succès ou de son insuccès, cela, en général, n'est pas et ne peut pas être une question de pure analyse théorique ou de pronostic. Il s'agit de la lutte de forces vives. Le résultat doit être déterminé dans l'action elle-même. La lutte intérieure du parti, malgré toute son acuité, n'est qu'un prélude à l'époque des combats de classe. Toutes les tâches sont encore entièrement devant nous.

Il est clair, qu'en cas de marche plus rapide et plus favorable du mouvement révolutionnaire en Occident et en Orient, l'Opposition accomplira beaucoup plus facilement sa tâche historique. Mais au cas où la Révolution mondiale serait différée, la lutte ne serait nullement sans espoir. L'Opposition ne se chargera certes pas de construire le socialisme dans un seul pays. Si l'on part du fait que l'impérialisme demeurera victorieux en Occident et en Orient pendant plusieurs années, ce serait un pur enfantillage de penser que le prolétariat en U.R.S.S. pourrait garder le pouvoir et construire le socialisme contre l'impérialisme mondial victorieux. Mais une telle sorte de perspective mondiale n'est en rien fondée. Les contradictions de l'économie mondiale ne s'adoucissent pas, mais s'aiguisent. Ce ne seront pas les grandes commotions qui manqueront. Cela, l'Opposition l'a précisément enseigné, par exemple, lors des événements de Chine, du Comité anglo-russe etc. Les succès dans cette voie sont seulement possibles à condition que soient assurées la défense et la pratique du bolchevisme véritable, fût-ce, pour un temps, à titre de petite minorité.

Mais, si même tout le développement de la lutte dans la prochaine période se montrait entièrement défavorable à la dictature du prolétariat en U.R.S.S., et aboutissait à sa chute, alors, même dans ce cas, le travail de l'Opposition garderait toute son importance. L'achèvement de Thermidor signifierait inéluctablement la scission du parti. L'Opposition serait l'expression des cadres révolutionnaires, et dans ce cas formerait, non « un deuxième parti », mais le prolongement historique du parti bolchevique. Le « deuxième » parti serait formé par l'union des éléments bureaucratiques et propriétaires, possédant déjà leur point d'appui sur le flanc droit. Le deuxième parti ne serait, à vrai dire, qu'une étape pour la bourgeoisie impérialiste intérieure et étrangère. La tâche du parti bolchevique, après la révolution bourgeoise, consisterait à préparer la deuxième révolution prolétarienne. Aujourd'hui, toutefois, il s'agit de prévenir un tel développement, en ayant recours au noyau prolétarien du parti et à la classe ouvrière dans son ensemble.

Perspectives

Le parti une fois formellement amputé de l'Opposition, les classes non prolétariennes se sentiront beaucoup plus d'assurance. Leur pression se renforcera encore. Les formes et méthodes de cette pression se feront toujours plus variées et plus enveloppantes : depuis la pression du chef d'équipe sur les ouvriers à l'usine jusqu'à la pression de la bourgeoisie européenne et américaine dans la question du monopole du commerce extérieur.

Si même nous prenons comme point de départ cette supposition que la pression de la bourgeoisie intérieure et internationale doit se terminer victorieusement, (mais ceci n'est nullement résolu par avance) alors, même en ce cas, il est impossible de s'imaginer que tout va se passer sans heurts, par le moyen d'un glissement accéléré, sans obstacles, sans tentatives de contre-pression prolétarienne de la part de la gauche. Précisément, l'offensive croissante des classes non prolétariennes doit pousser des couches de plus en plus larges sur la voie de la lutte active. Pour « diriger » la défense du noyau ouvrier du parti, aussi bien que de la classe ouvrière dans son ensemble, elles ont besoin de l'Opposition, même en cas de développement très défavorable des événements. Il est inutile d'expliquer que le noyau prolétarien du parti et la classe ouvrière ne se tourneront vers l'Opposition que si celle-ci sait, dans toutes les questions de la vie et de la lutte des masses, montrer que ses points de vue correspondent aux intérêts même du prolétariat. Cela suppose de l'activité de la part de l'Opposition, son intervention permanente dans tous les procès économiques, politiques et culturels de la vie ouvrière.

La fraction Staline se trouve non seulement sous la menace de la pression croissante venant de droite, mais aussi de l'inéluctable résistance de la gauche. Les stalinistes fulminent contre l'Opposition, espérant se rendre eux-mêmes maîtres de l'inéluctable résistance de la gauche contre les forces qui surgissent de droite.

Les éléments de l'aile droite du parti, de même que les éléments oustrialovistes de l'appareil d'État, comprennent la nécessité de certaines manœuvres vers la gauche, mais ils craignent que ces manœuvres puissent aller trop loin. Les déments du flanc droit, qui, appartenant ou non au parti, participent à la solution de toutes les questions du parti, sont caractérisés par leur liaison organique avec les nouveaux propriétaires. Ils ne peuvent accepter que des manœuvres qui, si elles comportent certains « sacrifices » en faveur du prolétariat, ne compromettent pas la situation matérielle des classes exploiteuses et ne rétrécissent pas leur rôle politique. C'est précisément de ce point de vue que se pose pour eux la question de la journée de sept heures, la question des salaires, l'aide aux pauvres de la campagne, etc. Les manœuvres de gauche ne sauveront pas la politique de Staline. La queue va frapper la tête. La croissance de l'aile droite s'exprime dans l'immédiat par la prépondérance croissante de l'appareil de l'État sur l'appareil du parti. Il est possible de suivre clairement la croissance de ce procès au cours des deux années qui se sont écoulées entre le 14e et le 15e Congrès. Le 14e Congrès du parti fut l'apogée de l'appareil du parti et en même temps de Staline. Le 15e Congrès a révélé un sérieux déplacement des forces vers la droite. Les fières déclarations des fonctionnaires de l'appareil centriste, selon lesquelles ils vont détruire en passant l'aile droite aussi, ne se sont pas réalisées. Le bureau politique est demeuré aussi oscillant qu'il l'était avant le 15e Congrès. La composition du nouveau comité central et de la nouvelle commission centrale de contrôle a introduit de nouvelles figures qui y sont entrées exclusivement en qualité de fonctionnaires. Le 15e Congrès a révélé l'affaiblissement de l'appareil du parti dans le système général du régime soviétique. La lutte Staline-Rykov reflète dans une large mesure la lutte des deux appareils où se réfracte à son tour la lutte de classe. La pression des classes non prolétariennes, largement et directement, se manifeste à travers l'appareil d'État. Cela ne signifie pas, toutefois, qu'elle se meut dans des cadres de classe bien clairs. Dans l'avenir, quand la politique de « sur place », la politique qui consiste à éluder les questions, à attendre, deviendra impossible, Staline pourra, avec succès, enfourcher le cheval de droite et liquider Rykov. Tout simplement se mettre à sa place. Mais même cette question ne peut être résolue sans de nouveaux déplacements de forces et sans de profondes secousses dans le parti. Les difficultés économiques s'approchent et menacent avec une force inexorable. L'Opposition a eu raison, aussi bien dans la compréhension de la situation économique du pays que dans ses prévisions concernant la marche future des événements. Les échecs graves dans la réquisition de blé pendant le premier trimestre sont l'indication d'une atteinte sérieuse à l'équilibre de toute l'économie de l'U.R.S.S. Une entorse sérieuse a déjà été faite au plan d'exportation et par suite au plan d'importation. Le manque de produits alimentaires a déjà contraint des centres ouvriers parmi les plus importants, comme Léningrad, à passer au système de la carte de rationnement. La cause spécifique des difficultés économiques pour l'année 1927-1928 réside dans l'inflation monétaire. Celle-ci a aggravé les difficultés de notre économie qui sont la conséquence du retard de l'industrie, de la disproportion etc.

L'inflation monétaire a été tout d'abord l'expression de ce fait que les dépenses réelles de l'économie d'État sont devenues beaucoup plus fortes que ses revenus réels ; et deuxièmement qu'une telle situation dans notre pays mène inéluctablement à porter atteinte à la liaison entre la ville et la campagne. Il n'est possible d'obtenir les moyens réels d'industrialiser plus vite le pays qu'en ayant recours à une sérieuse révision de la répartition des revenus nationaux, révision effectuée au bénéfice des éléments socialistes de notre économie. Faute de cela, même le plan actuellement en cours d'exécution pour les dépenses de capital a déterminé une situation très tendue des possibilités d'émission de papier-monnaie.

La lutte actuellement menée contre les difficultés économiques (renforcement du ravitaillement des campagnes en marchandises industrielles en privant le marché des villes) peut conduire à des succès partiels dans des compartiments séparés, au prix de nouvelles difficultés dans d'autres endroits. Toute la situation économique révèle la faillite de la politique actuelle qui consiste à trouver des solutions au coup par coup en fonction d'une ligne générale fausse.

Le plan de l'Opposition a été repoussé ; le groupe Staline n'a aucun plan, tandis que les éléments de droite ont peur de parler à haute voix de leurs véritables intentions : telle est la situation de la direction économique en ce moment. Ce qui est le plus vraisemblable, c'est que la situation économique ultérieure devenant plus aiguë, la ligne de la droite triomphera, et cela, la plate-forme de l'Opposition l'a prévu d'une manière absolument juste. A la base de la crise aiguë qui se manifeste actuellement dans la situation économique, il y a, comme racine, la disproportion entre l'économie industrielle et l'économie paysanne. Il n'est possible de faire disparaître cette disproportion que de deux manières : soit par les méthodes de régulation du plan et par une politique appropriée des impôts, des prix, des crédits, etc., soit par les moyens élémentaires du marché, non seulement du marché intérieur qui, pour cela, est certainement insuffisant, mais aussi par les moyens du marché extérieur. La première voie, c'est la voie de la plus juste répartition des revenus nationaux. La seconde, c'est celle qui consiste à supprimer aussi le monopole du commerce extérieur.

La clé de la situation, c'est la question du monopole du commerce extérieur. Il est hors de doute que la suppression du monopole du commerce extérieur, ou sa limitation, qui toucherait à son essence même, mènerait dans les premiers temps à une augmentation importante des forces productives. Les marchandises deviendraient meilleur marché. Les salaires s'élèveraient. Le pouvoir d'achat du rouble paysan grandirait. Mais l'ensemble signifierait la marche accélérée de l'économie nationale vers la liaison avec le capital mondial Dans ces conditions, la dictature du prolétariat ne pourrait être maintenue que pendant un court délai, ne pouvant pas s'évaluer en années. La restauration de la servitude capitaliste signifierait le partage, direct ou indirect, de la Russie en sphères d'influences ; elle serait entraînée dans la politique des secousses guerrières de l'impérialisme mondial, avec la perspective de la ruine et du dépérissement, comme en Chine. Dans la première période, la suppression du monopole du commerce extérieur donnerait indubitablement une impulsion aux forces productrices et une élévation temporaire du bien-être des masses travailleuses. C'est précisément dans ce sens qu'exerce sa pression le koulak, qui ne lâche pas son blé, de même que le capitaliste américain ne lâche aucun crédit.

Il n'est pas nécessaire de penser que la droite lancera le mot d'ordre de la suppression du monopole du commerce extérieur. Il y a beaucoup de moyens détournés et partiels comme l'a montré l'Histoire, lors des instructions pour les élections aux soviets. Dans les premiers temps, la pression s'exercera par ces voies détournées. La revendication de la suppression du monopole du commerce extérieur peut être assez rapidement présentée sous sa forme la plus large. On dira aux ouvriers : « Certes, Lénine était pour le monopole, mais tout dépend des conditions de temps et de lieu. Notre doctrine n'est pas un dogme. La situation a changé. Le développement des forces productives exige aussi quelque chose d'autre. » La politique actuelle, qui mène à une impasse, se prolongeant, il est absolument hors de doute que le mot d'ordre de la suppression par degrés du monopole du commerce extérieur peut entraîner derrière lui une partie de la classe ouvrière.

La pression de la droite s'exercera simultanément dans plusieurs directions. La prévision du système des élections vient de nouveau à l'ordre du jour. La politique fiscale, les droits de l'administration sur les usines et fabriques, la politique des crédits, et particulièrement dans les campagnes, etc., etc., toutes ces questions se poseront de nouveau sous la pression de la droite. Staline et son appareil se heurteront demain à cette pression et révéleront leur impuissance devant elle. On peut écarter les rykovistes et préparer la destitution de Rykov lui-même. Ces plaisanteries bureaucratiques ne résolvent pas la question. La pression de droite ne se réfracte pas seulement à travers le groupe Rykov. Cette pression est elle-même beaucoup plus profonde que la fraction Rykov. Elle provient des nouveaux possédants et des bureaucrates qui lui sont liés. Il faut, ou bien s'appuyer sur ces nouveaux possédants contre les ouvriers, ou bien s'appuyer sur les ouvriers contre leurs prétentions.

Tout cela réuni signifie que la formation des fractions se fera scion un rythme puissant sur l'aile droite, aussi bien à l'intérieur du parti qu'en dehors. Le cercle de l'appareil ne viendra pas à bout de la pression de classe. La logique de la situation est telle que le 15e Congrès, conformément à toutes les données, constitue le début de la poussée fractionnelle de droite du parti. Dans ces conditions, le rôle de l'aile gauche sera décisif pour le sort du parti et de la dictature du prolétariat. La critique de l'opportunisme, une juste orientation de classe, de justes mots d'ordre, l'éducation des meilleurs éléments révolutionnaires du parti, ce travail est particulièrement nécessaire et obligatoire en tout temps et à chaque occasion. La tâche de l'Opposition consiste à assurer la continuité du parti bolchevique authentique. Pendant une certaine période, cela signifiera aller contre le courant.

L'Opposition et l'Internationale

La résolution du 15e congrès, d'après le compte rendu du comité central dit :

« Dans le moment présent, en Europe, le reflux, d'une faible durée, de la vague révolutionnaire (après la défaite de la Révolution allemande de 1923) se change de nouveau en une vague montante par l'élévation de l'activité combative du prolétariat, etc. »

Nous avons de cette façon le premier aveu officiel fait ouvertement de ce qu'après la défaite de la révolution allemande en l'année 1923, le mouvement ouvrier a reflué en Europe – au moins sur le continent d'Europe – pendant environ quatre années. Que l'on allait avoir à faire face à ce reflux, cela pouvait et devait être prévu déjà en novembre-décembre 1923. C'est précisément dans cette période que l'Opposition a prédit que viendrait inéluctablement une certaine « pacification » dans les rapports capitalistes, qu'on assisterait inéluctablement à une invasion croissante de la part de l'Amérique dans le domaine de l'économie et de la politique européenne, et que, parallèlement à celà, se produirait inéluctablement un renforcement temporaire de la social-démocratie au détriment du communisme. Alors, ce pronostic marxiste fut qualifié de liquidateur. Le 5e Congrès de l'Internationale, réuni en 1924, fut conduit, dans l'ensemble, de ce point de vue que la vague révolutionnaire continuerait probablement à monter et que de là découlait la tâche d' « organiser » immédiatement la révolution. L'insurrection d'Estonie fut l'un des fruits les plus apparents de cette manière d'envisager les choses. Ce que l'on a appelé la « bolchevisation » des partis de l'Internationale, proclamé par le 5e Congrès, en liaison avec la tendance à écarter des éléments réellement indignes et corrompus, comportait aussi la lutte contre une juste appréciation marxiste des phases de l'époque impérialiste et de ses flux et reflux, appréciation sans laquelle, d'une manière générale, la stratégie révolutionnaire du bolchevisme est impossible. La position fausse prise par le 5e Congrès a inévitablement alimenté les erreurs et les tendances ultra-gauchistes.

Quand le reflux, au moment où il se produisit, eût révélé toute sa profondeur, la nouvelle direction de l'Internationale, devenue sage après coup, frappa les éléments de gauche des partis communistes. Le système de la permanence des dirigeants mis en pratique ces dernières années, n'a cessé de se renforcer dans l'Internationale.

La tâche la plus importante du 6e Congrès est d'apprécier d'une manière juste les erreurs fondamentales de la position prise par le 5e Congrès et de condamner d'une manière décisive cette direction dont l'incurie et le suivisme en présence de chaque tournant brusque des événements met sens dessus dessous les comités centraux des sections nationales des partis et ainsi ne permet pas de former des cadres dirigeants capables de s'orienter dans le changement des périodes de flux et de reflux du mouvement ouvrier.

Dans la classe ouvrière d'Europe, on observe indubitablement un déplacement vers la gauche. Il s'exprime par le renforcement de la lutte gréviste et l'augmentation des voix communistes, mais ce n'est que la première étape de ce développement. Le nombre des voix social-démocrates augmente parallèlement à celui des voix communistes, distançant même en partie ces derniers. Si ce processus se développe et s'approfondit, une seconde phase se produira alors, avec le début du déplacement de la social-démocratie vers le communisme.

Simultanément il faudra renforcer l'organisation des partis communistes, renforcement qu'il n'est pas encore possible de constater aujourd'hui. Un des plus grands obstacles à la croissance et au renforcement des partis communistes, c'est l'orientation politique de l'Internationale et son régime interne.

La poursuite de l'attaque contre la gauche va entraîner un nouvel écart des ciseaux entre le cours droitier du parti et le déplacement à gauche de la classe ouvrière. Une situation révolutionnaire peut, dans une des plus prochaines étapes, se déclarer ouvertement dans les pays d'Europe avec la même force et la même acuité qu'à Vienne. Toute la question réside dans la force des partis de l'Internationale communiste, dans leur ligne politique, dans leur direction. Les événements récents de Canton, complément aventurier de la politique menchevique, montrent que ce serait le plus grand crime de se créer à soi-même quelque illusion que ce soit sur la ligne politique actuelle de la direction dans les questions internationales. Seule l'Opposition, par un travail systématique, opiniâtre, persévérant et ininterrompu, est capable d'aider les partis communistes d'Occident et d'Orient à aller sur la voie bolchevique et à se montrer à la hauteur des situations révolutionnaires qui ne manqueront pas dans les années qui viennent. L'Opposition en U.R.S.S. ne peut remplir sa tâche que comme facteur révolutionnaire. La rupture de Kamenev et de Zinoviev avec la gauche de l'Internationale n'en est que plus inadmissible.

La question des deux partis

La lutte officielle contre l'Opposition se mène sous deux mots d'ordres essentiels : contre deux partis et contre le « trotskysme ». La prétendue lutte de Staline contre deux partis masque la formation d'une dualité de pouvoir dans le pays et la formation d'un parti bourgeois sur le flanc droit du parti russe et sous le couvert de son drapeau.

Dans toute une série d'institutions et dans les bureaux des secrétariats, ont lieu des conférences secrètes des membres de l'appareil du parti avec les spécialistes et les professeurs partisans d'Oustrialov en vue d'élaborer les méthodes et les mots d'ordre pour lutter contre l'Opposition. Ça, c'est la formation clandestine d'un deuxième parti qui, par tous les moyens, s'efforce de subordonner, et, partiellement, subordonne le noyau prolétarien de notre parti en même temps qu'il menace son aile gauche. Tout en masquant la formation de ce deuxième parti, l'appareil accuse l'Opposition de s'efforcer de créer un deuxième parti, et cela précisément parce que l'Opposition s'efforce de soustraire à la pression croissante de la bourgeoisie le noyau prolétarien du parti (faute de quoi il serait en général impossible de sauver l'unité du parti bolchevique). Ce serait pure illusion de penser qu'il est possible de maintenir la dictature du prolétariat, seulement par des adjurations verbales en faveur d'un parti indivisible.

La question : un ou deux partis – posée d'un point de vue concret, d'un point de vue de classe, et non d'un point de vue d'agitation verbale – sera résolue précisément par la question de savoir si on réussira à éveiller et à mobiliser les forces de résistance dans le parti et dans le prolétariat. L'Opposition ne peut atteindre ce but que si elle ne se laisse pas intimider par l'épouvantail des deux partis et par le charlatanisme en ce qui concerne le « trotskysme ».

Dans les thèses du camarade Zinoviev intitulées « Bilan du plénum de juillet », il est dit ce qui suit à propos de la question de deux partis :

« Si Staline exclut par paquets les oppositionnels du parti, il peut passer demain à des exclusions bien plus massives. Oui, c'est ainsi. Et néanmoins, cela ne nous fait en aucun cas aboutir au « mot d'ordre » des « deux partis ».

L'affaire se complique du fait que, sous le régime de Staline, il n'est pas possible de lutter pour les idées de Lénine autrement qu'en courant le risque d'être exclu du parti. C'est tout à fait indiscutable. Celui qui n'a pas réglé cette question pour lui-même et se dit que tout vaut mieux que d'être exclu du parti, ne peut, dans les conditions actuelles, combattre véritablement pour le léninisme ni prendre une position ferme d'« oppositionnel ».

« Il peut très bien arriver que des groupes importants d'Oppositionnels (et au nombre de ceux-ci tous les éléments dirigeants de l'Opposition), soient dans quelque temps chassés du parti. Et cependant, leur tâche sera de continuer leur travail et quoique n'étant plus formellement membres du parti, de ne pas s'éloigner d'un iota des enseignements de Lénine. Leur tâche sera, dans cette période particulièrement difficile, non pas de s'orienter vers la formation d'un deuxième parti, mais de continuer à s'orienter vers le redressement du parti, vers la correction de la ligne politique. Disons-le sans phrases : il est extrêmement difficile pour un léniniste exclu du parti de coordonner son travail avec celui des léninistes demeurés dans le parti. Mais faire cela est absolument nécessaire du point de vue de nos buts essentiels. »

Et plus loin :

« Ainsi que l'atteste toute l'expérience de la lutte, l'Opposition est unanime à considérer que la lutte pour l'unité du parti sur la base léniniste ne doit, en aucun cas, se réduire à se mettre à l'unisson de l'appareil, à atténuer les divergences et à baisser le ton politiquement. Lorsque les camarades se détachent de l'opposition pour aller à droite, ils n'invoquent pas pour expliquer leur départ, leur propre glissement vers le point de vue de Staline sur les questions intérieures et internationales, mais ils accusent l'Opposition de s'orienter vers le deuxième parti. En d'autres termes, ils ne font que répéter l'accusation lancée par Staline afin de masquer leur propre reculade. » (p. 14 et 15)

Il est vrai que nous ne sommes pas maintenant en juillet mais en décembre ; ces lignes conservent pourtant aujourd'hui toute leur force.

Répétons-le une fois encore. Si la droite, à l'intérieur du parti et autour, se rassemblait et gagnait à ses idées, au cours de la période prochaine, une fraction importante du noyau prolétarien du parti, la création d'un second parti deviendrait inévitable, ce qui signifierait la chute de la dictature et par conséquent la défaite des travailleurs. C'est la voie politique de la victoire des oustrialovistes. La voie opposée ne peut être imaginée que sous la forme de l'isolement de l'aile droite au moyen de la lutte oppositionnelle contre le centrisme de l'appareil et pour gagner l'influence sur le noyau prolétarien du parti. La dictature du prolétariat ne peut pas se maintenir longtemps sur la base de défaites successives de la gauche prolétarienne. Au contraire, la dictature, non seulement est compatible avec l'isolement et la liquidation politique de l'aile droite, mais elle exige impérieusement une telle liquidation. C'est pourquoi capituler devant le centrisme de l'appareil, au nom d'on ne sait qu'elle unité du parti, signifierait travailler directement et véritablement pour l'existence de deux partis, c'est-à-dire pour l'écroulement de la dictature du prolétariat.

La capitulation de Zinoviev et Kamenev

Si l'Opposition avait fait au congrès une déclaration ferme et loyale – une déclaration et non une demi-douzaine – si, sur aucune question politique, et en particulier, sur les causes du fractionnisme, elle n'avait agi contre sa conscience, notre situation serait incomparablement plus favorable.

Les hésitations dans les rangs de l'Opposition se sont produites, non pas à la base, mais au sommet. La conduite des camarades Zinoviev et Kamenev constitue un fait absolument inouï dans l'histoire du mouvement révolutionnaire, et même, si l'on veut, dans l'histoire de la lutte politique en général. Zinoviev et Kamenev ont formellement pris comme point de départ l'unité du parti considérée comme le critère suprême et, par leur conduite, ils ont affirmé qu'on ne pouvait obtenir cette unité en luttant pour ses idées, mais seulement par une reculade sur le terrain des idées.

Mais c'est pour le parti le blâme le plus impitoyable qu'on puisse imaginer. Cette conduite en effet contribue non à préserver l'unité du parti, mais à le démoraliser.

Elle justifie en quelque sorte les éléments de carriérisme, de duplicité, de poursuite d'intérêts personnels. Refuser de défendre ses positions revient à justifier en particulier le comportement de cette large couche de membres du parti corrompus et bornés qui pensent comme l'Opposition mais votent comme la majorité.

La reculade de Zinoviev et de Kamenev résulte de cette croyance mensongère selon laquelle il serait possible, dans n'importe quelle situation historique, de se tirer d'affaire en recourant à d'astucieuses manœuvres, au lieu de se maintenir sur une ligne politique principielle. C'est la pire caricature du léninisme. Caractérisant la politique de manœuvre de Lénine, nous disons dans notre plate-forme :

« De son temps (du temps de Lénine), le parti a toujours connu les causes de la manœuvre, sa signification, ses limites, la ligne en deçà de laquelle il ne faut pas reculer, et les positions desquelles doit partir à nouveau l'offensive prolétarienne... Grâce à cela, l'armée, tout en manœuvrant, a toujours maintenu sa cohésion, et la conscience de ses buts. »

Toutes ces conditions de la manœuvre léniniste ont été foulées aux pieds d'une manière qui viole tous les principes, par Zinoviev et par Kamenev. Nourrir l'espoir que, dans quelques mois, le document capitulard sera « enfoui » sous de nouveaux événements et sous de nouvelles luttes, c'est se tromper soi-même de façon pitoyable. Assurément, les éléments indifférents du parti passeront outre à ce document, mais les cadres de la fraction staliniste, de même que l'Opposition, ne l'oublieront pas et, au prochain tournant, l'évoqueront devant la classe ouvrière.

La capitulation politique de Zinoviev et de Kamenev s'explique par la tentative de passer d'une position révolutionnaire à une position centriste de gauche faisant contrepoids à la position centriste de droite occupée par Staline. Le centrisme peut se maintenir longtemps dans une époque de développement lent (le kautskysme avant la guerre) ; dans les conditions de l'époque actuelle, le centrisme est obligé d'abandonner rapidement ses positions et d'aller, soit à gauche, soit à droite. Lors de la montée du mouvement ouvrier, il n'est pas rare de voir le centrisme de gauche constituer un pont menant vers la position révolutionnaire. Lors d'une période de dépression, comme c'est le cas actuellement, le centrisme de gauche n'est qu'un pont conduisant de l'Opposition vers Staline. Le groupe Zinoviev-Kamenev ne pourra jouer aucun rôle indépendant. Sa capitulation est un déplacement de forces au sommet sous l'énorme pression exercée de l'intérieur et de l'extérieur sur l'aile révolutionnaire du parti russe et de l'Internationale. Les événements « enfouiront » la déclaration capitularde du 18 décembre en ce sens seulement qu'ils enjamberont le groupe Zinoviev-Kamenev.

Sur le « Trotskysme »

Zinoviev et Kamenev, qui ont pris une part dirigeante dans la création de la légende sur le trotskysme au cours des années 1924 et 1925, ont dit dans la déclaration de juillet 1926 :

« A l'heure actuelle, personne ne peut plus mettre en doute que le noyau essentiel de l'Opposition de 1923 a justement mis en garde contre le danger d'un écart hors de la ligne prolétarienne et contre l'avènement menaçant du régime de l'appareil. »

Il est absolument clair que si l'Opposition de 1923 a, depuis plus de deux ans, mis en garde contre les dangers essentiels menaçant le parti et la dictature du prolétariat, accuser cette Opposition de ce que l'on a nommé le « trotskysme », n'a pu que fournir une base pour les erreurs les plus graves dans la manière de comprendre la situation ainsi que les tâches qui en découlent. Conjointement avec les dirigeants de l'Opposition de 1923, Zinoviev et Kamenev ont élaboré les documents essentiels de l'Opposition, et parmi eux, le plus important de tous : la plate-forme Il est clair que les accusations de déviations petites-bourgeoises, de « trotskysme », etc. se trouvent par là même réduites en poussière.

La tentative attardée de relancer la lutte contre une « rechute » du trotskysme ne représente rien d'autre qu'une lamentable rechute de Zinoviev et Kamenev dans leurs propres erreurs de 1923, erreurs qui ont aidé à déplacer le régime du parti de la voie léniniste sur une voie glissant vers le marécage du centrisme et de l'opportunisme.

Le bilan du bloc

La capitulation de Zinoviev et de Kamenev pose de nouveau la question de savoir si le bloc ne fut pas, dans l'ensemble, une erreur. Les divers camarades qui sont enclins à formuler une telle conclusion, ne considèrent pas l'histoire du bloc dans son ensemble, mais seulement le maillon final de cette histoire.

L'Opposition de 1923 a pris naissance à Moscou, et celle de 1925-1926 à Léningrad. L'aile droite du parti possède sa base d'appui dans le Caucase du Nord, où la lutte entre les stalinistes et les rykovistes s'est déroulée sous sa forme la plus claire et la plus précise. Cette répartition des groupes politiques n'est pas due au hasard, et à elle seule, elle explique le bloc entre Moscou et Léningrad, c'est-à-dire le bloc entre les deux centres prolétariens les plus importants de notre Union. En dépit de telles ou telles vacillations se produisant au sommet, le bloc a été provoqué par de profondes pressions de classe. Parler dans ces conditions d'un « bloc » sans principes, c'est de la vulgaire médisance. Et, sur le plan des idées, l'Opposition de Léningrad, précisément grâce à sa base prolétarienne hautement qualifiée, a introduit dans le bloc des éléments de très grande valeur. Le rapprochement entre les éléments ouvriers d'avant-garde de Moscou et de Léningrad, continuera, en dépit du fait que les éléments dirigeants de l'Opposition de Léningrad sont devenus des renégats.

On peut dire de même en ce qui concerne l'Opposition dans l'Internationale. Les éléments les plus révolutionnaires, après les hésitations et les oscillations provoquées dans une large mesure par les fameuses décisions du 5e Congrès mondial, se trouveront progressivement les uns les autres. Les meilleurs éléments de l'Opposition de 1923 et de l'Opposition de 1925-1926 s'uniront à l'échelle internationale. Le départ de Zinoviev et de Kamenev n'empêchera pas ce processus de s'accomplir.

Appréciation de la tactique de l'Opposition

Dans l'histoire du bloc oppositionnel, on peut distinguer trois périodes : a) d'avril 1926 au 16 octobre ; b) du 16 octobre 1926 au 8 août 1927 ; c) du 8 août au 15e Congrès. Chacune de ces périodes est caractérisée par une montée de l'activité oppositionnelle, puis, lorsque celle-ci atteint un niveau critique, par un ralentissement plus ou moins important accompagné de déclarations de refus d'une activité fractionnelle.

Ce « caractère cyclique » original de la tactique oppositionnelle amène à penser qu'il s'agit en l'espèce de quelques causes d'ordre général. II est nécessaire de les rechercher d'une part dans les conditions générales de la dictature prolétarienne au sein d'un pays où la paysannerie est nombreuse, et, d'autre part, dans les conditions particulières créées par le reflux de la vague révolutionnaire et sa lutte contre l'aile gauche, l'appareil est armé de toutes les méthodes et de tous les moyens de la dictature. L'Opposition ne dispose comme arme que de la propagande. Les discours, l'utilisation du « prestige » des individualités, la « soudure » avec les sans-parti, l'occupation de locaux de réunions, les mots d'ordre lancés, ainsi que les pancartes dans les rues, lors du 7 novembre, tout cela, ce sont les formes diverses de la propagande.

L'appareil tente de transformer ces armes de propagande en formes embryonnaires de fraction d'abord, puis de parti et de guerre civile. L'Opposition refuse de s'engager sur cette voie. Elle atteint chaque fois la limite où l'appareil la place devant la nécessité de renoncer aux méthodes et procédés de propagande qu'elle utilisait. Les trois déclarations de l'Opposition, 16 octobre, 8 août et celle de novembre-décembre, ont eu pour but de montrer encore et toujours à la masse du parti que l'Opposition se fixe comme tâche, non le deuxième parti et la guerre civile, mais le redressement de la ligne suivie par le parti et par l'État par une réforme profonde.

Ceux qui critiquent la tactique suivie par l'Opposition, un instant, sur son caractère de « marche en zig-zag », raisonnent comme si l'Opposition déterminait librement sa tactique, et font abstraction de la pression frénétique d'une masse d'ennemis, de l'omnipotence de l'appareil, du glissement politique de la direction, de la passivité relative des masses ouvrières etc. Il n'est possible de comprendre la tactique de l'Opposition, avec ses inéluctables contradictions internes, que si l'on n'oublie pas que l'Opposition nage contre le courant, luttant contre les difficultés et des obstacles jusque-là inconnus dans l'histoire.

Dans les cas où ceux qui critiquent ne se bornent pas à des considérations fragmentaires et partielles, parfois fondées et parfois non fondées, mais tentent d'opposer à notre tactique, issue des conditions posées par la réalité, telle autre tactique, ils donnent habituellement et tout simplement un point d'appui pour l'appel à la capitulation. Quant aux véritables capitulards, ceux-ci tentent de caractériser la tactique actuelle de l'Opposition par cette formule : « Ni paix, ni guerre. » Par la « paix », ils entendent la capitulation ; par la « guerre » ils entendent deux partis. Mais les thèses de Zinoviev lui-même sur le bilan du plénum de juillet 1927, d'un bout à l'autre, sont imprégnées de cette pensée : Ni capitulation, ni deuxième parti. Telle fut toute la ligne suivie par l'Opposition.

Aux lâcheurs, il arrive toujours de cracher sur ce qu'ils ont fait la veille.

Aucun manuel n'enseigne les moyens de redresser une dictature prolétarienne placée sous le coup de Thermidor. Il faut chercher la méthode en partant de la situation réelle. Ces moyens seront trouvés si l'orientation fondamentale est juste. Quelques conseils.

I. – L'auto-éducation théorique est une tâche essentielle pour chaque oppositionnel et l'unique gage sérieux de sa fermeté. L'étude du compte-rendu sténographique du 15e Congrès du parti à la lumière des contre-thèses de l'Opposition et des faits nouveaux de la vie politique et économique doit constituer le contenu principal du travail de tout oppositionnel dans la dispersion qui a succédé à la dissolution de la fraction.

II. – Un oppositionnel, indépendamment du fait qu'il demeure dans le parti ou en soit exclu, doit militer activement dans toutes les organisations prolétariennes et soviétiques en général (parti, syndicats, soviets, clubs, etc.). Étant donné cela, un oppositionnel ne peut, en aucun cas, limiter son rôle à la critique ; il doit accomplir le travail positif mieux et plus consciencieusement que les fonctionnaires salariés. C'est seulement sur cette base que la critique faite du point de vue des principes trouvera accès dans la conscience des masses.

III. – Il est nécessaire d'en appeler à l'Internationale pour chercher à poser devant le 16e Congrès la question de l'Opposition dans toute sa plénitude.

Des témoignages sur l'origine de la légende du « Trotskisme »

Robert Paris — 2025-12-17T23:21:00Z

Propagande stalinienne antitrotskyste

Le terme de « trotskisme » viendrait de Milioukov, dirigeant du parti KD, dénonçant en 1905 le rôle de Trotski dans le Soviet. Il a été également été utilisé dans les débats du POSDR avant 1917. Mais son usage massif vient des zinoviévistes et des staliniens dans les années 1920. Tout en se réclamant de Lénine, ils laissent entendre que Trotski avait des idées opposées à celui-ci et contre-révolutionnaires. En 1929, la Pravda titre sur « Mister Trotski au service de la bourgeoisie britannique ». L'Internationale Communiste stalinisée de son côté affirme que « la lutte contre le trotskisme est aujourd'hui l'une des plus importantes tâches de tout le mouvement ouvrier international », et qu'« à l'heure actuelle, toutes les conditions pour écraser la vermine trotskiste existent ».

Dans les années 1930, la propagande stalinienne se fit encore plus grossière et n'utilisait plus que le terme d'« hitléro-trotskistes » pour condamner ses opposants. En France, le PCF et L'Humanité applaudissent à ces consignes. En 1935, L'Humanité exige la mise hors la loi des trotskistes en France, et ne parle désormais plus que des « hitléro-trotskistes au service de l'étranger ». L'apothéose est atteinte avec les procès de Moscou, où Vychinski parle des « bandits trotskistes, vulgaires mouchards et espions » ; affirme que « le trotskisme contre-révolutionnaire est devenu depuis longtemps déjà le pire détachement d'avant-garde du fascisme international », « converti en une des succursales des SS et de la Gestapo »...

Tous les partis communistes épurent leurs rangs, et tout militant critique peut se voir étiqueté de « trotskiste », exclu et diffamé, et souvent molesté. Il devient de plus en plus difficile pour les militants trotskistes de militer, et en particulier dans les entreprises, situation qui perdurera dans les décennies de Guerre froide.

Deux mythes sur le trotskysme

Les calomnies des staliniens contre Trotski et le trotskysme stigmatisent essentiellement deux aspects : la prétendue haine de Trotski pour la paysannerie d'une part, et son prétendu aventurisme putschiste et gauchiste d'autre part. Aujourd'hui, les staliniens ne croient plus guère aux théories qui font de Trotski un agent de la Gestapo ou de l'Intelligence Service britannique ; en revanche, les accusations plus "politiques" contre Trotski peuvent encore, elles, trouver de l'écho.

Haine de la paysannerie

Trotski pensait, comme la plupart des marxistes, que « l'histoire du capitalisme est l'histoire de la subordination de la campagne à la ville »[1] et que la classe ouvrière devait jouer un rôle déterminant. Dans la Russie semi-féodale et majoritairement paysanne, les marxistes, y compris Lénine et les bolchéviks, pensaient qu'il faudrait d'abord une révolution démocratique-bourgeoise, qui repose sur la force de la paysannerie. Trotski a été accusé, en raison de sa théorie de la révolution permanente qui donne un rôle dirigeant à la classe ouvrière, de sous-estimer le potentiel de la paysannerie. Ces accusations ressortent en particulier fin 1923 à des fins polémiques. Cela est renforcé par le fait qu'à ce moment-là Trotski défendait qu'il était urgent de développer en priorité l'industrie (pour renforcer la classe ouvrière et également pour résoudre la crise des ciseaux). Pourtant Trotski n'a quasiment pas eu la moindre divergence pratique avec Lénine et la direction bolchévique en Octobre et après sur la question paysanne. Il était convaincu de la nécessité de s'allier à la paysannerie et a largement réalisé cette alliance dans la pratique en dirigeant l'Armée rouge, armée majoritairement paysanne. Trotski fut également un des premiers à défendre une nouvelle politique économique plus favorable à la paysannerie en 1920, ce que le comité central refuse alors. Et il s'opposera aux collectivisations forcées dans les campagnes menées par Staline en 1928.

Aventurisme et gauchisme

Trotski ne se conduisit jamais de façon aventuriste : contre l'avis de Lénine, il s'opposa à la campagne de Pologne en 1920 ; il s'opposa aussi aux tentatives révolutionnaires avortées des communistes allemands en 1921 et 1923. Ce que les staliniens appellent « aventurisme », c'est tout ce qui dépasse leur horizon devenu réformiste à force de collaborer avec différents partis ou État bourgeois.

Léon Trotsky

Des témoignages sur l'origine de la légende du « Trotskisme »

3 janvier 1928

Tels sont les témoignages que j'ai pu recueillir à Moscou. Ils ne font que mettre crûment en lumière ce que les camarades mieux informés comprenaient déjà clairement avant de les connaître.

La légende du « trotskysme » qui fut créée, détruite et de nouveau reconstituée par les seuls et mêmes hommes, suivant les besoins du moment, nous amène à examiner une autre question plus générale : celle des méthodes à admettre dans la lutte politique au sein du parti révolutionnaire. Il n'est pas rare d'entendre dire par des représentants de la majorité actuelle (naturellement dans une conversation privée) :

« Il va de soi que nous savons très bien que l'Opposition n'a rien de commun avec le menchevisme. Mais il s'agit de deux groupes luttant pour le pouvoir, il faut donc de puissants moyens. »

Les maquignons qui sont maintenant dans l'appareil croient qu'une telle façon d'aborder les questions idéologiques est tout à fait réaliste et même véritablement bolchevique. Elle est pourtant profondément imprégnée de cynisme. L'idéologie est dans la lutte de classes une arme tranchante : elle se venge cruellement de ceux qui en abusent. Les cadres du parti se sont formés au cours d'années et de dizaines d'années, sur la base des thèses du marxisme contrôlées par l'expérience de la vie et de la lutte. Abuser des valeurs idéologiques, falsifier les théories, transformer les mots de « menchevisme », de « social-démocrate » etc. en injures vides de sens, tout cela sape inévitablement les bases de la vie du parti, détruit les liens d'idées, démoralise les cadres, désoriente les masses.

Nous ne reconnaissons pas l'existence d'une morale abstraite au-dessus de la réalité, des classes et des intérêts de celles-ci. Mais cela ne signifie nullement que nous ne reconnaissons l'existence d'aucune morale. Ce que l'on peut et ce que l'on ne peut pas faire est déterminé par les intérêts historiques du prolétariat et non par les besoins actuels de l'appareil – ou de la poignée de ceux qui le dirigent.

Il suffit de se représenter clairement, un instant seulement, le jeu répugnant de saute-mouton pratiqué dans le domaine des idées à propos du « trotskysme ». Il n'en a même pas été question entre 1917 et 1923. Pour nous en tenir à l'essentiel, c'est pendant cette période qu'a été élaboré le programme du parti, qu'a été fondée l'Internationale communiste, qu'ont été constitués ses cadres et établis ses documents principaux, parmi lesquels les thèses du Programme et les Manifestes de l'Internationale communiste. En 1923, après que Lénine ait été écarté de toute activité, de sérieuses divergences de vue sont apparues dans le noyau principal du comité central et ces divergences se sont développées, dans le cours des quatre années suivantes, autour de deux lignes de conduite irréconciliables. Le spectre du trotskysme a été lancé sur la scène en 1924 après une soigneuse préparation en coulisses. Zinoviev et Kamenev étaient les inspirateurs de cette campagne. Ils étaient à la tête de ce qu'on appelait à l'époque « la vieille garde bolchevique ». En face, le prétendu « trotskysme ». Mais le noyau des soi-disant « léninistes » scissionne en 1925. Quelques mois plus tard, Zinoviev et Kamenev ont été obligés de reconnaître que le noyau principal de l'Opposition de 23, les prétendus « trotskystes » avaient eu raison dans les questions essentielles sur lesquelles il y avait eu des divergences. Cet aveu est le plus cruel des châtiments encourus par les abus scandaleux commis dans le domaine théorique.

Mais il y a plus : bientôt Zinoviev et Kamenev sont eux-mêmes catalogués comme « trotskystes ». Il est difficile d'imaginer plus implacable ironie du hasard. Zinoviev et Kamenev s'unissent aux dirigeants de l'Opposition de 1923 dans un groupe parfaitement fondé à se dénommer gauche prolétarienne du parti ou bolcheviks-léninistes (Opposition) en opposition au groupe opportuniste Staline, Rykov, Boukharine. Le 15e congrès n'a rien changé à la ligne politique de la majorité ; au contraire, il l'a renforcée. Il a condamné l'Opposition et l'a exclue du parti. Pour Zinoviev et Kamenev, c'est apparu suffisant pour dissimuler le danger de Thermidor et tenter en revanche de ressusciter le fantôme du trotskysme. Il ne serait pas surprenant que Zinoviev se mette à rédiger une brochure contre le danger trotskyste et que Kamenev se mette à faire référence à ses discours et articles de 23-24.

Le manque de principes porte en lui son châtiment. Il se brise contre les faits, sape la confiance et en fin de compte se ridiculise.

Des individualités, même aussi considérables que Zinoviev et Kamenev, viennent et passent. La ligne politique, elle, demeure.

Les réponses de Jaurès et Trotsky au général Mandon

Alex, Waraa — 2025-12-02T23:17:00Z

Les réponses de Jaurès et Trotsky au général Mandon : pour un service militaire prolétarien !

Pour revigorer le drapeau français : E. Macron brasse du vent

Le drapeau bleu-blanc-rouge du capital français est en berne : expulsé d'Afrique par la Russie, le plan de Trump-Poutine ne lui donnant aucune place en Ukraine. Pire, la guerre d'Ukraine finira bientôt (ce qui n'est en rien contradictoire avec la marche à un guerre impérialiste générale), l'augmentation des dépenses publiques au profit des marchands de canon ne pourra plus être justifiée. Le défaut de paiement de l'Etat français se profile, les banques françaises vont perdre leur poule aux oeufs d'or.

C'est beaucoup d'argent perdu, mais également un problème politique : la prétendue guerre des civilisations entre l'Occident et la Russie n'a pas lieu, les dirigeants français ont menti depuis des années, l'impérialisme US, leur mentor, les "trompe" maintenant avec la Russie !

Pour redresser ce drapeau, le président Macron a donc mis en route son puissant moulin à vent favori : un discours martial, des "nous sommes en guerre", "les envahisseurs se préparent (dans 4 ans, on a le temps)". Les journalistes et partis de gouvernement font semblant d'y croire, dissertent sur le "Service militaire volontaire" que Macron a promis.

Or tout comme les "100 rafales" que Zelenski a promis d'acheter, le "Service volontaire" de Macron est pour l'instant une promesse vide, du vent. Le service national n'a d'ailleurs, en 1998, pas été supprimé, mais suspendu. Depuis, une "réserve opérationnelle" est censée seconder l'armée professionnelle. Aux USA, ce modèle fonctionne bien, mais en France, il reste très théorique, malgré toutes les formes de "Service" que les présidents successifs mettent en place sans succès. F. Hollande pourrait porter plainte pour plagiat contre Macron, car il créa un tel service en 2015, abrogé en 2017 :

« Article 1

Abrogé par Arrêté du 5 mai 2017 - art. 8

I. - Le service militaire volontaire a pour but de dispenser à des volontaires stagiaires une formation militaire, une formation civique et morale ainsi qu'une formation professionnelle. Il est institué à titre expérimental à compter du 1er septembre 2015 et pour une durée maximale de vingt-quatre mois.

II. - Les volontaires stagiaires peuvent effectuer une ou plusieurs périodes de stage. Ces formations peuvent être réalisées en partenariat avec l'établissement public d'insertion de la défense, des collectivités territoriales ou leurs groupements, des ministères, des entreprises ou d'autres organismes chargés de l'insertion professionnelle. Elles font l'objet de conventions.

III. - A l'issue du volontariat, il est délivré un certificat d'aptitude personnelle à l'insertion attestant de l'acquisition par le volontaire stagiaire d'un ensemble de savoirs théoriques, mis en pratique tant dans les formations militaire que professionnelle, civique et morale.(...) »

Fait le 30 juillet 2015.

Jean-Yves Le Drian

C'est donc pour l'instant surtout au niveau de la propagande que les annonces de Macron, celle des "enfants-soldats" du général Mandon, méritent une réponse des révolutionnaires.

Pour la gauche réformiste, l'envoi au massacre de toute une jeunesse : c'est une aubaine !

La gauche réformiste politique et syndicale (LFI, PS, PC, CGT) est gênée. La conscription de la jeunesse est à son programme, car la bourgeoisie peut en avoir besoin. C'est en 1914, grâce à la boucherie de la guerre impérialiste, que l'aile réformiste des partis et des syndicats (Blum pour le PS, Jouhaux pour la CGT), ont été appelés au gouvernement par la bourgeoisie française.

Ce n'est pas entrainés par des vagues de soulèvements ouvriers, ou de victoires électorales massives, que le rêve des réformistes s'est réalisé : c'est précisément en co-organisant un véritable génocide de la jeunesse française et européenne en 1914. Bouchers-adjoints (la viande étant la chair des jeunes, comme l'a rappelé Mandon) : ce fut la promotion des réformistes.

La France ne s'est jamais remise démographiquement de cette saignée de 1914-1918. Mais pour la direction de la CGT et le PS, quelle aubaine en 1914 ! Des postes, des voitures de luxe, des billets 1ère classe gratuits, des dîners bien arrosés pour "patriotes de l'arrière", puis des invitations aux conférences internationales de "paix" dans des hôtels de luxe (création de l'OIT).

Cette mentalité de nouveaux riches du PS et de la CGT, ils l'ont transmise à leurs héritiers. C'est sur les montagnes de cadavres de notre jeunesse qu'ont prospéré à partir de 1914 les directions réformistes de la CGT et du PS, qui ne sont plus, pour les révolutionnaires authentiques, que des "cadavres puants", comme les nomma Rosa Luxemburg en 1915. Au sommet de cette montagne des cadavres de la jeunesse, les réformistes placèrent ceux de Rosa Luxemburg et Jean Jaurès, assassinés par cette gauche patriote, en 1914 et 1919.

Certes il a fallu au PS et à la CGT, à partir de 1935, commencer à partager la galette avec le PCF, qui suite à la déclaration Laval-Staline se convertit au patriotisme. Mais la boucherie promettait de s'agrandir avec la perspective de la 2ème guerre mondiale, et grâce au pillage colonial, que le PC couvrit à partir de cette date. Pour contrer une révolution, en 1945-1947, menaçant la bourgeoisie et son appareil d'Etat qui avait collaboré dans la joie et la bonne humeur avec la bourgeoisie allemande temporairement nazie, de Gaulle ne se trompa pas en choisissant des ministres parmi les plus éminents assassins de la classe ouvrière révolutionnaire : les staliniens du PC et de la CGT ; massacre de Sétif, bataille de la production, bain de sang colonial à Madagascar, les staliniens sont déclarés, depuis de Gaulle : bons pour le service !

Mandon a bien eu ces partis de gauche ! A la veille des élections municipales, il a apposé de force sur les futurs programmes des Maires le cachet : patriote-assassin de la jeunesse. Car aucun maire, de gauche ou de droite, n'a vraiment protesté. Par sa formation militaire et très chrétienne, Mandon connaît le péché originel de la gauche réformiste en 1914 (PS et CGT) , 1935 (PC) puis 1940 (René Belin de la CGT, ministre de Pétain), et savait qu'elle devrait manger son chapeau face à ses déclarations. Sophie Binet, secrétaire générale de la CGT, le 2 décembre sur France Inter, a d'ailleurs réaffirmé sont son soutien à la politique de "défense nationale de la France", dans la lignée de la déclaration Laval-Staline

L'extrême gauche opportuniste aux côtés des socio-patriotes dans les syndicats

L'extrême-gauche opportuniste (les NPAs -A et -R, LO, RP, Solidaires) n'a pas encore péché publiquement à une grande échelle par des déclarations patriotiques. Mais elle le fait, cachée dans les organisations syndicales. Les drapeaux et slogans qu'elle agite (Trotsky, "les prolétaires n'ont pas de patrie", dit parfois N. Arthaud), constituent pour la bourgeoise française un leurre à entretenir, car cette extrême-gauche ne coûte pas cher (la plupart sont des profs bénévoles avec moins de 1% aux élections), et font croire à des millions de gens que ce sont les héritiers de Trotsky qui s'expriment vraiment... alors qu'ils en sont le contraire.

Ces partis se disent "internationalistes", mais pour eux le principal coupable, ce n'est pas l'Etat français mais Israël. Ils agitent des drapeaux palestiniens, mais jamais des drapeaux des Comores ou de Madagascar, auxquels Mayotte et les ïles Eparses devraient appartenir.

Lorsque l'armée française a, le 12 novembre dernier, exfiltré, grâce au point d'appui qu'est la possession coloniale de La Réunion, le président et son ami oligarque suite à la révolution de Madagascar, ces organisations n'ont pas appelé à la moindre manifestation à l'Ile de La Réunion !

L'internationalisme, pour ces organisations, c'est du domaine de la littérature, avec à l'appui toujours la même citation d'Anatole France : « On croit mourir pour la patrie ; on meurt pour des industriels. » Mais même Anatole France était plus révolutionnaire que ces partis, car sa citation plus complète est :

« ceux qui moururent dans cette guerre ne surent pas pourquoi ils mouraient. Il en est de même dans toutes les guerres. Mais non pas au même degré. Ceux qui tombèrent à Jemmapes ne se trompaient pas à ce point sur la cause à laquelle ils se dévouaient. Cette fois, l'ignorance des victimes est tragique. On croit mourir pour la patrie ; on meurt pour des industriels. »

Jemmapes, c'est un épisode d'une guerre révolutionnaire, et Anatole France avait raison de distinguer deux types de guerre. Les organisations d'extrême-gauche opportuniste sont simplement pacifiste : elles dénoncent comme la CGT tout nationalisme, racisme, et course aux armements qui "mèneraient à la guerre". Mais elles ne sont pas favorables à l'armement du prolétariat, et la déclaration de Mandon les gêne car face à sa provocation, elles sont incapables de répondre fermement : en opposant la violence de la révolution prolétarienne, à la violence impérialiste.

Le programme maximum des révolutionnaires : l'armement du prolétariat, outil indispensable de sa dictature

Jean Jaurès en 1907 avait répondu aux généraux de l'époque. Pas en citant vaguement, comme le fit N. Arthaud, sur son compte X, le couplet de l'Internationale : "Nos balles seront pour nos propres généraux".

Jaurès convoqua une réunion publique, s'adressa à des milliers de prolétaires pour leur expliquer la résolution sur l'antimilitarisme votée à Stuttgart au congrès de l'Internationale ouvrière. Jaurès en tant que dirigeant d'un parti ouvrier, la SFIO, défendit publiquement devant tout le prolétariat une politique d'armement de la classe ouvrière contre les gouvernements bourgeois.

N. Arthaud, par des "textos" en cachette, n'agit qu'en porte-parole d'un groupuscule électoral.

C'est le discours suivant qui provoqua la haine de la bourgeoisie française contre Jaurès. des campagnes de haine, d'appel à l'assassinat, commencèrent ce jour-là :

« Quand un litige commencera, nous dirons aux gouvernants : Entendez-vous par vos diplomates. Si vos diplomates n'y réussissent pas, allez devant les arbitres que vous avez désignés, vous-mêmes inclinez-vous devant eux ; pas de guerre, pas de sang versé : l'arbitrage de l'humanité, l'arbitrage de la raison. Et si vous ne le voulez pas, eh bien, vous êtes un gouvernement de scélérats, un gouvernement de meurtriers. (Vifs applaudissements.) Et le devoir des prolétaires, c'est de se soulever contre vous, c'est de prendre, c'est de garder les fusils que vous leur mettez entre les mais, mais non pas ... (Applaudissements et interruptions).
(...)
le droit, le devoir des prolétaires, c'est de ne pas gaspiller leur énergie au service d'un gouvernement du crime, c'est de retenir le fusil dont les gouvernements d'aventure auront armé le peuple et de s'en servir, non pas pour aller fusiller de l'autre côté de la frontière des ouvriers, des prolétaires, mais pour abattre révolutionnairement le gouvernement de crime. (Applaudissements enthousiastes et prolongés, bravos répétés). »

En Ukraine abattre Zelenski, en Russie abattre Poutine, aux USA abattre Trump, en France abattre Macron, ce serait l'équivalent en 2025 de ce que dit Jaurès en 1907 !

Jaurès ne donnait pas de nom, car c'est au fond l'armement du prolétariat, le désarmement de la bourgeoisie, qu'il avait en vue, pas des politiciens en particulier. Mais si la bourgeoisie résistait, il serait nécessaire de mener contre elle une lutte armée. Or "la lutte" tout court, c'est ce dont parlent nos faux révolutionnaires. La "lutte armée" appartient pour ces organisations à un passé dont elles montrent des photos dans des vidéos. L'arme fatale, ce serait pour ces faux révolutionnaires "la grève" : c'est le vieux truc de Pelloutier, le fondateur des Bourses du travail, hostile à la dictature du prolétariat. La grève économique suffirait à "ruiner" la bourgeoisie, puisque les travailleurs produisent toutes les richesses. Pas besoin de lutte armée, le tour est joué grâce à une application à grande échelle de la loi de 1864 qui autorisa les grèves.

La réponse à Mandon, c'est donc au contraire : organisons le service militaire du prolétariat, décrit par Trotsky dans le « Programme de transition » :

« Le devoir de la IV° Internationale est d'en finir, une fois pour toutes, avec cette politique servile. Les démocrates petits bourgeois - y compris les sociaux-démocrates, les staliniens et les anarchistes - poussent des cris d'autant plus forts sur la lutte contre le fascisme qu'ils capitulent plus lâchement devant lui en fait. Aux bandes du fascisme, seuls peuvent s'opposer avec succès des détachements ouvriers armés qui sentent derrière leur dos le soutien de dizaines de millions de travailleurs. La lutte contre le fascisme commence, non pas dans la rédaction d'une feuille libérale, mais dans l'usine, et finit dans la rue. Les jaunes et les gendarmes privés dans les usines sont les cellules fondamentales de l'armée du fascisme. Les PIQUETS DE GRÈVES sont les cellules fondamentales de l'armée du prolétariat. C'est de là qu'il faut partir. A l'occasion de chaque grève et de chaque manifestation de rue, il faut propager l'idée de la nécessité de la création de DÉTACHEMENTS OUVRIERS D'AUTODÉFENSE. Il faut inscrire ce mot d'ordre dans le programme de l'aile révolutionnaire des syndicats. Il faut former pratiquement des détachements d'autodéfense partout où c'est possible, à commencer par les organisations de jeunes, et les entraîner au maniement des armes.

La nouvelle vague du mouvement des masses doit servir, non seulement à accroître le nombre de ces détachements, mais encore à les unifier, par quartiers, par villes, par régions. Il faut donner une expression organisée à la haine légitime des ouvriers pour les jaunes et les bandes de gangsters et de fascistes. Il faut lancer le mot d'ordre de la MILICE OUVRIÈRE, comme seule garantie sérieuse de l'inviolabilité des organisations, des réunions et de la presse ouvrières. »

Le programme minimum des révolutionnaires : droits démocratiques et augmentation des salaires

Même si le service militaire bourgeois prend de l'avance sur le processus d'armement du prolétariat, seul des révolutionnaires petits-bourgeois de centre-ville peuvent appeler les jeunes travailleurs à "refuser" un service volontaire. Pour l'instant les "services" militaire de Hollande et Macron sont resté des coquilles vides, mais la situation peut changer. La jeunesse des quartiers pauvres peut être attirée par des formations que peut apporter l'armée : permis de conduire Poids lourds gratuit, diplômes de mécanique etc.

Les partis de gauche et d'extrême gauche ont abandonné cette jeunesse prolétaire, restant par exemple totalement inactifs face au mouvement mondial de la jeunesse GenZ. La bourgeoisie pourra donc attirer ceux qui préfèreront gagner "honnêtement" 800 euros, plutôt que se laisser absorber par la maffia de la drogue. Un "brevet de patriotisme" sera ensuite une lettre de recommandation pour trouver un travail.

En Allemagne, un tel service est payé 2000 euros, donc des slogans naturels sont : augmentation de la solde ! On veut 2000 euros comme en Allemagne ! A travail égal, salaire égal ! Droit de se syndiquer dans l'armée ! Si nos armées doivent défendre après-demain (dans 4 ans a dit Mandon, prétendant avoir "des informations") des valeurs démocratiques on ne sait où, nous sommes prêts à l'aider ici et maintenant : charité démocratique bien ordonnée commence par soi-même.

L'Etat a du mal à recruter policiers et gendarmes

Suite à un rapport de la Cour des comptes, contesté par la direction de la Gendarmerie, la presse s'est fait l'écho du problème de recrutement dans la gendarmerie :

« lls en ont gros sur le képi l Après 10 ou 20 ans passés en brigades ou dans différentes unités de terrain, en France, les gendarmes claquent la parte, usés, épuisés par “une surcharge de travail” qui, selon les démissionnaires en série, “ne cesse de s'alourdir”. A en croire ces militaires, sous-ofﬁciers, pourtant aguerris et endurcis, “le manque de considération“, “l'insufﬁsance des moyens” et l'impact sur leur vie personnelle provoquent un énorme malaise dans les rangs. Bien plus qu'un simple mouvement d'humeur, le blues de ces gendarmes contraints au silence en raison de leur statut, déborde des casernes pour s'exprimer en masse sur les réseaux sociaux. »

Si c'est bien le cas, le Service de Macron ne pourra marcher, de volontaire il deviendra obligatoire.

La propagande en direction de l'armée et de la police, révolutionnaire et antimilitariste, est une tradition du mouvement ouvrier complètement délaissée par les pseudos-révolutionnaires, qui veulent se faire une popularité dans la jeunesse en criant "tout le monde déteste les flics". Certes peu de policiers ou militaires seront sensibles aux arguments des révolutionnaires, mais un travail de "démoralisation" est indispensable, vis-à-vis de l'armée et de la population : les guerres impérialistes ne se font pas au profit de "valeurs", à part celle des actions du CAC 40.

En Ukraine, le syndicat Solidaires, suivi par les NPA, a mené une campagne social-patriote digne du général Mandon, invitant les enfants d'Ukraine à mourir pour le compte en banque des oligarques, au nom d'une prétendue guerre de libération nationale, incarnée par "la résistance". Or c'est dans les mois à venir qu'une campagne favorable à l'armement du prolétariat d'Ukraine pourrait être beaucoup plus juste et nécessaire. Car une fois signé le plan de dépeçage de l'Ukraine entre les USA et la Russie, les "patriotes" ukrainiens, reconvertis au pacifisme, enlèveront leur masque et redeviendront ouvertement des barons capitalistes avides. Des troupes comme celle du régiment Azov, qui ont pris l'ascendant dans l'armée ukrainienne, sont tout désignées pour devenir l'équivalent des Corps-francs allemands de 1919 : milice patronale et gouvernemental d'extrême droite, recrutée dans la petite-bourgeoise aigrie par une guerre perdue, au service du capital impérialiste. Les classes riches d'Ukraine ont, en 2025 comme en 1917, perdu la guerre. Un soulèvement anti-oligarques de la population est possible. Avec les mouvements genZ, c'est donc également à l'échelle internationale que se pose la question de l'armement du prolétariat, même si une guerre s'arrête.

"Il nous faut des armes !" Ce slogan de Blanqui, est plus que jamais à l'ordre du jour.

What did reformism, Stalinism, and Trotskyism propose in the face of the rise of fascism in Germany ?

Robert Paris — 2025-11-23T06:09:00Z

What did reformism, Stalinism, and Trotskyism propose in the face of the rise of fascism in Germany ?

"The rise to power of the 'National Socialists' would mean, above all, the extermination of the elite of the German proletariat, the destruction of its organizations, and the loss of its confidence in its own strength and its future. Since the contradictions and antagonisms in Germany have reached an extreme degree of gravity, the infernal work of Italian fascism will appear as a rather pale and almost humanitarian experience compared to the crimes of which German National Socialism will be capable. 'Retreat ?' you say, prophets of yesterday of the 'third period.' Leaders and institutions may retreat. Isolated individuals may hide. But the working class will know neither where to retreat nor where to hide in the face of fascist power. Indeed, if we admit the monstrous and the unbelievable as possible—that is, that the party actually turns away from the struggle and thus delivers the proletariat to its mortal enemy—this can only mean one thing : savage fighting will break out not before the fascists come to power, but "Afterwards, that is to say, under conditions a hundred times more favorable to fascism than today. The struggle of the proletariat, betrayed by its own leadership, caught off guard, disoriented and desperate, against the fascist regime would transform into a series of terrible, bloody, and irreparable convulsions. Ten proletarian uprisings, ten successive defeats, would weaken and exhaust the German working class less than its retreat today before fascism, while the question of who should be master in Germany is not yet resolved."

Leon Trotsky

excerpt from "The key to the world situation lies in Germany" (November 1931)

The turning point of the Communist International and the situation in Germany

September 26, 1930

1. The origins of the final turning point

In our time, tactical shifts, even very significant ones, are absolutely inevitable. They result from abrupt changes in the objective situation (instability of international relations ; sudden and irregular fluctuations in the economic climate ; brutal repercussions of economic fluctuations at the political level ; impulsive movements of the masses who feel they are in a hopeless situation, etc.). The careful study of changes in the objective situation is today a much more important and, at the same time, infinitely more difficult task than before the war, during the era of the "organic" development of capitalism. The party leadership now finds itself in the position of a driver navigating a winding mountain road. A poorly timed turn, excessive speed, exposes both the passengers and the vehicle to very serious, even fatal, dangers.

The leadership of the Communist International has given us, in recent years, examples of very abrupt shifts. The most recent one we have observed in recent months. What is the reason for the shifts in the Communist International since Lenin's death ? Is it due to changes in the objective situation ? No. It can be stated with absolute certainty that, since 1923, the Communist International has not made any timely tactical shifts based on a correct analysis of the changes that have occurred in objective conditions. On the contrary, each shift is in fact the result of an unbearable worsening of the contradiction between the line of the Communist International and the objective situation. And we are witnessing this once again today.

The Ninth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, the Sixth Congress, and especially the Tenth Plenum, had all been geared towards a sudden and linear expansion of the revolution ("the third period"), an expansion that the objective situation at that time completely precluded, following the severe defeats in England and China, the weakening of communist parties worldwide, and above all, the conditions of commercial and industrial expansion experienced by a whole series of capitalist countries. The tactical shift of the Communist International from February 1928 onward was thus in total contradiction with the actual course of history. This contradiction gave rise to adventurist tendencies, the prolonged isolation of parties, their organizational weakening, and so on. The leadership of the Communist International only made another shift in February 1930, when these phenomena had already taken on a distinctly threatening character ; this shift was a retreat and a step to the right in relation to the tactics of the "third period." By an ironic twist of fate, with no mercy for conformity, this new tactical shift of the Communist International coincided with a new turning point in the objective situation. The unprecedentedly serious international crisis undoubtedly opened new prospects for the radicalization of the masses and social upheaval. It was precisely under these conditions that a leftward turn was both possible and necessary : it was necessary to accelerate the revolutionary upsurge. This would have been entirely correct and necessary if, during the last three years, the leadership of the Communist International had taken full advantage of the period of economic recovery, coupled with the waning of the revolutionary movement, to strengthen the party's position within mass organizations, and primarily within the trade unions. Under these conditions, the driver could and should have shifted from second to third gear in 1930, or at least prepared to do so in the near future. In fact, the opposite process occurred. To avoid falling into the abyss, the driver had to downshift from third, which he had shifted into too early, back to second. If he had followed a sound strategic line, he would have been forced to accelerate.

This is the blatant contradiction between tactical necessities and strategic perspectives, in which, as a logical consequence of the errors of their leadership, the communist parties of a whole series of countries find themselves today.

It is in Germany that this contradiction manifests itself in its clearest and most dangerous form. Indeed, the recent elections there revealed a completely original balance of power, which is the result not only of the two periods of stabilization in Germany since the war, but also of the three periods of errors of the Communist International.
2. The parliamentary victory of the Communist Party in light of revolutionary tasks

Today, the official press of the Communist International presents the election results in Germany as a resounding victory for communism ; this victory, they claim, puts the slogan "Soviet Germany" on the agenda. Optimistic bureaucrats refuse to consider the significance of the balance of power revealed by the election statistics. They analyze the increase in communist votes independently of revolutionary tasks and the obstacles arising from the objective situation.

The Communist Party obtained approximately 4,600,000 votes, compared to 3,300,000 in 1928. This gain of 1,300,000 votes is enormous from the perspective of "normal" parliamentary procedures, given the overall increase in the number of voters. However, the Communist Party's gains seem quite insignificant compared to the meteoric rise of the Fascists, who jumped from 800,000 votes to 6,400,000. The fact that the Social Democrats, despite significant losses, retained their key figures and garnered more working-class votes than the Communist Party is equally important in assessing the election results.

However, if one seeks to identify the domestic and international conditions most likely to force the working class toward communism, no better example can be found than the current situation in Germany : the noose of the Young Plan, the economic crisis, the decadence of the leadership, the crisis of parliamentarism, and the frightening way in which the ruling social democracy is unmasking itself. Despite gaining 1,300,000 votes, the German Communist Party's place in the country's social life remains small and disproportionate to the concrete historical circumstances.

The weakness of communism's position is inextricably linked to the politics and internal functioning of the Communist International ; it becomes even more glaringly apparent when we compare the current social role of the Communist Party with its concrete and urgent tasks in the present historical conditions.

It is true that the Communist Party itself did not expect such an increase. But this proves that, with its repeated mistakes and defeats, the leadership of the Communist Party has lost the habit of ambitious perspectives and goals. Yesterday, it underestimated its own capabilities ; today, it is once again underestimating the difficulties. One danger is thus multiplied by another.

The first quality of a truly revolutionary party is knowing how to face reality.
3. The hesitations of the upper bourgeoisie

At every turning point in the road of history, at every social crisis, it is necessary to re-examine the problem of the relationships existing between the three classes of present-day society : the big bourgeoisie with finance capital at its head, the petty bourgeoisie oscillating between the two main camps, and, finally, the proletariat.

The upper bourgeoisie, which constitutes only a tiny fraction of the nation, cannot maintain its power without support from the petty bourgeoisie in both towns and villages—that is, from the last remaining representatives of the old middle classes—and from the masses who now constitute the new middle classes. Currently, this support takes two main forms, politically antagonistic but historically complementary : social democracy and fascism. In the person of social democracy, the petty bourgeoisie, which is subservient to finance capital, draws millions of workers along with it.

Divided, the German upper bourgeoisie is currently hesitant. Internal disagreements concern only the choice of treatment for the current social crisis. Social-democratic solutions repel a segment of the upper bourgeoisie because their results are uncertain and they risk incurring excessive overhead costs (taxes, social legislation, wages). Fascist intervention appears to the other segment as too risky and unjustified by the situation. In other words, the financial bourgeoisie as a whole is unsure of its assessment of the situation because it has not yet found sufficient grounds to proclaim the advent of its "third period," in which social democracy must inevitably give way to fascism ; moreover, everyone knows that in the final reckoning, social democracy will be rewarded for its services with a general pogrom. The hesitations of the upper bourgeoisie—given the weakening of its main parties—between social democracy and fascism are the most obvious symptom of a pre-revolutionary situation. It is clear that these hesitations would cease immediately upon the emergence of a truly revolutionary situation.
4. The petty bourgeoisie and fascism

For the social crisis to lead to proletarian revolution, it is essential, among other conditions, that the petty-bourgeois classes decisively shift to the side of the proletariat. This allows the proletariat to take the lead of the nation and govern it.

The latest elections reveal a reverse surge, and therein lies their essential symptomatic value. Under the blows of the crisis, the petty bourgeoisie has shifted not to the side of the proletarian revolution, but to the side of the most extreme imperialist reaction, dragging significant sections of the proletariat along with it.

The gigantic growth of National Socialism reflects two essential facts : a profound social crisis, wrenching the petty-bourgeois masses from their equilibrium, and the absence of a revolutionary party that would, from this moment on, play a recognized leading role in the eyes of the masses. If the Communist Party is the party of revolutionary hope, fascism, as a mass movement, is the party of counter-revolutionary despair. When revolutionary hope seizes the entire mass of the proletariat, the latter inevitably draws significant and ever-widening sections of the petty bourgeoisie along with it on the path to revolution. Yet, in this respect, the elections present precisely the opposite picture : counter-revolutionary despair has seized the petty-bourgeois mass with such force that it has drawn significant sections of the proletariat along with it.

How can this be explained ? In the past, we have observed (Italy, Germany) a sudden strengthening of fascism, victorious or at least threatening, following an exhausted or failed revolutionary situation, at the end of a revolutionary crisis, during which the proletarian vanguard had revealed its inability to take the lead of the nation, to transform the fate of all classes, including that of the petty bourgeoisie. This is precisely what gave fascism its enormous strength in Italy. But today in Germany, it is not a question of the outcome of a revolutionary situation but of its approach. The leading party officials, optimistic by nature, conclude that fascism, having arrived "too late," is doomed to a swift and inevitable defeat (Die Rote Fahne). These people refuse to learn. Fascism arrives "too late," if we refer to past revolutionary crises. But it appears early enough—at the dawn—for the new revolutionary crisis.

The fact that he was able to occupy such a strong starting position on the eve of a revolutionary period, and not at its end, is not the weak point of fascism but the weak point of communism. The petty bourgeoisie, therefore, does not need further disillusionment regarding the Communist Party's capacity to improve its lot ; it relies on past experience, it remembers the lessons of 1923, the capricious leaps of the Maslow-Thaelmann ultra-left course, the opportunistic impotence of the same Thaelmann, the empty rhetoric of the "third period," and so on. Finally, and this is the crux of the matter, its distrust of the proletarian revolution is fueled by the distrust that millions of social-democratic workers feel toward the Communist Party. The petty bourgeoisie, even though events have completely torn it from its conservative rut, can only turn to the side of social revolution if the latter has the sympathy of the majority of workers. This very important condition is precisely lacking in Germany, and this is no accident.

The programmatic declaration of the German Communist Party before the elections was entirely and solely devoted to fascism as the principal enemy. However, fascism emerged victorious from the elections, having garnered not only millions of semi-proletarian elements but also hundreds of thousands of industrial workers. This demonstrates that, despite the parliamentary victory of the Communist Party, the proletarian revolution suffered a serious overall defeat in these elections—a defeat that is obviously not decisive, but preliminary, and which should serve as a warning. It could become decisive, and inevitably will, if the Communist Party is unable to assess its partial parliamentary victory in light of this "preliminary" defeat of the revolution and to draw all the necessary conclusions.

Fascism has become a real danger in Germany ; it is the expression of the acute impasse of the bourgeois regime, of the conservative role of social democracy in the face of this regime, and of the accumulated weakness of the Communist Party, incapable of overthrowing this regime. Anyone who denies this is either blind or a braggart.

In 1923, Brandler, despite all our warnings, monstrously overestimated the strength of fascism. From this miscalculation of the balance of power arose a defensive policy, characterized by waiting, evasion, and cowardice. This is what doomed the revolution. Such events inevitably leave their mark on the conscience of all classes of the nation. The overestimation of fascism by the communist leadership created one of the causes of its subsequent strengthening. The opposite error—that is, the underestimation of fascism by the current leadership of the communist party—could lead the revolution to an even more serious defeat for many years to come.

The question of the pace of development, which obviously does not depend solely on us, gives this danger a particular urgency. The feverish episodes recorded by the political climate and revealed during the elections suggest that the pace of development of the national crisis could be very rapid. In other words, the course of events could, in the very near future, bring to the fore in Germany, at a new historical level, the old tragic contradiction between the maturity of the revolutionary situation on the one hand, and the weakness and strategic deficiencies of the revolutionary party on the other. This must be stated clearly, openly, and, above all, soon enough.
5. The Communist Party and the Working Class.

It would be a monstrous mistake to console oneself by thinking that the Bolshevik party, which in April 1917, after Lenin's arrival, began preparing to seize power, had fewer than 80,000 members and drew in its wake, even in Petrograd, barely a third of the workers and an even smaller proportion of the soldiers. The situation in Russia was entirely different. It was only in March that the revolutionary parties emerged from clandestinity, after three years of interruption of the political life, however stifled, that existed before the war. During the war, the working class had been renewed by approximately 40%. The overwhelming mass of the proletariat did not know the Bolsheviks, had never even heard of them. The vote for the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries in March and June was simply the expression of its first hesitant steps after its awakening. In this vote, there was not a trace of disappointment with the Bolsheviks or of accumulated mistrust, which can only be the result of the party's errors, concretely confirmed by the masses. On the contrary, each day of the revolutionary experience of 1917 detached the masses from the conciliators and pushed them toward the Bolsheviks. Hence the tumultuous, irresistible growth of the party and, above all, of its influence.

Fundamentally, the situation in Germany differs on this point and many others. The emergence of the German Communist Party on the political scene is not a recent phenomenon. In 1923, the majority of the working class supported it, whether openly or not. In 1924, during a period of decline, it garnered 3,600,000 votes, a higher percentage of the working class than it is today. This means that the workers who remained with the Social Democrats, as well as those who voted for the National Socialists this time, did so not out of mere ignorance, not because their awakening was only recent, not because they didn't yet know what the Communist Party was, but because they didn't believe in it based on their own experience of recent years.

It must not be forgotten that in February 1928, the Ninth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International signaled a strengthened, extraordinary, and implacable struggle against the "social-fascists." German social democracy was in power for almost the entire period, and each of its actions revealed its criminal and infamous role to the masses. A gigantic economic crisis crowned it all. It is difficult to imagine conditions more favorable to the weakening of social democracy. Yet, on the whole, it maintained its positions. How can this surprising fact be explained ? Simply by the fact that the leadership of the Communist Party, through its entire policy, aided social democracy by supporting it on its left wing.

This in no way means that the vote of five to six million workers for Social Democracy expresses their complete and unwavering confidence in it. Social Democratic workers should not be taken for blind. They are not so naive about their leaders, but they see no other way out in the current situation. We are speaking, of course, of ordinary workers, not of the labor aristocracy and bureaucracy. The policies of the Communist Party do not inspire their confidence, not because the Communist Party is a revolutionary party, but because they do not believe it can achieve a revolutionary victory and do not want to risk their lives in vain. By voting, with heavy hearts, for Social Democracy, these workers are not demonstrating their confidence in it ; on the contrary, they are expressing their distrust of the Communist Party. This is where the enormous difference lies between the situation of the German Communists and that of the Russian Bolsheviks in 1917.

But the difficulties are not limited to this problem. A deep-seated distrust of the leadership has accumulated within the party, and especially among the workers who support it or simply vote for it. This exacerbates what is called the "disproportion" between the party's influence and its membership ; in Germany, such a disproportion undoubtedly exists, and it is particularly evident at the level of labor within the trade unions. The official explanation for this disproportion is so flawed that the party is unable to "strengthen" its influence at the organizational level. The masses are considered purely passive material, whose adherence or non-adherence to the party depends solely on the secretary's ability to coerce each worker. The bureaucrat fails to understand that the workers have their own thoughts, their own experiences, their own will, and their own active or passive policies toward the party. By voting for the party, the worker votes for its flag, for the October Revolution, for his future revolution. But by refusing to join the Communist Party or to follow it in the trade union struggle, he expresses his distrust of the party's day-to-day policies. This "disproportion" is ultimately one of the channels through which the masses' distrust of the current leadership of the Communist International is expressed. And this distrust, created and reinforced by the errors, defeats, bluffs, and cynical deceptions of the masses from 1923 to 1930, represents one of the main obstacles on the road to the victory of the proletarian revolution.

Without self-confidence, the party will not win over the class. If it does not win over the proletariat, it will not wrest the petty-bourgeois masses from fascism. These two facts are inextricably linked.
6. Return to the "second period" or forward, once again, to the "third period" ?

If we adopt the official terminology of centrism, the problem must be formulated as follows. The leadership of the Communist International imposed the tactics of the "third period"—that is, the tactic of immediate revolutionary uprising—on the national sections at a time (1928) that was essentially characterized by features of the "second period" : the stabilization of the bourgeoisie and the ebb and decline of the revolution. The turning point that occurred in 1930 marked the rejection of the "third period" tactics and a return to the tactics of the "second period." While this turning point was making its way through the bureaucratic apparatus, very significant symptoms clearly demonstrated, at least in Germany, the effective return to the "third period." Does this not prove the necessity of a new turn toward the tactics of the "third period," which have just been abandoned ?

We use these terms to make the problem more accessible to those whose minds are clouded by the methodology and terminology of the centrist bureaucracy. But in no way do we endorse this terminology, which masks the combination of Stalinist bureaucracy with Bukharinist metaphysics. We reject the apocalyptic conception of the "third" period as the last : their number until the victory of the proletariat is a matter of the balance of power and changes in the situation ; all this can only be verified through action. But we reject the very essence of strategic schematism, with its numbered periods. There are no abstract, pre-established tactics, whether for the "second" or the "third" period. Naturally, victory and the conquest of power cannot be achieved without an armed uprising. But how does one achieve an uprising ?

The methods and pace of mass mobilization depend not only on the objective situation in general, but also, and above all, on the state of the proletariat at the beginning of the social crisis in the country, on the relations between the party and the class, between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie, etc. The state of the proletariat at the threshold of the "third period" depends in turn on the tactics applied by the party in the preceding period.

The normal and natural tactical shift, corresponding to the current turning point in the situation in Germany, should have been an acceleration of the pace, a progression of slogans and methods of struggle. But this tactical shift would only have been normal and natural if the pace and slogans of yesterday's struggle had corresponded to the conditions of the preceding period. But this was not the case. The acute contradiction between ultra-left policy and the stabilization of the situation is one of the causes of this tactical shift. This is why, at the very moment when the new turn in the objective situation, along with the general unfavorable regrouping of political forces, has brought communism a significant gain in votes, the party finds itself strategically and tactically more disoriented, embarrassed, and bewildered than ever before.

To explain the contradiction into which the German Communist Party, like the majority of other sections of the Communist International, but much more profoundly, has fallen, let us use the simplest comparison. To jump over a barrier, one must first gather momentum by running. The higher the barrier, the more important it is to start running in time, neither too late nor too early, to reach the obstacle with the necessary force. However, since February 1928, and especially since June 1929, the German Communist Party has done nothing but gather momentum. It is no wonder that the party began to run out of steam and drag its feet. The Communist International finally gave an order : "Slow down !" But no sooner had the breathless party regained a more normal pace than a seemingly real, not imaginary, barrier appeared before it, one that threatened to demand a revolutionary leap. Would the distance alone be enough to gather momentum ? Should the turning point have been abandoned and replaced with a counter-turn ? - these are the tactical and strategic questions that the German party is facing in all their urgency.

For the party's leading cadres to be able to find a correct answer to these questions, they must be able to assess the path forward, in conjunction with an analysis of the strategy of recent years and its consequences, as revealed in the elections. If, counterbalancing this, the bureaucracy were to succeed, through its cries of victory, in stifling the voice of political self-criticism, the proletariat would inevitably be drawn into a catastrophe more terrible than that of 1923.
7. Possible variants of further development

The revolutionary situation, which presents the proletariat with the immediate problem of seizing power, is composed of objective and subjective elements that are interconnected and largely mutually dependent. However, this interdependence is relative. The law of uneven development applies equally fully to the factors of the revolutionary situation. The insufficient development of any one of these factors can lead to the following alternative : either the revolutionary situation will not even reach explosion and will subside, or, having reached explosion, it will end in the defeat of the revolutionary class. What, in this respect, is the situation in Germany today ?

1. We are undoubtedly facing a profound national crisis (economy, international situation). The normal path of the bourgeois parliamentary regime offers no way out.

2. The political crisis of the ruling class and its system of government is absolutely undeniable. It is not a parliamentary crisis but a crisis of class domination by the bourgeoisie.

3. However, the revolutionary class is still deeply divided by internal contradictions. The strengthening of the revolutionary party at the expense of the reformist party is in its very early stages and is, for the moment, occurring at a pace that is far from commensurate with the depth of the crisis.

4. From the beginning of the crisis, the petty bourgeoisie has occupied a position which threatens the current system of capital domination, but which is at the same time mortally hostile to the proletarian revolution.

In other words, we are faced with the fundamental objective conditions for the proletarian revolution ; one of its political conditions exists (the state of the ruling class) ; the other political condition (the state of the proletariat) is only just beginning to evolve in the direction of revolution, but, due to the legacy of the past, cannot evolve rapidly ; finally, the third political condition (the state of the petty bourgeoisie) leans not toward the proletarian revolution but toward the bourgeois counter-revolution. This last condition will only evolve favorably if radical changes occur within the proletariat itself, that is, if social democracy is politically liquidated. We are thus confronted with a profoundly contradictory situation. Some of its components place the proletarian revolution on the agenda ; but others preclude any possibility of victory in the very near future, because they imply a profound prior modification of the balance of political forces.

Theoretically, one can imagine certain variations in the future development of the current situation in Germany. These variations depend as much on objective causes, including the policies of class enemies, as on the attitude of the Communist Party itself. Let us outline four possible developments.

1. The Communist Party, frightened by its own strategy (the third period), is proceeding cautiously, seeking to avoid any risky action ; it is letting a revolutionary situation slip away without a fight. This will be a repetition, in another form, of Brandler's policy of 1921-1923. Brandlerians and semi-Brandlerians, both inside and outside the party, will push in this direction, which reflects the pressure from social democracy.

2. Under the influence of its electoral success, the party, on the contrary, made a brutal turn to the left, launching itself into a direct struggle for power and, having become the party of an active minority, suffered a catastrophic defeat. Fascism, the strident and foolish agitation of the apparatus, which in no way raises the consciousness of the masses but on the contrary obscures it, the despair and impatience of a part of the working class, and especially of unemployed youth, all these things push in this direction.

3. It is also possible that the leadership, without renouncing anything, will strive empirically to find a middle ground between the first two options and thus commit a new series of errors ; but it will take so long to overcome the mistrust of the proletarian and semi-proletarian masses that, during this same period, objective conditions will have time to evolve in a direction unfavorable to the revolution, giving way to a new period of stabilization. The German party is being pushed above all in this eclectic direction, which combines general subservience with adventurism in specific cases, by the Stalinist leadership in Moscow, which fears taking a clear position and is preparing an alibi in advance, that is, the possibility of shifting responsibility onto the "executors," to the right or the left depending on the results. This is a policy we know well, one that sacrifices the historical and international interests of the proletariat to the "prestige" interests of the bureaucratic leadership. The theoretical presuppositions of such an orientation are already given in Pravda of September 16.

4. Let us conclude with the most favorable, or rather the only favorable, scenario : thanks to the efforts of its best and most conscientious members, the German party is fully aware of all the contradictions of the current situation. Through a just, bold, and flexible policy, the party still has time, given the present circumstances, to unite the majority of the proletariat and to persuade the semi-proletarian masses and the most exploited strata of the petty bourgeoisie to switch sides. The proletarian vanguard, as leader of the nation of workers and the oppressed, will achieve victory. The task of the Bolshevik-Leninists (of the Left Opposition) is to help the party steer its policy in this direction.

It would be completely pointless to try to guess which of these scenarios is most likely to occur in the near future. Such questions are solved through struggle, not conjecture.

A relentless ideological struggle against the centrist leadership of the Communist International is an indispensable element of this fight. Moscow has already signaled a policy of bureaucratic prestige, which covers up past mistakes and prepares the ground for future ones, through its hypocritical cries about the new triumph of the line.

While unbelievably exaggerating the party's victory, equally unbelievably minimizing the difficulties, and even interpreting the fascists' success as a positive factor in the proletarian revolution, Pravda nevertheless expresses a small reservation : "The party's successes must not go to its head." The perfidious policy of Stalinist leadership is once again true to form. The analysis of the situation is conducted in the spirit of the uncritical ultra-leftist, consciously pushing the party down the path of adventurism. At the same time, Stalin prepares an alibi with the ritual phrase about "the vertigo of success." It is precisely this short-sighted and unscrupulous policy that could doom the German revolution.
8. Where is the way out ?

Above, we have given an analysis, without any embellishment or indulgence, of the difficulties and dangers that fall entirely within the subjective political sphere ; they stem primarily from the errors and crimes of the epigones' leadership and, today, manifestly jeopardize the new revolutionary situation that, in our opinion, is emerging. Officials will either ignore our analysis or replenish their stock of insults. But this is not about these incorrigible officials, but about the fate of the German proletariat. Within the party, including the apparatus, there are many people who are observing and reflecting, and whom the acute nature of the situation will force to reflect with redoubled intensity tomorrow. It is to them that we address our analysis and conclusions.

Every crisis situation contains significant elements of uncertainty. Mindsets, opinions, and forces—both hostile and allied—are formed within the very process of the crisis. It is impossible to predict them mathematically in advance. They must be assessed in the struggle, through struggle, and policy must be adjusted accordingly based on these real-life observations.

Can the strength of the conservative resistance of the social-democratic workers be estimated in advance ? No. In light of the events of recent years, this strength appears immense. But the crux of the matter is that the party's misguided policy, which found its most complete expression in the absurd theory of social-fascism, is what has most fostered the cohesion of social democracy. To measure the true capacity for resistance of social democracy, another measuring instrument must be found, namely, that the communists adopt the correct tactics. If this condition is met—and it is no small condition—the extent to which social democracy is being eaten away from within will be revealed in a relatively short time.

What has been said above also applies to fascism, but in a different form. It developed under different conditions, thanks to the leaven of the Zinoviev-Stalinist strategy. What is its offensive strength ? How stable is it ? Has it reached its peak, as professional optimists tell us, or is it only in its infancy ? It is impossible to predict this mechanically. It can only be determined through action. It is precisely with regard to fascism, which is a razor in the hands of the class enemy, that a misguided policy of the Communist Party can, in a very short time, lead to a fatal result. On the other hand, a correct policy can—albeit in the much longer term—undermine the positions of fascism.

During crises within the regime, the revolutionary party is far stronger in extra-parliamentary mass struggles than within the framework of parliamentarism. However, this is contingent on one condition : that it correctly understands the situation and is capable of practically linking the real needs of the masses to the tasks of seizing power. Currently, everything boils down to this.

It would be a grave mistake to see only difficulties and dangers in the current German situation. No, the situation also offers enormous opportunities, provided it is thoroughly analyzed and directly utilized.

What is needed for that ?

1. A forced turn "to the right", while the situation is evolving "to the left", requires careful, conscientious and skillful examination of the subsequent evolution of the other components of the situation.

The abstract opposition between the methods of the second and third periods must be immediately rejected. The situation must be taken as it is, with all its contradictions and within the dynamic interplay of its development. It is necessary to adapt carefully to the real changes in this situation and to act upon it in a way that promotes its effective development, not out of complacency with the schemes of Molotov or Kuusinen.

Navigating the situation is the most difficult and crucial task. It cannot be accomplished through bureaucratic methods. Statistics, however important, are insufficient for this purpose. Daily, in-depth listening to the proletariat and workers in general is essential. It is necessary not only to put forward vital and compelling slogans, but also to be concerned with how they are adopted by the masses. Only a party with tens of thousands of local branches, gathering their testimonies, examining all the issues, and actively developing a collective position can achieve such a goal.

2. The internal workings of the party are inextricably linked to this problem. People appointed by Moscow, regardless of the party's trust or distrust of them, cannot lead the masses in an assault on capitalist society. The more artificial the current party system is, the deeper the crisis will be at the crucial moment of decision. Of all the "turning points," the most urgent and necessary concerns the party's internal system. It is a matter of life or death.

3. The change in the party's regime is both a condition and a consequence of the change in orientation. One is unthinkable without the other. The party must break free from this hypocritical, conventional atmosphere, where real ideals are silenced and fictitious values are glorified—in short, from the pernicious atmosphere of Stalinism, which is the result not of ideological and political influence, but of a gross material dependence of the apparatus and the command methods that derive from it.

To free the party from its bureaucratic prison, it is essential to comprehensively examine the "general line" of the German leadership, from 1923 onward, and even from the events of March 1921. The Left Opposition has offered, in a series of documents and theoretical works, its assessment of every stage of the disastrous official policy of the Communist International. This critique must become one of the party's core principles. It will not succeed in evading it or sweeping it under the rug. The party will not rise to the challenge of its grand tasks without a free and open assessment of its present in light of its past.

4. If the Communist Party, despite extraordinarily favorable conditions, proved powerless to seriously shake the social-democratic edifice with the formula of "social-fascism," then real fascism now threatens this same edifice not with the purely verbal formulas of a fictitious radicalism, but with the chemical formulas of explosives. However true it may be that social democracy, through all its policies, has prepared the way for the flourishing of fascism, it remains no less true that fascism is a mortal threat, especially to social democracy itself, whose very splendor is inextricably linked to the forms and methods of the democratic, parliamentary, and pacifist state.

There is no doubt that the leaders of the Social Democratic Party and a thin layer of the labor aristocracy ultimately prefer a fascist victory to the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. But precisely, the imminence of this choice is at the root of the immense difficulties the Social Democratic leadership faces with its own workers. The policy of a united front of the workers against fascism stems from the entire situation. It offers the Communist Party enormous possibilities. But the condition for success lies in abandoning the practice and theory of "social fascism," whose harmfulness is becoming dangerous under the current circumstances.

The social crisis will inevitably cause deep cracks in the social-democratic edifice. The radicalization of the masses will also affect social-democratic workers long before they cease to be social democrats. We will inevitably have to conclude agreements against fascism with the various social-democratic organizations and factions, setting precise conditions for the leaders in the eyes of the masses. Only fearful opportunists, allies of Chiang Kai-shek and Wan Jingwei, can bind themselves in advance to these agreements through a formal obligation. We must abandon the empty pronouncements of officials against the united front and return to the unified policy as formulated by Lenin and always implemented by the Bolsheviks, particularly in 1917.

5. The problem of unemployment is one of the most important elements of the current political crisis. The struggle against capitalism and for the seven-hour workday remains on the agenda. But only the slogan of broad and systematic cooperation with the USSR can raise this struggle to the level of revolutionary tasks. In its programmatic declaration for the elections, the Central Committee of the German Communist Party states that, upon coming to power, the Communists will develop cooperation with the USSR. This is beyond doubt. But the historical perspective must not be opposed to the political tasks of the moment. It is today that workers, and first and foremost the unemployed, must be mobilized under the slogan of broad economic cooperation with the Soviet Republic. The Gosplan of the USSR must develop, with the participation of German Communists and specialists, a plan for economic cooperation that, starting with unemployment, expands into general cooperation encompassing the main branches of the economy. The problem is not promising economic reorganization after seizing power, but actually seizing power. The problem is not promising cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union, but winning the masses over to this cooperation today by closely linking it to the crisis and unemployment and developing it into a massive plan for the social reorganization of both countries.

6. The political crisis in Germany calls into question the regime established in Europe by the Treaty of Versailles. The Central Committee of the German Communist Party says that once in power, the German proletariat will liquidate the Versailles documents. And that's all ? The abolition of the Treaty of Versailles would thus be the highest achievement of the proletarian revolution ! What will replace it ? This negative way of framing the problem brings the party closer to the National Socialists. United Soviet States of Europe—that is the only correct slogan offering a solution to the fragmentation of Europe, which threatens not only Germany but all of Europe with total economic and cultural decadence.

The slogan of proletarian unification of Europe is also a crucial weapon in the fight against the abject chauvinism of the fascists, against their crusade against France. The most dangerous and incorrect policy is that of passively adapting to the enemy, of pretending to be him. To the slogans of national despair and national madness, we must oppose the slogans that propose an international solution. But for this to happen, it is essential to cleanse the party of the poison of National Socialism, the core element of which is the theory of socialism in one country.

To condense everything said above into a simple formula, let us pose the question in the following way : should the tactics of the German Communist Party, in the immediate period, be placed under the sign of the offensive or the defensive ? To this we answer : the defensive.

If the confrontation were to take place today, as a consequence of the offensive by the Communist Party, the proletarian vanguard would be shattered against the bloc constituted by the State and fascism, the majority of the working class would remain in a fearful and perplexed neutrality, while the petty bourgeoisie, for the most part, would directly support fascism.

A defensive position implies a policy of rapprochement with the majority of the German working class and a united front with social-democratic and non-party workers against the fascist danger.

To deny this danger, to minimize it, to treat it lightly is the greatest crime that can be committed today against the proletarian revolution in Germany.

What will the Communist Party "defend" ? The Weimar Constitution ? No, we'll leave that to Brandler. The Communist Party must call for the defense of the material and intellectual positions that the working class has already won in the German state. The fate of its political and trade union organizations, its newspapers and printing presses, its clubs and libraries, is at stake. The communist worker must say to the social-democratic worker : "The policies of our parties are irreconcilable ; but if the fascists come tonight to destroy your organization's headquarters, I will come to your aid, arms in hand. Do you promise that if this same danger threatens my organization, you will rush to my aid ?" This is the essence of the politics of the present period. All agitation must be conducted in this spirit.

The more we develop this agitation with perseverance, with seriousness, with reflection, without the shouting and boasting of which the workers are so weary, the more relevant the defensive organizational measures that we will propose in each factory, in each working-class district, will be, the less danger there will be that the attack of the fascists will take us by surprise, the greater the assurance that this attack will unite and not divide the ranks of the workers.

Indeed, the fascists, due to their meteoric rise and the petty-bourgeois, impatient, and undisciplined nature of their army, will be inclined to launch an attack in the near future. Attempting to compete with them now in this arena would be not only a desperate measure but also deadly dangerous. On the contrary, the more the fascists appear to the social-democratic workers and the entire working masses as the attacking side, the greater our chances not only of crushing the fascist offensive but also of launching a victorious counter-offensive. The defense must be vigilant, active, and courageous. The general staff must keep a watchful eye on the entire battlefield and take into account all changes so as not to miss another reversal of fortune when the time comes to give the signal for the general assault.

There are strategists who always, under any circumstances, advocate a defensive stance. The Brandlerians, for example, are among them. To be surprised that they still speak of defense today would be utterly childish ; they always do. The Brandlerians are one of the mouthpieces of social democracy. We must, however, engage with the social-democratic workers on the defensive in order to then draw them into a decisive offensive. The Brandlerians are completely incapable of this. When the balance of power shifts radically in favor of proletarian revolution, the Brandlerians will once again appear as a dead weight and an obstacle to the revolution. This is why a defensive policy aimed at rapprochement with the social-democratic masses must in no way imply a softening of the contradictions with the Brandlerian leadership, behind which there are not, and never will be, the masses.

Within the framework of the regrouping of forces described above, and the tasks of the proletarian vanguard, the methods of physical repression applied by the Stalinist bureaucracy in Germany and other countries against the Bolshevik-Leninists take on a very particular significance. This constitutes a direct service rendered to the Social Democratic police and the shock troops of fascism. In total contradiction with the traditions of the proletarian revolutionary movement, these methods perfectly suit the mentality of the petty-bourgeois bureaucrats, who cling to their guaranteed salaries from above and fear losing them with the irruption of democracy within the party. The infamies of the Stalinists must be the subject of a broad and as concrete an explanation as possible, aimed at unmasking the role of the most unworthy officials within the party apparatus. The experience of the USSR and other countries proves that those who fight most frenetically against the left-wing opposition are despicable individuals who desperately need to conceal their faults and crimes from the leadership : squandering of public funds, abuse of power, or simply utter incompetence. It is quite clear that denouncing the brutal exploits of the Stalinist apparatus against the Bolshevik-Leninists will be all the more successful the more broadly we develop our general agitation based on the tasks outlined above.

If we have examined the problem of the tactical shift of the Communist International solely in light of the German situation, it is because the German crisis has once again placed the German Communist Party at the center of attention of the world proletarian vanguard, and because, in the light of this crisis, all problems appear with the greatest clarity. It would not be difficult to demonstrate that what is said here applies, to a greater or lesser extent, to other countries as well.

In France, all the forms taken by the class struggle since the war are infinitely less acute and decisive than in Germany. But the general trends of development are the same, not to mention, of course, the direct dependence that links the fate of France to that of Germany. The turning points of the Communist International are, in any case, universal in nature. The French Communist Party, proclaimed by Molotov as the leading candidate for power as early as 1928, has pursued a completely suicidal policy over the past two years. In particular, it failed to foresee the economic boom. A tactical shift was announced in France just as the economic recovery was giving way to a crisis. Thus, the same contradictions, the same difficulties, and the same tasks that we discussed in relation to Germany are also on the agenda in France.

IN WHAT WAYS IS THE CURRENT POLICY OF THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY WRONG ?

(Letter to a German communist worker, member of the German Communist Party)
December 8, 1931

Germany is living through one of its greatest historical moments ; the fate of the German people, the fate of Europe, and, to a large extent, the fate of all humanity for decades to come, depend on it. When you place a ball at the top of a pyramid, a slight push is enough to make it roll either to the right or to the left. This is the situation Germany is approaching hour by hour. Some forces want the ball to roll to the right and break the back of the working class. Others want to keep the ball at the top. This is utopian. The ball cannot remain on the apex of the pyramid. The communists would like the ball to roll to the left and break the back of capitalism. It is not enough to want something ; one must be able to do it. Let us try once again to calmly examine the situation : Is the policy currently being pursued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany right or wrong ?

What does Hitler want ?
Fascists are growing very rapidly. Communists are also growing, but much more slowly. This growth of both extremes proves that the ball cannot remain at the top of the pyramid. The rapid growth of fascists implies that the ball could roll to the right. This constitutes an immense danger.

Hitler tries to convince people that he is against a coup d'état. To strangle democracy once and for all, he claims to have come to power through the only democratic means. Can we really take him at his word ?

It is clear that if the fascists were certain of obtaining an absolute majority of seats in the next elections through peaceful means, they might prefer that path. In fact, it is closed to them. It would be foolish to think that the Nazis will continue to grow at the same rate as today for an extended period. Sooner or later, their social reservoir will run dry.

Fascism contains such terrible contradictions that the moment is near when the tide will cease to balance the tide. This moment may come long before the fascists have managed to gather more than half the votes. It will be impossible for them to stop because they will have nothing left to hope for. They will be forced to resort to a coup d'état.

But even without mentioning that, the democratic path is blocked for the fascists. The tremendous growth of political antagonisms in the country and, above all, the agitation of fascist thugs will inevitably lead to a situation where the closer the fascists get to the majority, the more volatile the atmosphere will become, and the more skirmishes and battles will multiply. From this perspective, civil war is absolutely unavoidable. The question of the fascists seizing power will be resolved not by a vote but by the civil war that the fascists are preparing and provoking.

Can we imagine for a single moment that Hitler and his advisors don't understand and foresee this ? That would be to take them for fools. There is no greater crime in politics than counting on the stupidity of a powerful enemy. Since Hitler cannot possibly be unaware that the path to power leads through a very harsh civil war, his speeches about the democratic and peaceful way are therefore nothing but a cover, that is to say, a war stratagem. We must be all the more vigilant.

What lies behind Hitler's war stratagem ?
His calculation is quite clear and obvious : he seeks to lull his adversary into complacency with the longer-term prospect of Nazi parliamentary expansion, so that at the opportune moment he can deliver a fatal blow to the lulled enemy. It is entirely possible that Hitler's admiration for democratic parliamentarism is intended to help him forge a coalition in the near future in which fascists occupy the most important positions, which they will then use... for a coup d'état. Indeed, it is more than evident that a coalition of the center with the fascists would not be a step towards a "democratic" solution to the problem, but would serve as a springboard for a coup d'état under the most favorable conditions for fascism.

We must aim close.
Everything proves that the outcome, even independently of the will of the fascist high command, will occur within the next few months, if not weeks. This circumstance is of enormous importance for the formulation of a just policy. If we accept that the fascists will seize power in two or three months, it will be ten times more difficult to fight against them next year than this year. Revolutionary plans of all kinds, drawn up two, three, or five years in advance, are nothing but pathetic and shameful chatter if the working class allows the fascists to come to power in the next two, three, or five months. The time factor in military operations, as in politics during revolutionary crises, is of decisive importance. To illustrate this idea, let us take an example. Hugo Urbahns, who considers himself a "left-wing communist," declares that the German Communist Party has failed, that it is politically dead, and he proposes to build a new party. If Urbahns were right, it would mean that the victory of the fascists is assured, because it takes years to create a new party (moreover, it is absolutely not proven that Urbahns' party will be better than Thaelmann's : when Urbahns was in charge of the party, there were no fewer mistakes).

If fascism were to actually seize power, it would mean not only the physical liquidation of the Communist Party, but also its complete political bankruptcy. The millions of workers who make up the proletariat would never forgive the Communist International and its German section for a shameful defeat inflicted by hordes of human dust. Therefore, the rise of the fascists to power would, in all likelihood, necessitate the creation of a new revolutionary party and a new international. It would be a terrible historical catastrophe. Only true liquidators—those who, hiding behind empty rhetoric, are in fact preparing to capitulate cowardly before the battle even begins—consider all of this inevitable. We Bolshevik-Leninists, whom the Stalinists call "Trotskyists," have nothing in common with such people. We firmly believe that victory over the fascists is possible not after they come to power, not after five, ten or twenty years of their domination, but today, in the current situation, in the months or weeks to come.

Thaelmann believes that the victory of fascism is inevitable.
To win, a just policy is necessary. This implies, in particular, that a policy must be adapted to the present situation, to the current realignment of forces, and not calculated for a situation that will arise in one, two, or three years, when the question of power will have long since been resolved.

The entire problem stems from the fact that the policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany is based, partly consciously and partly unconsciously, on the recognition of the inevitable victory of fascism. Indeed, in its appeal for a "united red front," published on November 29, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany starts from the premise that it is impossible to defeat fascism without first defeating German social democracy.

Thaelmann repeats this idea ad nauseam in his article. Is this idea correct ? Historically, it is absolutely true. But this does not mean at all that we can resolve the issues on the agenda simply by repeating it. This idea, correct from the perspective of revolutionary strategy as a whole, becomes a lie, even a reactionary one, once translated into the language of tactics. Is it true that to eliminate unemployment and poverty, capitalism must first be destroyed ? It is. But only the most foolish person would conclude from this that we should not fight with all our might today against the measures that allow capitalism to increase the misery of the workers.

Can we hope that the Communist Party will overthrow social democracy and fascism in the coming months ? No sensible person who can read and do arithmetic would venture such a statement. Politically, the question is this : can we, today, in the coming months—that is, despite the presence of social democracy, unfortunately still very powerful, albeit weakened—mount successfully against the onslaught of fascism ? The Central Committee of the German Communist Party answers in the negative. In other words, Thälmann considers the victory of fascism inevitable.

Let's return to the Russian experience !
To present my idea as clearly and concretely as possible, I will revisit the experience of the Kornilov uprising. On August 26, 1917 (old calendar), General Komilov launched a Cossack detachment and a savage division on Petrograd. In power was Kerensky, a servant of the bourgeoisie and three-quarters allied with Kornilov. Lenin was in hiding, accused of being in the service of the Hohenzolems ; at that time, I was imprisoned on the same charge in a cell at the Kresty. What was the attitude of the Bolsheviks then ? They also had the right to say : "To defeat Kornilov's gang, we must defeat Kerensky's gang." They said it more than once, because it was correct and necessary for future propaganda. But it was absolutely insufficient to resist Kornilov on August 26 and the days that followed, and to prevent him from slaughtering the proletariat of Petrograd. That is why the Bolsheviks were not content with simply issuing a general appeal to the workers and soldiers : Break with the conciliators and support the united red front of the Bolsheviks ! No, the Bolsheviks proposed a united front of struggle to the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, and created joint organizations for the struggle with them. Was this correct or incorrect ? Let Thaelmann answer me. To show even more clearly what the united front looked like, I will mention the following episode : released from prison thanks to bail paid by the trade union organizations, I went directly from my cell to a session of the People's Defense Committee, where, with the Menshevik Dan and the Socialist Revolutionary Gots, who were Kerensky's allies and who had kept me in prison, I examined and resolved the problems of the struggle against Kornilov. Was this correct or incorrect ? Let Remmele answer me.

Is Brüning a "lesser evil" ?
Social democracy supports Brüning, votes for him, and takes responsibility for his policies before the masses, based on the assertion that the Brüning government is a "lesser evil." This is the viewpoint the Rote Fahne (Red Flag) is trying to attribute to me, under the pretext that I protested against the stupid and shameful participation of the communists in Hitler's referendum. But did the German Left Opposition, and I in particular, demand that the communists vote for Brüning and support him ? We Marxists consider Brüning and Hitler, as well as Braun, to be representatives of one and the same system. The question of which of them is a "lesser evil" is meaningless, because their system, against which we are fighting, needs all of its elements. But today, these elements are in conflict, and the party of the proletariat must absolutely use this conflict in the interest of the revolution.

There are seven notes in a scale. Asking which note is the "best"—C, D, or G—is meaningless. However, a musician must know when and which key to strike. Asking abstractly whether Brüning or Hitler is the lesser evil is equally meaningless. But one must know which of these keys to strike. Is that clear ? For those who don't understand, let's take another example. If one of my enemies poisons me daily with small doses of poison, and another wants to shoot me from behind, I would first wrest the revolver from my second enemy's hands, which would give me the opportunity to finish off the first. But that doesn't mean that poison is a "lesser evil" compared to the revolver.

Unfortunately, the leaders of the German Communist Party found themselves on the same footing as the Social Democrats, merely reversing the roles : the Social Democrats voted for Brüning, calling him the lesser evil ; the Communists, who absolutely refused to trust Brüning and Braun (and they were quite right), took to the streets to support Hitler's referendum, that is, the fascists' attempt to overthrow Brüning. In doing so, they acknowledged that Hitler was the lesser evil, since a victory in the referendum would bring Hitler to power, not the proletariat. Frankly, it's a bit embarrassing to explain something so basic ! It's bad, very bad, that musicians like Remmele, instead of distinguishing the notes, play the piano with their boots.

It is not a question of the workers who have left social democracy, but of those who remain.
Thousands upon thousands of Noskes, Welses, and Hilferdings will ultimately prefer fascism to communism. But to do so, they must definitively break with the workers—something they have not yet done. Social democracy, with all its internal antagonisms, is now entering into a sharp conflict with the fascists. Our task is to use this conflict, not to reconcile the two adversaries against us at the crucial moment.

Now, we must turn against fascism by forming a single front. And this front of direct struggle against fascism, common to the entire proletariat, must be used for a flank attack, but one that will be all the more effective against social democracy.

We must demonstrate in practice the utmost eagerness to conclude a united front against fascists with the social democrats wherever they are willing to join. When we tell social-democratic workers, "Abandon your leaders and join our united front outside of any party," we are merely adding another empty phrase to thousands of others. We must know how to detach workers from their leaders in action. And the action now is the struggle against fascism.

There is no doubt that there are, and will continue to be, social-democratic workers ready to fight against fascism shoulder to shoulder with communist workers, independently of and even against the will of social-democratic organizations. Obviously, the closest possible ties must be established with these vanguard workers. But for the moment, they are few in number. The German worker is educated in a spirit of organization and discipline. This has its strengths and its weaknesses. The overwhelming majority of social-democratic workers want to fight against the fascists, but, for the time being, only with their organization. It is impossible to skip this step. We must help social-democratic workers to test, in practice—in a new and exceptional situation—the worth of their organizations and their leaders when it comes to the life or death of the working class.

The social-democratic bloc against the fascists must be forced to unite
. Unfortunately, there are many terrified opportunists in the Central Committee of the Communist Party. They have heard that opportunism is a love for blocs.

That is why they are against blocs. They do not understand the difference that can exist between an arrangement at the parliamentary level and a combat agreement, even the most modest, concerning a strike or the protection of typesetters against fascist gangs.

Electoral agreements and parliamentary bargains concluded by the revolutionary party with the social democrats generally serve the social democrats. A practical agreement for mass actions, for militant aims, is always made to the benefit of the revolutionary party. The Anglo-Russian Committee was an unacceptable form of bloc between two leaderships, on a vague and misleading common political platform that did not compel any action. Maintaining this bloc during the general strike, when the General Council was acting as a strikebreaker, amounted to a policy of treason for the Stalinists.

No common platform with the Social Democrats or the leaders of the German trade unions, no joint publications, no flags, no joint posters ! March separately, strike together ! Agree only on how to strike, on whom to strike, and when ! We can agree on this point with the devil, his grandmother, and even with Noske and Grzesinski. On the sole condition that we don't tie our own hands.

Finally, a practical set of measures must be developed quickly, not with the aim of "unmasking" social democracy (in front of the communists), but with the aim of effectively combating fascism. This program must address the protection of factories, the freedom of action of factory committees, the inviolability of workers' organizations and institutions, the issue of arms depots that fascists could seize, the measures to be taken in case of danger, that is to say, the militant actions of social-democratic communist detachments, etc.

In the fight against fascism, factory committees play a crucial role. A particularly well-thought-out action plan is essential. Every factory must be transformed into an anti-fascist fortress, complete with its own commander and combat teams. Maps of the barracks and other fascist strongholds in every city and district must be obtained. The fascists are trying to encircle revolutionary centers. The encircler must be surrounded. Agreement on this matter with social-democratic and trade union organizations is not only permissible but imperative. To refuse it in the name of "principled" considerations (in reality, through bureaucratic stupidity or, worse still, cowardice) is tantamount to directly aiding fascism.

As early as November 1930, that is, a year ago, we proposed a practical program agreed upon with the Social Democratic workers. What has been done in this direction ? Almost nothing. The Central Committee of the Communist Party has been preoccupied with everything except what constituted its immediate task. How much precious time has been wasted ! In truth, there isn't much left. The program of action must be purely practical, purely concrete, without any artificial "demands," without any ulterior motives, so that every average Social Democratic worker can say to themselves : what the Communists are proposing is absolutely essential for the struggle against fascism. On this basis, we must lead the Social Democratic workers by example and criticize their leaders who, inevitably, will oppose and hinder the movement. Only on this path is victory possible.

A Good Quote from Lenin
: Today's epigones—that is, Lenin's very poor disciples—like to fill their gaps in knowledge at every turn with quotations that are often entirely inappropriate. For a Marxist, it is not the quotation but the correct method that allows the question to be resolved. But with the correct method, it is not difficult to find the appropriate quotation. When introducing the analogy with Kornilov's uprising earlier, I thought to myself : surely we can find in Lenin a theoretical interpretation of our bloc with the conciliators in the struggle against Kornilov. And indeed, in the second part of Volume XIV of the Russian edition, I found the following lines in a letter from Lenin to the Central Committee, dated early September 1917 :

Even now, we must not support Kerensky's government. That would be a betrayal of our principles. The question will be asked : shouldn't we then fight against Kornilov ? Of course we should. But it's not the same thing ; there's a line between the two. And some Bolsheviks cross that line, giving in to the spirit of "conciliation" and allowing themselves to be swept along by the flow of events.
We are waging and will continue to wage war against Kornilov, but we are not supporting Kerensky ; on the contrary, we are exposing his weakness. There is a difference. A rather subtle difference, but absolutely essential, and one that must not be forgotten.
So, what does the change in our tactics after Kornilov's revolt consist of ? It consists
in the fact that we are changing the form of our struggle against Kerensky. Without in the least lessening our hostility towards him, without retracting any of the words we have spoken against him, without abandoning our goal of overthrowing him, we say : we must take the moment into account ; we will not try to overthrow him immediately. We will now fight him in another way, specifically by highlighting Kerensky's weakness and hesitations in the eyes of the people (who are fighting Kornilov).
We propose nothing else : total independence of the Communist organization and its press, complete freedom of Communist criticism, even with regard to social democracy and the trade unions. Only the most despicable opportunists could accept the alienation of the Communist Party's freedom (for example, through joining the Kuomintang).

We are not part of it.

We must not back down from our critique of social democracy. We must not forget the past. We will settle all our historical accounts in due course, including our account with Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. Similarly, we Russian Bolsheviks have finally presented a comprehensive indictment to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries for the persecutions, slander, arrests, and murders of workers, soldiers, and peasants.

But we presented this note two months after having used the personal score-settling between Kerensky and Kornilov, between the "democrats" and the fascists, to more effectively repel the fascists. It was only thanks to this that we won.

If the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany adopts the position expressed in Lenin's quotation, the entire attitude toward the social-democratic masses and the trade union organizations will change immediately : instead of articles and speeches that are convincing only to those already convinced, the agitators will find common ground with hundreds of thousands and millions of new workers. Differentiation within social democracy will accelerate. The fascists will soon realize that it is no longer a matter of deceiving Brüning, Braun, and Wels, but of engaging in open struggle with the entire working class. A profound differentiation within fascism will inevitably occur on this basis. Only this path makes victory possible.

But this victory must be desired. Now, among the communist civil servants, there are, alas, quite a few cowardly careerists and bureaucrats who cherish their cushy positions, their salaries, and even more so, their own skins. These individuals are very prone to parade ultra-leftist rhetoric, which masks a pitiful and contemptible fatalism. "One cannot fight fascism without having defeated social democracy !" says the fierce revolutionary, and... he prepares his passport for exile.

Communist workers, you number in the hundreds of thousands, in the millions, and you have nowhere to go ; there won't be enough passports for you. If fascism comes to power, it will roll over your heads and spines like a terrifying tank. Salvation lies only in a merciless struggle. Only joining forces with the social-democratic workers in the struggle can bring victory. Hurry, communist workers, for your time is running out !

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January 1932

Leon Trotsky

The German Revolution and the Stalinist Bureaucracy

Vital problems of the German proletariat

The shift within the Communist International, linked to the changing situation, presents the Left Communist Opposition with new and extremely important tasks. Its forces are diminished. But each current is developing in parallel with its own tasks. Understanding them clearly is one of the most important guarantees of victory.

Preface

Because of its extreme backwardness, Russian capitalism has proven to be the weakest link in the imperialist chain. German capitalism appears in the current crisis as the weakest link for the opposite reason : it is the most advanced capitalism in a Europe that finds itself in a dead-end situation. The more the dynamic character of the productive forces in Germany asserts itself, the more they are stifled in the European state system, akin to the cages of a pathetic provincial menagerie. Every turn in the situation confronts German capitalism with the very tasks it had tried to solve through war. Through the Hohenzollern government, the German bourgeoisie prepared to "organize Europe." Through the Brüning-Curtius government, it attempted to achieve... a customs union with Austria. What a terrifying reduction of tasks, possibilities, and prospects ! But this union, too, had to be abandoned. The European system has feet of clay. If a few million Austrians unite with Germany, France's great saving hegemony could collapse.

Europe, and especially Germany, cannot progress along the capitalist path. If the current crisis were temporarily overcome through the automatic workings of capitalist forces—at the expense of the workers—this would imply the imminent resurgence of all contradictions in an even more concentrated form.

Europe's weight in the global economy can only diminish. American policies—the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan, the Hoover Moratorium—are firmly entrenched in the European front. Europe is being subjected to American control.

The decay of capitalism entails social and cultural decay. The path of systematic differentiation of nations, of the growth of the proletariat at the cost of a shrinking middle class, is blocked. A further slowing of the social crisis can only mean the impoverishment of the petty bourgeoisie and the degeneration of ever-larger sections of the proletariat into lumpenproletariat. This danger, the most serious of all, is choking the German vanguard.

The social-democratic bureaucracy is the most rotten part of decaying capitalist Europe. It began its historical journey under the banner of Marx and Engels. Its objective was the overthrow of bourgeois domination. The powerful rise of capitalism absorbed it and dragged it along in its wake. In the name of reform, it renounced revolution, first in deeds and then in words. Kautsky, of course, continued to defend revolutionary rhetoric for a long time, adapting it to the needs of reformism. Bernstein, on the contrary, demanded that revolution be renounced : capitalism is entering a period of peaceful prosperity, without crisis or war. An exemplary prediction. It may seem that there is an irreconcilable contradiction between Kautsky and Bernstein. In fact, they complemented each other symmetrically, like the left and right boots of reformism.

War broke out. Social democracy supported the war in the name of future prosperity. Instead of prosperity, there was decline. Today, the question is no longer whether the necessity of revolution stems from the bankruptcy of capitalism, nor whether workers can be reconciled with capitalism through reforms. The new policy of social democracy is to save bourgeois society by abandoning reforms.

But the decline of social democracy did not end there. The current crisis of dying capitalism has forced social democracy to renounce the fruits of a long economic and political struggle and to reduce German workers to the standard of living of their fathers, grandfathers, and even great-grandfathers. There is no historical picture more tragic and at the same time more repulsive than the pernicious decay of reformism amidst the ruins of all its conquests and all its hopes. The theater is searching for modernism. Let it therefore stage Hauptmann's The Weavers more often, the most relevant of all plays. But let the theater director not forget to reserve the front rows for the leaders of social democracy.

Moreover, they have no use for spectacles : they have reached the absolute limit of their capacity to adapt. There is a threshold below which the German working class cannot accept descending for long. However, the bourgeois regime, fighting for its existence, refuses to acknowledge this threshold. Brüning's emergency decrees are merely a first step, a test of the waters. The Brüning regime maintains itself thanks to the cowardly and treacherous support of the Social Democratic bureaucracy, which itself relies on the lukewarm and sullen confidence of a segment of the proletariat. The system of bureaucratic decrees is unstable, uncertain, and unsustainable. Capital needs a different, more decisive policy. The support of the Social Democrats, who cannot forget their own workers, is not only insufficient for it to achieve its goals, but is already beginning to hinder it. The era of half-measures is over. To try to find a way out, the bourgeoisie must definitively free itself from the pressure of workers' organizations ; it must sweep them away, break them, disperse them.

Here begins the historical mission of fascism. It puts back in the saddle classes that are immediately above the proletariat and fear being thrown into its ranks ; it organizes them, militarizes them with the means of finance capital, under the cover of the official State, and sends them to crush proletarian organizations, from the most revolutionary to the most moderate.

Fascism is not merely a system of repression, violence, and police terror. Fascism is a specific type of state founded on the extirpation of all elements of proletarian democracy within bourgeois society. The task of fascism is not only to crush the communist vanguard, but also to maintain the entire class in a state of forced atomization. For this, it is not enough to physically exterminate the most revolutionary stratum of the workers. It is necessary to crush all free and independent organizations, destroy all the proletariat's bases of support, and annihilate the results of three-quarters of a century of work by social democracy and the trade unions. For it is on this work that, in the final analysis, the Communist Party is founded.

Social democracy laid the groundwork for the victory of fascism. But in doing so, it also laid the groundwork for its own political demise. It is entirely fair to hold social democracy responsible for Brüning's exceptional legislation and the threat of fascist barbarity. But it is absurd to equate social democracy with fascism.

Through its policies during the Revolution of 1848, the liberal bourgeoisie paved the way for the triumph of the counter-revolution, which subsequently rendered liberalism powerless. Marx and Engels denounced the German liberal bourgeoisie just as vehemently as Lassalle, and in greater depth. But when the Lassalleans lumped the feudal counter-revolution and the liberal bourgeoisie together in the same reactionary category, Marx and Engels rightly condemned this misguided ultra-leftism. The Lassalleans' flawed position, on occasion, made them complicit with the monarchy, despite the overall progressive nature of their work, which was infinitely more significant than that of the liberals.

The theory of "social-fascism" reproduces the fundamental error of the Lassalleans on new historical grounds. By attaching the same fascist label to both the National Socialists and the Social Democrats, the Stalinist bureaucracy is drawn into actions such as supporting Hitler's referendum : this is no better than the Lassalleans' alliances with Bismarck.

In their struggle against social democracy, German communists must at the present stage rely on two distinct positions :
a) the political responsibility of social democracy with regard to the power of fascism,
b) the absolute incompatibility that exists between fascism and the workers' organizations on which social democracy is based.

The contradictions of German capitalism have reached such a level of tension that an explosion is inevitable. The adaptability of social democracy has reached the point of near self-destruction. The errors of the Stalinist bureaucracy have reached the brink of catastrophe. These are the three terms of the equation that characterizes the situation in Germany. Everything hangs by a thread.

When one follows the German situation in newspapers that arrive almost a week late, when a manuscript takes another week to travel the distance between Constantinople and Berlin, and when it takes weeks for a pamphlet to reach its reader, one involuntarily wonders : won't it be too late ? And each time the answer is : no, the armies engaged in this struggle are too vast for us to fear a simultaneous and decisive victory. The forces of the German proletariat are not exhausted. They haven't even begun their march yet. The logic of events will speak with increasing force each day. This justifies the author's attempt to make his voice heard, even with a delay of several weeks—that is, of an entire historical period.

The Stalinist bureaucracy decided it would carry out its work more easily if it imprisoned the author of these lines in Prinkipo. It persuaded the Social Democrat Hermann Müller to refuse a visa to... a "Menshevik" : the united front was thus achieved without hesitation or procrastination. Today, the Stalinists declare in the official Soviet newspapers that I am "defending" Brüning's government in agreement with the Social Democrats, who are scrambling to secure my entry into Germany. Rather than be outraged by this baseness, it's better to laugh at this stupidity. But let's not laugh for too long, for we have little time.

There is no doubt that the unfolding situation will prove our assertions correct. But how will history provide this proof : through the collapse of the Stalinist faction or through the victory of Marxist policy ? That is the crux of the matter. It concerns the fate of the German people, and not just them.

The questions examined in this pamphlet are not new. For nine years now, the leadership of the Communist International has been engaged in revising values and striving to disorganize the international vanguard of the proletariat through tactical convulsions, the sum of which is what is called the "General Line." The Russian Left Opposition (the Bolshevik-Leninists) was formed on the basis not only of Russian problems but also of international ones. And the problems of Germany's revolutionary development were not the least of their concerns. Serious disagreements in this area arose as early as 1923. The author of these pages has spoken on the issues debated on several occasions. A significant portion of his critical works has even been published in German. This pamphlet is in keeping with the theoretical and political work of the Left Opposition. Much of what is only mentioned here in passing was the subject of detailed study in its time. I must refer the reader in particular to my books : "The International Revolution and the Communist International," "The Permanent Revolution," etc. Now that the disagreements appear to everyone as a major historical problem, their origins can be better and more deeply appreciated. For a serious revolutionary, for a genuine Marxist, this is absolutely essential. Eclectics live on episodic thoughts, on improvisations that arise under the pressure of events. Marxist cadres, capable of leading the proletarian revolution, educate themselves through a thorough, continuous, and sustained study of the tasks and the divergences.

Prinkipo, January 27, 1932.

1. Social democracy

The "iron front" was originally the bloc formed by the powerful social-democratic trade unions, strong in numbers, and the impotent groups of bourgeois "republicans," who had lost all support among the people and all confidence. If corpses are useless in the struggle, they are good enough to prevent the living from fighting. The social-democratic leaders use their bourgeois allies to restrain the workers' organizations. The struggle, the struggle... that's all anyone talks about. But what if we can ultimately do without fighting ? Will the fascists ever truly move from words to action ? As for the social democrats, they never have, and yet they are no worse than the others.

In the face of real danger, Social Democracy places its hopes not in the "Iron Front" but in the Prussian police. A miscalculation ! The fact that a significant portion of the police were chosen from among Social Democratic workers is entirely meaningless. Here again, existence shapes conscience. The worker, having become a policeman in the service of the capitalist state, is a bourgeois policeman, not a worker. In recent years, these policemen have had to confront revolutionary workers far more often than National Socialist students. Such an environment leaves its mark. And the essential point is that every policeman knows that governments change, but the police remain.

An article in the New Year's issue of the social-democratic newspaper Das freie Wort (what a pathetic paper !) explains the profound meaning of the policy of "tolerance." Faced with the police and the Reichswehr, Hitler, it seems, will never be able to come to power. Indeed, the Reichswehr, according to the constitution, is directly subordinate to the President of the Republic. Consequently, fascism is not dangerous as long as there is a president at the head of state who is faithful to the constitution. The Brüning government must be supported until the presidential elections, in order to elect, by allying with the parliamentary bourgeoisie, a constitutional president, and thus block Hitler's path to power for seven years. We reproduce the content of article [1] exactly. A mass party, which draws millions of people into its wake (towards socialism !), believes that the question of which class will be in power in today's thoroughly shaken Germany depends not on the militancy of the German proletariat, not on the assault columns of fascism, nor even on the composition of the Reichswehr, but on whether or not the pure spirit of the Weimar Constitution (with the necessary amount of camphor and mothballs) will be installed in the presidential palace. And what will happen if, in a certain situation, the spirit of Weimar admits, in agreement with Bettmann-Hollweg, that "necessity knows no law" ? And what will happen if the fragile shell of the Weimar spirit, despite the camphor and mothballs, tears open at the least opportune moment ? And what if... but there is no end to such questions.

The reformist politicians, these skillful wheeler-dealers, these old hands of intrigue and careerism, these men experienced in parliamentary and ministerial schemes, turn out - one cannot find a more tender expression - to be perfect fools, as soon as the course of events throws them out of their usual sphere and confronts them with important facts.

To place one's hope in a president is also to place one's hope in the "State." Faced with the coming confrontation between the proletariat and the fascist petty bourgeoisie—these two camps constitute the overwhelming majority of the German nation—the Marxists of Vorwärts are calling on the night watchman for help. "State, intervene !" (Staat, greif zu !). This means :

"Brüning, do not force us to defend ourselves with the forces of the workers' organizations, for that will set the whole proletariat in motion, and then the movement will surpass the bald heads of the government : originally an anti-fascist movement, it will end up as a communist movement."

To this, Brüning, if he didn't prefer to remain silent, could reply : "I couldn't overcome fascism with the police forces, even if I wanted to ; but I wouldn't want to, even if I could. Turning the Reichswehr against the fascists would mean cutting the Reichswehr in two, if not turning it entirely against me ; and what's even more important : turning the bureaucratic apparatus against the fascists would mean giving the workers free rein, restoring to them total freedom of action : the consequences would be the same as those you Social Democrats fear, and which I, for that reason, fear all the more." The appeals of Social Democracy will produce on the state apparatus, on the judges, on the Reichswehr, on the police, the opposite effect to that intended. The most "loyal," "neutral," and least National Socialist-affiliated civil servant reasons as follows : "The Social Democrats have millions of people behind them ; they have immense resources at their disposal : the press, parliament, municipalities ; their very survival is at stake ; they are assured of the support of the Communists in the fight against the Fascists ; and yet, these all-powerful gentlemen are turning to me, a mere civil servant, to save them from the attack of a party with millions of members, whose leaders could be my superiors tomorrow : the Social Democrats' situation must be dire and without any prospects... It's time for me, a civil servant, to think about my own survival." The result is that the "loyal," "neutral" civil servant who hesitated until yesterday will inevitably take precautionary measures, that is, will align himself with the National Socialists to secure his future. This is how reformists who outlive themselves end up working for fascists because of their bureaucratic line.

A parasite of the bourgeoisie, social democracy is condemned to a miserable ideological parasitism. Sometimes it borrows the ideas of bourgeois economists, sometimes it tries to use scraps of Marxism. Having included in my pamphlet arguments against the Communist Party's participation in Hitler's referendum, Hilferding concludes : "In truth, there is nothing to add to these lines to explain the social democracy's tactics regarding the Brüning government." And Remmele and Thalheimer declare : "Look, Hilferding is relying on Trotsky." And a fascist rag adds : in this affair, Trotsky is being paid with a promise of a visa. A Stalinist journalist enters the scene and telegraphs the fascist newspaper's declaration to Moscow. The editorial staff of Izvestia, where the unfortunate Radek happens to be, prints the telegram. This chain of events deserves to be noted before moving on.

Let us return to more serious matters. Hitler can afford the luxury of a struggle against Brüning only because the entire bourgeois regime rests on the backs of half the working class, the half led by Hilferding and his associates. If the Social Democrats had not pursued a policy of class betrayal, Hitler, quite apart from never having acquired the power he possesses today, would have clung to Brüning's government as to a lifeline. If the Communists had overthrown Brüning with the Social Democrats, it would have been an event of enormous political significance. Its consequences, in any case, would have far exceeded the Social Democratic leadership. Hilferding attempts to justify his betrayal in our critique, where we demanded that the Communists acknowledge Hilferding's betrayal as a fact.

Although Hilferding has "nothing to add" to Trotsky's words, he nevertheless adds something : the balance of power, he says, is such that even if joint actions by communist and social-democratic workers were to take place, it would be impossible "even by intensifying the struggle, to overthrow the adversary and seize power." The crux of the matter lies in this remark, made in passing and without supporting evidence. According to Hilferding, in contemporary Germany, where the proletariat constitutes the majority of the population and the decisive productive force of society, the joint struggle of social democracy and the Communist Party could not possibly deliver power to the proletariat ! But then, at what point is power likely to pass into the hands of the proletariat ? Before the war, there was the prospect of the automatic growth of capitalism, the growth of the proletariat, and the parallel growth of social democracy. The war brought this process to an end, and now no force in the world is capable of restoring it. The decay of capitalism means that the question of power must be resolved on the basis of the current productive forces. By prolonging the agony of the capitalist system, social democracy leads only to further economic decline, the disintegration of the proletariat, and social gangrene. It has no other prospects ; and tomorrow will be worse than today, and the day after, worse than tomorrow. But already the leaders of social democracy no longer dare to face the future. They possess all the flaws of a ruling class doomed to disappear : indifference, paralysis of will, a tendency to turn away from events and to hope for miracles. If you think about it, Tarnov's economic research serves the same purpose as the comforting pronouncements of some Rasputin...

The Social Democrats, allied with the Communists, could not seize power. There he is, the educated petty bourgeois (gebildet), infinitely cowardly and arrogant, filled from head to toe with mistrust and contempt for the masses. The Social Democrats and the Communist Party together have about 40% of the vote, not counting the fact that the betrayals of the Social Democrats and the errors of the Communist Party are driving millions of workers into the camp of indifference or even into that of National Socialism. The mere fact that these two parties were to undertake joint actions would considerably increase the political strength of the proletariat, while offering new prospects to the masses. But let's start with the 40%. Brüning or Hitler might have more. But only these three groups—the proletariat, the center party, or the fascists—can govern Germany. The educated petit bourgeois is imbued to the very core of this truth : the representative of capital needs only 20% of the vote to govern, because the bourgeoisie owns the banks, the trusts, the cartels, the railways. It is true that our educated petit bourgeois was preparing, twelve years ago, to "socialize" all of this. Anything can happen ! A program of socialization—yes, expropriation of the expropriators—no, because that is already Bolshevism.

We analyzed the balance of power above by focusing on the parliamentary level. But this is a distorting mirror. The parliamentary representation of an oppressed class is considerably less than its actual strength, and conversely, the representation of the bourgeoisie, even the day before its fall, will always be a charade of its imagined strength. Only revolutionary struggle lays bare the true balance of power by sweeping away everything that might conceal it. In the direct and immediate struggle for power, the proletariat develops a force infinitely greater than its expression in parliament, provided, however, that internal sabotage, Austro-Marxism, or other forms of betrayal do not paralyze it. Let us recall once again the incomparable lesson of history : when the Bolsheviks had seized, and firmly seized, power, they held only a third of the votes in the Constituent Assembly, which, with the Left SRs, amounted to less than 40%. And despite the appalling economic destruction, the war, the betrayal of European social democracy and especially that of German social democracy, despite the postwar weariness, despite the development of a Thermidorian mindset, the first workers' state has held for fourteen years. What then can be said of Germany ? When the social-democratic worker rises up with the communist worker to seize power, the task will be nine-tenth accomplished.

And yet, Hilferding argues, if the Social Democrats had voted against the Brüning government and thus overthrown it, the result would have been the rise of the fascists to power. Certainly, at the parliamentary level, the situation appears this way ; but the parliamentary level is not our concern here. The Social Democrats could only refuse to support Brüning if they committed themselves to the path of revolutionary struggle. It was either support for Brüning or the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat. There is no third option. A Social Democratic vote against Brüning would have immediately altered the balance of power, not on the parliamentary chessboard, where the pieces would suddenly have been under the table, but in the arena of the revolutionary class struggle. With such a turning point, the forces of the working class would not have doubled but multiplied tenfold, because the moral factor is not the least important in the class struggle, especially during major historical turning points. A high-voltage moral current would have swept through all levels of the people. The proletariat would have confidently declared itself the only one capable of giving a new, higher direction to the life of this great nation. The disintegration and demoralization of Hitler's army would have begun even before the decisive battles. Certainly, the clashes could not have been avoided ; but the firm will to prevail and a bold offensive would have made victory infinitely easier than even the most optimistic revolutionary imagines today.

For this to happen, only one thing is needed : a shift in social democracy onto the path of revolution. After the experience of the years 1914-1932, it would be a ridiculous illusion to expect a voluntary shift on the part of the leadership. As for the majority of social-democratic workers, it's a different matter : they can and will make the shift ; they simply need help. But it will be a shift not only against the bourgeois state, but also against the ruling circles of their own party.

And here, our Austro-Marxist, who "has nothing to add" to our words, will once again try to counter us with quotes from our own work : have we not written, in fact, that the policy of the Stalinist bureaucracy presented itself as a series of errors, have we not condemned the participation of the Communist Party in Hitler's referendum ?

We have written about it and we have condemned it. But we are fighting against the leadership of the Communist International precisely because it is incapable of shattering social democracy, of wresting the masses from its influence, and of freeing the engine of history from its rusty brake. Through its missteps, its errors, and its bureaucratic ultimacity, the Stalinist bureaucracy allows social democracy to maintain itself and to land on its feet every time.

The Communist Party is a proletarian, anti-bourgeois party, even if it is misled. Social democracy, despite its working-class composition, is an entirely bourgeois party, very skillfully led in "normal" conditions from the perspective of the bourgeoisie's objectives ; but this party is worthless in conditions of social crisis. The social-democratic leaders are forced, even against their will, to admit the bourgeois character of their party. Regarding the crisis and unemployment, Tarnov repeats the worn-out phrases about the "shame of capitalist civilization," in the same way that a Protestant pastor speaks of the sin of wealth ; Tarnov speaks of socialism as a priest speaks of reward in the afterlife. But he expresses himself quite differently on concrete issues : "If on September 14th this specter (of unemployment) had not loomed over the ballot boxes, that day would have had a completely different character in German history" (report to the Leipzig Congress). Social democracy lost voters and seats because capitalism revealed its true face in the crisis. The crisis did not strengthen the "socialist" party, but on the contrary, it weakened it, just as it reduced the circulation of goods, the money in bank coffers, the arrogance of Hoover and Ford, the income of the Prince of Monaco, etc. The most optimistic assessments of the economic situation are now to be found not in bourgeois newspapers but in social-democratic newspapers. Could there be a more irrefutable demonstration of the bourgeois character of this party ? If the sickness of capitalism implies the sickness of social democracy, then the imminent death of capitalism can only mean the imminent death of social democracy. A party that relies on the workers but serves the bourgeoisie cannot, in a period of extreme intensification of the class struggle, fail to feel the breath of the grave.

Notes

[1] The article is modestly signed with the initials EH. These must be reproduced for our descendants. Generations of workers from different countries have not labored in vain. Great thinkers and revolutionary fighters have not passed through this world without leaving their mark. EH exists, he watches over us, and he shows the German proletariat the way forward.
Malicious tongues claim that EH is related to E. Heilmann, who disgraced himself during the war with particularly despicable chauvinism. It's hard to believe : such a brilliant mind !

2. Democracy and Fascism

The 11th Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International acknowledged the need to put an end to the erroneous views based on the "liberal construction of the contradiction between fascism and bourgeois democracy, between the parliamentary forms of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and its openly fascist forms..." The core of this Stalinist philosophy is very simple : starting from the Marxist denial of an absolute contradiction, it derives from this a denial of contradiction in general, even relative contradiction. This is the typical error of vulgar leftism. For if there is no contradiction between democracy and fascism, even at the level of the forms that bourgeois domination takes, these two regimes must simply coincide. Hence the conclusion : social democracy = fascism. But why then is social democracy called social fascism ? What exactly the term "social" means in this relationship, we have so far received no explanation [1].

However, the decisions of the plenums of the Executive Committee of the Communist International do not alter the fundamental nature of things. A contradiction exists between fascism and democracy. It is not "absolute," or, to use Marxist terminology, it does not express the domination of two irreconcilable classes. Rather, it designates two different systems of domination of one and the same class. These two systems—parliamentary democracy and fascist—rely on different combinations of oppressed and exploited classes and inevitably come into acute conflict with one another.

Social democracy, today the main representative of the bourgeois parliamentary system, relies on the workers. Fascism relies on the petty bourgeoisie. Social democracy cannot have any influence without a mass workers' organization. Fascism can only establish its power once workers' organizations have been destroyed. Parliament is the main arena of social democracy. The fascist system is founded on the destruction of parliamentarism. For the monopoly bourgeoisie, parliamentary and fascist systems are merely different instruments of its domination : it resorts to one or the other depending on historical conditions. But for both social democracy and fascism, the choice of one instrument or the other has independent significance ; indeed, it is a matter of political life or death.

The fascist regime sees its turn coming when the "normal" means—military and police—of the bourgeois dictatorship, with their parliamentary cover, prove insufficient to maintain social equilibrium. Through the agents of fascism, capital mobilizes the masses of the enraged petty bourgeoisie, the bands of the declassed and demoralized lumpenproletariat, all those countless human beings whom finance capital itself has plunged into rage and despair. The bourgeoisie demands a finished product from fascism : having accepted the methods of civil war, it wants peace for many years to come. And the agents of fascism, using the petty bourgeoisie as a battering ram and destroying all obstacles in their path, will bring their work to a successful conclusion. The victory of fascism results in finance capital seizing all organs and institutions of domination, leadership, and education in its iron grip : the state apparatus with its army, municipalities, universities, schools, press, trade unions, and cooperatives. The fascization of the state entails not only the "Mussolinization" of forms and methods of government—in this area, changes ultimately play a secondary role—but above all, the crushing of workers' organizations. The proletariat must be reduced to a state of complete apathy, and a network of institutions must be created that penetrates deeply into the masses to prevent any independent crystallization of the proletariat. This is precisely the essence of the fascist regime.

What has just been said in no way contradicts the fact that a transitional regime between the democratic and fascist systems, combining features of both, can exist for a specific period : this is the general law of the replacement of one system by another, even if they are irreconcilably hostile to one another. There are times when the bourgeoisie relies on both social democracy and fascism, that is, when it simultaneously uses its conciliatory and terrorist agents. Such, in a certain sense, was Kerensky's government during the last months of its existence : it relied halfway on the Soviets and at the same time conspired with Kornilov. Such is Brüning's government, dancing on a tightrope between the two irreconcilable camps, with the pendulum of emergency decrees in its hands. But such a situation of the state and the government can only be temporary. It is characteristic of the transition period : social democracy is about to see its mission expire, while neither communism nor fascism is yet ready to seize power.

Italian communists, who have long grappled with the problem of fascism, have repeatedly protested against the widespread but erroneous use of this concept. At the time of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International, Ercoli was still developing positions on the question of fascism that are now considered "Trotskyist." Defining fascism as the most consistent and complete system of reaction, Ercoli explained : "This assertion is based neither on terrorist and cruel acts, nor on the large number of workers and peasants killed, nor on the ferocity of the various types of torture widely employed, nor on the severity of the sentences ; it is motivated by the systematic destruction of all forms of autonomous mass organization." Ercoli is absolutely right : the essence and role of fascism aim at the total liquidation of all workers' organizations and the prevention of any resurgence of them. In developed capitalist society, this objective cannot be achieved through police means alone. The only way to reach it is to counter the pressure of the proletariat—when it wanes—with the pressure of the petty-bourgeois masses gripped by despair. It is precisely this particular system of capitalist reaction that has entered history under the name of fascism.

"The problem of the relations between fascism and social democracy," wrote Ercoli, "falls precisely within this domain (that is, the irreconcilable opposition between fascism and workers' organizations). From this perspective, fascism is clearly distinguished from all other reactionary regimes that have been established so far in the contemporary capitalist world. It rejects any compromise with social democracy, it persecutes it fiercely ; it has deprived it of any possibility of legal existence ; it has forced it into emigration." This is what this article, printed in the leading organ of the Communist International, declared ! Subsequently, Manuilsky suggested to Molotov the brilliant idea of the "third period." France, Germany, and Poland were placed at the "forefront of the revolutionary offensive." The conquest of power was proclaimed an immediate task. And since, faced with the proletarian uprising, all parties except the Communist Party were counter-revolutionary, it was no longer necessary to distinguish between fascism and social democracy. The theory of social fascism was endorsed. The bureaucrats of the Communist International changed their tune. Ercoli hastened to demonstrate that while truth was dear to him, Molotov was even dearer, and... wrote a report defending the theory of social fascism. "Italian social democracy," he declared in February 1930, "is becoming fascist with extreme ease." Alas, it is with even greater ease that the functionaries of official communism are becoming subservient.

Our critique of the theory and practice of the "Third Period" was, predictably, declared counter-revolutionary. The cruel experience, which cost the proletarian vanguard so dearly, made a turning point necessary at this level as well. The "Third Period," along with Molotov, was expelled from the Communist International. But the theory of social-fascism remained as the only fully mature fruit of the Third Period. Here, there could be no change : only Molotov had aligned himself with the Third Period ; Stalin, on the other hand, had become entangled in the theory of social-fascism himself.

As an epigraph to its studies on social-fascism, the Rote Fahne (Red Flag) placed these words of Stalin : "Fascism is the fighting organization of the bourgeoisie, which relies on the active support of social democracy. Social democracy is objectively the moderate wing of fascism." As is generally the case with Stalin when he attempts to generalize, the first sentence contradicts the second. That the bourgeoisie relies on social democracy and that fascism is the fighting organization of the bourgeoisie is entirely indisputable and has been stated for a long time. But from this only follows the fact that both social democracy and fascism are instruments of the big bourgeoisie. It is impossible to understand, however, why social democracy is also portrayed as the "wing" of fascism. A second definition from the same author is no more profound : social democracy and fascism are not adversaries but, on the contrary, twins... Twins can be cruel adversaries ; moreover, it is not at all necessary for allies to be born on the same day to the same mother. In Stalin's construction, not only is formal logic lacking, but also dialectic. The power of this formula lies in the fact that no one dares to criticize it.

Between democracy and fascism, there is no difference from the point of view of "class content," Werner Hirsch, following Stalin, teaches us (Die Internationale, January 1932). The transition from democracy to fascism can take on the character of an "organic process," that is to say, occur "gradually and deliberately." This reasoning might be surprising if his successors hadn't taught us to stop being surprised.

Between democracy and fascism there is no "class difference." This must mean, of course, that both democracy and fascism have a bourgeois character. We didn't need January 1932 to realize this. But the ruling class does not live in isolation. It exists in specific relationships with other classes. In the "democratic" regime of developed capitalist society, the bourgeoisie relies primarily on the working class, which has been co-opted by reformists. This system finds its most complete expression in England, under both Labour and Conservative governments. In a fascist regime, at least in its initial stages, capital relies on the petty bourgeoisie to destroy the organizations of the proletariat. Italy, for example ! Is there a difference in the "class content" of these two regimes ? If we only ask the question about the ruling class, there is no difference. But if we consider the situation and the reciprocal relationships between all classes from the point of view of the proletariat, the difference is very great.

Over several decades, workers have built, within bourgeois democracy, by using it while simultaneously struggling against it, their bastions, their bases, their centers of proletarian democracy : trade unions, parties, training clubs, sports organizations, cooperatives, and so on. The proletariat can come to power not through the formal framework of bourgeois democracy but through revolutionary means : this is demonstrated by both theory and experience. But it is precisely for this revolutionary path that the proletariat needs bases of support for proletarian democracy within the bourgeois state. The work of the Second International, when it still played a progressive historical role, was reduced to the creation of such bases.

The primary and sole function of fascism is to destroy all bastions of proletarian democracy down to their very foundations. Does this have any "class significance" for the proletariat ? Let the great theorists consider this question. Having undeniably labeled the regime bourgeois, Hirsch, like his mentors, overlooks one crucial detail : the proletariat's place within this regime. They substitute a dry sociological abstraction for the historical process. But the class struggle is waged on the ground of history, not in the stratosphere of sociology. The starting point for the struggle against fascism is not the abstraction of the democratic state, but the living organizations of the proletariat, where all its experience is concentrated and which shape the future.

The fact that the transition from democracy to fascism can be "organic" or "progressive" obviously means nothing more than that it is possible to deprive the proletariat, without any upheaval or struggle, not only of its material gains—a certain standard of living, social legislation, civil and political rights—but also of the principal instrument of these gains, namely its organizations. Thus, this "cold" transition to fascism presupposes the most appalling political capitulation of the proletariat imaginable.

Werner Hirsch's theoretical reasoning is not accidental : while elaborating on Stalin's pronouncements, it simultaneously generalizes all the current agitation within the Communist Party. His main objective is to demonstrate that there is no difference between Hitler's regime and Brüning's. Thaelmann and Remmele currently see this as the quintessence of Bolshevik policy.

The matter is not limited to Germany. The idea that a fascist victory will bring nothing new is being zealously propagated in all sections of the Communist International. In the January issue of the French journal *Les Cahiers du bolchevisme*, we read : "The Trotskyists who act in practice like Breitscheid accept the famous social-democratic theory of the lesser evil, according to which Brüning is not as bad as Hitler, according to which it is less unpleasant to starve to death under Brüning than under Hitler, and infinitely preferable to be shot by Groener than by Frick." This quotation is not the most foolish, even if, to give it its due, it is quite foolish. However, it expresses, alas, the very essence of the political philosophy of the leaders of the Communist International.

The fact is that Stalinists compare two regimes from the perspective of vulgar democracy. Indeed, if one applies the formal "democratic" criterion to Brüning's regime, the conclusion is indisputable : only the skin and bones of the proud Weimar Constitution remain. But for us, the question is not thereby resolved. The question must be considered from the perspective of proletarian democracy. This is the only reliable criterion when it comes to knowing where and when the fascist regime replaces the "normal" police response of decaying capitalism.

Is Brüning "better" than Hitler (is he more likeable ?), a question, it must be admitted, hardly concerns us. But one only needs to look at the map of workers' organizations to see that fascism has not yet won in Germany. Gigantic obstacles and forces still stand in the way of victory.

Brüning's current regime is a bureaucratic dictatorship, or more precisely, a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, enforced by military and police means. The petty fascist bourgeoisie and the proletarian organizations are, so to speak, in a balance. If the workers' organizations were united in soviets, if the factory committees fought for control of production, one could speak of a dual power. Due to the dispersion of the proletariat and the tactical impotence of its vanguard, this is not yet possible. But the very fact that powerful workers' organizations exist, capable under certain conditions of mounting a swift and decisive counterattack against fascism, prevents Hitler from seizing power and grants the bureaucratic apparatus a certain degree of "independence."

Brüning's dictatorship is a caricature of Bonapartism. This dictatorship is unstable, flimsy, and provisional. It does not mark the beginning of a new social equilibrium but rather heralds the imminent end of the old one. Relying directly on only a small minority of the bourgeoisie, Brüning, tolerated by the Social Democrats against the will of the workers, and threatened by fascism, is capable of wielding power in the form of decrees, but not in reality. Dissolving parliament with its consent, promulgating a few decrees against the workers, declaring a Christmas truce, using it to settle a few minor scores, dispersing a hundred meetings, closing a dozen newspapers, exchanging letters with Hitler worthy of a provincial grocer—that is all Brüning can accomplish. For anything more significant, his reach is insufficient.

Brüning is forced to tolerate the existence of workers' organizations insofar as he has not yet decided to hand power back to Hitler and lacks the independent force necessary to liquidate them. Brüning is forced to tolerate and protect the fascists insofar as he mortally fears a workers' victory. Brüning's regime is a transitional one, which cannot last long and foreshadows catastrophe. The current government survives only because the main camps have not yet assessed their strength. The real battle has not yet begun. It still lies ahead. It is a dictatorship of bureaucratic impotence that fills the pause before the fight, before the open confrontation between the two sides.

Those self-proclaimed experts who boast that they see no difference "between Brüning and Hitler" are actually saying : it doesn't matter whether our organizations still exist or have already been destroyed. Beneath this pseudo-radical rhetoric lies the most ignoble passivity : in any case, we cannot avoid defeat ! Read carefully the quote from the French Stalinist journal : the whole question is whether it is better to starve with Brüning or with Hitler. We are not asking how and under what conditions it is better to die, but how to fight and win. Our conclusion is this : we must engage in the general struggle before Brüning's bureaucratic dictatorship is replaced by the fascist regime, that is, before the workers' organizations are crushed. We must prepare for the general struggle by developing, expanding, and intensifying individual struggles. But for this, we must have a correct perspective and, above all, not proclaim an enemy victorious when they are still far from victory.

We are getting to the heart of the matter : therein lies the strategic key to the situation, the starting point for the struggle. Every conscious worker, and all the more so every communist, must realize the emptiness, the nullity, the rot of the Stalinist bureaucracy's discussions, where they claim that Brüning and Hitler are one and the same. "You're mixing everything up !" we reply. "You're shamefully muddying the waters because you're afraid of difficulties, of important tasks. You're capitulating before the fight, you're proclaiming that we've already suffered a defeat. You're lying ! The working class is divided, weakened by the reformists, disoriented by the errors of its own vanguard, but it is not yet defeated, its forces are not yet exhausted... No, the proletariat of Germany is still powerful. The most optimistic calculations will prove completely outdated the day revolutionary energy forces its way into the arena of action."

The Brüning regime is a preparatory regime. For what ? Either for the victory of fascism or for the victory of the proletariat. This regime is preparatory because both sides are preparing for the decisive battle. To equate Brüning with Hitler is to identify the situation before the battle with the situation after defeat ; it means considering defeat inevitable in advance, it means calling for capitulation without a fight. The overwhelming majority of workers, particularly communists, do not want this. The Stalinist bureaucracy, naturally, does not want it either. We must not be content with good intentions that Hitler will use to pave his hell, but understand the objective meaning of the policy, its orientation, its tendencies. We must fully expose the passive, cowardly, wait-and-see, capitulating, and declamatory nature of the policy of Stalin, Manuilsky, Thälmann, and Remmele. Revolutionary workers must understand that the Communist Party holds the key to the situation ; but with this key the Stalinist bureaucracy is trying to close the doors leading to revolutionary action.

Notes

[1] Among metaphysicians (people who think anti-dialectically), the same abstraction fulfills two, three, or even more functions, often completely opposed. "Democracy" in general and "fascism" in particular, as we have seen, are in no way different from one another. But this does not preclude the existence of "the dictatorship of the workers and peasants" (for China, India, Spain) on Earth. Dictatorship of the proletariat ? No. Capitalist dictatorship ? No. So which one ? Democratic ! It turns out that a pure form of democracy, above classes, still exists on Earth. And yet the 11th Plenum explained that democracy is in no way different from fascism. In that case, does "democratic dictatorship" differ from... fascist dictatorship ?
Only a very naive person could expect an honest and serious answer from the Stalinists on this matter of principle. In reality, there will only be a few more insults, that's all. And yet, the very wrong with the revolution in the East is linked to this issue.

3. Bureaucratic ultimaism

When the newspapers of the new Socialist Workers' Party (SAP) denounce the "party egoism" of Social Democracy and the Communist Party ; when Seydewitz asserts that for him "class interests are above party interests"—they are falling into political sentimentality or, worse, concealing their own party's interests beneath sentimental phrases. This is a path that leads nowhere. When reaction demands that the interests of the nation be placed above the interests of classes, we Marxists explain that, under the guise of the interests of the "whole," reaction is defending the interests of the exploiting class. The interests of a nation cannot be formulated except from the perspective of the ruling class or the class that claims to occupy the ruling position. The interests of a class cannot be formulated except in the form of a program ; a program cannot be defended except by founding a party.

A class, considered in and of itself, is merely raw material for exploitation. The proletariat begins to play an independent role only when it transforms from a social class in itself into a political class in its own right. This can only happen through the party ; the party is the historical organ through which the proletariat attains class consciousness. To say, "The class is above the party," is tantamount to asserting that the class in its raw state is superior to the class attaining class consciousness. This is not only incorrect but also reactionary. This petty-bourgeois theory is entirely unnecessary to justify the need for a united front.

The class's progression toward consciousness—that is, the result of the revolutionary party's work, which draws the proletariat along with it—is a complex and contradictory process. The class is not homogeneous. Its different parts will reach consciousness by different paths and at different paces. The bourgeoisie plays an active role in this process. It creates its own organs within the working class or uses existing ones to pit certain strata of workers against others. Different parties operate simultaneously within the proletariat. This is why it remains politically divided for much of its historical development. This explains why the problem of a united front arises at certain particularly critical periods.

When it pursues a just policy, the Communist Party expresses the historical interests of the proletariat. Its task is to win over the majority of the proletariat : only in this way is socialist revolution possible. The Communist Party can fulfill its mission only by maintaining complete and total political and organizational independence from other parties and organizations, whether they operate within or outside the working class. Failure to respect this fundamental requirement of Marxist policy is the most serious of all crimes against the interests of the proletariat as a class. The Chinese revolution of 1925–1927 was lost precisely because the Communist International, led by Stalin and Bukharin, forced the Chinese Communist Party to join the Kuomintang, the party of the Chinese bourgeoisie, and submit to its discipline. The experience of Stalinist policy with regard to the Kuomintang will forever be recorded in history as the catastrophic sabotage of a revolution by its leaders. The Stalinist theory of "two-component parties, worker and peasant," as applied to the East, was the generalization and legitimization of the practice with regard to the Kuomintang. The application of this theory in Japan, India, Indonesia, and Korea undermined the authority of communism and delayed the revolutionary development of the proletariat for many years. The same perfidious policy was pursued, albeit less cynically, in the United States, England, and throughout Europe until 1928.

The struggle of the Left Opposition for the complete and unconditional independence of the Communist Party and its policies, under all historical conditions and at every stage of the proletariat's development, caused extreme tension in relations between the opposition and Stalin's faction at the very moment when he allied himself with Chiang Kai-shek, Wan Tin-wei, Purcell, Radich, Lafollette, and others. It is needless to recall that Thaelmann and Remmele, as well as Brandler and Thalheimer, were all entirely on Stalin's side against the Bolshevik-Leninists in this struggle. Therefore, we need no lessons from Stalin and Thaelmann regarding the independence of the Communist Party's policies !

But the proletariat attains revolutionary consciousness not through formal education, but through the class struggle, which brooks no interruption. To fight, the proletariat needs unity within its ranks. This is true both for localized economic conflicts within the confines of a factory and for "national" political struggles, such as the fight against fascism. Therefore, the united front tactic is not something occasional or artificial, nor a clever maneuver—no, it arises completely and entirely from the objective conditions of the proletariat's development. The passage in the Communist Manifesto, which states that communists will not oppose the proletariat, that they have no other objectives and tasks than those of the proletariat, expresses the idea that the party's struggle to win the majority of the class must, in no way, contradict the workers' need to unite their ranks in the struggle.

The Rote Fahne rightly condemns the assertion that "class interests are above party interests." In fact, there is a coincidence between the well-understood interests of the class and the correctly formulated tasks of the party. As long as the matter remains confined to this historical and philosophical assertion, the Rote Fahne's position is unassailable. But the political conclusions it draws from this directly violate Marxism.

The fundamental identity of the interests of the proletariat and the tasks of the Communist Party does not mean that the proletariat as a whole is already conscious of its interests, nor that the party will formulate them correctly under any circumstances. The very necessity of the party stems precisely from the fact that the proletariat is not born with a ready-made understanding of its historical interests. The party's task is to teach and demonstrate to the proletariat its right to leadership based on the experience of struggle. However, the Stalinist bureaucracy believes that the proletariat can simply be required to submit at the mere sight of the party passport bearing the seal of the Communist International.

Any united front not placed beforehand under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Rote Fahne reiterates, is directed against the interests of the proletariat. Anyone who does not recognize the leadership of the Communist Party is thereby a "counter-revolutionary." The worker is forced to take the Communist organization at its word and in advance. Starting from the principle of the identical tasks of the party and the class, the bureaucrat arrogates to himself the right to give orders to the class. The historical task that the Communist Party still has to accomplish—the unification of the overwhelming majority of workers under its banner—is transformed by the bureaucrat into an ultimatum, a revolver held to the temple of the working class. Dialectical thought is replaced by formalistic, administrative, and bureaucratic thinking.

The historical task that needs to be accomplished is considered already accomplished. The trust that needs to be earned is considered already earned. Clearly, this is an easy way out. But it doesn't get us very far. In politics, we must start from what exists, not from what we wish there were, nor from what will be. If we take it to its logical conclusion, the position of the Stalinist bureaucracy is, in essence, the negation of the party. Indeed, what is the point of all its historical work if the proletariat must recognize in advance the leadership of Thälmann and Remmele ?

The party has the right to demand of a worker who wants to join the communist ranks : you must accept our program, our statutes, and the leadership of our elected bodies. But it is absurd and criminal to impose the same requirement, or even part of it, a priori on the working masses or workers' organizations, when it comes to joint action for clearly defined militant tasks. This undermines the very foundations of the party, which can only fulfill its function within the framework of proper relations with the working class. Instead of issuing a unilateral ultimatum that irritates and offends the workers, a precise program of joint action must be proposed : this is the surest way to gain effective leadership.

Ultimism is an attempt to coerce the working class when it cannot be persuaded : if you, the workers, do not recognize the leadership of Thälmann-Remmele-Neumann, we will not allow you to form a united front. A treacherous enemy could not have imagined a more disadvantageous situation than the one in which the leaders of the Communist Party have placed themselves. On this path, they are rushing to their doom.

The leadership of the German Communist Party only underscores its ultimacity more clearly when, in its appeals, it backtracks in a purely casuistic manner : "We are not asking you to accept our communist views in advance." This sounds like an excuse for a policy that has no excuse. When the party declares that it refuses to engage in any negotiations whatsoever with other organizations, but that it allows social-democratic workers to break with their organization and place themselves under the leadership of the Communist Party, without calling themselves communists, this amounts to pure ultimacity. The retreat regarding "communist views" is utterly ridiculous : calling oneself a communist does not deter a worker who is ready to break with their party today to take part in the struggle under communist leadership. The worker is unfamiliar with diplomatic subterfuge and the game of labels. They judge policy and organization on their substance. They remain committed to social democracy as long as they do not trust the communist leadership. It is safe to say that the majority of social-democratic workers remain in their party today not because they trust the reformist leadership, but solely because they do not yet trust the communist leadership. However, they want to fight against fascism from this moment on. If the next stage of the common struggle is outlined for them, they will demand that their organization commit to it. If they sense resistance from their organization, they may even break with it.

Instead of helping social-democratic workers find their way through experience, the Central Committee of the Communist Party is helping the social-democratic leaders against the workers. Their reluctance to fight, their fear of struggle, their inability to fight—the Wels and Hilferdings are now successfully concealing these by referring to the Communist Party's unwillingness to participate in a common struggle. The Communist Party's stubborn, stupid, absurd refusal of a united front policy has become, under current conditions, the primary political resource of social democracy. This is precisely why social democracy, with its characteristic parasitism, clings so tightly to our critique of the Stalin-Thaelmann ultimatist policy.

The official leaders of the Communist International today pontificate with an air of self-importance about raising the party's theoretical level and studying "the history of Bolshevism." In fact, "the level" is only declining ; the lessons of Bolshevism are being forgotten, distorted, and trampled underfoot. However, it is very easy to find in the history of the Russian party the precursor to the current policy of the German Central Committee : the late Bogdanov, founder of ultimadism (or otzovism). As early as 1905, he believed it was impossible for Bolsheviks to participate in the St. Petersburg Soviet unless the Soviet first recognized the Social Democratic leadership. Under Bogdanov's influence, the St. Petersburg office of the Bolshevik Central Committee adopted the following resolution in October 1905 : to present the St. Petersburg Soviet with a motion demanding that it recognize the party leadership ; otherwise, to withdraw from the Soviet. The young lawyer Krassikov, then a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee, presented this ultimatum at the plenary session of the Soviet. The workers' deputies, among whom were also Bolsheviks, looked at each other in astonishment, then moved on to the agenda. No one left the Soviet. Soon, Lenin arrived from abroad and gave the ultimatum-makers a stern dressing-down : one cannot, he said, force the masses to skip the necessary stages of their own political development through ultimatums.

Bogdanov, however, did not abandon his methodology and subsequently created an "ultimatist" or "otzovist" faction : a name given to them because they tended to force the Bolsheviks to withdraw from any organization that refused to accept the ultimatum they presented from above : "recognize our leadership in advance." The ultimatists tried to apply their policy not only in the Soviet, but also in the parliamentary system, in professional organizations, and, in general, in all legal or semi-legal organizations of the working class.

Lenin's struggle against ultimatism was a struggle for the establishment of correct relations between the party and the working class. In the old Bolshevik party, the ultimatists never managed to play any significant role ; otherwise, the victory of Bolshevism would have been impossible. Bolshevism drew its strength from its careful and nuanced approach to the working class. When he came to power, Lenin continued the struggle against ultimatism, particularly and especially with regard to the trade unions. "If today in Russia," he wrote, "after two and a half years of extraordinary victories over the bourgeoisie of Russia and the Entente, we were to make 'recognition of the dictatorship' a condition of joining the trade unions, we would be making a mistake, we would be undermining our influence over the masses, we would be helping the Mensheviks. Indeed, the entire task of the communists consists in knowing how to convince the laggards, in knowing how to work among them, and not in cutting themselves off from them with childish 'left-wing' slogans." (The infantile disorder of communism, leftism.) This is all the more imperative for the communist parties of the West, which represent only a minority of the working class.

However, the situation in the USSR has changed radically in recent times. The Communist Party, now in power, is developing a different kind of relationship between the vanguard and the working class : one involving an element of constraint. Lenin's struggle against the bureaucracy of the Party and the Soviets was fundamentally a struggle not against the poor organization of offices, administrative delays, negligence, and so on, but against the subjugation of the working class to the apparatus, against the transformation of the Party bureaucracy into a new "ruling" layer. Lenin's advice before his death—to create a proletarian control commission, independent of the Central Committee, and to remove Stalin and his faction from the Party apparatus—was directed against the bureaucratic degeneration of the Party. For a number of reasons, which we cannot go into here, the Party ignored this advice. The bureaucratic degeneration of the Party has been pushed to its extreme in recent years. The Stalinist apparatus does nothing but give orders. The language of command is the language of ultimacity. Every worker must acknowledge in advance that all decisions of the Central Committee, past, present, and future, are infallible. Claims to infallibility have grown all the more as policy has become more flawed.

Having taken control of the apparatus of the Communist International, the Stalinist faction naturally exported its methods to the foreign sections, that is, to the communist parties of capitalist countries. The policy of the German leadership mirrored the policy of the Moscow leadership.

Thaelmann sees how the Stalinist bureaucracy rules by proclaiming counter-revolutionaries all those who do not recognize its infallibility. In what way is Thaelmann worse than Stalin ? If the working class does not humbly submit to his leadership, it is because the working class is counter-revolutionary. Those who point out to Thaelmann the disastrous nature of ultimatics are doubly counter-revolutionary. Lenin's complete works are among the most counter-revolutionary. It is not without reason that Stalin ruthlessly censored them, particularly foreign-language editions.

If ultimatics is harmful under any circumstances ; if, in the USSR, it signifies the squandering of the party's moral capital, it is doubly unjustified in Western parties, which are only now beginning to accumulate their moral capital. In the Soviet Union, the victorious revolution at least created the material conditions for bureaucratic ultimatics in the form of the repressive apparatus. In capitalist countries, including Germany, ultimatics transforms into a powerless caricature that hinders the Communist Party's march to power. Thaelmann-Remmele's ultimatics is, above all, ridiculous. And ridicule is deadly, especially when it comes to the party of the revolution.

Let us for a moment transport the problem to the political arena of England, where the Communist Party (as a result of the disastrous errors of the Stalinist bureaucracy) still represents only a tiny fraction of the proletariat. If we accept that any form of united front, unless it is communist, is "counter-revolutionary," it becomes clear that the British proletariat must postpone the struggle until the Communist Party is at its head. But the Communist Party cannot assume leadership of the class except on the basis of the latter's revolutionary experience. Now, experience can only take on a revolutionary character if the party draws millions of workers into the struggle. And it is only possible to draw non-communist masses, and even more so organized masses, into the struggle on the basis of the united front policy. We fall into a vicious circle from which bureaucratic ultimacity offers no escape. But revolutionary dialectics has long since pointed the way out, based on a multitude of examples in the most diverse fields : combination of the struggle for power and the struggle for reforms ; complete independence of the party but unity of the trade unions ; struggle against the bourgeois regime, while using its institutions ; implacable criticism of parliamentarism from the parliamentary tribune ; merciless struggle against reformism, while concluding practical agreements with the reformists for partial tasks.

In England, the inconsistency of ultimatics is glaringly obvious, given the extraordinary weakness of the Communist Party. In Germany, the disastrous nature of ultimatics is somewhat masked by the party's large membership and its growth. But the German party is growing under the pressure of circumstances, not thanks to the leadership's policies ; not because of ultimatics, but in spite of it. Moreover, numerical growth is not decisive : the political relationship between the party and the working class is what matters. On this fundamental front, the situation is not improving, because the German party has erected the barbed wire of ultimatics between itself and the working class.

4. The Stalinists' zigzags on the united front question

The former Social Democrat Torchors (Düsseldorf), who switched to the Communist Party, said in an official report that she delivered on behalf of the party in Frankfurt around mid-January :

"The Social Democratic leaders have already been sufficiently exposed, and maneuvering in this direction by proposing unity at the top is simply a waste of energy." We quote from the Frankfurt communist newspaper, which heaps praise on this report. "The Social Democratic leaders have already been sufficiently exposed." Enough for the speaker, who has moved from Social Democracy to the Communist Party (which, of course, is entirely to her credit), but not enough for the millions of workers who vote for Social Democracy and tolerate the reformist bureaucracy of the trade unions at its head.

However, it is pointless to refer to a single report. In the latest of the Rote Fahne appeals (January 28) that reached me, it is once again demonstrated that it is only permissible to create a united front against the leaders of social democracy and without them. Why ? Because "no one who has lived through and endured the actions of these 'leaders' for the past eight years will believe them." But what, we ask ourselves, is to be done with those who have entered politics less than eighteen years ago, or even less than eighteen months ago ? Since the beginning of the war, new political generations have come of age ; they must themselves experience the older generation, even if only on a very small scale. "It is precisely," Lenin taught the ultra-leftists, "that we must not believe that what has run its course for us has run its course for the class, has run its course for the masses." But the older generation of social democrats, who experienced these eighteen years, have by no means broken with their leaders. On the contrary, it is precisely within social democracy that many "old guard" remain, bound to the party by strong traditions. It is regrettable, of course, that the masses are taking so long to learn. But to a large extent, the fault lies with the communist "educators," who have failed to expose the criminal nature of reformism in concrete terms. At the very least, we must take advantage of the new situation, while the masses' attention is focused to the utmost on the mortal danger, to subject the reformists to a new test that will perhaps, this time, be decisive.

Without concealing or moderating in any way our opinion of the leaders of social democracy, we can and must say to the social-democratic workers : "Since, on the one hand, you agree to fight with us, and on the other hand, you do not yet want to break with your leaders, here is what we propose : compel them to undertake a common struggle with us for such and such practical tasks, by such and such means ; as far as we, the communists, are ready." What could be simpler, clearer, more convincing than that ?

It was precisely in this sense that I wrote - with the deliberate intention of arousing genuine terror or feigned indignation in fools and charlatans - that, in the struggle against fascism, we were prepared to make militant practical agreements with the devil, with his grandmother, and even with Noske and Zörgiebel [1].

The official party violates its own rigid position at every turn. In its calls for a "united red front" (with itself), it invariably puts forward the demand for "unlimited freedom of demonstrations, meetings, coalitions, and the proletarian press." This is an absolutely correct slogan. But insofar as the Communist Party speaks of proletarian newspapers, meetings, etc., and not just communist ones, it is in fact advancing the slogan of a united front with social democracy itself, which publishes workers' newspapers, convenes assemblies, and so on. The height of absurdity is to put forward political slogans, which contain the idea of a united front with social democracy, and then refuse practical agreements to fight on those very slogans.

Münzenberg, in whom general principles and mercantile common sense clash, wrote in November in *Der rote Aufbau* : "It is true that National Socialism is the most reactionary, chauvinistic, and ferocious wing of the fascist movement in Germany, and that indeed, all left-wing circles (!) have the greatest interest in opposing the strengthening of the influence and power of this wing of German fascism." If Hitler's party is the "most reactionary, most ferocious" wing, then the Brüning government is less ferocious and less reactionary. Münzenberg thus arrives, almost stealthily, at the theory of the "lesser evil." To maintain the appearance of orthodoxy, Münzenberg distinguishes between different kinds of fascism : mild, medium, and strong, as if they were Turkish tobacco. But if all the "left-wing circles" (and what are their names ?) are interested in victory over fascism, wouldn't it be necessary to subject these "left-wing circles" to a practical test ?

Wasn't it clear that we should have seized upon Breitscheid's diplomatic and ambiguous proposal immediately, putting forward our own practical, concrete, and well-developed program for a joint struggle against fascism, and demanding a joint meeting of the leadership of both parties, with the participation of the leadership of the free trade unions ? At the same time, we should have vigorously disseminated this program at all levels of both parties and among the masses. The negotiations should have taken place in full public view : the press should have provided daily reports, without exaggeration or absurd fabrications. Workers are infinitely more receptive to such concrete action that hits the mark than to the constant clamoring about "social fascism." If the problem had been framed in this way, social democracy could not have, even for a moment, hidden behind the cardboard facade of the "iron front."

Reread Lenin's *Left-Wing Communism : An Infantile Disorder* : it is the most relevant book today. It is precisely in relation to situations analogous to the one we have today in Germany that Lenin speaks—and we quote verbatim—of the "absolute necessity for the vanguard of the proletariat, for its conscious part, for the Communist Party, to maneuver, to reach agreements, compromises with the various groups of proletarians, the various parties of workers and smallholders... The key is to know how to apply this tactic in such a way as to raise, and not lower, the general level of consciousness of the proletariat, its revolutionary spirit, its capacity to struggle and to win." But what is the attitude of the Communist Party ? In its newspapers, it repeats daily that for it, only "the united front that will be directed against Brüning, Severing, Leipart, Hitler, and their ilk" is acceptable. Faced with the proletarian uprising, there is no doubt that there will be no difference between Brüning, Severing, Leipart, and Hitler. The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks allied themselves with the Cadets and Kornilovians against the Bolshevik uprising in October : Kerensky led the Black Hundred Cossack general, Krasnov, to Petrograd ; the Mensheviks supported Kornilov and Krasnov ; and the Socialist Revolutionaries organized the Junker uprising under the leadership of monarchist officers.

But this absolutely does not mean that Brüning, Severing, Leipart, and Hitler still belong to the same camp under all circumstances. Their interests now diverge. For social democracy, the question at this moment is less about defending the foundations of capitalist society against proletarian revolution than about defending the semi-parliamentary bourgeois system against fascism. It would be utter folly to refuse to make use of this antagonism.

"To wage war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie...," wrote Lenin in Children's Disease, "and to renounce a priori any maneuvering, any exploitation of the oppositions of interests (even if momentary) which divide our enemies, any agreement and compromise with possible allies (even if temporary, unreliable, wavering, conditional), is this not utterly ridiculous ?" We quote verbatim again : the words in parentheses underlined by us are Lenin's.

And further on : "One can only triumph over a more powerful adversary at the cost of extreme strain and on the express condition of exploiting, in the most meticulous, attentive, circumspect, and intelligent way, the slightest 'crack' between the enemies." What are Thaelmann and Remmele, led by Manuilsky, doing ? The crack between social democracy and fascism—and what a crack it is !—they are trying with all their might to plug it using the theory of social fascism and the practice of sabotaging the united front.

Lenin demanded that every "opportunity to secure a numerically strong ally be used, even if that ally is temporary, faltering, conditional, unstable, and unreliable. Anyone who hasn't grasped this truth has understood nothing of Marxism, nor, in general, of contemporary scientific socialism." Look, prophets of the new Stalinist school : it is stated here clearly and precisely that you have understood nothing of Marxism. This is what Lenin said about you : acknowledge receipt !

But without a victory over social democracy, the Stalinists retort, there can be no victory over fascism. Is this true ? In a certain sense, it is. But the converse is also true : victory over Italian social democracy is impossible without a victory over Italian fascism. Fascism, like social democracy, is an instrument of the bourgeoisie. As long as capital dominates, social democracy and fascism will continue to exist in various combinations. Thus, all problems boil down to a single denominator : the proletariat must overthrow the bourgeois regime.

But it is precisely today, as this regime falters in Germany, that fascism comes to its rescue. To overthrow this defender, we are told, we must first put an end to social democracy... Such a rigid schematism places us in a vicious circle. We can only escape it through action. The nature of this action is determined not by the interplay of abstract categories, but by the real relationships of living, historical forces.

No, the bureaucrats keep repeating, let's liquidate social democracy "first." How ? It's very simple : by ordering the party organizations to recruit one hundred thousand new members within a certain timeframe. Pure propaganda instead of political struggle, a bureaucrat's plan instead of a dialectical strategy. And what if the actual development of the class struggle were to pose the question of fascism to the working class today, as a matter of life or death ? Then the working class must turn its back on the problem, it must be lulled to sleep, it must be convinced that the fight against fascism is a secondary task, that this task can wait, that it will resolve itself, that fascism already effectively dominates, that Hitler will bring nothing new, that there's no need to fear Hitler, that Hitler is merely paving the way for the communists.

Perhaps this is an exaggeration ? No, it is the true and obvious guiding principle of the leaders of the Communist Party. They do not always pursue it to its logical conclusion. When confronted by the masses, they often backtrack on their latest conclusions, conflating different positions, confusing the workers and themselves ; but every time they try to extricate themselves, they start from the premise of the inevitable victory of fascism.

On October 14th of last year, Remmele, one of the three official leaders of the Communist Party, declared in the Reichstag : "Mr. Brüning himself has said very clearly : when they (the fascists) are in power, the united front of the proletariat will be realized and sweep everything away" (loud applause from the Communist benches). That Brüning seeks to frighten the bourgeoisie and the Social Democrats with such a prospect is understandable : he is defending his power. That Remmele should console the workers with this prospect is shameful : he is paving the way for Hitler's power, for this entire prospect is fundamentally false and demonstrates a complete misunderstanding of mass psychology and the dialectic of revolutionary struggle. If the German proletariat, which is now a direct witness to all events, allows the fascists to come to power—that is, if it displays an absolutely criminal blindness and passivity—there is decidedly no reason to count on the fact that, after the fascists come to power, the same proletariat will shake off its passivity and "sweep everything away" : in any case, that is not what happened in Italy. Remmele reasons entirely in the spirit of the petty-bourgeois French rhetoricians of the 19th century, who demonstrated a total inability to rally the masses to their cause, but who, on the other hand, were firmly convinced that, when Louis Bonaparte took the helm of the Republic, the people would immediately rise up to defend them and "sweep everything away." However, the people, who had allowed the adventurer Louis Bonaparte to come to power, proved, of course, incapable of sweeping him away afterward. This required new major events, historical upheavals, including war.

For Remmele, the united front of the proletariat, as we have seen, is only achievable after Hitler comes to power. Could there be a more pathetic admission of his own inadequacy ? Since we, Remmele and Co., are incapable of uniting the proletariat, we entrust this task to Hitler. When he has united the proletariat for us, we will show ourselves in all our strength. Then comes a boastful declaration : "We are the victors of tomorrow, and the question is no longer : who will crush whom ? That question has already been resolved (applause from the Communist benches). There is only one question left : when will we overthrow the bourgeoisie ?" That's all ! In Russian, they call that reaching for the stars. We are the victors of tomorrow. For that, all we lack today is the united front.

Hitler will give it to us tomorrow, when he comes to power. So tomorrow's victor won't be Remmele, but Hitler. But get this through your heads : the communists' victory is still a long way off.

Remmele himself senses that his optimism is faltering, and he tries to bolster it. "These fascist gentlemen don't frighten us ; they'll wear themselves out faster than any other government ('quite true,' from the communist benches)." The proof : the fascists want inflation of the paper money, and that's ruin for the masses ; therefore, everything will turn out perfectly. This is how Remmele's verbal inflation misleads the German workers.

Here we have the programmatic speech of an official party leader, printed in large numbers and intended for the Communist Party's membership drive : a ready-made party membership form is printed at the end of the speech. This programmatic speech is entirely built on capitulation to fascism. "We do not fear" Hitler's rise to power. But this is, in fact, an inverted formula of cowardice. "We" do not consider ourselves capable of preventing Hitler from coming to power ; worse : we, bureaucrats, are so corrupt that we don't dare seriously consider fighting Hitler. That is why, "we are not afraid." What are you not afraid of : fighting Hitler ? No, they are not afraid... of Hitler's victory. They are not afraid of shirking the fight. They are not afraid of acknowledging their own cowardice. Shame, thrice shame ! In one of my last pamphlets, I wrote that the Stalinist bureaucracy was preparing to lay a trap for Hitler...in the form of state power. The communist scribblers, from Münzenberg to Ullstein and from Mosse to Münzenberg, immediately declared : "Trotsky is slandering the Communist Party." Isn't it clear : out of hostility toward communism, out of hatred for the German proletariat, out of a burning desire to save German capitalism, Trotsky attributes a plan of capitulation to the Stalinist bureaucracy ? In fact, I have only summarized Remmele's programmatic speech and Thaelmann's theoretical article. Where, then, is the slander ?

Thaelmann and Remmele remain fully faithful to the Stalinist gospel. Let us recall once again what Stalin taught in the autumn of 1923, when everything in Germany, as today, hung by a thread : "The Communists," Stalin wrote to Zinoviev and Bukharin, "should they strive (at the present stage) to seize power without the Social Democrats, are they already ready for that—that, in my opinion, is the heart of the matter... If today in Germany power falls, so to speak, and the Communists pick it up, they will collapse spectacularly. That is in the best-case scenario. And in the worst, they will be torn to pieces and rejected... Obviously, the Fascists are watching, but it is more advantageous for us if the Fascists attack first : this will rally the entire working class around the Communists... In my opinion, the Germans must be restrained, not encouraged."

In his pamphlet on the Mass Strike, Langner writes : "Brandler's assertion that the October struggle (1923) brought about a 'decisive defeat' is nothing more than an attempt to gloss over opportunist errors and the opportunistic capitulation without a fight" (p. 101). This is quite true. But who was the instigator of the "capitulation without a fight" ? Who was "restraining" it instead of "encouraging" it ? In 1931, Stalin merely elaborated on his 1923 formula : let the fascists seize power, and they will only be paving the way for us. Obviously, it is far less dangerous to attack Brandler than Stalin : the Langners know this well...

It is true that in the last two months—and the resolute protests of the left have certainly played a part in this—a shift has occurred : the Communist Party no longer says that Hitler must seize power in order to quickly exhaust himself ; today, it insists more on the opposite aspect of the question : the struggle against fascism must not be postponed until Hitler comes to power ; the struggle must be waged now, by rousing the workers against Brüning's decrees, by broadening and deepening the struggle in the economic and political arena. This is entirely correct. Everything the representatives of the Communist Party say in this context is indisputable. On this point, there is no disagreement between us. But the main question remains : how to move from words to action ?

The overwhelming majority of party members and a significant portion of the apparatus—of this we have no doubt—sincerely desire the struggle. But we must face reality : this struggle is not happening ; it is nowhere in sight. Brüning's decrees have passed with impunity. The Christmas truce has not been broken. The policy of impromptu partial strikes, judging by the accounts given by the Communist Party itself, has not yielded any serious results so far. The workers see this. They cannot be swayed by a single cry.

The Communist Party blames social democracy for the passivity of the masses. Historically, this is undeniable. But we are not historians, but revolutionary political activists. This is not about historical research, but about finding a way out of the impasse.

The SAP, which at the beginning of its existence formally raised (particularly in the articles of Rosenfeld and Seydewitz) the question of the struggle against fascism and linked the counter-attack to Hitler's rise to power, has taken a certain step forward. Its press now demands the rapid organization of resistance to fascism, by rousing the workers against famine and police oppression. We readily acknowledge that the change in the SAP's position occurred under the influence of communist critique : one of communism's tasks is to advance centrism by critiquing its hybrid nature. But this is insufficient : the fruits of this critique must be used politically, by proposing that the SAP move from words to action. The SAP must be subjected to a practical, public, and clear test : not by interpreting isolated quotations—that would not suffice—but by proposing to agree on specific practical means of resistance. If the SAP reveals its shortcomings, the authority of the Communist Party will be strengthened, and the intermediate party will be quickly eliminated. What is there to fear ?

It is not true, however, that the SAP doesn't want to fight seriously. Several factions exist within it. Today, insofar as the matter boils down to abstract propaganda for a united front, internal contradictions lie dormant. When the struggle begins, they will resurface. Only the Communist Party stands to gain from this.

But the main question remains : that of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). If it rejects the practical proposals accepted by the SAP, this will create a new situation. The centrists, who would like to maintain an equal distance from the Communist Party and the Social Democrats, railing against one or the other and strengthening themselves at the expense of both (this is the philosophy developed by Urbahns), would immediately find themselves in a precarious position, because it would become clear that it is precisely the Social Democrats who are sabotaging the revolutionary struggle. Isn't that a significant advantage ? The SAP workers would then resolutely turn their gaze toward the Communist Party.

But the refusal of Wels and Co. to accept the action program agreed upon by the SAP would not go unpunished, even for the Social Democrats. The Vorwärts would immediately lose the opportunity to complain about the Communist Party's passivity. The attraction to the united front would immediately grow among the Social Democratic workers. And that would be tantamount to an attraction to the Communist Party. Isn't that clear ?

At each of these stages and at each of these turning points, the Communist Party would discover new possibilities. Instead of the monotonous repetition of the same ready-made formulas before the same audience, it would gain the possibility of mobilizing new strata, educating them on the basis of lived experience, tempering them, and strengthening its hegemony within the working class.

There can be no discussion about the fact that the Communist Party is simultaneously relinquishing its independent leadership of strikes, demonstrations, and political campaigns. It retains its full freedom of action. It waits for no one.

But based on his actions, he actively maneuvers towards other workers' organizations, destroys the compartmentalization among workers, brings to light the contradictions of reformism and centrism, and advances revolutionary crystallization in the proletariat.

Notes

[1] The French journal Les Cahiers du bolchevisme, the most stupid and ignorant of all the productions of the Stalinist bureaucracy, eagerly seized upon the allusion to the devil's grandmother, obviously without suspecting in the slightest that it has a very long history in Marxist literature. The time is near, let us hope, when the revolutionary workers will send their ignorant and dishonest teachers to the aforementioned grandmother, so that they may learn their lesson there.

5. Historical background on the issue of the united front

Considerations regarding the united front policy stem from the fundamental and imperative necessities of the class struggle (in the Marxist, not bureaucratic, sense of these words) that it is impossible to read the objections of the Stalinist bureaucracy without blushing with indignation and shame. One can explain the simplest ideas daily to the most backward and ignorant workers or peasants without growing weary ; in this case, the aim is to mobilize new social strata. But what a misfortune it is when one has to demonstrate and explain elementary ideas to people whose brains have been crushed by the bureaucratic press ! What can be done with the "leaders," who have no logical arguments at their disposal, but who, on the other hand, have a repertoire of international insults at hand ? The fundamental positions of Marxism are labeled with a single term : "counter-revolution" ! This word is terribly devalued in the mouths of those who, so far at least, have demonstrated in no way their capacity to make a revolution. But what about the decisions of the first four congresses of the Communist International ? Does the Stalinist bureaucracy recognize them, yes or no ?

The documents are very much alive and have retained their full significance to this day. I am extracting from them—for they are very numerous—the theses I drafted between the Third and Fourth Congresses for the French Communist Party. They had been adopted by the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party and the Executive Committee of the Communist International, and published at that time in various languages in communist publications. We reproduce verbatim the section of the theses devoted to the argument and defense of the united front policy :

"...It is quite evident that the activity of the proletariat as a class does not cease during the preparatory period for the revolution. Conflicts with employers, with the bourgeoisie, with state power, initiated by one side or the other, follow one another. In these conflicts, insofar as they concern the vital interests of the entire working class, or its majority, or one or another of its parts, the working masses feel the necessity of unity of action... The party that mechanically opposes this necessity... will inevitably be condemned in the conscience of the workers. The
problem of the united front arises from the need to ensure the working class the possibility of a united front in the struggle against capital, despite the inevitable split in our time of political organizations that rely on the working class. Anyone who does not understand this task considers the party as a propaganda association, and not as an organization for mass action.
If the Communist Party had not radically broken And definitively, with social democracy, it would never have become the party of the proletarian revolution. If the Communist Party had not sought the organizational means to make possible at every moment joint and coordinated actions between the communist and non-communist (including social-democratic) working masses, it would have thereby demonstrated its inability to win over the majority of the working class through mass action.
It is not enough to separate communists from reformists, nor to bind them together through organizational discipline ; this organization must learn to direct all the collective actions of the proletariat in every area of its real struggle.
This is the second letter of the ABC of Communism.
Does the united front extend only to the working masses or does it also include the opportunist leaders ? The very act of asking this question stems from a misunderstanding. If we could simply rally the working masses around our banner... without going through the reformist organizations, parties or trade unions, that would obviously be better. But then, the very question of a united front would not arise in its current form.
Leaving aside all other considerations, it is in our interest to draw the reformists out of their hiding places and place them beside us, facing the fighting masses. By applying this correct tactic, we can only gain. The communist who has doubts or apprehensions on this point is like the swimmer who has adopted the theories on the best way to swim, but who doesn't dare to jump into the water.
By concluding an agreement with other organizations, we naturally impose upon ourselves a certain discipline of action.
But this discipline cannot be absolute. Should the reformists hinder the struggle, clearly to the detriment of the movement, in order to counterbalance the situation and the mood of the masses, we, as an independent organization, always retain the right to carry the struggle through to the end, without our temporary half-allies.
This policy can only be seen as a rapprochement with the reformists from the perspective of a journalist who believes he is distancing himself from reformism when, without leaving his newsroom, he continues to criticize it in the same terms, and who fears confronting it before the working masses and giving them the opportunity to judge communists and reformists on equal footing—the conditions of mass struggle. This supposedly revolutionary fear of "rapprochement" fundamentally conceals a political passivity that strives to maintain the status quo, where communists and reformists have their clearly defined spheres of influence, their regular attendees at their meetings, their press, and where all of this creates the illusion of a serious political struggle.
On the question of the united front, we see a passive and indecisive tendency emerging, masked by verbal intransigence. From the outset, the following paradox is striking : the right-wing elements of the party, with their centrist and pacifist tendencies, appear as the most implacable opponents of the united front, hiding behind the banner of revolutionary intransigence. Conversely, those elements who, in the most difficult moments, were entirely aligned with the positions of the Third International, are now speaking out in favor of the united front. In fact, today it is the supporters of a passive and wait-and-see tactic who are intervening under the mask of a pseudo-revolutionary intransigence" (Trotsky, The First Five Years of the Communist International ; pp. 345-378 of the Russian edition).

Wouldn't you say these lines were written today against Stalin, Manuilsky, Thaelmann, Remmele, and Neumann ? In fact, they were written ten years ago against Frossard, Cachin, Charles Rappoport, Daniel Renoult, and other French opportunists hiding behind ultra-leftist rhetoric. Were the theses cited—and we pose this question directly to the Stalinist bureaucracy—already "counter-revolutionary" when they expressed the policy of the Russian Politburo, headed by Lenin, and defined the policy of the Communist International ? Don't try to tell us that conditions have changed since then : this isn't a matter of circumstance but, as stated in the texts themselves, of the very ABCs of communism.

Ten years ago, the Communist International explained the essence of the united front policy as follows : the Communist Party demonstrates in practice to the masses and their organizations that it is ready to fight alongside them, even for the most modest objectives, provided these objectives align with the historical development of the proletariat ; in this struggle, the Communist Party takes into account, at every moment, the true state of mind of the class ; it addresses itself not only to the masses, but also to organizations whose leadership is recognized by the masses ; before the masses, it compels reformist organizations to take a public stance on the real tasks of the class struggle. The united front policy accelerates the revolutionary awakening of the class, revealing in practice that it is not the Communist Party's desire for splitting, but the deliberate sabotage of the social-democratic leaders that undermines the common struggle. It is clear that these ideas have not aged in the slightest.

How then can we explain the Communist International's abandonment of the united front policy ? By the failures and fiascos this policy has experienced in the past. If these failures, whose causes lie not in the policy itself but in the politicians, had been highlighted, analyzed, and studied at the time, the German Communist Party would have been perfectly equipped to face the current situation, both strategically and tactically. But the Stalinist bureaucracy acted like the nearsighted monkey in the fable : having put his glasses on his tail and cleaned them to no avail, he decided they were useless and smashed them against a stone. Everyone acts as they see fit, but it's not the glasses' fault.

The errors in the united front policy were twofold. Most often, the leading organs of the Communist Party addressed the reformists, proposing a common struggle based on radical slogans that were neither derived from the situation nor aligned with the level of consciousness of the masses. These proposals were like blank shots. The masses remained uninvolved, and the reformist leaders interpreted the communists' proposal as a plot to destroy social democracy. In all these cases, it was a purely formal application of the united front policy, which never went beyond the stage of mere declarations ; in fact, by its very nature, it can only produce results based on a realistic assessment of the situation and the state of the masses. The weapon of "open letters," used too frequently and incorrectly, jammed and had to be abandoned.

Another type of distortion took on a far more fatal character. In the hands of the Stalinist leadership, the united front policy was transformed into a search for alliances at the cost of abandoning the independence of the Communist Party. Relying on Moscow and believing themselves all-powerful, the bureaucrats of the Communist International seriously believed they could command the masses, impose a path upon them, curb the agrarian movement and strikes in China, buy an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek at the price of abandoning the independent policy of the Communist Party, re-educate the bureaucracy of the trade unions—the main pillars of British imperialism—behind a banquet table in London or in the spa towns of the Caucasus, transform Croatian bourgeois, like Radich, into communists, and so on. Moreover, this stemmed from the best intentions in the world : to accelerate development by doing for the masses what they were not yet ready to do. It is worth recalling that in a number of countries, particularly Austria, the bureaucrats of the Communist International have recently attempted to artificially create, from the top down, a "left-wing" social democracy intended to serve as a bridge to communism. This charade, too, has led only to failure. The results of all these experiments and ventures have been invariably catastrophic. The global revolutionary movement has been set back several years.

It was then that Manuilsky decided to break the glasses, and Kuusinen, to avoid making another mistake, proclaimed everyone a fascist except for himself and his friends. Today, the matter is simpler and clearer, and henceforth, there can be no more errors. What united front can there be with "social-fascists" against national-fascists, or with "left-wing social-fascists" against "right-wing social-fascists" ? Having thus executed a complete about-face, the Stalinist bureaucracy was forced to declare the resolutions of the first four congresses of the International counter-revolutionary.

6 Lessons from the Russian experience

In one of our previous works, we referred to the Bolshevik experience in the struggle against Kornilov : the official leaders responded with grumbles of disapproval. Let us recall once again the heart of the matter, to show more precisely and in more detail how the Stalinist school draws lessons from the past.

In July-August 1917, the head of government, Kerensky, practically implemented the program of Commander-in-Chief Kornilov : he reinstated field military courts and the death penalty for soldiers on the front, removed all influence over state affairs from the conciliatory Soviets, repressed the peasants, doubled the price of bread (within the framework of the state monopoly on the wheat trade), prepared the evacuation of revolutionary Petrograd and assembled counter-revolutionary troops on the outskirts of the capital, in agreement with Kornilov, promised the Allies a new offensive on the front, etc. Such was the general political situation.

On August 26, Kornilov broke with Kerensky because of the latter's hesitations and launched his troops on Petrograd. The Bolshevik party was in a semi-legal situation. Its leaders, starting with Lenin, were either in hiding or in prison, accused of liaising with the Hohenzollern leadership. Bolshevik newspapers were banned. The prosecutions came from Kerensky's government, which was supported on its left by the conciliatory Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

What did the Bolshevik party do ? It didn't hesitate for a moment to conclude a practical agreement with its jailers, Kerensky, Tseretelli, and Dan, to fight against Kornilov. Revolutionary defense committees were created everywhere, where the Bolsheviks were in the minority. This didn't prevent them from playing a leading role : in agreements aimed at developing revolutionary action among the masses, the most consistent and daring revolutionary party always wins. The Bolsheviks were at the forefront, destroying the barriers that separated them from the Menshevik workers and especially the SR soldiers, and drawing them into their ranks.

Perhaps the Bolsheviks acted this way only because they were caught off guard ? No, the Bolsheviks had, dozens, hundreds of times in the preceding months, demanded a joint struggle from the Mensheviks against the mobilizing counter-revolution. As early as May 27, when Tseretelli called for repressive measures against the Bolshevik sailors, Trotsky declared at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet : "If a counter-revolutionary general tries to put a noose around the neck of the revolution, the Cadets will pull the rope, but the sailors of Kronstadt will come to fight and die with us." This proved entirely true. During the days when Kornilov was advancing, Kerensky addressed the sailors of the cruiser Aurora, asking them to take upon themselves the defense of the Winter Palace. The sailors were all Bolsheviks. They hated Kerensky. But this did not prevent them from vigilantly protecting the Winter Palace. Their representatives went to the "Kresty" prison to meet Trotsky, who was imprisoned there, and asked him : shouldn't Kerensky be arrested ? But the question was somewhat of a joke : the sailors understood that Kornilov had to be crushed first, and then Kerensky dealt with. Thanks to sound political leadership, the sailors of the Aurora had a better understanding than Thaelmann's Central Committee.

The Rote Fahne calls our historical analysis "erroneous." Why ? That's a pointless question. Can we really expect sensible objections from these people ? They've been ordered from Moscow, under threat of dismissal, to bark at the mere mention of Trotsky's name. They're carrying out the order as best they can. According to them, Trotsky "has made an erroneous comparison between Brüning's current struggle 'against' Hitler and the Bolsheviks' struggle during Kornilov's reactionary uprising in early September 1917 : immediately confronted with an acute revolutionary situation, the Bolsheviks were fighting the Mensheviks to gain a majority in the Soviets, and armed in the struggle against Kornilov, they were simultaneously attacking Kerensky on his flanks. Trotsky thus presents support for Brüning and the Prussian government as the lesser of two evils" (Rote Fahne, December 22).

It is difficult to refute all this nonsense. I supposedly compare the Bolsheviks' struggle against Kornilov with Brüning's struggle against Hitler. I am not overestimating the intellectual capabilities of the Rote Fahne editorial staff, but these people could not possibly have failed to understand my point. I compare the Bolsheviks' struggle against Kornilov with that of the German Communist Party against Hitler. In what way is this comparison "erroneous" ? The Bolsheviks, writes the Rote Fahne, were at that time fighting the Mensheviks to gain a majority in the Soviets. But the German Communist Party, too, was fighting the Social Democrats to gain a majority among the working class. In Russia, we were on the verge of "an acute revolutionary situation." Quite right. However, if the Bolsheviks had adopted Thälmann's position in August, a counter-revolutionary situation could have arisen instead of a revolutionary one.

During the last days of August, Kornilov was crushed, not by force of arms, but by the sheer unity of the masses. The day after September 3, Lenin proposed the following compromise to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in the press : "You have the majority in the Soviets," he told them, "take power, and we will support you against the bourgeoisie. Guarantee us complete freedom of agitation, and we promise you a peaceful struggle for the majority in the Soviets." Such was the opportunist Lenin ! The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries rejected the compromise, that is, yet another proposal for a united front against the bourgeoisie. This rejection became a powerful weapon in the hands of the Bolsheviks for preparing the armed uprising that, seven weeks later, swept away the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

So far, there has been only one victorious proletarian revolution in the world. I do not, by any means, believe that we made no mistakes on the path to victory ; however, I think that our experience holds a certain importance for the Communist Party of Germany. I draw a historical analogy between two very similar and related situations. What is the response of the leaders of the Communist Party of Germany ? Insults.

Only the ultra-left group Roter Kämpfer, armed with all its expertise, attempted to seriously criticize our comparison. It believes that the Bolsheviks acted correctly in August, "because Kornilov was the representative of the Tsarist counter-revolution. This means that his struggle was that of feudal reaction against the bourgeois revolution. Under these conditions, a tactical agreement between the workers and the bourgeoisie and its SR and Menshevik appendages was not only necessary but inevitable, since the interests of both classes coincided in repelling the feudal counter-revolution." But since Hitler represents the bourgeois, not the feudal, counter-revolution, the social democracy that supports the bourgeoisie cannot engage against Hitler. This is why there is no united front in Germany and why Trotsky's comparison is flawed.

All of this sounds very solid. But in fact, there isn't a single word of it that's true. The Russian bourgeoisie in August 1917 didn't oppose the feudal reaction at all : all the landowners supported the Cadet Party, which opposed the expropriation of landowners. Kornilov proclaimed himself a republican, "son of a peasant," and a supporter of agrarian reform and a Constituent Assembly. The entire bourgeoisie supported Kornilov. The agreement between the Bolsheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks became possible only because the conciliators had temporarily broken with the bourgeoisie : it was fear of Kornilov that had driven them to do so. The conciliators understood that once Kornilov won a victory, the bourgeoisie would cease to need them and would allow Kornilov to crush them. Within these limits, we see that there is a total analogy with the relationship that exists between social democracy and fascism.

The difference doesn't begin at all where the theorists of the Red Fighters see it. In Russia, the petty-bourgeois masses, especially the peasantry, leaned not to the right but to the left. Kornilov didn't rely on the petty bourgeoisie. It is precisely for this reason that his movement wasn't fascist. It was a bourgeois counter-revolution—and absolutely not a feudal one—led by a scheming general. Therein lay his weakness. Kornilov relied on the sympathy of the entire bourgeoisie and on the military support of the officers, the Junkers, that is, the younger generation of that same bourgeoisie. This proved insufficient. But in the event of a misguided Bolshevik policy, Kornilov's victory was by no means out of the question.

We see that the Roter Kämpfer's arguments against the united front in Germany are based on the fact that its theorists do not understand either the Russian situation or the German situation [1].

Feeling unsure of its footing on the ice of Russian history, the Rote Fahne tries to approach the question from another angle. For Trotsky, only the National Socialists are fascists. "An exceptional situation, the dictatorial lowering of wages, the de facto prohibition of strikes... all this is not fascism for Trotsky. But all this our party must endure." The impotent fury of these people is disarming. Where and when did I propose to "endure" the Brüning government ? And what does "endure" even mean ? If it refers to parliamentary or extra-parliamentary support for the Brüning government, it's shameful for communists to even speak of it. But in a broader, historical sense, you, you loudmouths, are forced to "endure" the Brüning government because you are too weak to overthrow it.

All the arguments that the Rote Fahne directs against me concerning German affairs could just as easily have been directed against the Bolsheviks in 1917. One could say : "For the Bolsheviks, Kornilov's policy begins with Kornilov. But, in fact, isn't Kerensky a Kornilovist ? Isn't his policy aimed at crushing the revolution ? Isn't he threatening the peasants with punitive expeditions ? Isn't he organizing lockouts ? Isn't Lenin in hiding ? And all this we have to put up with ?"

As far as I can recall, not a single Bolshevik dared to venture such an argument. But if one had, the response would have been something like this : "We accuse Kerensky of preparing and facilitating Kornilov's rise to power. But does that absolve us of the obligation to respond to Kornilov's offensive ? We accuse the doorman of half-opening the gates to the looter. But does that mean we should neglect the gate ?" Since the Brüning government, thanks to the benevolence of the Social Democrats, has plunged the proletariat up to its knees in capitulation to fascism, you conclude : up to the knees, up to the waist, or completely—isn't it all the same ? No, it's not the same. He who has sunk up to his knees in the swamp can still get out. But for someone who has sunk in up to their head, there is no hope of coming back out.

Lenin wrote about the ultra-left : "They speak very highly of us Bolsheviks. Sometimes one feels like saying to them : if you praised us less, you would understand Bolshevik tactics better and know them better !"

Notes

[1] All the other positions of this group are of the same caliber and present themselves as a repetition of the grossest errors of the Stalinist bureaucracy, accompanied by even more ultra-leftist grimaces. Fascism is already triumphant, Hitler is not an independent threat, and the workers do not want to fight. If this is the case, and if enough time remains, the theorists of the Roter Kämpfer should use this respite and read good books instead of writing bad articles. Long ago, Marx explained to Weitling that ignorance could not lead to good results.

7. Lessons from the Italian experience

Italian fascism arose directly from the uprising of the Italian proletariat, betrayed by the reformists. Since the end of the war, the revolutionary movement in Italy had been steadily gaining momentum and, in September 1920, culminated in the workers' takeover of factories and mills. The dictatorship of the proletariat was a reality ; it simply needed to be organized and its consequences fully realized. Social democracy became frightened and retreated. After bold and heroic efforts, the proletariat found itself facing a void. The collapse of the revolutionary movement was the most important prerequisite for the rise of fascism. In September, the revolutionary offensive of the proletariat stalled ; by November, the first major attack by the fascists had taken place (the capture of Bologna).

In truth, the proletariat was still capable, after the September catastrophe, of waging defensive battles. But the Social Democrats had only one concern : to withdraw the workers from the fight at the cost of constant concessions. The Social Democrats hoped that a submissive attitude on the part of the workers would turn bourgeois "public opinion" against the fascists. Moreover, the reformists even counted on the support of Victor Emmanuel. Until the very last moment, they did everything in their power to dissuade the workers from fighting against Mussolini's gangs. But this was to no avail. Following the lead of the upper bourgeoisie, the crown sided with the fascists. Having become convinced at the last minute that it was impossible to stop fascism through docility, the Social Democrats called on the workers to launch a general strike. But this call was a fiasco. The reformers had kept the powder wet for so long, fearing it would catch fire, that when they finally approached a lit match with a trembling hand, the powder did not catch fire.

Two years after its emergence, fascism was in power. It consolidated its position thanks to the fact that the first period of its domination coincided with a favorable economic climate, following the depression of 1921-1922. The fascists used the offensive force of the petty bourgeoisie to crush the retreating proletariat. But this did not happen immediately. Already in power, Mussolini proceeded cautiously : he did not yet have a ready-made model. For the first two years, even the constitution remained unchanged. The fascist government was a coalition. Fascist gangs, meanwhile, wielded sticks, knives, and revolvers. Only gradually was the fascist state created, which entailed the complete suppression of all independent mass organizations.

Mussolini achieved this result at the cost of the bureaucratization of the Fascist Party. After harnessing the offensive force of the petty bourgeoisie, Fascism strangled it in the vise of the bourgeois state. It could not act otherwise, for the disenchantment of the masses it had amassed was becoming its most immediate danger. Bureaucratized Fascism came remarkably close to other forms of military and police dictatorship. It no longer possessed its former social base. Fascism's main reserve, the petty bourgeoisie, was exhausted. Only historical inertia allowed the Fascist state to maintain the proletariat in a state of dispersion and impotence. The balance of power shifted automatically in favor of the proletariat. This shift must lead to revolution. The defeat of Fascism would be one of the most catastrophic events in European history. But the facts prove that all these processes take time. The fascist state has been in place for ten years. How much longer will it last ? Without venturing to set a timeframe, one can confidently say that Hitler's victory in Germany would mean another long reprieve for Mussolini. Hitler's defeat would mark the beginning of the end for Mussolini.

In its policy toward Hitler, German social democracy did not invent a single word : it merely repeated, more emphatically, what the Italian reformists had accomplished in their time, albeit with greater temperament. The latter explained fascism as a postwar psychosis ; German social democracy saw it as a "Versailles" psychosis, or even a psychosis of crisis. In both cases, the reformists turned a blind eye to the organic nature of fascism, as a mass movement born of imperialist decline.

Fearing revolutionary mobilization of the workers, the Italian reformists placed all their hopes in the "State." Their rallying cry was : "Victor Emmanuel, intervene !" German social democracy does not have such a democratic resource as a monarch faithful to the constitution. Well, it must be content with a president. "Hindenburg, intervene !"

In the struggle against Mussolini—that is, in the retreat before him—Turati coined the brilliant phrase : "One must have the courage to be a coward." The German reformists are less frivolous in their slogans. They demand "courage to endure unpopularity" (Mut zur Unpopularität). It's the same thing. One shouldn't fear unpopularity when one cowardly accommodates oneself to the enemy.

The same causes produce the same effects. If the course of events depended solely on the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, Hitler's career would be assured.

However, it must be acknowledged that, for its part, the German Communist Party did not learn much from the Italian experience.

The Italian Communist Party emerged almost simultaneously with fascism. But the same conditions of revolutionary retreat that brought fascism to power hampered the development of the Communist Party. It failed to grasp the magnitude of the fascist danger, clung to revolutionary illusions, was irreconcilably opposed to the united front policy, in short, suffered from all the typical growing pains. This is hardly surprising : it was only two years old. It saw fascism as nothing more than "capitalist reaction." The Communist Party failed to discern the specific characteristics of fascism, which stem from the mobilization of the petty bourgeoisie against the proletariat. According to information from my Italian friends, with the sole exception of Gramsci, the Communist Party did not believe a fascist seizure of power was possible. Since the proletarian revolution had been defeated, since capitalism had held firm, and since the counter-revolution had triumphed, what counter-revolutionary coup could possibly still occur ? The bourgeoisie cannot rise up against itself ! This was the fundamental political orientation of the Italian Communist Party. However, it must not be forgotten that Italian fascism was then a new phenomenon, still in its formative stages : it would have been difficult even for a more experienced party to discern its specific characteristics.

The leadership of the German Communist Party today reproduces almost verbatim the initial position of Italian communism : fascism is merely capitalist reaction ; the differences between the various forms of capitalist reaction are irrelevant from the proletariat's point of view. This vulgar radicalism is all the less excusable given that the German party is much older than the Italian party was at the same time ; moreover, Marxism has been enriched today by Italy's tragic experience. To assert that fascism is already in place or to deny the very possibility of its coming to power amounts to the same thing politically. Ignoring the specific nature of fascism can only paralyze the will to fight against it.

The primary blame obviously lies with the leadership of the Communist International. Italian communists, more than any others, should have raised their voices to warn against these errors. But Stalin and Manuilsky forced them to disregard the most important lessons of their own defeat. We have seen how hastily Ercoli hastened to abandon the positions of social fascism, that is, the positions of passively awaiting a fascist victory in Germany.

International social democracy long consoled itself by saying that Bolshevism was conceivable only in a backward country. It then applied the same assertion to fascism. German social democracy must now understand, at its own expense, the falsity of this consolation : its petty-bourgeois fellow travelers have joined, and continue to join, the fascist camp, while the workers are leaving it for the Communist Party. Only fascism and Bolshevism are developing in Germany. Although Russia, on the one hand, and Italy, on the other, are infinitely more backward countries than Germany, both have nevertheless served as arenas for the development of political movements characteristic of imperialist capitalism. Advanced Germany must reproduce the processes that are already complete in Russia and Italy. The fundamental problem of German development can now be formulated as follows : to follow the Russian path or the Italian path ?

Obviously, this does not mean that Germany's highly developed social structure is unimportant for the future of Bolshevism and Fascism. Italy is, to a greater extent than Germany, a petty-bourgeois and peasant country. It suffices to recall that in Germany there are 9.8 million people working in agriculture and forestry, and 18.5 million in industry and commerce—almost twice as many. In Italy, for every 10.3 million people working in agriculture and forestry, there are 6.4 million working in industry and commerce. These raw, aggregate figures still fall far short of conveying the significant specific weight of the proletariat in the life of the German nation. Even the enormous number of unemployed is proof, in reverse, of the social power of the German proletariat. The key is to translate this power into revolutionary political terms.

The last major defeat of the German proletariat, which can be placed on the same historical level as the September Days in Italy, dates back to 1923. During the eight years that followed, many wounds healed, and a new generation arose. The Communist Party of Germany represents an infinitely greater force than the Italian communists did in 1922. The specific weight of the proletariat ; the considerable length of time that has passed since its last defeat ; and the immense strength of the Communist Party—these are the three advantages that are of enormous importance in the overall assessment of the situation and the prospects.

But to use these advantages, one must understand them. Which is not the case. Thaelmann's position in 1932 mirrors Bordiga's position in 1922. It is on this point that the danger becomes particularly grave. But here, too, there is an additional advantage that did not exist ten years ago. Within the ranks of the German revolutionaries, there is a Marxist opposition that draws upon the experience of the last decade. This opposition is numerically small, but events are giving its voice exceptional force. Under certain conditions, a slight push can trigger an avalanche. The critical impetus of the left-wing opposition can contribute to a timely change in the policy of the proletarian vanguard. This is what our task boils down to today !

8. Through the United Front – towards the Soviets, Supreme Organs of the United Front

The veneration of Soviets in words is as widespread in "left-wing" circles as the misunderstanding of their historical function. Soviets are most often defined as the organs of the struggle for power, the organs of the uprising, and finally, the organs of dictatorship. These definitions are formally correct. But they do not exhaust the historical function of Soviets. And above all, they do not explain why Soviets are precisely what is necessary in the struggle for power. The answer to this question is as follows : just as the trade union is the elementary form of the united front in the economic struggle, so too is the Soviet the highest form of the united front when the time comes for the proletariat to struggle for power.

The Soviet itself possesses no miraculous power. It is merely the class representative of the proletariat, with all its strengths and weaknesses. But it is precisely this, and only this, that makes the Soviet the organizational possibility for workers of different political tendencies and at different stages of development to unite their efforts in the revolutionary struggle for power. In the current pre-revolutionary situation, the vanguard German workers must have a very clear understanding of the historical function of the Soviets as organs of the united front.

If, during the preparatory period, the Communist Party had succeeded in completely eliminating all other parties from the ranks of the proletariat, and in gathering under its banner, both politically and organizationally, the overwhelming majority of workers, the Soviets would be of no necessity.

But, as historical experience proves, there is no reason to believe that the Communist Party, in any country whatsoever - in countries with an old capitalist culture even less than in backward countries - succeeds in occupying such a totally hegemonic position within the working class, especially before the proletarian revolution.

Present-day Germany shows us precisely that the task of the direct and immediate struggle for power confronts the proletariat long before it is fully united under the banner of the Communist Party. The revolutionary situation, at the political level, is characterized precisely by the fact that all groups and all strata of the proletariat, or at least their overwhelming majority, aspire to unite their efforts to change the existing regime. However, this does not mean that all understand how to proceed, and even less that they are ready to break with their parties and join the ranks of the Communist Party. Political consciousness does not mature in such a linear and uniform way ; profound internal differences persist even in revolutionary times when all processes occur in leaps and bounds. But at the same time, the need for an organization above parties, encompassing the entire class, becomes particularly pressing. Giving form to this need is the historical mission of the Soviets. This is their immense role. In a revolutionary situation, they are the highest organizational expression of proletarian unity. Anyone who hasn't grasped this has completely misunderstood the Soviet question. Thaelmann, Neumann, and Remmele can give all the speeches and write all the articles they want about the future "Soviet Germany." But their current policies are sabotaging the creation of Soviets in Germany.

Being so far removed from events, not knowing directly what the masses are feeling, and lacking the ability to take the pulse of the working class on a daily basis, it is very difficult for me to foresee the transitional forms that will lead to the creation of Soviets in Germany. Furthermore, I have suggested that Soviets could be an extension of factory committees : in saying this, I relied primarily on the experience of 1923. But it is clear that this is not the only path. Under the pressure of unemployment and poverty on the one hand, and under the fascist pressure on the other, the need for revolutionary unity may take the direct form of Soviets, bypassing factory committees. But whatever path leads to Soviets, they will be nothing other than the organizational expression of the proletariat's strengths and weaknesses, its internal differences, and its general aspiration to overcome them—in short, the organs of the united class front.

In Germany, the Social Democrats and the Communist Party share influence over the majority of the working class. The Social Democratic leadership does everything it can to alienate the workers. The Communist Party leadership opposes the influx of workers with all its might. This results in the emergence of a third party, accompanied by a relatively slow shift in the balance of power in favor of the Communists. Even if the Communist Party were to pursue a correct policy, the need for revolutionary class unity would grow among the workers far more rapidly than the Communist Party's dominance within the class. The necessity of establishing Soviets would thus remain fully apparent.

The creation of Soviets presupposes the agreement of the various parties and organizations of the working class, beginning with the factories ; this agreement must cover both the necessity of Soviets and the timing and method of their formation. This means : Soviets are the fully realized form of the united front in the revolutionary era, and their emergence must be preceded by the policy of the united front in the preparatory period.

Is it necessary to reiterate that during the first six months of 1917 in Russia, it was the conciliators, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Mensheviks who held the majority in the Soviets ? The Bolshevik party, without for a moment relinquishing its revolutionary independence as a party, simultaneously respected organizational discipline in relation to the majority within the framework of Soviet activity. It is clear that in Germany, the Communist Party will occupy a much more prominent position than the Bolsheviks did in the Soviets in March 1917, from the very establishment of the first Soviet. It is entirely possible that the Communists will very quickly gain a majority in the Soviets. This will in no way diminish their significance as instruments of a united front, since, initially, the minority—the Social Democrats, the non-party members, the Catholic workers, etc.—will be largely absent. - will still number in the millions, and the surest way to ruin yourself, even in the most revolutionary situation, is to disregard such a minority. But all that is the music of the future. Today, the Communist Party is the minority. That's where we must start.

What has been said does not, of course, mean that the path to Soviets necessarily requires a prior agreement with Wels, Hilferding, Breitscheid, etc. In 1918, Hilferding wondered how to include Soviets in the Weimar Constitution without harming it ; one might think that his mind is currently occupied with the following problem : how to include fascist barracks in the Weimar Constitution without harming Social Democracy ? The creation of Soviets must be carried out when the general condition of the proletariat allows it, even if this is against the will of the Social Democratic leadership. To achieve this, it is necessary to detach the Social Democratic base from the leadership : but this goal cannot be achieved by pretending it has already been accomplished. To detach millions of Social Democratic workers from their reactionary leaders, it is precisely necessary to show these workers that we are ready to enter the Soviets even with these "leaders."

However, we cannot consider as excluded a priori the fact that even the upper stratum of social democracy will be forced to step onto the white-hot plate of the Soviets, to try to repeat the maneuver of Ebert, Scheidemann, Haase and Co. in 1918-1919 : everything will depend, then, less on the ill will of these gentlemen than on the force and conditions in which history will seize them in its pincers.

The emergence of the first significant local Soviet, in which Social Democratic and Communist workers would be present not as individuals but as organizations, would have a considerable effect on the entire German working class. Not only Social Democratic and non-party workers, but also liberal and Catholic workers, would not be able to resist this centripetal force for long. All parts of the German proletariat, especially those most inclined and capable of organizing, would be drawn to the Soviets like metal filings to a magnet. The Communist Party would find in the Soviets a new and exceptionally favorable battleground for achieving a leading role in the proletarian revolution. It can be considered certain that the overwhelming majority of Social Democratic workers, and even a significant portion of the Social Democratic apparatus, would be drawn into the Soviets immediately, if the leadership of the Communist Party were not so zealous in helping the Social Democratic leaders to halt the pressure from the masses.

If the Communist Party deems unacceptable any agreement with factory committees, social-democratic organizations, trade unions, etc., on a specific program of practical tasks, this means only that it deems unacceptable to create Soviets with social democracy. Since there can be no strictly communist Soviets, as they would be of no use to anyone, the Communist Party's rejection of agreements and joint actions with other working-class parties means nothing other than the rejection of Soviets altogether.

The Rote Fahne will likely respond to this reasoning with a barrage of insults and will prove, as if by magic, that I am Brüning's election agent, Wels's secret ally, and so on. I am ready to take responsibility for all these articles, but on one condition : that the Rote Fahne, for its part, explain to the German workers how, when, and in what form Soviets can be created in Germany without the united front policy towards other workers' organizations.

To shed light on the question of the Soviets, as organs of the united front, the reflections offered on this subject by one of the Communist Party's provincial newspapers, the Klassenkampf (Halle-Mersenburg), are very instructive. "All workers' organizations," the newspaper ironically remarks, "in their present form, with all their errors and weaknesses, must be united in broad defensive anti-fascist alliances. What does this mean ? We can dispense with lengthy theoretical explanations ; history has been the harsh teacher of the German working class on this matter : the crushing of the 1918-1919 revolution was the price the German working class paid for the united front of all workers' organizations, which was nothing but a formless mass." Here we have an unparalleled example of superficial chatter !

The united front of 1918-1919 was essentially achieved through the Soviets. Should the Spartacists have joined the Soviets or not ? If we take this quote literally, they should have remained separate from the Soviets. But since the Spartacists represented a small minority of the working class and could not possibly replace the Social Democrats with their own Soviets, their isolation from the Soviets would simply have meant their isolation from the revolution. If the united front had this appearance of a "formless mass," the fault lay not with the Soviets as organs of the united front, but with the political state of the working class itself—that is, with the weakness of the Spartacist Union and the extraordinary strength of the Social Democrats. Generally speaking, the united front cannot replace a powerful revolutionary party. It can only help to strengthen it. This applies equally to the Soviets. The fear of the weak Spartacist Union of missing an exceptional opportunity drove it to ultra-leftist actions and premature interventions. Conversely, if the Spartacists had remained outside the united front, that is, the Soviets, these negative traits would undoubtedly have been even more pronounced.

Have these people truly learned nothing from the experience of the German revolution of 1918-1919 ? Have they even read *Childhood Illness* ? The Stalinist regime truly wreaked havoc on minds ! After bureaucratizing the Soviets in the USSR, the epigones now consider them a mere technical instrument in the hands of the party apparatus. They have forgotten that the Soviets were created as workers' parliaments, and that they attracted the masses because they offered the possibility of bringing together all sections of the working class, regardless of party affiliation ; they have forgotten that this is precisely where the gigantic educational and revolutionary power of the Soviets lay. Everything is forgotten, confused, distorted. Oh, thrice-cursed epigones ! The problem of the relationship between the party and the Soviets is of decisive importance for revolutionary policy. The current course of the Communist Party is, in fact, aimed at substituting the party for the Soviets ; However, Hugo Urbahns, never missing an opportunity to increase the confusion, is preparing to replace the party with Soviets. According to the report published by the SAZ, Urbahns declared at a meeting held in Berlin in January, while criticizing the Communist Party's claims to lead the working class : "Leadership will be in the hands of the Soviets, elected by the masses themselves and not chosen according to the will and whim of a single party" (massive approval). It is perfectly understandable that the Communist Party's ultimacity irritates the workers, who are inclined to applaud any protest against bureaucratic bluster. But this does not change the fact that Urbahns's position on this issue, too, has nothing in common with Marxism. It is indisputable that the workers "themselves" will elect the Soviets. The only question is whom they will elect. We must enter the Soviets along with all other organizations, whatever they may be, with "all their errors and weaknesses." But to think that the Soviets can "on their own" lead the proletariat's struggle for power amounts to propagating a crude fetishism of the Soviet. Everything depends on the party that leads the Soviets. That is why, unlike Urbahns, the Bolshevik-Leninists do not deny the Communist Party the right to lead the Soviets ; on the contrary, they declare : only on the basis of the united front, only through mass organizations, can the Communist Party achieve a leading position in the future Soviets and lead the proletariat to the conquest of power.

(....)

11. The contradiction between the economic successes of the USSR and the bureaucratization of the regime

It is impossible to lay the foundations for a revolutionary policy in "a single country." The problem of the German revolution is currently inextricably linked to the question of political leadership in the USSR. This link must be understood in all its consequences.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is the response to the resistance of the propertied classes. The limitations placed on freedoms stem from the military regime of the revolution, that is, from the conditions of class warfare. From this perspective, it is quite clear that the internal consolidation of the Soviet Republic, its economic growth, the weakening of bourgeois resistance, and above all, the successful "liquidation" of the last capitalist class, the kulaks, should lead to the flourishing of democracy within the party, the trade unions, and the Soviets.

The Stalinists never tire of repeating that "we have already entered socialism," that the current collectivization in itself marks the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, and that the next Five-Year Plan must bring these processes to their conclusion. If this is so, why has this process led to the total crushing of the party, the trade unions, and the Soviets by the bureaucratic apparatus, which, in turn, has taken on the character of Bonapartism in its publicity ? Why, during the famine and the civil war, did the party thrive so intensely, why did it never occur to anyone to question whether or not one could criticize Lenin or the Central Committee as a whole, whereas now the slightest disagreement with Stalin leads to expulsion from the party and repressive administrative measures ?

The threat of war from imperialist states cannot in any way explain, much less justify, the development of bureaucratic despotism. When classes are more or less liquidated in a national socialist society, this marks the beginning of the withering away of the state. If a socialist society can mount a victorious resistance against an external enemy, it does so as a socialist society, not as a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and even less as a state of the dictatorship of the bureaucracy.

But we are not talking about the withering away of the dictatorship : it is still too early because we have not yet "entered socialism." We are talking about something else. We are asking : what explains the bureaucratic degeneration of the dictatorship ? Where does this glaring, monstrous, terrifying contradiction come from, between the successes of socialist construction and the regime of personal dictatorship that relies on an impersonal apparatus, that holds the country's ruling class by the throat ? How can we explain that politics and the economy are developing in completely opposite directions ?

The economic successes are very significant. The October Revolution has already been fully justified from an economic standpoint. The high rates of economic growth are irrefutable proof that socialist methods offer an immense advantage, even for accomplishing production tasks that, in the West, have been resolved using capitalist methods. Will not the benefits of a socialist economy in advanced countries be tremendous ?

However, the question posed by the October Revolution is not yet resolved, even in draft form.

The Stalinist bureaucracy labels the economy "socialist" based on its premises and tendencies. But this is not enough. The economic successes of the Soviet Union are occurring on a still underdeveloped economic foundation. Nationalized industry is going through stages that advanced capitalist nations have long since passed through. The working woman in line has her own criterion for socialism, and this criterion of the "consumer," to use the bureaucrat's contemptuous expression, is in reality quite decisive. In the conflict between the worker's perspective and that of the bureaucrat, we, the Left Opposition, stand with the worker against the bureaucrat who exaggerates the achievements, glosses over the accumulating contradictions, and holds a knife to the worker's throat to prevent her from criticizing.

Last year, we abruptly shifted from equal pay to differentiated (piece-rate) wages. It is undeniable that the principle of equal pay for labor is unrealizable when the level of productive forces, and consequently of culture in general, is low. This also implies that the problem of socialism is not resolved solely at the level of social forms of property ownership, but presupposes a certain level of technological power within society. However, the growth of technological power inevitably causes productive forces to spill over national borders.

By reverting to piece-rate wages, which had been prematurely abolished, the bureaucracy labeled equal pay a "kulak" principle. This is a blatant absurdity that reveals the depths of hypocrisy and lies into which the Stalinists have sunk. In fact, they should have said : "We have advanced too quickly with egalitarian methods of remunerating labor ; we are still far from socialism ; we are still poor, and we must return to semi-capitalist or kulak methods." Let us reiterate that there is no contradiction here with the socialist objective. There is only an irreconcilable contradiction with the bureaucratic falsification of reality.

The return to piece-rate wages is a consequence of the resistance posed by economic underdevelopment. Many more such setbacks are likely, especially in agriculture where excessive administrative progress has been made.

Industrialization and collectivization are carried out using unilateral, uncontrolled, and bureaucratic methods of command that bypass the working masses. Trade unions are deprived of any possibility of influencing the relationship between consumption and accumulation. Differentiation within the peasantry has been temporarily eliminated, less economically than administratively. The social measures taken by the bureaucracy regarding the liquidation of classes are terribly ahead of the fundamental process of the development of the productive forces.

This leads to an increase in industrial production costs, low production quality, higher prices, shortages of consumer goods, and raises the threat of a resurgence of unemployment.

The extreme tension in the country's political atmosphere stemmed from the contradictions between the growth of the Soviet economy and the economic policies of the bureaucracy, which was sometimes monstrously behind the economy's needs (1923-1928), and at other times, frightened by its own backwardness, embarked on a desperate attempt to catch up with purely administrative measures (1928-1932). Here too, a leftward zigzag followed a rightward one. With these two zigzags, the bureaucracy repeatedly found itself at odds with economic realities and, consequently, with the workers' state of mind. It could not tolerate their criticism, neither when it was lagging behind nor when it was rushing ahead.

The bureaucracy can exert its pressure on workers and peasants only by depriving them of the opportunity to participate in solving the problems of their own work and their entire future. This is where the greatest danger lies. The constant fear of mass resistance creates a political "short circuit" of personal and bureaucratic dictatorship.

Does this imply that the pace of industrialization and collectivization must be slowed ? For a certain period, undoubtedly. But this period may be short-lived. The participation of workers in the management of the country, its politics, and its economy ; real control over the bureaucracy ; and a growing sense of responsibility among leaders toward those they lead—all of this can only have a beneficial influence on production, reduce internal friction, minimize costly economic fluctuations, ensure a healthier distribution of forces and resources, and ultimately increase the overall growth rate. Soviet democracy is a vital necessity, especially for the economy. Conversely, bureaucracy harbors tragic economic surprises.

Looking broadly at the history of the epigone period in the development of the USSR, it is easy to conclude that the fundamental political premise of the regime's bureaucratization was the weariness of the masses following the upheavals of the revolution and the civil war. Famine and epidemics raged across the country. Political issues took a back seat. Everyone's thoughts were fixated on a piece of bread. During War Communism, everyone received the same starvation ration. The transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP) brought the first economic successes. The rations became more plentiful, but not everyone received them. The establishment of a market economy led to the calculation of production costs, basic rationalization, and the dismissal of surplus workers from factories. These economic successes were accompanied for a long period by rising unemployment.

It must not be forgotten for a moment that the strengthening of the apparatus's power relied on unemployment. After years of famine, the reserve army of the unemployed terrified all the machine-working proletarians. The removal of independent and critical workers from the factories, and the blacklisting of opposition figures, became one of the most important and effective instruments in the hands of the Stalinist bureaucracy. Without this circumstance, it would not have succeeded in stifling Lenin's party.

Subsequent economic successes gradually led to the depletion of the reserve army of industrial workers (the hidden overpopulation of villages, masked by collectivization, remains acutely apparent). The industrial worker no longer fears being dismissed from the factory. His daily experience teaches him that the shortsightedness and arbitrariness of the bureaucracy have considerably complicated the resolution of his problems. The Soviet press denounces certain workshops and enterprises where not enough room is given to workers' initiative, their inventiveness, etc. : as if the initiative of the proletariat could be confined to the workshops, as if the workshops could be oases of productive democracy, when in reality the proletariat is crushed within the party, the Soviets, and the trade unions.

The general condition of the proletariat today is quite different from what it was in 1922-1923. The proletariat has grown both numerically and culturally. Having accomplished a monumental amount of work, which is at the root of the regeneration and growth of the economy, the workers feel their self-confidence returning and increasing. This heightened self-confidence is beginning to transform into discontent with the bureaucratic regime.

The suppression of the party, the flourishing of personal rule, and the rise of arbitrary power might give the impression of a weakening of the Soviet system. But this is not the case. The Soviet system has been considerably strengthened. At the same time, the contradiction between this system and the bureaucratic stranglehold has significantly worsened. The Stalinist apparatus is watching with terror as economic successes do not strengthen but, on the contrary, undermine its position. In the struggle to maintain its power, it is already forced to tighten the screws, prohibiting any form of "self-criticism" other than Byzantine praise for its leaders.

This is not the first time in history that economic development has clashed with the political situation in which it occurred. But it is crucial to understand precisely what conditions are generating this discontent. The rising wave of opposition is in no way directed against the socialist state, Soviet structures, or the Communist Party. The discontent is directed against the apparatus and its personification, Stalin. This explains the recent outbreak of a fierce campaign against so-called "Trotskyist smuggling."

The adversary is likely to be elusive ; he is everywhere and nowhere. He emerges in workshops, in schools, insinuates himself into historical journals and all textbooks. This means that facts and documents confound the bureaucracy, revealing its inconsistencies and errors. The past cannot be recalled calmly and objectively ; it must be rewritten, every crack through which suspicion can creep regarding the infallibility of the apparatus and its leader must be plugged. We have before us all the hallmarks of a ruling class that has lost its mind. Yaroslavsky, Yaroslavsky himself, has proven unreliable ! These are not chance incidents, mere details, or personal conflicts : the crux of the matter is that the economic successes, which initially strengthened the bureaucracy, are now, due to the dialectic of their development, at odds with the bureaucracy. It is for this reason that at the last party conference, that is to say at the congress of the Stalinist apparatus, Trotskyism, thrice beaten and crushed, was declared "vanguard of the bourgeois counter-revolution".

This stupid and politically ludicrous resolution sheds light on some of Stalin's very "practical" plans for settling personal scores. It's not for nothing that Lenin warned the party against appointing Stalin as General Secretary : "This cook can only cook spicy dishes..." And this cook hasn't yet exhausted his culinary repertoire.

Despite the tightening of theoretical and administrative controls, Stalin's personal dictatorship is clearly nearing its end. The apparatus is completely fractured. The Yaroslavsky crack is just one of hundreds of cracks that today remain unnamed. The fact that this new political crisis is ripening on the basis of the manifest and undeniable successes of the Soviet economy, the growth of the proletariat, and the initial successes of collectivized agriculture is sufficient guarantee that the liquidation of bureaucratic despotism will coincide not with a collapse of the Soviet system, as might have been feared just three or four years ago, but rather with its liberation, its growth, its flourishing.

But it is precisely in its later period that the Stalinist bureaucracy is capable of doing the most harm. The question of its prestige has become its central political issue. If apolitical historians are excluded from the party solely because they failed to celebrate Stalin's exploits in 1917, can the plebiscitary regime admit to acknowledging the errors committed in 1931-1932 ? Can it renounce the theory of social fascism ? Can it disavow Stalin, who summed up the heart of the German problem in the following formula : let the fascists come to power first, and then our turn will come ?

The objective conditions in Germany are so imperative that if the leadership of the German Communist Party possessed the necessary freedom of action, it would undoubtedly have already turned to us. But it is not free. While the Left Opposition is promoting the ideas and slogans of Bolshevism, validated by the victory of 1917, the Stalinist clique is ordering by telegram the launch of an international campaign against "Trotskyism." The campaign is being waged not on the basis of the problems of the German revolution, which is a matter of life or death for the world proletariat, but on the basis of a paltry and falsifying article by Stalin on matters of Bolshevism's history. It is difficult to imagine a greater disproportion between the tasks at hand and the meager ideological resources of the official leadership. Such is the humiliating, undignified, and profoundly tragic situation of the Communist International.

The problem of the Stalinist regime and the problem of the German revolution are inextricably linked. Future events will either unravel or resolve this link in the interests of both the Russian and German revolutions.

13. The strike strategy

On the trade union question, the Communist leadership definitively muddled the party. The general aim of the "third period" was to create parallel unions. The assumption was that the mass movement would overwhelm the existing organizations and that the organs of the RGO (Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition) would become the initiative committees for the economic struggle. To carry out this plan, only one tiny detail was missing : the mass movement. During spring floods, the water sweeps away a great many barricades. Let's try removing the barricade, decided Lozovsky ; perhaps the spring waters will start flowing.

The reformist unions resisted. The Communist Party excluded itself from the factories. As a result, it was decided to make some partial adjustments to union policy. The Communist Party refused to call on unorganized workers to join the reformist unions. But it also opposed leaving the unions. While creating parallel organizations, it revived the slogan of struggle within the reformist organizations in order to gain influence there. The whole system is a model of self-sabotage.

The Rote Fahne complains that many communists consider it pointless to participate in reformist unions. "What's the point of reviving this business ?" they declare. And indeed : what is the purpose ? If the serious aim is to seize control of the old unions, then the unorganized must be called upon to join : it is the new strata that can create a base for a left wing. But in this case, parallel unions—that is, a competing agency for recruiting workers—must not be created.

The leadership's policy toward reformist trade unions reaches the same heights of confusion as on other issues. The Rote Fahne of January 28th criticized the communist activists of the Düsseldorf metalworkers' union for promoting the slogan of "ruthless struggle against the participation of union leaders" in supporting the Brüning government. These opportunistic demands are unacceptable because they presuppose (!) that the reformists are likely to renounce support for Brüning and his emergency laws. Frankly, it all sounds like a bad joke ! The Rote Fahne believes it is sufficient to heap insults upon the leaders, but unacceptable to subject them to the political test of the masses.

However, reformist unions currently offer an extraordinarily favorable field of action. The Social Democratic Party still has the opportunity to deceive workers with its political rhetoric ; on the other hand, the dead end of capitalism stands before the unions like a prison wall. The 200,000 or 300,000 workers organized in independent red unions can become a valuable catalyst within the reformist unions.

At the end of January, a communist conference of works councils from across the country was held in Berlin. The Rote Fahne (Red Flag) published the following report : "Works Councils Forge the Red Workers' Front" (February 2). One would search in vain for information on the composition of the conference, or on the number of workers and businesses represented. Unlike the Bolsheviks, who meticulously and publicly recorded every shift in the balance of power within the working class, the German Stalinists, imitating their Russian counterparts, are playing a game of hide-and-seek. They refuse to acknowledge that the communist works councils represent only 4% of the total, compared to 84% for the Social Democrats ! The assessment of the "third period" policy is contained in this report. Will labeling the isolation of communists within businesses a "united red front" actually improve matters ?

The prolonged crisis of capitalism is drawing the most painful and dangerous dividing line within the proletariat : between those who work and the unemployed. The fact that reformists are predominant in the workplaces, and communists among the unemployed, paralyzes both parts of the proletariat. Those who have jobs can wait longer. The unemployed are more impatient. Today, their impatience has a revolutionary character. But if the Communist Party fails to find the forms and slogans of struggle that, by uniting the unemployed and those who work, will open the prospect of a revolutionary outcome, the impatience of the unemployed will inevitably turn against the Communist Party.

In 1917, despite the Bolshevik party's political correctness and the rapid development of the revolution, the most disadvantaged and impatient segments of the proletariat, even in Petrograd as early as September-October, began to turn away from Bolshevism and toward the syndicalists and anarchists. Had the October Revolution not erupted in time, the disintegration of the proletariat would have become acute and would have led to the revolution's decay. In Germany, the anarchists are useless : the National Socialists can take their place, combining anarchist demagoguery with their openly reactionary aims.

The workers are by no means immune once and for all from the influence of the fascists. The proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie appear as communicating vessels, especially in the present conditions, when the reserve army of the proletariat cannot help but supply small shopkeepers, peddlers, etc., and the enraged petty bourgeoisie, proletarians and lumpenproletarians.

Employees, technical and administrative staff, and certain levels of civil servants were once a significant pillar of social democracy. Today, these elements have either shifted or are shifting to the National Socialists. They may, if they haven't already begun to do so, draw the working-class elite along with them. In this way, National Socialism penetrates the proletariat from above.

However, its potential penetration from below, that is, through the unemployed, is far more dangerous. No class can live long without prospects and hope. The unemployed are not a class, but they already constitute a very compact and stable social stratum, which is trying in vain to escape unbearable living conditions. If it is true, in general, that only proletarian revolution can save Germany from decay and disintegration, this is true first and foremost for the millions of unemployed.

Given the Communist Party's weakness in businesses and unions, its numerical growth solves nothing. In a nation shaken by crisis and riddled with contradictions, a far-left party can find tens of thousands of new supporters, especially if the entire party apparatus is, for the sake of "competition," focused exclusively on individual recruitment. What is decisive is the relationship between the party and the working class. A communist worker elected to a factory committee or to the leadership of their union is more important than thousands of new members, recruited here and there, joining the party today only to leave tomorrow.

But this individual influx of new members will not last forever. If it persists in postponing the struggle until it has definitively ousted the reformists, the Communist Party will soon realize that at a certain point, social democracy will cease to lose influence to the Communist Party and that, conversely, the fascists will begin to demoralize the unemployed, the Communist Party's main base. A political party cannot with impunity refrain from mobilizing its forces for the tasks arising from the situation. The Communist Party is striving to trigger sectoral strikes to pave the way for a mass struggle. Successes in this area are meager. As always, the Stalinists are preoccupied with self-criticism : "We don't yet know how to organize...", "we don't yet know how to lead...", moreover, "we" always means "you." The theory of the infamous March Days of 1921 is making a reappearance ; To "electrify" the proletariat through offensive actions by minority groups. But the workers have no need to be "electrified." They want to be given clear perspectives and to be helped to create the beginnings of a mass movement.

In their strategy of strikes, it is clear that the Communist Party relies on isolated quotations from Lenin, as interpreted by Lozovsky and Manuilsky. Certainly, there were periods when the Mensheviks fought against "strike mania," while the Bolsheviks spearheaded each new strike, drawing ever-larger masses into the movement. This coincided with a period of awakening of new strata of the working class. Such was the Bolsheviks' tactic in 1905, during the period of industrial expansion that preceded the war, in the early months of the February Revolution.

But in the period immediately preceding October, from the conflict of July 1917, the tactics of the Bolsheviks were different : they did not push for strikes, they restrained them because each major strike tended to turn into a decisive confrontation, while the political premises were not yet ripe.

This did not prevent them, during these months, from taking the lead in all the strikes that broke out despite their warnings, mainly in the most backward sectors of industry (textiles, leather, etc.).

While the Bolsheviks boldly launched strikes in the interest of the revolution under certain conditions, they also prevented workers from striking under other conditions, again in the interest of the revolution. In this area, as in all others, there is no ready-made formula. The strike tactics for each period were always part of a comprehensive strategy, and the connection between the part and the whole was clear to the vanguard workers.

What is the current situation in Germany ? Workers who have jobs are not resisting wage cuts because they fear the unemployed. This is hardly surprising : when there are several million unemployed, the traditional strike, organized by unions, is a hopeless struggle. It is doubly doomed when there is political antagonism between the unemployed and those who have jobs. This does not preclude sectoral strikes, particularly in the most backward sectors of industry. On the other hand, it is the workers in the most important sectors who, in such a situation, are most inclined to listen to the voice of reformist leaders. Attempts by the Communist Party to trigger a strike without changing the overall situation within the proletariat amount to little more than small partisan operations which, even if successful, have no lasting impact.

According to accounts from communist workers (see, for example, *Der rote Aufbau*), many workers in factories declare that sectoral strikes are currently meaningless, that only a general strike can lift workers out of poverty. "General strike" here means "prospects for struggle." Workers are all the less enthusiastic about sectoral strikes because they are directly confronted by state power : monopoly capital speaks to workers in the language of Brüning's exceptional laws [1].

At the dawn of the workers' movement, agitators often refrained from developing revolutionary and socialist perspectives so as not to frighten the workers they sought to draw into a strike. Today, the situation is entirely the opposite. The leading strata of German workers can only decide to participate in an economic struggle if the general prospects of the coming struggle are clear to them. They do not find these prospects with the communist leadership.

Regarding the tactics of the March 1921 uprisings in Germany ("electrifying" the minority of the proletariat instead of winning over the majority), the author of these lines declared at the Third Congress : "When the overwhelming majority of the working class does not find itself in the movement, does not sympathize with it, or even doubts its success, when the minority, on the other hand, rushes forward and mechanically tries to push the workers into strikes, in that case this impatient minority, in the person of the party, can come into conflict with the working class and break its head in the process."

Should we then abandon the strike as a form of struggle ? No, not abandon it, but create the essential political and organizational foundations. Restoring union unity is one of them. The reformist bureaucracy naturally opposes this. Until now, the split has secured it the best possible position. But the direct threat of fascism is changing the situation within the unions, to the great disadvantage of the bureaucracy. The desire for unity is growing. Leipart's clique can still try, in the current situation, to refuse to restore unity : this will double or triple the influence of the communists within the unions. If unity is achieved, so much the better ; a wide field of activity will open up before the communists. We need no half-measures, but a radical shift !

Without a broad campaign against the high cost of living, for a reduction in the working week, against wage cuts, without the participation of the unemployed in this struggle, without the application of the united front policy, small, improvised strikes will never lead to a unified struggle.

Left-wing social democrats speak of the necessity, "in the event of fascists coming to power," of resorting to a general strike. It is quite possible that Leipart himself makes such threats behind closed doors. The Rote Fahne refers to this as Luxemburgism. This is slandering the great revolutionary. While Rosa Luxemburg may have overestimated the specific importance of the general strike in the question of power, she understood perfectly well that one should not call for a general strike arbitrarily, that it is prepared by the entire previous trajectory of the workers' movement, by the policies of the party and the unions. In the mouths of left-wing social democrats, the general strike is above all a comforting myth that allows them to escape the grim reality.

For many years, French social democrats promised to resort to a general strike in the event of war. The Basel Congress of 1912 even promised to resort to a revolutionary uprising. But the threat of a strike and an uprising was, in both cases, nothing more than a farcical bombast. It is not at all a question of the opposition between a strike and an uprising, but rather of an abstract, formal, purely verbal attitude toward both. The pre-war, Bebelian social democrat was a reformist, armed with the abstract concept of revolution ; the post-war reformist, brandishing the threat of a general strike, is already a veritable caricature.

The communist leadership's attitude toward the general strike is, of course, much more serious. But it lacks clarity, even on this issue. Yet clarity is essential. The general strike is a very important means of struggle, but it is not a universal remedy. There are situations where the general strike risks weakening the workers more than their direct enemy. The strike must be an important element of strategic calculation, but not a panacea in which all strategy is lost.

Generally speaking, the general strike is the instrument of struggle of the weak against the strong, or, more precisely, of the one who, at the beginning of the struggle, feels the weakest against the one he considers the strongest : when I personally cannot use an important instrument, I at least try to prevent the enemy from using it ; if I cannot fire a cannon, I will at least remove its firing pin. Such is the "idea" of the general strike.

The general strike has always appeared as an instrument of struggle against an established state power that controls the railways, the telegraph, the military and police forces, etc. By paralyzing the state apparatus, the general strike either "frightened" the power, or created the premises for a revolutionary solution to the question of power.

The general strike proves to be a particularly effective means of struggle when only revolutionary enthusiasm unites the working masses, the absence of organization and a combat leadership preventing them from assessing the balance of power in advance or developing a plan of operations. It is reasonable to assume that the anti-fascist revolution in Italy, the beginning of which will be marked by a number of localized conflicts, will inevitably pass through the stage of the general strike. Only through this means will the Italian working class, currently fragmented, regain awareness of its unified status and gauge the strength of the enemy's resistance that it must overthrow.

A general strike would be an appropriate form of struggle against fascism in Germany only if fascism were already in power and firmly controlled the state apparatus. But the slogan of a general strike is merely an empty formula if the goal is to crush fascism in its attempt to seize power.

During Kornilov's march on Petrograd, neither the Bolsheviks nor the Soviets as a whole considered calling a general strike. On the railways, workers struggled to transport revolutionary troops and hold back Kornilov's convoys. Factories only stopped to the extent that workers had to leave for the front. Enterprises working for the revolutionary front redoubled their efforts.

There was no question of a general strike during the October Revolution. On the eve of the revolution, the vast majority of factories and regiments had already rallied to the leadership of the Bolshevik Soviet. Calling the factories to a general strike under these circumstances would have weakened oneself, not the enemy. On the railways, the workers were striving to support the uprising ; the office workers, while feigning neutrality, were aiding the counter-revolution. A general railway strike was pointless ; the question was resolved when the workers gained the upper hand.

If, in Germany, the struggle erupts from localized conflicts triggered by fascist provocation, it is unlikely that a call for a general strike will meet the demands of the situation. A general strike would primarily mean cutting one city off from another, one district from another, and even one factory from another. It would be more difficult to find and mobilize the unemployed. Under these conditions, the fascists, who have no shortage of leadership, can gain a certain advantage thanks to their centralized command. Admittedly, their rank and file are so fragmented that even then, the fascists' attempt can be repelled. But that is another aspect of the problem.

The question of railway communications must be approached not from the point of view of the "prestige" of the general strike which implies that everyone goes on strike, but from the point of view of its usefulness in the fight : for whom and against whom will the lines of communication be used during the confrontation ?

Consequently, we must prepare not for a general strike but to resist the fascists. This implies : creating resistance bases everywhere, shock detachments, reserves, local headquarters and command centers, effective communication, and very simple mobilization plans.

What the local organizations accomplished in a corner of the province, in Bruchsal or Klingental, where the communists, along with the SAP and the trade unions, created a defense organization despite the boycott by the reformist leadership, is an example for the entire country, despite its modest size. O powerful leaders, O seven-times-wise strategists, we want to cry out to them, take a lesson from the workers of Bruchsal and Klingental, imitate them, broaden their experience, take a lesson from the workers of Bruchsal and Klingental !

The German working class possesses powerful political, economic, and sporting organizations. This is what distinguishes the "Brüning regime" from the "Hitler regime." Brüning deserves no credit for this : bureaucratic weakness is not a merit. But we must face facts. The main, crucial, fundamental fact is that the working class in Germany still fully controls its organizations. The misuse of its strength is the sole reason for its weakness. Simply extend the experience of Bruchsal and Klingental to the entire country, and Germany will present a completely different face. Under these conditions, the working class will be able to resort to forms of struggle against the fascists that are far more effective and direct than the general strike. If the evolution of the situation made the use of the general strike necessary (such a situation could arise from a certain type of relationship between the fascists and the organs of the State), the system of defense committees formed on the basis of the united front would guarantee in advance the success of the mass strike.

The struggle would not end there. Indeed, what exactly is the organization in Bruchsal and Klingental ? One must be able to discern what is important in seemingly minor events : this local defense committee is in fact the local committee of workers' deputies ; it doesn't call itself that, nor is it aware of it, because it's a small, provincial place. Here too, quantity determines quality. Transport this experience to Berlin and you'll have the Berlin Soviet of Workers' Deputies !

Notes

[1] Some ultra-left groups (for example, the Italian Bordigist group) believe that a united front is only acceptable for economic struggles. Today, even more than in the past, it is impossible to separate economic struggles from political struggles. The example of Germany, where tariff agreements are abolished and wages are reduced by government decrees, should make this truth clear even to toddlers. It is worth noting in passing that, currently, Stalinists are reviving many of the old prejudices of the Bordigists. It is no wonder that the "Prometeo" group, which learns nothing and has not progressed an inch, is now, in this era of ultra-left zigzags within the Communist International, much closer to the Stalinists than to us.

(....)

15. Is the situation hopeless ?

It is a difficult task to mobilize the majority of the German working class for an offensive all at once. After the defeats of 1919, 1921, and 1923, after the adventures of the "third period," German workers, already firmly controlled by powerful conservative organizations, have seen centers of resistance develop within their ranks. But this organizational strength of the German workers, which has thus far prevented any penetration of fascism into their ranks, opens up the widest possibilities for defensive struggles.

It must be borne in mind that a united front policy is far more effective in defense than in attack. The conservative or backward strata of the proletariat are more easily drawn into a struggle to defend existing gains than to conquer new ones.

Brüning's emergency decrees and the threat from Hitler are, in this sense, an "ideal" wake-up call for the united front policy. This is not about defense in the most basic and obvious sense of the word. Under these conditions, it is possible to win over the vast majority of the working class to the united front. Moreover, the objectives of the struggle cannot fail to find sympathy among the lower strata of the petty bourgeoisie, including the shopkeepers in working-class neighborhoods and districts.

Despite all the difficulties and dangers, the current situation in Germany presents enormous advantages for the revolutionary party ; it imperatively dictates a clear strategic plan : from defense to offense. Without for a single moment abandoning its primary objective, which remains the conquest of power, the Communist Party is adopting a defensive position for immediate action. It is time to restore to the formula "Class against class" its true meaning !

The resistance of the workers to the offensive of capital and the State will inevitably provoke a redoubled offensive by fascism. However timid the first steps of the defense may have been, the reaction of the adversary will quickly close the ranks of the united front, broaden its tasks, necessitate the application of more decisive methods, expel the reactionary layers of the bureaucracy from the united front, strengthen the influence of the communists, while breaking down the barriers between workers, and thus prepare the way for the shift from defense to offense.

If, in defensive battles, the Communist Party gains the upper hand—and with a just policy, this is beyond doubt—it must under no circumstances seek the agreement of the reformist and centrist leaderships before going on the offensive. The masses decide : from the moment they break away from the reformist leadership, an agreement with the latter becomes meaningless. Perpetuating the united front would demonstrate a complete misunderstanding of the dialectic of revolutionary struggle and would transform the united front from a springboard into a barrier.

The most difficult political situations are, in a certain sense, the easiest : they admit only one solution. When a task is clearly defined by its name, in principle it has already been solved : from a united front for defense to the conquest of power under the banner of communism.

What are the chances of success ? The situation is difficult. Ultra-left ultimacity supports reformism. Reformism supports the bureaucratic dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Brüning's bureaucratic dictatorship worsens the country's economic agony and fuels fascism.

The situation is very difficult and very dangerous, but by no means hopeless. The Stalinist apparatus, benefiting from usurped authority and the material resources of the October Revolution, is very strong, but it is not all-powerful. The dialectic of class struggle is stronger. It is simply a matter of knowing how to support it at the right time.

Today, many people "on the left" express great pessimism about the fate of Germany. In 1923, they say, when fascism was still very weak and the Communist Party enjoyed great influence in the trade unions and factory committees, the proletariat did not win the victory ; how could one expect a victory today, when the party has weakened and fascism is incomparably stronger ?

This argument, convincing at first glance, is in fact entirely fallacious. In 1923, the struggle was halted : faced with the specter of fascism, the party refused to fight. Where there is no struggle, there can be no victory. It is precisely the strength of fascism and its pressure that today preclude any possibility of refusing to fight. We must fight. And if the German working class takes up the fight, it can win. It must win.

Just yesterday, the top brass were declaring : "We're not afraid of the fascists coming to power ; they'll quickly exhaust themselves, etc." This idea prevailed at the party's highest levels for several months. Had it taken root permanently, it would have meant that the Communist Party was trying to anesthetize the proletariat before Hitler cut off its head. That was the main danger. Today, no one defends this idea anymore. We have won a first victory. The idea that fascism must be crushed before it comes to power has penetrated the working masses. This is an important victory. All future agitation must stem from this.

The working masses are dejected. Unemployment and want overwhelm them. But the leadership's confusion, the mess it has created, torments them even more. The workers understand that it is impossible to let Hitler come to power. But how ? No solution is in sight. The leaders are of no help ; on the contrary, they are an obstacle. But the workers want to fight.

There is a surprising fact that, as far as one can tell from a distance, has not been fully appreciated : the miners of Hirsch-Dunker have declared that the capitalist system must be replaced by the socialist system ! This means that they will agree tomorrow to create Soviets as a form of organization for the entire working class. Perhaps they agree even today : one only has to ask them ! This symptom alone is a hundred times more important than all the impressionistic pronouncements of those gentlemen, men of letters and eloquent speakers, who disdainfully complain about the masses.

Indeed, a certain passivity is evident within the ranks of the Communist Party, despite the clamor of the party apparatus. And why is that ? Grassroots communists are attending their cell meetings less and less frequently, where they are bombarded with empty rhetoric. Ideas coming from above cannot be applied either in the factory or on the street. The worker is aware of the irreconcilable contradiction between what he needs when facing the masses and what he is given in official party meetings. The artificial atmosphere, created by a loud, boastful apparatus that cannot tolerate objections, is becoming unbearable for ordinary party members. Hence the emptiness and coldness of the meetings. This reflects not a refusal to fight, but a political disarray and a muted protest against an all-powerful but foolish leadership.

This disarray within the proletariat is an encouragement to the fascists. They continue their offensive. The danger grows. But precisely this awareness of the fascist danger will extraordinarily sensitize the vanguard workers and create a favorable atmosphere for putting forward clear and simple proposals, leading to action.

Referring to the example of Braunschweig, Münzenberg wrote last November : "Today, there can be no doubt that this united front will one day spontaneously emerge under the growing pressure of fascist terror and attacks." Münzenberg does not explain why the Central Committee, of which he is a member, did not make the events in Braunschweig the starting point for a bold united front policy. No matter : Münzenberg, although thereby acknowledging his own inconsistency, is correct in his prediction.

The approach of the fascist threat can only lead to the radicalization of social-democratic workers and even significant sections of the reformist apparatus. The revolutionary wing of the SAP will undoubtedly take a step forward. Under these circumstances, a shift in the communist apparatus is more or less inevitable, even at the cost of internal divisions and splits. It is for such a development that we must prepare.

A turning point for the Stalinists is inevitable. Certain symptoms already reveal the strength of the pressure exerted from the rank and file : some arguments are no longer being used, the rhetoric is becoming increasingly confused, the slogans more and more ambiguous ; at the same time, those who were imprudent enough to understand the party's tasks before the Central Committee were expelled are being excluded. These are unmistakable symptoms, but for now, they are only symptoms.

On several occasions in the past, the Stalinist bureaucracy wasted hundreds of tons of paper in a polemic against counter-revolutionary "Trotskyism", only to make a 180° turn and try to implement the program of the left opposition, often, in truth, with a fatal delay.

In China, the turning point came too late and in such a way that it effectively dealt the final blow to the revolution (the Canton uprising !). In England, the "turning point" was initiated by the adversary, namely the General Council, which broke with the Stalinists when it no longer needed them. In the USSR, the turning point of 1928 came just in time to save the dictatorship from imminent catastrophe. It is not difficult to explain the differences between these three important examples. In China, the young and inexperienced Communist Party blindly followed Moscow's leadership ; in fact, the voice of the left-wing opposition did not have time to reach China. The same thing happened in England. In the USSR, the left-wing opposition was present and waged a relentless campaign against the policy toward the kulaks.

In China and England, Stalin and Co. took risks from a distance ; in the USSR, the danger hung over their own heads.

The political advantage of the German working class already lies in the fact that all the problems have been raised openly and in a timely manner ; the authority of the leadership of the Communist International is considerably undermined ; the Marxist opposition is acting on the spot, in Germany itself ; the vanguard of the proletariat includes thousands of experienced and critical elements, who are able to raise their voices and are already beginning to make them heard.

In Germany, the left-wing opposition is numerically small. But its political influence can prove decisive at a sudden historical turning point. Just as a switchman can, by opportunely pulling a lever, send a heavily laden train onto another track, so too can the small opposition, by firmly and confidently pulling the ideological lever, force the train of the German Communist Party and, above all, the heavy convoy of the German proletariat to change course.

Events are proving, more and more each day, the correctness of our position. When the ceiling starts burning above their heads, even the most obtuse bureaucrats no longer care about their prestige. And the secret advisors then jump out the window, wearing only their underwear. The pedagogy of facts will aid our self-criticism.

Will the German Communist Party succeed in making this shift in time ? We can only speak of it now in a conditional manner. Without the frenzy of the "Third Period," the German proletariat would already be in power. If the Communist Party had accepted the program of action put forward by the Left Opposition after the last Reichstag elections, victory would have been assured. Today, it is not possible to speak of victory with certainty. But we can call the shift that will allow German workers to enter the struggle, before fascism seizes control of the state apparatus, opportune.

To achieve this turning point, an immense effort is needed. The vanguard elements of communism, both inside and outside the party, must not be afraid to act. They must openly fight against the narrow-minded ultimacity of the bureaucracy, both within the party and before the working masses.

"But isn't that a breach of discipline ?" a hesitant communist might ask. Of course, it's a breach of Stalinist discipline. No serious revolutionary would break discipline, even formal discipline, unless they had compelling reasons. But someone who, hiding behind discipline, tolerates a policy whose disastrous nature is obvious, is not a revolutionary but a spineless coward, a weakling. It would be a crime for opposition communists to embark, like Urbahns and Co., on the path of creating a new Communist Party before even making serious efforts to change the direction of the old one. It's not difficult to create a small, independent organization. But creating a new Communist Party is a gigantic task. Do the cadres necessary for such a task exist ? If so, what have they done to influence the tens of thousands of workers who are members of the official party ? If these leaders believe they are capable of explaining to the workers the need for a new party, then they must, first and foremost, put themselves to the test by working to regenerate the existing party.

To raise the question of a third party today means opposing, on the eve of a major historical decision, millions of communist workers who, although dissatisfied with their leadership, remain bound to their party by a revolutionary commitment. We must find a common language with these millions of communist workers. Despite insults, slander, and persecution, we must reach the conscience of these workers, show them that we want the same thing as they do ; that we have no interests other than those of communism ; that the path we are indicating is the only right one.

We must ruthlessly unmask the ultra-left capitulators ; we must demand a clear answer from the "leaders" to the question : what to do now ?, and propose our own answer for the whole country, for each region, for each city, for each neighborhood, for each factory.

Within the party, cells of Bolshevik-Leninists must be created. Their banner must proclaim : "Change of direction and reform of the party system." Wherever they secure a solid base, they must begin implementing the United Front policy, even on a small, local scale. Will the party bureaucracy exclude them ? Of course, but its rule under current conditions will not last long.

A public discussion, without interruption of meetings, without truncated quotations, without venomous slander, a fair exchange of opinions is necessary among the ranks of the Communists and the entire proletariat : this is how, in Russia, throughout 1917, we debated with all parties and within our own party. Through this broad discussion, we must prepare for an extraordinary party congress with a single item on the agenda : "What are we going to do ?" The left-wing opposition is not an intermediary between the Communist Party and social democracy. They are the soldiers of communism, its agitators, its propagandists, its organizers. We must turn to the party ! We must explain to it ! We must convince it !

If the Communist Party is forced to adopt a united front policy, it will almost certainly repel the fascist offensive. And a decisive victory over fascism will pave the way for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But taking the lead in the revolution will not be enough to resolve all the contradictions within the Communist Party. The mission of the Left Opposition will by no means be finished. In a sense, it will only be beginning. The first task of the victory of the proletarian revolution in Germany should be the elimination of bureaucratic dependence on the Stalinist apparatus.

Tomorrow, after the victory of the German proletariat, and even before, in its struggle for power, the shackles that paralyze the Communist International will be shattered. The poverty of ideas of bureaucratic centrism, the national limitations of its horizon, the anti-proletarian character of its regime—all this will become apparent in the light of the German revolution, which will be incomparably more vigorous than the October Revolution. The ideas of Marx and Lenin will inevitably triumph within the German proletariat.

Conclusion

A merchant was leading some oxen to the slaughterhouse. The butcher stepped forward, knife in hand. "Let's close ranks and gore this executioner with our horns," suggested one of the oxen. "But how is the butcher worse than the merchant who led us here with his stick ?" replied the oxen who had received their political education at Manuilsky's boarding school.
"Because then we can settle the merchant's score !" "No," replied the principled oxen to their advisor, "you are the left-wing guarantor of our enemies, you are yourself a social butcher." And they refused to close ranks. (From Aesop's Fables.)

"To place the annulment of the Treaty of Versailles necessarily, absolutely and immediately in the foreground, before the question of the liberation from the yoke of imperialism of other countries oppressed by imperialism, is petty-bourgeois nationalism (worthy of Kautsky, Hilferding, Otto Bauer and Co.), and not revolutionary internationalism" (Lenin, Infantile Disorder of Communism).

What is needed is the complete abandonment of national communism, the public and definitive liquidation of the slogans of "popular revolution" and "national liberation." Not : "Down with the Treaty of Versailles !", but : "Long live the Soviet United States of Europe."

Socialism is only achievable on the basis of the most recent achievements of modern technology and on the basis of the international division of labor.

The building of socialism in the USSR is not a national process that can be self-sufficient ; it is an integral part of the international revolution.

The conquest of power by the German and European proletariat is an incomparably more real and immediate task than the construction of a socialist society, closed in on itself and autarkic, within the borders of the USSR.

Unconditional defense of the USSR, the first workers' state, against the internal and external enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat !

But the defense of the USSR must not be undertaken blindly. International proletarian control over the Soviet bureaucracy ! A ruthless exposure of its Thermidorian and national-reformist tendencies, of which the theory of socialism in one country is the generalization.

What does the Communist Party need ? A return to the strategic school of the first four congresses of the International Communist Party. An abandonment of ultimacies towards mass workers' organizations : communist leadership cannot be imposed, it can only be won.

Abandonment of the theory of social-fascism, which helps social democracy and fascism.

Consistent exploitation of the antagonism between social democracy and fascism :
a) for a more effective struggle against fascism ;
b) to oppose social-democratic workers to their reformist leadership.

It is the vital interests of proletarian democracy, and not the principles of formal democracy, that must serve as the criteria for assessing changes in political regimes of bourgeois domination.

No support whatsoever, direct or indirect, for the Brüning regime !

Bold and devoted defense of proletarian organizations against fascists.

"Class against class !" This means that all proletarian organizations must take their place in the united front against the bourgeoisie.

The practical program of the united front must be defined by an agreement between the organizations in the presence of the masses. Each organization remains under its own banner and retains its leadership. In action, each organization respects the discipline of the united front.

"Class against class !" A tireless campaign of agitation must be waged to ensure that social-democratic organizations and reformist trade unions break with their perfidious bourgeois allies of the "iron front" and close ranks with communist organizations and all other organizations of the proletariat.

"Class against class !" Propaganda and organizational preparation of the Workers' Soviets, as a superior form of the proletarian united front.

Total political and organizational independence of the Communist Party at all times and in all circumstances.

No combining of programs or flags. No unprincipled transactions. Total freedom to criticize current allies.

The left-wing opposition supports, needless to say, Thaelmann's candidacy for the presidency.

The Bolshevik-Leninists must be at the forefront of the mobilization of workers, under the banner of the official communist candidacy.

German communists should take their inspiration not from the current internal regime of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which reflects the domination of an apparatus on the basis of a victorious revolution, but from the regime of the party that led to the revolution.

The liquidation of the omnipotence of the apparatus in the German Communist Party is a matter of life or death.

A return to democracy within the party is essential.

The communist workers must first obtain a serious and honest discussion within the party on matters of strategy and tactics. The voice of the Left Opposition (the Bolshevik-Leninists) must be heard by the party. After a general discussion within the party, decisions must be made by an extraordinary, freely elected congress.

The correct policy of the Communist Party towards the SAP is as follows : uncompromising (but honest, i.e., factual) criticism of the bastard character of the leadership ; a caring, fraternal attitude towards the left wing ; a willingness to make practical agreements with the SAP and to establish closer political ties with the revolutionary wing.

A complete change of direction in trade union policy :
struggle against the reformist leadership based on trade union unity.
Systematically pursue a united front policy in the enterprises. Agreements with reformist factory committees, based on a precise program of demands.
Struggle for lower prices. Struggle against wage cuts. Place this struggle on the path of the campaign for workers' control over production.
Campaign for cooperation with the USSR based on a unified economic plan.
Development by the organs of the USSR, with the participation of interested organizations of the German proletariat, of an exemplary plan.
Campaign for Germany's transition to socialism based on such a plan.

Those who claim the situation is hopeless are lying. Pessimists and skeptics must be driven from the ranks of the proletariat like lepers. The internal resources of the German proletariat are inexhaustible. They will find a way.

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The only way

October 1932

Foreword

The decline of capitalism promises to be even more tumultuous, dramatic, and bloody than its rise. German capitalism will by no means be an exception. If its agony is prolonged unduly, the blame—let's not deceive ourselves—lies with the parties of the proletariat.

German capitalism emerged somewhat late and found itself without the privileges of primogeniture. Russia's development placed it midway between England and India. In this scenario, Germany should have occupied the space between England and Russia, without, however, possessing Great Britain's powerful overseas colonies or Tsarist Russia's internal colonies. Germany, embedded in the heart of Europe, was faced with the necessity, at a time when the world had already been divided, of conquering foreign markets and undertaking a further partition of the colonies that had already been divided.

German capitalism was not given the opportunity to simply go with the flow, to surrender itself to the free play of forces. Only Great Britain could afford this luxury, and then only for a limited historical period, the end of which we have recently witnessed. Nor could German capitalism afford the "sense of moderation" that characterizes French capitalism, firmly established within its borders and possessing reserves in the form of rich colonial possessions.

The German bourgeoisie, deeply opportunistic in domestic politics, had to be audacious in the realms of economics and international politics, forging ahead, expanding its production immeasurably to catch up with the older nations, brandishing its sword, and launching itself into war. The extreme rationalization of postwar German industry stemmed from the need to overcome the adverse conditions resulting from historical backwardness, geographical location, and military defeat.

If the economic ills of our time are, in the end, the result of the contradiction between the development of humanity's productive forces on the one hand, and the private ownership of the means of production and national borders on the other, then German capitalism is in the throes of the most violent convulsions because it is the most modern, advanced, and dynamic capitalism on the European continent.

The doctors of German capitalism are divided into three schools : the liberals, the supporters of a planned economy, the supporters of autarky.

Liberals would like to reinstate the "natural" laws of the market. But the sorry political fate of German liberalism reflects the fact that German capitalism was never based on Manchesterian principles : thanks to protectionism, it arrived directly at trusts and monopolies. The German economy cannot be returned to a "healthy" past, for the simple reason that such a past never existed.

"National Socialism" promises to revise the Treaty of Versailles in its own way, which practically means continuing the offensive of Hohenzollern imperialism. At the same time, it wants to lead Germany toward autarky, that is, down the path of provincialism and self-limitation. The lion's roars here mask the psychology of a beaten dog. Trying to adapt German capitalism to its national borders is like trying to treat a man by amputating his right hand, his left foot, and part of his skull.

Curing capitalism with a planned economy means eliminating competition. In that case, one would have to begin by abolishing private ownership of the means of production. Reformers, bureaucrats, and learned professors have never even dared to imagine it. The German economy is anything but purely German : it is an integral part of the world economy. A German plan is conceivable only within the framework of an international economic plan. Planning limited to the national level would amount to abandoning the world economy, that is, it would mark an attempt to return to a system of autarky.

These three schools of thought, which are in conflict with one another, are in fact united, for they are all trapped in the vicious cycle of reactionary utopianism. What deserves to be saved is not German capitalism, but the Germany of its capitalism.

During the years of crisis, the German bourgeoisie, or at least its theorists, engaged in speeches of contrition : they claimed to have pursued a far too risky policy, taken out foreign loans quite recklessly, and developed industrial infrastructure without due consideration ; in the future, they would have to be more cautious. Today, even more so than in the past, the upper echelons of the German bourgeoisie are proponents of economic adventures, as evidenced by Papen's program and the attitude of finance capital toward it.

At the first signs of industrial revival, the behavior of German capitalism will conform to its historical past, not to the pious wishes of liberal moralists. Profit-hungry entrepreneurs will once again crank up the steam, heedless of the pressure gauge. The hunt for foreign credit will resume its feverish character. Reduced opportunities for expansion ? All the more reason to develop monopolies. The world, gripped by fear, will witness the return of the previous period, but in the form of even more violent convulsions. Simultaneously, the resurgence of German militarism will proceed at full speed, as if the years 1914-1918 had never happened. The German bourgeoisie will once again place barons from east of the Elbe at the head of the nation. These barons are even more inclined to risk the country's future under the banner of Bonapartism than under that of the legitimate monarchy.

In their moments of clarity, the leaders of German social democracy must ask themselves : by what miracle does our party, after all it has done, continue to unite millions of workers ? The conservatism inherent in any mass organization certainly plays a significant role. Several generations of proletarians have passed through the political school of social democracy, creating a strong tradition. However, this is not the primary cause of the vitality of reformism. Workers cannot simply abandon social democracy, despite all the crimes of that party : they must be able to educate themselves through another party. Yet, for the past nine years, the German Communist Party, through its leadership, has truly done everything in its power to alienate the masses from it or, at the very least, to prevent them from rallying around the Communist Party.

The capitulationist policy of Stalin and Brandler in 1923 ; the ultra-left zigzag of Maslow, Ruth Fischer, and Thälmann from 1924 to 1925 ; the purely opportunistic servility to social democracy from 1926 to 1928 ; the adventures of the "third period" from 1928 to 1930 ; the theory and practice of "social fascism" and "national liberation" from 1930 to 1932—these are the terms of the equation. Their sum totals : Hindenburg, Papen, Schleicher, and company.

The capitalist path offers no way out for the German people. This is the essential strength of the Communist Party.

The example of the Soviet Union shows that the socialist path is a possible solution. This is where the second source of strength of the Communist Party lies.

However, due to the conditions under which the isolated proletarian state developed, a national and opportunistic bureaucracy took control of the Soviet Union—a bureaucracy that does not believe in world revolution, defends its independence against it, and at the same time retains unlimited power over the Communist International. This is where the greatest misfortune lies for the German and international proletariat.

The situation in Germany seems designed to allow the Communist Party to win over the majority of workers in a short period of time. But the Communist Party should simply understand that it currently represents only a minority of the proletariat and commit itself firmly to the united front strategy. Instead, the Communist Party has adopted a tactic that can be summarized as follows : to prevent German workers from waging economic struggles, resisting fascism, seizing the weapon of the general strike, or creating Soviets, as long as the proletariat does not recognize the leading role of the Communist Party a priori. Political tasks are thus transformed into ultimatums.

Where does this deplorable method come from ? The answer lies in the policies of the Stalinist faction in the Soviet Union. There, the apparatus transformed political leadership into a series of administrative orders. By preventing workers from discussing, criticizing, or voting, the Stalinist bureaucracy effectively spoke to them in the language of ultimatums. Thälmann's policy is an attempt to translate Stalinism into poor German. There is, however, a difference : the USSR bureaucracy has the state power it received from the October Revolution to carry out its diktat policies ; Thälmann, on the other hand, has only the formal authority of the Soviet Union to lend weight to his ultimatum. This is significant moral support which, while sufficient under current conditions to silence communist workers, is not enough to win over social-democratic workers. But it is precisely on the solution to this latter task that the fate of the German revolution now depends.

Following on from the author's previous works, devoted to the politics of the German proletariat, this booklet attempts to study the problems of revolutionary politics in Germany in its new stage.

Prinkipo, September 13, 1932.

1. Bonapartism and Fascism

Let's try to briefly review what happened and where we stand.

It was thanks to social democracy that the Brüning government obtained parliamentary support to govern through exceptional laws. The social-democratic leaders declared : "In this way, we will block fascism's path to power." The Stalinist bureaucracy responded : "No, fascism has already won ; the Brüning regime is fascism." Both statements were false. The social democrats sought to portray their retreat from fascism as a struggle against it. The Stalinists presented the situation as if the victory of fascism was a foregone conclusion. The fighting spirit of the proletariat was being undermined on both sides, facilitating and hastening the enemy's victory.

In the past, we characterized the Brüning government as Bonapartist (as a "caricature of Bonapartism"), that is, as a military-police dictatorship. When the struggle between the two camps of society—between the haves and the have-nots, between the exploiters and the exploited—reaches its peak, the conditions for the domination of the bureaucracy, the police, and the army are created. The government becomes independent of society. Let us recall this once again : if you symmetrically push two forks into a cork, it can balance even on a pinhead. A government of this type does not, of course, cease to be the servant of the haves. But the servant then sits on his master's back, hammers the back of his neck, and doesn't hesitate, on occasion, to wipe his shoes on his master's face.

It could have been assumed that Brüning would remain in power until the very end. But during the course of events, a new link was added : the Papen government. To be precise, we must correct our earlier definition : the Brüning government was a pre-Bonapartist government. Brüning was merely a precursor. Bonapartism in its fully developed form entered the scene with the Papen-Schleicher government.

What was the difference ? Brüning swore there was no greater happiness than "serving" Hindenburg and Paragraph 48. With his fist, Hitler "supported" Brüning on the right. But Brüning leaned his left elbow on Wels's shoulder. In the Reichstag, Brüning found a majority that exempted him from having to take the Reichstag into account.

The more independent Brüning became from Parliament, the more the top of the bureaucracy felt independent of Brüning and the political groups behind him. The final step was to sever the link with the Reichstag. The Von Papen government emerged as a miracle of bureaucratic immaculate conception. It rests its right elbow on Hitler's shoulder. With its policeman's fist, it defends itself against the proletariat on its left. This is the secret of its stability—that is, the reason it didn't fall the very day it appeared.

The Brüning government was clerical, bureaucratic, and police-state in character. The Reichswehr remained in reserve. The "Iron Front" served as the direct support for order. The elimination of this dependence on the "Iron Front" was the essential reason for Hindenburg and Papen's coup. On this occasion, the generals automatically found themselves in the leading positions.

The Social Democratic leaders paid the price for the operation. This is what happens to them in times of social crisis. These scheming petty bourgeois appear to be clear-headed when intelligence isn't required. Today, they hide under their covers at night. They break out in a cold sweat and hope for a miracle : perhaps they'll manage not only to save their own skins but also their comfortable furniture and their innocent little savings. But there will be no miracle...

Unfortunately, the Communist Party, too, was completely caught off guard by events. The Stalinist bureaucracy had foreseen nothing. Now, Thälmann, Remmele, and others are constantly talking about the "coup of July 20th." But how is this possible ? They previously claimed that fascism was already here, and that only Trotskyist counter-revolutionaries could speak of it in the future tense. But it now turns out that to go from Brüning to Papen—not to Hitler, but only to Papen—required a genuine "coup." The "class content" of Severing, Brüning, and Hitler "is the same," these sages had taught us. So where did the coup come from, and what was its purpose ?

But the confusion doesn't end there. Although the difference between Bonapartism and fascism is now sufficiently clear, Thälmann, Remmele, and company speak of the fascist coup of July 20th. At the same time, they warn the workers of the imminent danger of a coup by Hitler—that is, another fascist coup. Finally, social democracy is still labeled social-fascist. The unfolding events thus boil down to the fact that different varieties of "fascism" seize power from one another through "fascist" coups. Isn't it clear that the entire Stalinist theory was specifically designed to block people's minds ?

The Papen government's entry onto the scene produced an impression of strength all the greater because the workers were less prepared for it (total disregard for political parties, new emergency laws, dissolution of the Reichstag, repressive measures, martial law in the capital, and the dismantling of Prussian-style democracy). You kill a lion with bullets ; you crush a flea with a fingernail ; as for the Social Democratic ministers, you eliminate them with a flick of the nose.

Despite its appearance of concentrated strength, the Papen government, "in itself," is even weaker than its predecessor. A Bonapartist regime can only be stable and long-lasting if it brings to an end a revolutionary period, when the balance of power has been tested in confrontations, when the revolutionary classes are exhausted, while the propertied classes are not yet freed from their terror : will tomorrow not bring new upheavals ? Without this fundamental condition, that is, without the prior exhaustion of the masses' energy in the struggle, a Bonapartist regime is incapable of developing.

The barons, the capital magnates, and the bankers, through the Papen government, are attempting to secure their positions and businesses by means of the police and the regular army. The idea of handing over all power to Hitler, who relies on the greedy and unruly gangs of the petty bourgeoisie, is not at all appealing to them. Certainly, they do not doubt that Hitler will ultimately prove to be the docile instrument of their domination. But this implies upheaval, the risk of a long civil war, and significant overhead costs. It is true that fascism ultimately leads to a Bonapartist-style military-bureaucratic dictatorship, as the example of Italy demonstrates. But this requires several years, even in the case of total victory : in Germany, the time frame is longer than in Italy. It is clear that the propertied classes preferred a more economical path, that is to say the path of Schleicher, and not that of Hitler, not to mention the fact that Schleicher's preferences are for Schleicher himself.

The fact that the neutralization of the irreconcilable camps led to the existence of the Papen government in no way implies that the forces of the revolutionary proletariat and those of the reactionary petty bourgeoisie are equal in the balance of history. The entire problem is thus shifted to the political sphere. Social democracy paralyzes the proletariat by using the machinery of the Iron Front. Through its absurd policy of ultimacity, the Stalinist bureaucracy prevents the workers from choosing the revolutionary path. With proper leadership of the proletariat, fascism would have been annihilated, and Bonapartism would have found no crack through which to infiltrate. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The paralyzed power of the proletariat has given the Bonapartist clique its deceptive appearance of "power." This is the political formula of today.

The Papen government is merely the point of intersection of two great historical forces. Its personal influence is almost nil. This is why it cannot help but be frightened by its own posturing and feel dizzy before the void surrounding it. This, and this alone, explains why the government's actions are two-thirds cowardice and one-third audacity. With respect to Prussia, that is, the Social Democrats, the government was playing a winning hand every time : it knew these gentlemen would offer no resistance. It scheduled new elections after the dissolution of the Reichstag but did not dare postpone them. After proclaiming martial law, it hastened to explain : this was solely to facilitate a capitulation without a fight by the Social Democratic leaders.

But there is the Reichswehr ! We are not inclined to forget it. Engels defined the state as bands of armed men with material appendages, such as prisons, etc. Regarding the power of the current government, one could even say that only the Reichswehr truly exists. But the Reichswehr is by no means a submissive and reliable instrument in the hands of the group of individuals, at whose head is Papen. In fact, the government is more like a political commission attached to the Reichswehr.

Despite its overwhelming influence over the government, the Reichswehr could not claim to play an autonomous political role. One hundred thousand soldiers, however cohesive and battle-hardened (and this remains to be seen), could not command a nation of 65 million people torn apart by profound social divisions. The Reichswehr would be merely one element, and moreover, a non-decisive one, in the struggle between social forces.

In its own way, the new Reichstag reflects quite well the country's political situation, which led to the Bonapartist experiment. This parliament without a majority, with its irreconcilable factions, is a concrete and irrefutable argument in favor of dictatorship. The limits of democracy are once again laid bare. Where the very foundations of society are at stake, parliamentary arithmetic solves nothing. It is struggle that decides.

We will not attempt to predict from afar the path that the government's attempts at patching things up will take in the coming days. Our assumptions are, in any case, lagging behind reality, and the possible transitional forms and combinations will not solve the problem. A right-wing alliance with the center would imply the "legalization" of the National Socialists' rise to power, that is, it would provide the most convenient cover for a fascist coup. The type of power dynamic that would initially emerge between Hitler, Schleicher, and the center-right leaders is a more significant problem for them than for the German people. Every conceivable political combination with Hitler means the absorption of the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the police, and the army into fascism.

If we accept that the center will not enter into a coalition, where a break with its own workers would be the price of its role as a brake on Hitler's engine, then only the openly extra-parliamentary path remains. A coalition without the center will ensure the National Socialists' dominance even more easily and quickly. If the latter do not immediately come to an understanding with Papen and do not immediately launch an open offensive, the Bonapartist character of the government will become even more apparent : Von Schleicher will have his "hundred days"... but without the preceding Napoleonic years.

One hundred days—no, we are, it seems, being too generous. The Reichswehr does not decide. Schleicher is not enough. Only the methods of a long and merciless civil war can ensure the extra-parliamentary dictatorship of the Junkers and the magnates of finance capital. Will Hitler be able to accomplish this task ? That depends not only on the good or ill will of fascism, but also on the revolutionary will of the proletariat.

2. Bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and proletariat

Any serious analysis of the political situation must start from the relationships existing between the three classes : the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie (including the peasantry) and the proletariat.

The upper bourgeoisie, powerful from an economic point of view, represents, taken in itself, only a tiny minority. To consolidate its domination, it must maintain well-defined relationships with the petty bourgeoisie and, through the latter, with the proletariat.

To understand the dialectic of these relations, it is necessary to distinguish three historical stages : the dawn of capitalist development, when the bourgeoisie, in order to fulfill its mission, needed revolutionary methods ; the flourishing and maturity of the capitalist regime, when the bourgeoisie gave its domination orderly, peaceful, conservative and democratic forms ; and finally the decline of capitalism, when the bourgeoisie is forced, in order to defend its right to exploitation, to resort to civil war against the proletariat.

The political programs characteristic of these three stages—Jacobinism, reformist democracy (including social democracy), and fascism—are, in their essence, the programs of petty-bourgeois currents. This circumstance alone demonstrates the enormous, indeed decisive, importance of the political self-determination of the petty-bourgeois strata for the fate of bourgeois society as a whole !

However, the relationship between the bourgeoisie and its main social base is by no means founded on mutual trust and peaceful collaboration. The petty bourgeoisie, as a whole, is an exploited and humiliated class. It envies the upper bourgeoisie and often hates it. Furthermore, while the bourgeoisie relies on the support of the petty bourgeoisie, it does not trust it, for it always fears, quite rightly, that the latter might overstep the boundaries established for it.

By purging the land and paving the way for the development of the bourgeoisie, the Jacobins were constantly in acute conflict with it. They served the bourgeoisie while simultaneously waging a relentless struggle against it. Having fulfilled their limited historical mission, the Jacobins fell, for the domination of capital was predetermined.

Through a series of steps, the bourgeoisie consolidated its power in the form of parliamentary democracy. Again, this was neither peaceful nor willing. The bourgeoisie was mortally afraid of the right to universal suffrage. Finally, by combining repressive measures with concessions, the lash of deprivation with reforms, it subjugated, within the framework of formal democracy, not only the old petty bourgeoisie, but also, to a large extent, the proletariat through the intermediary of the new petty bourgeoisie—the labor bureaucracy. In August 1914, the imperialist bourgeoisie succeeded, through parliamentary democracy, in leading tens of millions of workers and peasants to the slaughter.

It was the war that clearly marked the beginning of the decline of capitalism and, above all, of the democratic form of its domination. From then on, there was no longer any question of new reforms or handouts, but rather of chipping away at and reversing what had already been granted. The political domination of the bourgeoisie thus came into conflict not only with the organs of proletarian democracy (trade unions and political parties), but also with the parliamentary democracy within which workers' organizations had been formed. Hence the crusade against Marxism on the one hand, and against democratic parliamentarism on the other.

In the past, the leading figures of the liberal bourgeoisie proved incapable of overcoming the monarchy, the feudal lords, and the Church on their own ; similarly, the magnates of finance capital cannot overcome the proletariat on their own. The support of the petty bourgeoisie is indispensable. To this end, it is necessary to alert, mobilize, rehabilitate, and arm it. But this period presents dangers. While utilizing it, the bourgeoisie fears fascism. In May 1926, Piłsudsky was forced to save bourgeois society through a coup d'état directed against the traditional parties of the Polish bourgeoisie. The affair went so far that the official leader of the Polish Communist Party, Varsky, who had moved from Rosa Luxemburg's positions to Stalin's and not Lenin's, took Pilsudsky's coup as the path to "revolutionary democratic dictatorship" and called on the workers to support Pilsudsky.

During the meeting of the Polish commission of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, the author of these lines stated the following regarding the events in Poland :

Overall, Pilsudsky's coup appears as a petty-bourgeois, "plebeian" way of resolving the urgent tasks of a bourgeois society on the verge of collapse. This clearly aligns it with Italian fascism.
These two movements undeniably share common traits : their shock troops were recruited primarily from the petty bourgeoisie ; Pilsudsky, like Mussolini, acted using extra-parliamentary, openly violent means and the methods of civil war ; both sought not to overthrow bourgeois society, but rather to save it. While initially they revitalized the petty-bourgeois masses, they allied themselves with the upper bourgeoisie after coming to power. In this regard, a historical generalization involuntarily comes to mind, for which we must recall Marx's definition of Jacobinism as a plebeian means of overcoming the feudal enemies of the bourgeoisie... This was during the rise of the bourgeoisie. It must now be said that, in the era of the bourgeoisie's decline, the latter again needs "plebeian" methods to solve its tasks, which are no longer progressive but entirely reactionary. And, in this sense, fascism is a caricature of Jacobinism...
"The decadent bourgeoisie is incapable of maintaining itself in power by the methods and means of the parliamentary state it has built ; fascism, as an instrument of self-defense, is necessary for it, at least in the most critical moments. But the bourgeoisie does not like this 'plebeian' way of solving its problems. It displays a very great hostility toward Jacobinism, which paved the way in blood for the development of bourgeois society. Fascists are infinitely closer to the decadent bourgeoisie than Jacobins are to the rising bourgeoisie. But the well-established bourgeoisie does not like the fascist way of solving its problems, because upheavals, even in the interests of bourgeois society, are not without risks for it. Hence the antagonism between fascism and the traditional parties of the bourgeoisie...
" The great The bourgeoisie doesn't appreciate fascist methods, just as a man with a sore jaw doesn't like having his teeth pulled. The respectable circles of bourgeois society viewed dentist Pilsudsky's practices with hatred, but ultimately they submitted to the inevitable, albeit with threats, bargaining, and backroom deals. And so, yesterday's idol of the petty bourgeoisie has transformed into the policeman of capital.

To this attempt to define the historical place of fascism as a political offshoot of social democracy, the official leadership opposed the theory of social-fascism. In the early days, it might have appeared as a foolish, albeit pretentious and bombastic, but harmless, notion. Subsequent events showed what a disastrous influence Stalinist theory exerted on the development of the Communist International [1].

Must we conclude from the historical roles of Jacobinism, democracy, and fascism that the petty bourgeoisie is condemned to remain, until the end of its days, an instrument in the hands of capital ? If this were so, the dictatorship of the proletariat would be impossible in a number of countries where the petty bourgeoisie constitutes the majority of the nation, and rendered extremely difficult in other countries where the petty bourgeoisie constitutes a respectable minority. Fortunately, this is not the case. The experience of the Paris Commune, at least within the confines of a single city, and then the experience of the October Revolution, on an infinitely larger scale in time and space, proved that the alliance between the petty and the large bourgeoisie is not eternal. If the petty bourgeoisie is incapable of conducting an independent policy (and it is particularly for this reason that a petty bourgeois "democratic dictatorship" is unrealizable), it has no choice but to choose between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

During the rise, growth, and flourishing of capitalism, the petty bourgeoisie, despite violent outbursts of discontent, remained relatively docilely harnessed to the capitalist system. Indeed, it was the only thing it had to do. But in the conditions of decaying capitalism, in an economic dead end, the petty bourgeoisie yearns, attempts, and tries to break free from the tutelage of the former masters and leaders of society. It is quite capable of linking its fate to that of the proletariat. For this to happen, only one thing is necessary : the petty bourgeoisie must be convinced of the proletariat's capacity to lead society onto a new path. The proletariat can inspire such confidence only through its strength, its assertiveness in action, a bold offensive against the enemy, and the success of its revolutionary policies.

But woe betide the revolutionary party if it fails to rise to the occasion ! The daily struggle of the proletariat exacerbates the instability of bourgeois society. Strikes and political unrest worsen the country's economic situation. The petty bourgeoisie might resign itself, for the time being, to increasing hardships if its experience proved that the proletariat is capable of extricating it from its present situation and leading it onto a new path. But if the revolutionary party, despite the constant intensification of the class struggle, continues to prove incapable of rallying the proletariat around itself, agitates in vain, sows confusion, and contradicts itself, then the petty bourgeoisie loses patience and begins to see the workers as responsible for its own misfortunes. All the bourgeois parties, including the Social Democrats, strive to persuade it of this. And when the crisis reaches an unbearable level of severity, a party steps forward, with the stated aim of inciting the petty bourgeoisie to a fever pitch and directing its hatred and despair against the proletariat. In Germany, this historical function is fulfilled by National Socialism, a broad movement whose ideology is formed from all the putrid emanations of decaying bourgeois society.

The fundamental political responsibility for the rise of fascism obviously falls on social democracy. Since the imperialist war, this party's policy has been to erase the idea of independent politics from the proletariat's consciousness, to convince them of the eternal nature of capitalism, and to bring them to their knees before the decaying bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie may side with the workers if they see in them a new master.

Social democracy teaches the worker to behave like a lackey. The petty bourgeoisie will not follow a lackey. The policy of reformism deprives the proletariat of any possibility of leading the plebeian masses of the petty bourgeoisie and, by the same token, transforms the latter into cannon fodder for fascism.

For us, the responsibility of social democracy does not exhaust the political problem. Since the beginning of the war, we have characterized this party as the representative of the imperialist bourgeoisie within the proletariat.

This new orientation of revolutionary Marxists gave birth to the Third International. Its task was to unite the proletariat under the banner of the revolution and thereby ensure it a leading influence over the oppressed masses of the petty bourgeoisie in towns and the countryside.

The postwar period was marked, in Germany more than anywhere else, by an intractable economic situation and civil war. Both the international and domestic situations imperiously pushed Germany down the path of socialism. At every turn, social democracy revealed its internal emptiness and impotence, the reactionary nature of its policies, and the venality of its leaders. What more could the Communist Party possibly need to develop ? However, after significant successes in its early years, the German Communist Party entered a period of missteps and zigzags, where opportunism replaced adventurism. The centrist bureaucracy systematically weakened the vanguard of the proletariat, preventing it from rallying the class. In doing so, it deprived the proletariat as a whole of the possibility of drawing the oppressed masses of the petty bourgeoisie into its fold. The Stalinist bureaucracy bears a direct and immediate responsibility for the growth of fascism in the eyes of the vanguard of the proletariat.

3. Is social democracy an ally of fascism or its enemy ?

It is relatively simple to understand the relationships between classes in the form of a schema established once and for all. It is incomparably more difficult to correctly assess the concrete relationships between classes in each given situation.

Currently, the German upper class is hesitating ; this is a state that the upper class, generally speaking, rarely experiences. A segment of it has definitively decided that a fascist solution is inevitable and would like to hasten its implementation. Another segment hopes to resolve the situation through a Bonapartist, military-police dictatorship. In this latter camp, no one desires a return to the Weimar "democracy."

The petty bourgeoisie is divided. National Socialism, which has rallied the overwhelming majority of the middle classes under its banner, wants to seize all power. The democratic wing of the petty bourgeoisie, which continues to rally millions of workers, would like to return to a form of democracy like that of Ebert. In the meantime, it is prepared to support, at least passively, the Bonapartist dictatorship. The social-democratic calculation is as follows : under pressure from the Nazis, the Papen-Schleicher government will be forced to restore the balance by strengthening its left wing ; at the same time, the crisis may subside ; within the petty bourgeoisie, there may be a beginning of sobering up ; the bourgeoisie may cease to exploit the workers so relentlessly ; and everything will return to normal, God willing.

The Bonapartist clique does not, in fact, desire a total victory for fascism. It has nothing against using, within certain limits, the support of social democracy. But for this to happen, it must "tolerate" workers' organizations, which is only possible on the condition of accepting the legal existence of the Communist Party, at least to some extent. Moreover, the support given by social democracy to the military dictatorship will inevitably drive the workers into the arms of the Communist Party. In seeking support against the brown plague, the government will quickly find itself under attack from the red devils.

The official communist press argues that social democracy, by tolerating Brüning, paved the way for Papen, and that half-heartedly tolerating Papen hastened Hitler's rise. This is entirely true. On this point, we have no disagreement with the Stalinists. But it also means that in a time of social crisis, the policy of reformism strikes not only the masses, but reformism itself. And today, we have reached a critical juncture in this process.

Hitler tolerates Schleicher. Social democracy cannot resist Papen. If this situation were to become entrenched for a long time, social democracy would then become the left wing of Bonapartism, leaving fascism to play the role of the right wing. Theoretically, it is not impossible that the current, unprecedented crisis of German capitalism will not lead to a decisive solution, that is to say, that it will end neither with the victory of the proletariat nor with the triumph of the fascist counter-revolution. If the Communist Party pursues its policy of stubborn ultimacity and thus saves social democracy from inevitable collapse ; if Hitler does not decide, in the following days, to stage a coup d'état and thus provoke the inevitable disintegration of his own ranks ; If the economic situation improves before Schleicher falls, then the combination of paragraph 48 of the Weimar constitution, the Reichswehr, social democracy half in opposition and fascism also half in opposition, might perhaps be maintained (until a new social shock which, in any case, cannot be long in coming).

For now, we are still far from that fortunate confluence of circumstances that fuels the dreams of social democracy. It is by no means guaranteed. Even the Stalinists seem not to believe in the longevity and stability of the Papen-Schleicher regime. Everything suggests that the Wels-Schleicher-Hitler triangle will collapse before it even has a chance to form.

But perhaps he will be replaced by the Wels-Hitler combination ? According to Stalin, they are "twins, not antipodes." Let's assume that Social Democracy, without fearing the reaction of its workers, decides to sell its tolerance to Hitler. But fascism has no need of this commodity : what it needs is not the tolerance of Social Democracy but its liquidation. Hitler's government can only accomplish its task after crushing the resistance of the proletariat and liquidating any possible organs of that resistance. Such is the historical function of fascism. The Stalinists limit themselves to a psychological, or more precisely, moral assessment of the cowardly and greedy petty bourgeois who lead Social Democracy. Can one imagine, they say, that these notorious traitors will break away from the fascist bourgeoisie and oppose it ? Such a non-dialectical method has little in common with Marxism, which starts not from people's self-awareness or what they want, but primarily from the conditions in which they are placed and the changing of those conditions.

Social democracy supports the bourgeois regime not because of the profits of the coal and iron magnates, but because of the revenue it possesses as a party, in the person of its powerful and extensive apparatus. Certainly, fascism poses no threat whatsoever to the bourgeois regime, which social democracy safeguards. But fascism is a threat to the role social democracy plays within the bourgeois regime and, consequently, to the revenue it receives in return. While the Stalinists overlook this aspect of the matter, social democracy never loses sight of the mortal danger that a fascist victory represents for itself—not for the bourgeoisie, but for itself precisely.

When we indicated, about three years ago, that the starting point of the next crisis in Austria and Germany would, in all likelihood, be the irreconcilable antagonism between social democracy and fascism ; when, on this basis, we rejected the theory of social fascism, which, far from highlighting this imminent conflict, actually obscured it ; when we announced that social democracy, including a significant part of its apparatus, could, through the course of events, be drawn into the struggle against fascism and that this would create a favorable starting position for the Communist Party for a subsequent offensive, a great many communists—not only paid officials but also quite sincere revolutionaries—accused us of idealizing social democracy. All that remained was to remain passive. It is difficult to argue with people whose thinking stops there, where, for a Marxist, the problem is only just beginning.

In discussions, I have sometimes given the following example : the Jewish bourgeoisie in Tsarist Russia constituted the most fearful and demoralized segment of the entire Russian bourgeoisie. And yet, insofar as the pogroms of the Black Hundreds, though directed primarily against poor Jews, also affected them, they were forced to resort to self-defense. Admittedly, they did not display remarkable bravery in this regard. But with this danger hanging over their heads, liberal Jewish bourgeois, for example, raised substantial sums to arm revolutionary students and workers. Thus, a temporary, practical agreement was reached between the most revolutionary workers, ready to fight with weapons in hand, and the most terrified segment of the bourgeoisie, which had sunk into despair.

Last year, I wrote that in the struggle against fascism, communists should be prepared to make a practical deal not only with the devil and his grandmother but also with Grzesinsky. This sentence circulated widely in the Stalinist press worldwide : could there be better proof of the "social-fascism" of the Left Opposition ? Some comrades had warned me : "They will seize upon this sentence." I replied : "This sentence is written precisely so that they will seize upon it. Let them take a red-hot iron and burn their fingers ! Fools must be taught a lesson." The course of the struggle led Von Papen to imprison Grzesinsky. Did this episode fit with the theory of social-fascism and the predictions of the Stalinist bureaucracy ? No, it was in complete contradiction with them. However, our assessment of the situation fully accepted such a possibility and assigned it a specific place.

But social democracy refused to fight once again, a Stalinist will retort. Yes, it refused. Anyone who believed that social democracy would engage in the struggle independently, at the initiative of its leaders, and moreover, under conditions where the Communist Party itself was incapable of engaging in the fight, could only be disappointed. We did not expect such a miracle. Therefore, social democracy could not "disappoint" us.

We readily believe that Grzesinsky did not transform into a revolutionary tiger. However, isn't the situation where Grzesinsky, from his fortress, sent detachments of police to defend "democracy" against revolutionary workers quite different from the situation where the Bonapartist savior of capitalism sent the same Grzesinsky to prison ? And shouldn't we appreciate and use this difference politically ?

To return to the example given above, it is not difficult to see a difference between the Jewish manufacturer tipping the Tsarist sergeants who massacre the striking workers in his factory, and that same manufacturer secretly giving the money to yesterday's strikers to buy weapons against the organizers of pogroms. A bourgeois remains a bourgeois. But a change in circumstances leads to a change in attitude. The Bolsheviks led the strike against the manufacturer. Subsequently, they accepted money from that same manufacturer to fight against the pogroms.

Does all that we have said mean that social democracy as a whole will lead the struggle against fascism ? To this we reply : a portion of social-democratic officials will undoubtedly join the fascist camp ; a significant portion will hide under their beds when danger strikes. And a large part of the working class will not participate in the struggle. It is entirely impossible to predict which portion of the social-democratic workers will be drawn into the struggle, at what precise moment, and which part of the apparatus they will draw in after them. This depends on a great many circumstances, including the Communist Party's mode of action. The united front policy serves to separate those who want to fight from those who do not ; to push forward those who hesitate ; and finally, to compromise the capitulating leaders in the eyes of the workers, thereby increasing the workers' militancy.

How much time has been wasted, needlessly, absurdly, shamefully ! And how much could have been accomplished, even in just these last two years ! Long beforehand, it was clear that monopolistic capital and its fascist army would, with fists and clubs, force social democracy into opposition and self-defense. This prediction had to be demonstrated to the entire working class, the initiative of the united front had to be taken and maintained at every new stage. Shouts and howls were useless. A sure-fire victory could be achieved. It was enough to formulate clearly and precisely what the enemy would inevitably do and to develop a practical united front program without exaggeration or empty appeals, but also without weakness or concessions. What a high position the German Communist Party would occupy today if it had assimilated the ABCs of Leninist politics and applied them with the necessary firmness.
4. Thälmann's Twenty-One Mistakes

In mid-July, a pamphlet appeared containing Thälmann's answers to twenty-one questions from Social Democratic workers on how to create a "united red front." The pamphlet begins with the words : "The anti-fascist united front is gaining powerful momentum !" On July 20, the Communist Party called on workers to stage a political strike. The call went unheeded. Thus, in the space of five days, the chasm separating fine bureaucratic rhetoric from political reality was revealed.

The party obtained 5,300,000 votes in the July 31 elections. By celebrating this result as a resounding victory, the party demonstrated how much the defeat had diminished its hopes and ambitions. In the first round of the presidential elections, the party had garnered nearly 5,000,000 votes. It thus gained only 300,000 votes in four and a half months—and what months they were ! In March, the communist press tirelessly repeated that the number of votes would have been incomparably greater had it been a Reichstag election, hundreds of thousands of sympathizers considering the presidential elections pointless as a "platonic" exercise. If we take this March commentary into consideration—and it deserves it—it follows that the party, in its last four months, has grown virtually nothing.

In April, the Social Democrats elected Hindenburg, who then staged a coup d'état directly against them. One might have thought that this single event would be enough to shake the very foundations of reformism. Then came the further worsening of the crisis with all its terrible consequences. Finally, on July 20, eleven days before the elections, the Social Democrats retreated ignominiously, tail between their legs, in the face of the coup d'état by the Reich President they had elected. In such times, revolutionary parties experience feverish growth. Whatever it undertakes, the Social Democrats only push the workers further away, to its left. Instead of advancing with seven-league boots, the Communist Party flounders, hesitates, retreats, and for every step forward, takes half a step back. If the party is crying victory, solely because it did not lose any votes on July 31, it means that it has definitively lost touch with reality.

To understand why and how, under extraordinarily favorable conditions, this revolutionary party condemned itself to shameful impotence, one must read Thälmann's replies to the Social Democratic workers. It is a tedious and thankless task, but one that can shed light on what was going on in the minds of the Stalinist leaders.

Thälmann offers several contradictory answers to the question : "What is the communists' assessment of the Papen government ?" He begins by pointing out the "danger of the immediate establishment of a fascist dictatorship." So it doesn't exist yet ? He quite aptly refers to the members of the government as "representatives of the capitalists, the trusts, the generals, and the Junkers." A moment later, speaking of this same government, he calls it "the fascist cabinet" and concludes by stating that "the Papen government has set itself the objective of the immediate establishment of a fascist dictatorship."

By ignoring the social and political differences between Bonapartism—that is, a regime of "sacred union" founded on a military-police dictatorship—and fascism—that is, a regime of open civil war against the proletariat—Thälmann deprives himself of any possibility of understanding what is happening before his very eyes. If the Papen cabinet is a fascist cabinet, what fascist "danger" can there still be ? If the workers believe Thälmann when he claims that Papen has set himself the objective (!) of establishing a fascist dictatorship, the party will miss the highly probable conflict between Hitler and Papen-Schleicher, just as happened in the past with the conflict between Papen and Otto Braun.

To the question, "Does the Communist Party sincerely envision a united front ?", Thälmann naturally answers in the affirmative and offers as proof the fact that the communists are not making any approaches to Hindenburg and Papen. "No," he says, "we are raising the issue of struggle, the struggle against the entire system, against capitalism. And that is the most serious guarantee of our sincerity regarding a united front." Thälmann clearly doesn't understand what this is about. Social-democratic workers remain social democrats precisely because they still believe in the progressive, reformist path of transition from capitalism to socialism. Since they know that the communists advocate the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, the social-democratic workers ask : Is your proposal for a united front sincere ? And Thälmann replies : Of course, we are sincere, because for us it is a matter of overthrowing the entire capitalist system.

It goes without saying that we are not trying to hide anything from the social-democratic workers. But in every case, one must know how far one can go and maintain a sense of political realities. Any skilled propagandist would have replied : "You are betting everything on democracy ; we believe that revolution is the only way out. However, we cannot and will not carry out the revolution without you. Hitler is now our common enemy. After we have crushed Hitler, we will take stock together and consider what real next steps to take."

The interlocutors—odd as it may seem at first glance—not only show indulgence toward the speaker, but they approve of him on several occasions. The secret to this indulgence lies in the fact that Thälmann's interlocutors not only belong to the Anti-Fascist Action movement but also encourage workers to vote for the Communist Party of Germany. These are former members who have rallied to communism. Such recruits can only be warmly welcomed. However, passing off an explanation to workers who have broken with social democracy as an explanation to the social-democratic masses clearly reveals the fraudulent nature of the undertaking. This cheap charade is entirely characteristic of the current policies of Thälmann and his associates.

In any case, the former Social Democrats are asking questions that truly resonate with the Social Democratic masses : "Is Anti-Fascist Action an annex of the Communist Party ?" "No," Thälmann replies. "The proof ? Anti-Fascist Action is not an organization but a mass movement." As if organizing the mass movement weren't the Communist Party's direct task. But the second argument is even better : Anti-Fascist Action is supposedly above parties because (!) it is directed against the capitalist state : "Karl Marx, already drawing lessons from the Paris Commune, placed the destruction of the bourgeois state apparatus at the forefront of the tasks of the working class." Oh ! What an unfortunate quote ! The Social Democrats want—despite Marx—to improve the bourgeois state, not destroy it. They are not communists but reformists. Inadvertently, Thälmann demonstrates precisely what he sought to refute : the "Anti-Fascist Action" is a party subsidiary. Clearly, the official leader of the Communist Party understands neither the situation nor the political thinking of the social-democratic worker. He fails to grasp the rationale for the united front. Every word he utters is a weapon for the reformist leaders and pushes the social-democratic workers toward them.

Thälmann demonstrates the impossibility of any joint action with social democracy in the following way : "Furthermore, we (?) must clearly recognize that even if social democracy is currently showing a semblance of opposition, it will never renounce its own coalition plans, nor the idea of making a pact with the fascist bourgeoisie." Even if this were true, it would still need to be demonstrated concretely to the social-democratic workers. But this is false. Even if the social-democratic leaders have not abandoned the idea of making pacts with the bourgeoisie, the fascist bourgeoisie refuses to make a pact with social democracy. And this fact may be decisive for the fate of social democracy. During the transfer of power from Papen to Hitler, the bourgeoisie will in no way be able to spare social democracy from its fate. Civil war has its own rules. The domination of fascist terror can only mean the liquidation of social democracy. Mussolini began precisely this way, so he could more freely crush revolutionary workers. In any case, the "social fascists" are determined to survive. This is the most realistic policy and, at the same time, the most revolutionary in its consequences.

If, on the other hand, social democracy never separates itself from the fascist bourgeoisie (even though Matteotti did separate himself from Mussolini), shouldn't social-democratic workers who want to participate in the Anti-Fascist Action leave their party ? This is one of the questions posed. Thälmann replies : "It goes without saying for us communists that social-democratic workers or members of the Reich Banner can participate in the Anti-Fascist Action without necessarily leaving their party." And to clearly demonstrate his lack of any sectarian spirit, Thälmann continues : "If you join us by the millions, in close ranks, we will welcome you with joy, even if, in our opinion, there is still some confusion in your minds on certain points concerning the assessment of the German Social Democratic Party." Words of gold ! We consider your party fascist, you consider it democratic, but let's not quibble over details ! All you need to do is come to us "by the millions," without abandoning your fascist party. "Confusion on certain points" cannot be an obstacle. On the other hand, the confusion that reigns in the minds of the all-powerful bureaucrats is an obstacle at every turn.

To elaborate further, Thälmann adds : "We are not posing the problem on a party-by-party basis, but on a class-wide scale." Like Seydewitz, Thälmann is prepared to renounce party interests in the name of class interests. Unfortunately, for a Marxist, such a position is impossible. If his program were not the scientific expression of the working class's interests, the party would be worthless.

Aside from this gross error of principle, Thälmann's words also contain a practical absurdity. How can one avoid asking the question "from party to party," when that is precisely the crux of the matter ? Millions of workers follow social democracy. Millions more follow the Communist Party. To the question posed by social-democratic workers, "How can we achieve joint action between your party and our party against fascism ?", Thälmann responds "on a class level," not "on a party level" : "Join us by the millions !" Isn't that a rather pathetic display of rhetoric ? “We communists,” Thälmann continues, “do not want unity at any price. We cannot, in the interest of unity with social democracy, abandon the class content of our politics… and renounce strikes, the struggles of the unemployed, tenants' actions, and the revolutionary self-defense of the masses.” He substitutes the absurd unity with social democracy for an agreement on specific practical actions. In the name of the necessity of the revolutionary assault, he justifies the refusal to carry out joint strike and self-defense actions today. Whoever can make sense of Thälmann's thoughts deserves a prize.

The listeners pressed on : "Is an alliance between the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party to fight against the Papen government and fascism possible ?" Thälmann mentioned two or three facts to prove that social democracy was not fighting against fascism and continued :

"Every member of the Social Democratic Party agrees with us when we assert that an alliance between the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party is impossible based on these facts, but also for reasons of principle." The bureaucrat once again takes for granted precisely what should be proven. The ultimacity becomes particularly ridiculous when, to the question of a united front with organizations representing millions of workers, Thälmann replies : the Social Democrats must at least recognize that an agreement with their party is impossible because it is a fascist party. Could Leipart and Wels be rendered a greater service ?

"We communists, who want nothing in common with the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, tirelessly explain that we are ready, at any moment, to wage the anti-fascist struggle with our Social Democratic and Reich Banner comrades, as well as with the grassroots organizations that want to fight." Where do the grassroots organizations end ? And what if the grassroots organizations submit to the discipline of the higher authorities and propose to negotiate with them first ? Finally, there are intermediate levels between the grassroots organizations and the higher authorities. Can we predict where the dividing line will lie between those who want to fight and those who refuse to fight ? This can only be decided in practice, not in advance. What sense can there be in tying one's own hands and feet ?

A report in the Rote Fahne of July 29, devoted to the Reich Banner rallies, quotes these remarkable words from a Social Democratic section leader : "Today, the masses yearn for a united anti-fascist front. If the leaders do not heed this, I will join the united front over them." The communist newspaper reports these words without comment. Yet they provide the key to the entire united front tactic. This Social Democrat wants to fight alongside the communists against the fascists. He already doubts the goodwill of his leaders. If the leaders refuse, he says, I will go over them. Dozens, hundreds, thousands, millions of Social Democrats share this mindset. The task of the Communist Party is to show them in practice whether the Social Democratic leaders truly want to fight or not. And this can only be demonstrated through experience, a new experience in a new situation. This experience will not happen overnight. Social-democratic leaders must be tested in businesses and workshops, in cities and in the countryside, throughout the country, today and tomorrow. Their proposal must be reiterated, presented in a new form, from a fresh perspective, adapted to the new situation.

But Thälmann doesn't want to. Based on the "fundamental differences we have outlined between the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party, we reject any negotiation with the Social Democratic Party leadership." This argument is worth noting ; Thälmann repeats it several times. But if there were no "fundamental differences," there wouldn't be two parties. And if there weren't two parties, the question of a united front wouldn't arise. Thälmann is trying to prove too much. Less is more.

Doesn't the creation of the Red Trade Union Opposition (RGO) signify "a split within the organized working class ?" the workers ask. No, replies Thälmann, citing Engels' 1895 letter on sentimental and aesthetic philanthropists in support. Who is so maliciously feeding Thälmann quotations ? The RGO was supposedly created in a spirit of unity, not division. Moreover, workers should under no circumstances leave their unions to join the Red Trade Union Opposition. On the contrary, it would be preferable for RGO members to remain in the unions to carry out oppositional work. Thälmann's words must sound very convincing to the communists who have set themselves the task of fighting the Social Democratic leadership. But as a reply to the Social Democratic workers, concerned with trade union unity, Thälmann's words must sound like sarcasm. “Why did you abandon our unions and organize yourselves separately ?” the Social Democratic workers asked. “If you want to join our independent organization to fight against the Social Democratic leadership, we are not asking you to leave the unions,” Thälmann replied. It was a pointed response. “Does democracy exist within the Communist Party of Germany ?” the workers asked, changing the subject. Thälmann answered in the affirmative. And with good reason ? But immediately he continued in a completely unexpected manner : “Legally as well as illegally, especially illegally, the party must protect itself from spies, provocateurs, and agents sent by the police.” This digression was not accidental. The very recent doctrine, developed in a pamphlet by a mysterious Büchner, justified the rejection of democracy in the interest of fighting spies. Anyone who protested against the omnipotence of the Stalinist bureaucracy had to be considered, at the very least, suspect. Police officers and provocateurs from all countries are enthusiastic about this theory. They will bark louder than anyone else at the opposition, which will divert attention from themselves and allow them to fish in troubled waters.

The flourishing of democracy is also proven, according to Thälmann, by the fact that problems are addressed by "world congresses and conferences of the Executive Committee of the Communist International." The speaker neglects to mention the date of the last world congress. We can remind him : July 1928, more than four years ago. Since then, apparently, no issues worthy of attention have arisen. Why, incidentally, does Thälmann not convene an extraordinary party congress to resolve the problems upon which the fate of the German proletariat depends ? Certainly not out of excessive democracy within the party, is it ?

And the pages turn. Thälmann answers twenty-one questions. Each answer is a mistake. In total, twenty-one mistakes, not counting the minor and secondary errors. And there are many of those.

Thälmann recounts that the Bolsheviks broke with the Mensheviks as early as 1903. In fact, the split didn't occur until 1912. This didn't prevent the February 1917 revolution from finding Bolshevik and Menshevik organizations united in much of the country. As recently as April, Stalin was advocating a merger between the Bolsheviks and Tseretelli's party—not a united front, but a merger of the two parties. Only Lenin's arrival prevented this.

Thälmann states that the Bolsheviks dissolved the Constituent Assembly in 1917. In fact, this took place in early 1918. Thälmann is clearly unfamiliar with the history of the Russian Revolution and the Bolshevik Party.

But it is far more serious that he fails to grasp the fundamentals of Bolshevik tactics. In his "theoretical" articles, he even dares to dispute the fact that the Bolsheviks made a pact with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries against Kornilov. To support his claims, he provides quotations from who-knows-who, which have nothing to do with the matter. He neglects to answer the questions. Weren't there People's Defense Committees throughout the country during Kornilov's coup ? Did they lead the struggle against Kornilov ? Did representatives of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and Socialist Revolutionaries belong to these committees ? Yes, yes, yes. Were the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries in power at that time ? Were they persecuting the Bolsheviks as agents of the German General Staff ? Were there thousands of Bolsheviks in prisons at that time ? Was Lenin in hiding ? Yes, yes, yes. What quotes can refute these historical facts ?

Thälmann can refer to Manuilsky, Lozovsky, and Stalin (if the latter ever speaks). But he should leave Leninism and the history of the October Revolution alone ; for him, it's a book sealed seven times over.

In conclusion, we must raise another very important issue concerning the Treaty of Versailles. Social-democratic workers are asking whether the Communist Party is making political concessions to National Socialism. In his reply, Thälmann continues to defend the slogan of national liberation and places it on the same level as the slogan of social liberation. Reparations—or what remains of them today—are, for Thälmann, just as important as the private ownership of the means of production. This policy seems designed to divert the workers' attention from fundamental problems, to weaken the struggle against capitalism, and to force them to look for the main enemy and the root cause of their misery outside our borders. In fact, today more than ever, "the main enemy is within our own country !" Von Schleicher expressed this idea even more crudely : we must, above all, he explained on the radio on July 26, "get rid of these dogs within !" This soldier's phrase is excellent. We gladly adopt it. All communists should make it their own. When the Nazis divert attention to Versailles, revolutionary workers must respond with Schleicher's words : no, we must first get rid of these dogs within !
5. Stalin-Thälmann Policy in Practice

It is in critical moments, when far-reaching decisions must be made, that tactics are truly tested. The strength of Bolshevism lay in the fact that its slogans and methods proved true when events demanded bold decisions. What value can principles have if they must be abandoned as soon as the situation becomes critical ?

Realistic politics relies on the natural development of the class struggle. Sectarian politics tries to impose artificial rules on the class struggle. A revolutionary situation implies an extreme intensification of the class struggle. It is precisely for this reason that, in a revolutionary situation, the realistic politics of the Marxists exerts a powerful force of attraction on the masses. Conversely, sectarian politics has less force the greater the pressure of events. The Blanquists and Proudhonians, caught off guard by the movement of the Paris Commune, did the opposite of what they had always preached. During the Russian Revolution, the anarchists were still forced to recognize the Soviets as the organs of power, and so on.

The Communist International relies on the masses who, in the past, were won over to Marxism and whom the authority of the October Revolution united. But the policy of the Stalinist faction currently in leadership seeks to control the class struggle, instead of giving it political expression. This is the essence of bureaucracy, and in this respect, it resembles sectarianism, from which it is clearly distinguished by other characteristics. Thanks to a powerful apparatus, the material resources of the Soviet state, and the authority of the October Revolution, the Stalinist bureaucracy was able, during periods of relative calm, to impose artificial maxims of conduct on the vanguard of the proletariat. But, insofar as the class struggle is concentrated in the civil war, bureaucratic orders increasingly clash with harsh reality. Abrupt shifts in the real situation easily disconcert the proud and vain bureaucracy. When it cannot command, it capitulates. The policy of the Thälmannian Central Committee during the last few months will one day be studied as an example of the most pitiful and shameful confusion.

Since the "third period," the fact that any agreement with social democracy was out of the question had become an absolute dogma. Not only was it inadmissible to take the initiative for a united front, as the Third and Fourth Congresses had taught, but any proposal for joint action from social democracy also had to be rejected. The reformist leaders were "sufficiently unmasked." Past experience was enough. Instead of engaging in politics, the focus should be on teaching history to the masses. Making proposals to the reformists implied admitting that they were capable of fighting. That alone was already social-fascism. This deafening melody has been poured out by the ultra-left's barrel organ for the last three or four years. And then, on June 22nd, the Communist faction in the Prussian Parliament, to everyone's surprise, including its own, proposed an agreement with the Social Democrats and even with the Center Party. The same thing happened again in Hesse. Faced with the danger of the Parliament's presidency falling into Nazi hands, all sacrosanct principles were thrown to the devil. Is that surprising ? Isn't it appalling ?

But this mortal leap is not difficult to explain. It is well known that many superficial liberals and radicals joke all their lives about religion and heavenly powers, only to call the priest when faced with death or serious illness. The same is true in politics. The core of centrism is opportunism. Under the influence of external circumstances (tradition, mass pressure, political competition), centrism is forced, at certain times, to put on a leftist display. To do so, it must restrain itself and do violence to its political nature. By pushing itself to the limit, it often reaches the extreme of formal leftism. But as soon as a serious danger threatens, the true nature of centrism resurfaces. On a matter as crucial as the defense of the Soviet Union, the Stalinist bureaucracy always relied far more on bourgeois pacifists, English trade union bureaucrats, and French radicals than on the revolutionary movement of the proletariat. At the slightest external threat, the Stalinists immediately sacrificed their ultra-leftist rhetoric, as well as the vital interests of the international revolution, in the name of friendship with such dubious and unreliable "friends" as lawyers, writers, and mere drawing-room smooth talkers. A united front from above ? Not a chance ! But at the same time, Münzenberg, the High Commissioner for Shady Affairs, clung to the coattails of liberal windbags of all kinds and radical scribblers, "for the defense of the USSR."

The Stalinist bureaucracy in Germany, like that of all other countries except the USSR, is extremely dissatisfied with the compromising way in which Barbusse is conducting the affairs of the anti-war congress. In this area, Thälmann, Foster, and company would prefer to be more radical. However, in their own domestic affairs, each of them acts according to the same pattern as the authorities in Moscow : when faced with serious danger, they abandon their vain and counterfeit leftism and reveal their true opportunistic nature.

Was the initiative of the Communist faction in the Landtag inherently wrong and unacceptable ? We do not think so. In 1917, the Bolsheviks repeatedly made the following offer to the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries : "Take power, and we will support you against the bourgeoisie, should it offer any resistance." Some compromises are acceptable ; under certain conditions, they are necessary. This depends on the objective, how the compromise is perceived by the masses, and its limits. To limit compromise to the Landtag or the Reichstag, to consider it an end in itself that a Social Democrat or a Catholic should become president instead of a Fascist, amounts to falling entirely into parliamentary idiocy. The situation is quite different when the party sets itself the task of the systematic and methodical struggle to win over the Social Democratic workers on the basis of a united front. In this case, the parliamentary agreement against the fascist takeover of the presidency would have been an integral part of an extra-parliamentary agreement for the struggle against fascism. It goes without saying that the Communist Party would prefer to resolve the problem once and for all at the extra-parliamentary level. But mere preference is not enough when the forces are lacking. The Social Democratic workers have shown that they believe in the magical power of the July 31st vote. We must start from there. The Communist Party's past mistakes (the Prussian referendum, etc.) have considerably facilitated the reformist leaders' sabotage of the united front. A technical agreement in parliament, or even the mere proposal of such an agreement, must help the Communist Party clear itself of the accusation of collaborating with the fascists against social democracy. This is not an action in itself, but an action that, fundamentally, must pave the way for a fighting agreement or, at the very least, for the struggle for such an agreement among the mass organizations.

It is clear that these orientations are different. The struggle with social-democratic organizations can, and as it develops, take on a revolutionary character. The possibility of drawing closer to the social-democratic masses through high-level parliamentary agreements must also be considered. But for a Bolshevik, this can only be a rite of passage. The Stalinist bureaucracy acts in the opposite way : not only does it reject any agreement for struggle, but, worse, it maliciously sabotages any agreement that emerges from the grassroots. At the same time, it proposes a parliamentary alliance to the social-democratic deputies. Thus, in times of danger, it explains that its own ultra-leftist theory and practice are worthless, and it replaces them not with the politics of revolutionary Marxism but with an unprincipled parliamentary alliance based on the lowest common denominator.

The response will be that the Prussian and Hessian episodes were an error by the deputies, which the Central Committee corrected. But firstly, since such a decision, so important from the point of view of principles, should not have been taken outside the Central Committee, the blame falls entirely on the Central Committee ; secondly, how can we explain that the "steel," "consistent," "Bolshevik" policy, at a critical moment, after months of shouting and uproar, polemics, insults, and exclusions, gave way to an opportunistic "error" ?

But the matter is not limited to the Landtag. Thälmann and Remmele have simply betrayed themselves and their school of thought on a much more significant and important issue. On the evening of July 20, the Central Committee of the Communist Party drafted the following resolution :

"The Communist Party publicly asks, before the proletariat, the Social Democratic Party, the ADGB [2], and the Afabund [3] whether they are prepared to launch, jointly with the Communist Party, a general strike for the demands of the proletariat." The Central Committee published this important and unexpected resolution in its circulars of July 26 without adding the slightest comment. Is it possible to pass a more negative judgment on the entirety of the policy pursued up to this point ? Only the day before, it was considered social-fascist and counter-revolutionary to address the Social Democratic leadership with a proposal for joint action. On this basis, communists had been expelled and the struggle against "Trotskyism" waged. How could this Central Committee suddenly, on the evening of July 26, worship what it had burned the day before ? In what tragic situation has the bureaucracy placed the party, if the Central Committee dares to appear before it with its surprising resolution, without explaining or justifying itself.

Such turning points are the touchstone of any policy. Indeed, on the evening of July 20th, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany explained to the world : "Our policy up to now has been worthless." An unintentional admission, certainly, but entirely accurate. Unfortunately, this proposal of July 20th, which reversed previous policy, could in no way have a positive outcome. An appeal to the leadership—regardless of their response—can only have revolutionary significance if it has been prepared at the grassroots level, that is, if it is based on a comprehensive policy. But the Stalinist bureaucracy repeats daily to the social-democratic workers : "We, the communists, refuse any joint action with the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party." (See Thälmann's "response.") The unprepared, unmotivated, and unexpected proposal of July 20th had the sole effect of exposing the communist leadership, revealing its inconsistency, its frivolity, its tendency towards panic and adventurous outbursts.

The policies of the centrist bureaucracy help their adversaries and enemies at every turn. And when, under pressure and then events, a few hundred thousand workers rally to the banner of communism, this happens despite the Stalin-Thälmann policy. It is precisely for this reason that the party is uncertain about the future.
6. What is being said in Prague about the united front ?

"When, in 1926, the Communist International concluded a united front with the Social Democratic leaders," wrote the central organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Rude Pravo, on February 27 of that year, supposedly under the pen of "a worker correspondent in the factory," "it did so to expose them to the masses, and at the time, Trotsky was fiercely opposed to it. But today, when Social Democracy is discredited by its countless betrayals of the workers' struggles, Trotsky proposes a united front with its leaders. Trotsky is now against the Anglo-Russian committee of 1926, but for an Anglo-Russian committee of 1932."

These lines bring us to the heart of the matter. In 1926, the Communist International was striving to "unmask" the reformist leaders through the policy of the united front, and that was perfectly valid. But since then, social democracy has "discredited" itself. In whose eyes ? It still represents a larger number of workers than the Communist Party. It's regrettable, but that's the way it is. We can therefore consider that the reformist leaders have still not been unmasked. If the united front method was good in 1926, why would it be bad in 1932 ? "Trotsky was in favor of an Anglo-Russian committee in 1932, but against the Anglo-Russian committee of 1926." In 1926, the united front was concluded solely at the top, between the leaders of the Soviet trade unions and those of the trade unions, not to develop joint practical actions while the masses were separated by borders and their social circumstances, but on the basis of a "platform" of friendly diplomatic relations, with a clear pacifist bias. At the time of the miners' strike and then the general strike, the Anglo-Russian committee couldn't even meet because the "allies" were each pulling in opposite directions : the Soviet trade unionists were trying to support the strike, the trade unionists to break the strikers. Significant sums collected by Russian workers were rejected by the General Council as "cursed money." Only when the strike was definitively betrayed and broken did the Anglo-Russian committee convene for a traditional banquet where empty rhetoric was exchanged. The Anglo-Russian committee's policy thus served to conceal the reformist strikebreakers from the working masses.

Today, the situation is entirely different. In Germany, workers, both social democrats and communists, are in the same position, facing a single enemy. They are mixed together in factories, in trade unions, in social security organizations, and so on. This is not a purely verbal "platform" between leaders, but rather very concrete tasks that must directly involve mass organizations in the struggle.

A united front policy at the national level is ten times more difficult than at the local level. A united front policy at the international level is a hundred times more difficult than at the national level. Uniting with British reformists on a slogan such as "defending the USSR" or "defending the Chinese revolution" is like writing with smoke and mirrors. In Germany, workers' organizations, including Social Democrats, are directly threatened with crushing. It would be illusory to expect Social Democracy to fight against the German bourgeoisie to defend the USSR. But it is perfectly possible to expect Social Democracy to fight to defend its mandates, its meetings, its newspapers, its coffers, and, ultimately, its own survival.

However, even in Germany, adopting a fetishistic attitude toward the united front is by no means advisable. An agreement remains an agreement. It is maintained as long as it serves the practical purpose for which it was concluded. If the reformist leaders begin to hinder or sabotage the movement, the communists must always ask themselves : isn't it time to break the agreement and lead the masses under our own banner ? Such a policy is not easy. But who said leading the proletariat to victory was an easy task ? By contrasting 1926 with 1932, Rude Pravo only reveals his misunderstanding of both what happened six years ago and what is happening now.

The example I gave of the Bolsheviks' agreement with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries against Kornilov also caught the attention of the "worker's correspondent" from an imaginary factory. "At that time," he wrote, "Kerensky actually fought against Kornilov for a specific period of time and helped the proletariat crush him. Even a toddler can see that social democracy is not currently fighting against fascism." Thälmann, who is certainly no "toddler," asserts that the Russian Bolsheviks never made an agreement with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries against Kornilov. Rude Pravo, as we can see, chooses a different path. He does not deny the agreement. But, in his view, the agreement was justified by the fact that Kerensky was genuinely fighting against Kornilov, unlike the Social Democrats who were paving the way for fascism to seize power. The idealization of Kerensky presented here is entirely unexpected. When did Kerensky begin fighting against Kornilov ? At the precise moment Kornilov raised his Cossack saber above Kerensky's head, that is, on the evening of August 26, 1917. Just the day before, Kerensky had been conspiring directly with Kornilov to crush the workers and soldiers of Petrograd. If Kerensky began fighting against Kornilov, or more precisely, did not oppose the struggle against Kornilov for a time, it was solely because the Bolsheviks left him no other option. The fact that Kornilov and Kerensky, two conspirators, broke with each other and entered into open conflict was, to some extent, a surprise. But it could and should have been foreseen, if only based on the Italian and Polish experience, that German fascism and social democracy would clash. Why would it be acceptable to make a deal with Kerensky against Kornilov while forbidding the dissemination of propaganda, the defense, support, and preparation of an agreement with social-democratic mass organizations against fascism ? Why must such agreements be sabotaged wherever they are formed ? For this is precisely how Thälmann and his associates operate.

Rude Pravo naturally seized upon my remarks about how one could make a pact for militant action with the devil himself, his grandmother, and with Noske, Grzesinsky. "Look, communist workers," the newspaper wrote, "you must, therefore, make a pact with Grzesinsky, who shot so many of your comrades in arms. Discuss with him how to fight together against the fascists, with whom he sits at banquets and on factory boards..." The whole problem is shifted onto the terrain of artificial sentimentality. This argument is worthy of an anarchist, an old Russian left-wing Socialist Revolutionary, a "revolutionary pacifist," or even Münzenberg himself. But there is no trace of Marxism in it.

Is it true that Grzesinsky was first and foremost the executioner of the workers ? Undoubtedly, yes. But wasn't Kerensky an executioner of workers and peasants on an even greater scale than Grzesinsky ? And yet Rude Pravo retrospectively approved the practical agreement with Kerensky.

Supporting the executioner in his work directed against the workers is a crime and even treason : Stalin's alliance with Chiang Kai-shek is one such example. But if, tomorrow, this executioner of the Chinese people were to find himself at war with the Japanese, practical agreements of combat between Chinese workers and Chiang Kai-shek would not only be permissible but obligatory.

Did Grzesinsky attend banquets with fascist leaders ? I don't know, but I readily admit it. However, Grzesinsky later had to spend time in a Berlin prison, not in the name of socialism, of course, but because he refused to cede his place in the sun to the Bonapartists and fascists. If the Communist Party had openly declared, even just a year ago : "We are ready to fight the fascist bandits, even with Grzesinsky" ; if it had made this a rallying cry, if it had developed it in its speeches and articles and instilled it deeply in the masses, Grzesinsky would not have been able, in July, to justify his capitulation to the workers by referring to the sabotage of the Communist Party. He would have had to either commit himself even more to the struggle or compromise himself definitively in the eyes of his own workers. Isn't that clear ?

Certainly, even if Grzesinsky had been drawn into the struggle by the logic of his own situation or by the pressure of the masses, he would have remained an extremely unreliable and disloyal ally. He would have been only concerned with moving as quickly as possible from the more or less real struggle to an agreement with the capitalists. But the masses, even social-democratic ones, once set in motion, do not stop as easily as their police-state president when he has been offended. Their rapprochement in the struggle with the communist workers would have allowed the leaders of the Communist Party to exert a much broader influence over the social-democratic workers, especially in the face of a common threat. This is the ultimate goal of the united front.

Only spineless centrists like those in the SAP could reduce the entire politics of the proletariat to agreements with reformist organizations or, worse, to the abstract slogan of "unity." For a Marxist, the united front policy is only one of the methods used in the class struggle. Under certain conditions, this method is worthless : it would be utterly absurd to try to reach an agreement with the reformists to carry out the socialist revolution. But there are situations where refusing the united front risks costing the revolutionary party dearly for many years to come. Such is the situation in Germany at present.

The united front policy presents the greatest dangers and difficulties when applied, as we have indicated above, on an international scale, where it is more difficult to formulate practical tasks and organize mass control. This is especially true in the fight against war. The chances of joint action are very slim, and the opportunities for reformists and pacifists to evade and deceive us are much greater. By this, we do not mean that the united front policy is excluded at this level.

On the contrary, we requested that the Communist International address itself directly to the Second International and the Amsterdam International with the proposal to organize a joint congress against the war. The task of the Communist International in this matter would have been to formulate the most concrete commitments possible with regard to the various countries and situations. If social democracy had been obliged to attend such a congress, the question of war could have been a sharp wedge that we could have driven into its ranks, provided we had adopted the correct political position.

The utmost political and organizational clarity is necessary, as this is an agreement between proletarian organizations with millions of members, still divided by profound principled differences. No ambiguous intermediaries, no diplomatic cover-ups, no empty pacifist pronouncements !

The Communist International, however, once again deemed it wiser to act by going against the grain of Marxism : refusing to engage in public negotiations with the reformist internationals, it entered into behind-the-scenes talks with Friedrich Adler... through a pacifist writer, Henri Barbusse, a man of utter confusion. The result of this policy was that Barbusse gathered in Amsterdam the crypto-communist organizations, the "close" and "sympathetic" organizations and groups, as well as pacifist figures from all countries. The most sincere and honest of the latter—and they were a minority—could, each individually, say of themselves : "Me and my confusion." Who needs this charade, this intellectual vanity fair, this Münzenberg-style gathering, a blatant example of political quackery ? And to what end [4] ?

But let us return to Prague. Five months after the publication of the article analyzed above, the same newspaper published an article by one of the party leaders, Klement Gottwald, which presented itself as an appeal to Czech workers of various tendencies to conclude a fighting agreement. The fascist danger threatens all of Central Europe. Only the unity of the proletariat can stop the reactionary offensive. There is no time to lose, for it is already "five minutes to midnight." The appeal is written in a very urgent tone. But it is in vain that Gottwald, following Seydewitz and Thälmann, swears that he is not defending the interests of his party but the interests of the class : such a distinction is quite indecent coming from a Marxist. Gottwald denounces the sabotage by the Social Democratic leaders. Needless to say, he is entirely right on this point. Unfortunately, the author does not speak openly about the policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany ; Clearly, he is hesitant to defend it, although he doesn't dare criticize it. Gottwald addresses the crucial question fairly well, even if it lacks boldness. Inviting workers of different tendencies to reach an agreement in the factories, Gottwald writes : "Many of you may say : unite at the top, at the bottom we will easily reach an agreement. We believe," the author continues, "that the essential thing is for the workers to agree at the bottom ; as for the leaders, we have already said that we would even unite with the devil if he is against the rulers and for the interests of the working class. And we tell you this clearly : if your leaders renounce even for a moment their alliance with the bourgeoisie, if they commit themselves against the rulers on even a single point, we will welcome this event and we will support them in this matter."

Everything is said there, and almost correctly. Gottwald even mentioned the devil, whose name provoked the righteous indignation of the Rude Pravo editorial staff only five months ago. Gottwald has completely forgotten the devil's grandmother. May God have mercy on her soul : we are ready to sacrifice her to the united front. Perhaps, for his part, Gottwald will agree, to console the offended old woman, to give her full and complete control of the Rude Pravo article of February 27th and of the "working-class correspondent," a hack writer.

Gottwald's political reflections apply, we hope, not only to Czechoslovakia but also to Germany. Gottwald should have said so himself. Furthermore, the Party leadership, neither in Berlin nor in Prague, can be content with simply proclaiming its readiness to join a united front with the Social Democrats ; it must demonstrate this actively, offensively, Bolshevikly, through specific proposals and practical actions. This is precisely what we demand.

Gottwald's article, thanks to its realistic and non-ultimatist tone, immediately resonated with social-democratic workers : on July 31, Rude Pravo published a letter, among others, from an unemployed typesetter recently returned from Germany. In this letter, one senses the democratic worker, clearly influenced by the prejudices of reformism. It is all the more important to see how the policies of the German Communist Party were reflected in his conscience. "When, in the autumn of last year," the typesetter wrote, "Comrade Breitscheid addressed an appeal to the Communist Party to undertake joint actions with the Social Democrats, it provoked a veritable explosion of fury from the Rote Fahne. The social-democratic workers then said to themselves : 'Now we know how serious the Communists' intentions are regarding the united front.'"

This is the authentic voice of a worker. His words contribute far more to solving the problem than dozens of articles by unprincipled scribblers. Breitscheid, in fact, wasn't proposing a united front. He was merely trying to frighten the bourgeoisie with the prospect of joint action with the communists. If the Central Committee of the Communist Party had immediately raised the issue directly, it would have placed the Social Democratic leadership in a difficult position. But the Central Committee of the Communist Party hastily put itself in a difficult position.

In the pamphlet "The German Revolution and the Stalinist Bureaucracy," I wrote specifically about Breitscheid's declaration : "Is it not clear that we should have seized upon Breitscheid's diplomatic and ambiguous proposal immediately, putting forward on our side a practical, concrete, and well-developed program for the common struggle against fascism, and demanding a joint meeting of the leadership of both parties, with the participation of the leadership of the free trade unions ? Simultaneously, we should have energetically disseminated this program at all levels of both parties and among the masses."

By rejecting the reformist leader's trial balloon, the Central Committee of the Communist Party transformed Breitscheid's ambiguous statement in the workers' minds into a sincere proposal for a united front, and the social-democratic workers drew the following conclusion : "Our people want joint action, but the communists are sabotaging it." Could one imagine a more misguided and absurd policy ? Could Breitscheid's maneuver have been better facilitated ? The Prague printer's letter clearly demonstrates that Breitscheid, with Thälmann's collaboration, fully achieved his objective.

Rude Pravo tried to find a contradiction and confusion in the fact that, while we rejected agreements in some cases, we accepted them in others, and that we considered it essential to re-define each time the scope, the slogans, and the modalities of the agreement, linking them to the specific situation. Rude Pravo doesn't suspect that in politics, as in all other serious matters, one must know : what one wants, when, where, and how. And it's not useless to understand why.

In our critique of the Communist International's program four years ago, we outlined some basic rules of the united front policy. We believe it is worthwhile to reiterate them here.

"The possibility of betrayal is always present among reformists. But this does not imply that reformism and betrayal are synonymous at every moment. Temporary agreements are possible with reformists when they take a step forward. But when, frightened by the movement's evolution, they betray it, maintaining the bloc with them is a criminal concession to the traitors and a cover-up of their betrayal.
Here is the most important rule, the immutable and constant rule of all maneuvering : never merge, mix, or intertwine your organization with another, even with the one that is currently the most 'friendly.' Never engage in actions that, directly or indirectly, openly or covertly, subject your party to other parties or organizations of other classes, limit your freedom of agitation, or make you responsible, even partially, for the political line of other parties. Do not mix flags, let alone kneel before another flag."

Today, after the experience of the Barbusse congress, we would add yet another rule :

"Agreements can only be concluded publicly, before the masses, from party to party, from organization to organization. Do not resort to the services of dubious brokers. Do not try to pass off diplomatic agreements with bourgeois pacifists as the proletarian united front."

7. Class struggle in light of current circumstances

It is by no means out of theoretical pedantry that we have insisted on distinguishing between fascism and Bonapartism. The different terms allow us to differentiate the different concepts which, in politics, allow us to distinguish the real forces. The crushing of fascism would leave no room for Bonapartism and, we hope, would mark the direct entry into the socialist revolution. But the proletariat is not prepared for the revolution. It is the shifting relationship between social democracy and the Bonapartist government on the one hand, and between Bonapartism and fascism on the other, that will determine (without altering the fundamental problem) the path and pace of the preparation for the struggle between the proletariat and the fascist counter-revolution. Given the circumstances, the contradictions between Hitler, Schleicher, and Wels make a fascist victory difficult and offer the Communist Party a new and most precious advantage : a credit of time.

"Fascism will come to power in a cold, calculated way," Stalinist theorists repeatedly declared. This formula was meant to convey the idea that the fascists would seize power legally, peacefully, through a coalition, without needing to resort to an open coup. Events have already refuted these predictions. The Papen government came to power through a coup d'état, which it completed with the coup in Prussia. Even if we grant that the coalition of Nazis and the center will overthrow the Papen government through "constitutional" methods, this fact in itself will not solve anything. There is a vast difference between Hitler's "peaceful" seizure of power and the establishment of a fascist regime. Fundamentally, the coalition would facilitate the coup d'état, but could not replace it. Once the Weimar Constitution is definitively abolished, the most important task remains : the suppression of the organs of proletarian democracy. From this perspective, what does the "cold road" mean ? Nothing other than the forgetting of resistance on the part of the workers. Indeed, Papen's Bonapartist coup d'état provoked no response. Will the fascist coup also go unanswered ? It is around this question that the prediction of the "cold road" revolves, consciously or unconsciously.

If the Communist Party were an overwhelming force, if the proletariat were marching straight to power, all the contradictions within the propertied class would be temporarily erased : fascists, Bonapartists, and democrats would form a single front against the proletarian revolution. But this is not the case. The propertied classes and the parties serving them can afford to openly display their contradictions, given the weakness of the Communist Party and the fragmentation of the proletariat. The Communist Party can only strengthen itself by exploiting these contradictions.

In a highly industrialized Germany, fascism might not be so keen to assert its claims to absolute power. The German proletariat is undoubtedly larger and potentially stronger than the Italian proletariat. Although fascism in Germany is stronger and better organized than it was in Italy at the same time, the liquidation of "Marxism" must nevertheless appear to it as a difficult and risky task. Moreover, it is possible that the peak of Hitler's political career is already behind him. The excessively long period of waiting and the new obstacle posed by Bonapartism undoubtedly weaken fascism, exacerbate internal friction, and could significantly reduce its influence. But for now, these are only tendencies that have been impossible to gauge. Only the actual struggle can answer that question. To assume a priori that National Socialism will stop halfway, without causing any difficulties, would be to show reckless nonchalance.

The theory of the "cold path" in its fully developed form is no better than the theory of "social fascism" ; more precisely, it is its inverse. Both disregard the contradictions between the main components of the opposing camp and ignore the successive stages of the process. The Communist Party is completely sidelined. It is no coincidence that Hirsch, the theorist of the "cold path," is also the theorist of "social fascism." The country's political crisis is developing on the basis of the economic crisis. But the economy is not immutable. Yesterday we were forced to say that the cyclical crisis only exacerbates the fundamental, organic crisis of the capitalist system ; today we must remember that the general decline of capitalism does not preclude cyclical fluctuations. The current crisis will not last forever. The capitalist world's hopes for a change in the cyclical situation are exaggerated, but not without some basis. The struggle between political forces must be integrated into the economic perspective. Papen's program makes this all the more urgent as it assumes an upward trend in the short term.

Economic expansion becomes visible to everyone when the flow of goods accelerates and production and the number of employed workers increase. But it doesn't begin there. Preparatory processes in the areas of monetary circulation and credit precede expansion. Capital hidden in unprofitable businesses and industrial sectors must be released and made available as cash seeking investment. The market, stripped of its excesses, bloating, and distortions, must reflect real demand. Confidence must be restored in the relationships between different businesses, and between the market and businesses. Furthermore, this confidence, so often discussed in the world press, must be fostered by not only economic factors but also political ones (reparations, war debts, disarmament, and armament).

No increase in trade, production, or the number of employed workers is currently on the horizon ; on the contrary, the decline continues. However, the processes preparing for this economic shift have clearly already played most of their role. Numerous indicators suggest that this shift, while not imminent, has indeed drawn closer. This is the assessment that can be made on a global scale.

However, a distinction must be made between creditor countries (the United States, England, France) and debtor countries, or more precisely, bankrupt countries. Germany occupies the foremost position in this second group. Germany possesses no liquid capital. Its economy can only receive impetus from external capital. But a country that is unable to repay its debts cannot obtain any loans. In any case, creditors will only open their purses when they are convinced that Germany is once again capable of exporting more than it imports, the difference being used to cover its debts. Demand for German products is expected primarily from the agricultural countries of Southern Europe. But agricultural countries, in turn, depend on the demand for raw materials and foodstuffs from industrialized countries. Germany is, therefore, forced to wait. The regenerative current will first flow through its capitalist competitors and its agricultural partners.

But the bourgeoisie cannot wait. The Bonapartist clique is even less inclined to wait. While promising not to tamper with the stability of the currency, the Papen government embarks on a massive inflationary program. Amidst speeches about the rebirth of economic liberalism, it issues administrative decrees to regulate the economic cycle and, in the name of free enterprise, directly subjects taxpayers to capitalist entrepreneurs.

The hope for a rapid turnaround in the economic situation is the central tenet of the Papen government's program. If it doesn't happen in time, the two billion will vanish like drops of water on a hot plate. Papen's plan is far riskier and more speculative than the bull market currently unfolding on the New York Stock Exchange. And in the event of failure, the consequences of this Bonapartist gamble will be far more catastrophic.

The fall of the mark will be the most immediate and noticeable result of the gap between the government's plans and the actual movement of the market. Social ills, exacerbated by inflation, will become unbearable. The failure of Papen's economic program will necessitate a new, more effective one. Which one ? Most likely, fascism. If the Bonapartist remedy fails to cure the situation, then fascist surgery will be necessary. Social democracy will gesticulate "on the left" and implode. The Communist Party will grow, if it doesn't hinder itself. Overall, this will signify a revolutionary situation. Under these conditions, three-quarters of the chances of victory depend on the communist strategy.

The revolutionary party must, however, be prepared for another eventuality : the sudden arrival of a turning point in the economic situation. Let us suppose that the Papen-Schleicher government manages to hold on until industry and commerce restart. Would it then be saved ? No, because the beginning of an upward trend would mean the end of Bonapartism, and perhaps not only Bonapartism.

The forces of the German proletariat are not exhausted. But they are weakened : by the sacrifices, defeats, and disappointments that have followed one another since 1914 ; by the systematic betrayals of social democracy ; by the disrepute into which the Communist Party has plunged itself. Six or seven million unemployed hang like a ball and chain around the proletariat. The decrees of Brüning and Papen met with no resistance. The coup of July 20th went unanswered.

It can be predicted with the utmost certainty that the changing economic climate will give a powerful boost to the temporarily diminished activity of the proletariat. From the moment the company stops laying off workers and starts hiring again, their confidence grows : they are needed once more. The spring that had been so tightly compressed begins to unwind. Until now, workers have only fought to regain lost positions, not to gain new ones. And German workers have lost too much. Neither emergency decrees nor the intervention of the Reichswehr will be able to stop the mass strikes that will erupt on the wave of recovery. The Bonapartist regime, which can only maintain itself thanks to "social peace," will be the first victim of this economic shift.

We are already witnessing a surge in strikes in various countries (Belgium, England, Poland, partially in the United States, but not in Germany). Assessing the development of mass strikes in light of the current economic situation is not easy. Statistics record fluctuations in the economic climate with an inevitable lag. Economic recovery must be a reality for it to be recorded. Generally, workers detect changes in the economic climate before statisticians do. New orders, or even the anticipation of new orders, the reorganization of companies to expand production, or simply the cessation of layoffs, all increase the strength of workers' demands. The defensive strike of textile workers in Lancashire was undoubtedly triggered by a turning point in the textile industry. The Belgian strike likely originated from a further worsening of the crisis in the coal industry. The diversity of economic shocks that have given rise to the recent strikes reflects the changing nature of the new phase of the global economic situation. But generally speaking, the growth of the mass movement is an indication of a noticeable shift in the economic situation. In any case, the economic recovery, from its very beginnings, has led to a surge in mass struggles.

The ruling classes of all countries expect a miracle from industrial growth, as evidenced by the surge in stock market speculation. If capitalism were truly entering a phase of renewed prosperity or slow but sustained progress, this would obviously lead to a stabilization of capitalism, the consolidation of the bourgeoisie's position, and, simultaneously, the weakening of fascism and the strengthening of reformism. But there is no serious reason to hope or fear that the new economic upturn, inevitable in itself, will be able to overcome the general trends toward decline in the world economy, and particularly in the European economy. Pre-war capitalism developed according to the formula of expanded reproduction ; present-day capitalism, with all its cyclical fluctuations, is merely the expanded reproduction of misery and catastrophes. The new economic cycle will inevitably lead to a redistribution of power, both within each country and within the capitalist camp, primarily between Europe and America. In the short term, the capitalist world will find itself facing insurmountable contradictions and will experience new, even more terrible upheavals.

Without risk of being wrong, we can make the following prediction : the economic recovery will strengthen the confidence of the workers and give new impetus to their struggle, but it will not succeed in giving capitalism, especially European capitalism, the possibility of a second birth.

In the context of the renewed surge of capitalism's decline, the practical gains of the workers will, by necessity, be extremely limited. Will German capitalism, at the height of its economic resurgence, restore to workers the conditions they enjoyed before the current crisis ? Everything points to a negative answer. The mass movement, having emerged from its slumber, will have to take on a political character all the more quickly.

The first stage of industrial revitalization will be extremely perilous for social democracy. The workers will launch a struggle to regain what they have lost. The leading figures of social democracy will hope for a return to the "normal" order. They will seek above all to prove their ability to participate in a new coalition. Leaders and masses will each pull in opposite directions. To exploit this new crisis of reformism, the communists need correct orientation amidst the changing circumstances ; they must quickly formulate a practical program of action that takes as its starting point the losses suffered by the workers during the years of crisis. The transition from the economic struggle to the political struggle will be a particularly favorable moment for increasing the strength and influence of the revolutionary proletarian party.

Here, as elsewhere, the correct application of the united front policy is the condition for any success. For the Communist Party of Germany, this means above all that it no longer sits on the fence in the field of the trade union movement : it must move firmly towards the free trade unions ; bring the current cadres of the RGO into them ; undertake systematic action to gain influence in the factory committees and in the trade unions ; prepare a broad campaign under the slogan of workers' control over production.

8. The path to socialism

Kautsky, Hilferding and others have repeatedly explained in recent years that they were never proponents of the theory of the collapse of capitalism, which revisionists once attributed to Marxists and which Kautsky's followers now attribute to communists.

The Bernsteinians outlined two perspectives : one, unrealistic, supposedly orthodox "Marxist," according to which capitalism was bound to collapse mechanically under the weight of its internal contradictions ; the other, "real," which asserted that a gradual evolution from capitalism to socialism was possible. These two schemes, so opposed at first glance, share a common feature : the absence of the revolutionary factor. While rejecting the caricature of the automatic collapse of capitalism, which was attributed to them, the Marxists emphasized that with the intensification of the class struggle, the proletariat would make the revolution long before the objective contradictions of capitalism had caused its automatic collapse.

This controversy took place at the end of the last century. It must be acknowledged that the reality of capitalism since the war is, from a certain perspective, closer to Bernstein's caricature of Marxism than anyone, revisionists first and foremost, could have imagined. Hadn't they conjured up the specter of final collapse only to prove its unreal nature ? Meanwhile, capitalism appears all the closer to inevitable collapse the longer the revolutionary intervention of the proletariat in the destiny of society is delayed.

The theory of pauperization was the essential element of the theory of collapse. Marxists cautiously asserted that the worsening of social contradictions did not necessarily imply an absolute decline in the living standards of the masses. In fact, it is precisely this latter process that we are witnessing. Could the collapse of capitalism have manifested itself more brutally than in chronic unemployment and the dismantling of social safety nets—that is, in society's refusal to feed its own slaves ?

Opportunistic resistance within the working class proved powerful enough to grant capitalism, on borrowed time, another reprieve of several decades. The result was not the idyllic peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism, but a state that closely resembles the disintegration of society.

For a long time, reformists tried to shift the blame for the current state of society onto the war. But, firstly, it was not the war that created the destructive tendencies of capitalism ; it merely revealed and accelerated them. Secondly, the war could not have accomplished its work of destruction without the political support of reformism. Thirdly, the intractable contradictions of capitalism are preparing new wars on various fronts. Reformism will not succeed in extricating itself from its historical responsibility. By paralyzing and restraining the revolutionary energy of the proletariat, international social democracy is giving the process of capitalist collapse its most blind, unrestrained, catastrophic, and bloody forms.

It goes without saying that one can only speak of the realization of the revisionist caricature of Marxism in the conditional tense, in relation to a specific historical period. However, decaying capitalism will lead—even if with a considerable delay—not to an automatic collapse, but to revolution.

The current crisis has swept away what remained of reformist utopias. Today, opportunistic practice no longer has any theoretical cover. Wels, Hilferding, Grzesinsky, and Noske scoff at the catastrophes that may now befall the masses, provided their own interests are not harmed. But the situation is such that the crisis of the bourgeois regime also affects the reformist leaders.

"State, intervene !" – the social democrats were still crying out recently as they retreated before fascism. And the state did intervene : Otto Braun and Severing were thrown to the ground. Today, writes Vorwärts, everyone must recognize the advantages of democracy over dictatorial rule. Certainly, democracy offered serious advantages, Grzesinsky thought, by experiencing prison firsthand.

From this experience, social democracy drew the following conclusion : "It is time to move to socialization !" Tarnov, only yesterday a physician of capitalism, suddenly decided to be its gravedigger. Capitalism was clearly exhausted, since it was throwing reformist ministers, high-ranking officials, and police chiefs into unemployment. Wels wrote a programmatic article : the hour of socialism has struck. Let Schleicher deprive the deputies of their salaries and the former ministers of their pensions, and Hilferding will write a study on the historical function of the general strike.

The Social Democratic leadership's "leftward" shift is surprising in its crudeness and hypocrisy. But this in no way implies that the maneuver is doomed to failure. This party, despite all its crimes, still leads millions of workers. It will not fall on its own. We must know how to overthrow it.

The Communist Party will explain that Wels-Tarnov's path to socialism is just another maneuver to deceive the masses, and it will be right. It will recount the history of social-democratic "socializations" over the past fourteen years. This is useful, but not sufficient : history, even the most recent history, cannot replace active politics.

Tarnov attempts to reduce the debate on the reformist or revolutionary path to socialism to the simple question of the "pace" of transformations. As a theorist, one could not sink any lower. The pace of socialist transformations actually depends on the state of the country's productive forces, its level of culture, the amount of expenditure necessary for its defense, and so on. But transformations, whether slow or rapid, are only possible if at the head of society there is a class that has an interest in socialism, and at the head of this class, a party that does not seek to deceive the exploited and that is always ready to crush the resistance of the exploiters. It must be explained to the workers that this is precisely what constitutes the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But that is not enough. We cannot, when it comes to the burning problems of the world proletariat, forget, as the Communist International does, the existence of the Soviet Union. In Germany, the task is not to undertake the construction of socialism for the first time, but to combine Germany's productive forces, culture, and technical and organizational genius with the construction of socialism already begun in the USSR.

The German Communist Party merely sings the praises of the USSR, indulging in gross and dangerous exaggerations. But it is utterly incapable of connecting the construction of socialism in the USSR, its monumental experiments, and its invaluable achievements to the tasks of the proletarian revolution in Germany. The Stalinist bureaucracy, for its part, is completely unable to assist the German Communist Party on this crucial issue, as its perspective is limited to a single country.

The incoherent and cowardly projects of state capitalism and social democracy must be countered with a comprehensive plan for the joint construction of socialism in the USSR and Germany. No one demands an immediate, detailed plan. A preliminary outline will suffice ; only the fundamental principles are necessary. This plan must be discussed as quickly as possible in all organizations of the German working class, first and foremost in the trade unions.

These discussions must include progressive elements among technicians, statisticians, and economists. The widespread discussions on a planned economy in Germany today reflect the impasse of German capitalism but remain academic, bureaucratic, abstract, and pedantic. Only the Communist Party can ensure that these discussions on this issue stop going in circles.

The building of socialism is already underway ; a bridge must be built across national borders. Here is the first plan : study it, improve it, refine it ! Workers, elect special planning commissions ! Mandate them to make contact with the trade unions and economic bodies of the Soviets ! Create, on the basis of the trade unions, factory committees, and other workers' organizations, a central planning commission that will liaise with Gosplan in the USSR. Involve German engineers, administrators, and economists in this work !

This is the only correct way to approach the question of the planned economy today, in 1932 after fifteen years of Soviet power and fourteen years of convulsions of the German capitalist republic.

Nothing is easier than mocking the social-democratic bureaucracy, starting with Wels, who sang the praises of socialism. But we mustn't forget that reformist workers take the question of socialism very seriously. Therefore, we must adopt a very serious attitude towards reformist workers. Here we find the problem of the united front in all its complexity.

If social democracy sets itself the task (and we know what to think of that) not of saving capitalism, but of building socialism, it must seek an agreement not with the center but with the communists. Will the Communist Party reject such an agreement ? Not at all. On the contrary, it will itself propose an agreement, it will demand it before the masses, just as it will demand payment of the recently issued socialist bonds.

The Communist Party's offensive against social democracy must now be waged on three fronts. The crushing of fascism remains an urgent task. The proletariat's decisive struggle against fascism requires a simultaneous confrontation with the Bonapartist state apparatus. For this, the general strike is an irreplaceable weapon. It must be prepared. A special plan must be developed—that is, a plan for mobilizing forces for its execution. From this plan, a mass campaign must be developed, and based on this campaign, an agreement on the conduct of the general strike must be proposed to social democracy, attaching specific political conditions to it. This proposal, taken up and implemented at each new stage, must, in its momentum, lead to the creation of soviets as the highest organs of the united front.

Papen's economic plan, which already has the force of law, is the cause of unprecedented misery for the German proletariat ; even the leaders of the Social Democrats and the trade unions admit it verbally. In the press, they express themselves in an energetic tone unheard of from them for a very long time. There is a chasm between their words and their actions, we know, but we must take them at their word. We must develop a set of measures for a common struggle against the exceptional laws and Bonapartism. The struggle imposed on the proletariat by the entire situation cannot, by its very nature, be waged within the framework of democracy. Hitler had an army of 400,000 men ; Papen and Schleicher, in addition to the Reichswehr, had a semi-private army of 200,000 men—the "Steel Helmets"—the bourgeois democracy had the semi-tolerated Reich Banner army, and the Communist Party had the banned Red Front army : such a situation proves that the problem of the state is a question of force. One could not imagine a better revolutionary school.

The Communist Party must tell the working class : Schleicher cannot be overthrown by playing the parliamentary game. If social democracy agrees to overthrow the Bonapartist government by other means, the Communist Party pledges to support social democracy with all its might. Communists hereby commit never to using violent means against a social-democratic government, as long as it relies on the majority of the working class and guarantees the Communist Party freedom of agitation and organization. This way of framing the issue will be understood by all social-democratic and non-party workers.

The third front is the struggle for socialism. Here too, we must strike while the iron is hot and force social democracy to confront it with a concrete plan of cooperation with the USSR. What is necessary in this regard has already been said above.

Of course, these areas of struggle, which have different levels of importance in the overall strategic perspective, must not be isolated from one another, but rather intertwined. The political crisis in society demands that partial problems be linked to general problems ; this is precisely the essence of the revolutionary situation.
9 The only way

Can we expect the Central Committee of the Communist Party to embark on the correct path of its own accord ? Its entire history proves that it is incapable of doing so. No sooner had it begun to correct itself than it found itself confronted with the prospect of "Trotskyism." If Thälmann didn't understand this on his own, it was explained to him from Moscow : the "part" must be sacrificed to the "whole," that is, the interests of the German revolution must be sacrificed to the interests of the Stalinist apparatus. The timid attempts to revise policy were put on hold. Bureaucratic reaction triumphs once again across the board.

This is certainly not Thälmann's doing. If the Communist International were to allow its local branches the freedom to exist, to think, and to develop, they could have elected their own leadership over the past fifteen years. But the bureaucracy has established a system for appointing leaders and supporting those it has nominated through artificial publicity. Thälmann is both a product and a victim of this system.

The cadres, whose development is stalled, weaken the party. They compensate for their shortcomings with retaliatory measures. The party's hesitations and lack of confidence inevitably affect the class as a whole. One cannot call upon the masses for bold actions when the party itself is incapable of taking revolutionary initiatives.

Even if Thälmann were to receive a telegram from Manuilsky tomorrow insisting on the need for a shift toward a united front policy, the leadership's latest zigzag would be of little use, as it is too compromised. Correct policy requires a sound system within the party. The party's internal democracy, currently a mere toy in the hands of the bureaucracy, must become a reality again. The party must first become a party again ; then the masses will trust it. In practical terms, this means that an extraordinary congress of the party and the Communist International must be put on the agenda.

A general discussion must obviously precede the party congress. All barriers erected by the apparatus must be removed. Every party organization, every party cell, has the right to invite to its meetings and listen to any communist, whether a party member or an ex-member, if it deems it necessary for the formation of its opinion. The press must be placed at the service of discussion : all party newspapers must devote sufficient space each day to critical articles. The special press committees, elected at the general assemblies of party members, must ensure that the newspapers serve the party and not the bureaucracy.

The discussion will undoubtedly require considerable time and energy. The party apparatus will argue that in a critical period, it cannot afford the "luxury of discussion." The bureaucratic saviors believe that in a difficult situation, the party must remain silent. Marxists, on the other hand, believe that the more difficult the situation, the more important the independent role of the party becomes.

In 1917, the leadership of the Bolshevik Party enjoyed immense prestige. Yet, throughout the year, the party engaged in a series of in-depth discussions. On the eve of the October Revolution, the party debated passionately to determine which of the two factions within the Central Committee was correct : the majority, which supported the uprising, or the minority, which opposed it. Despite the depth of the disagreements, there were never any expulsions or repressive measures. The non-party masses were invited to participate in these discussions. In Petrograd, an assembly of non-party women sent a delegation to the Central Committee to support the majority. Admittedly, the discussions took time. But in return, these discussions, conducted freely and without lies or falsification, forged a general and unwavering conviction regarding the correctness of the political line, which alone made victory possible.

How will the situation in Germany develop ? Will the small wheel of the opposition succeed in setting the large wheel of the party in motion in time ? The question is being asked. Pessimistic voices are often heard. In the various communist groups, within the party itself as well as on its periphery, there are many comrades who say : the Left Opposition has the right position on all the important issues. But it is weak. Its leaders are few in number and politically inexperienced. Can such an organization, with its small weekly newspaper (Permanente Revolution), stand up to the powerful apparatus of the Communist International ?

The lessons of these events are stronger than the Stalinist bureaucracy. We want to be, in the eyes of the communist masses, the interpreters of these experiences. This is our historical role as a faction. We do not demand, like Seydewitz and Co., that the revolutionary proletariat place its trust in us on credit. We set ourselves a more modest task : we offer our help to the communist vanguard in developing a correct political line. To this end, we are recruiting and training our own cadres. This preparatory stage cannot be skipped. At each new stage of the struggle, the most conscious and critical elements within the proletariat will rally to our side.

The revolutionary party begins with an idea, a program directed against the very powerful apparatus of class society. It is not the cadres who create the ideas, but the ideas that create the cadres. Fear of the power of the apparatus is one of the most salient features of the opportunism cultivated by the Stalinist bureaucracy. Marxist critique is stronger than any apparatus.

The organizational forms that the future development of the Left Opposition will take depend on a great many circumstances : the weight of historical blows, the resilience of the Stalinist bureaucracy, the actions of ordinary communists, and the energy of the opposition itself. However, the principles and methods we defend have been tested in the most important events of world history, in defeat as well as in victory. They will prevail.

The successes of the opposition in all countries, including Germany, are well-known. But they are happening more slowly than many of us expect. This is regrettable, but not surprising. The bureaucracy cynically presents communists who begin to listen to the left-wing opposition with the following choice : participate in the campaign against "Trotskyism," or leave the ranks of the Communist International. For party officials, their jobs and salaries are at stake, and the Stalinist apparatus is masterful at exploiting sensitive issues. But the thousands of ordinary communists, torn between their devotion to communist ideals and the threat of expulsion from the Communist International, are infinitely more important. This explains why there are so many divided, intimidated, or hidden opposition members within the official Communist Party.

This unusual combination of historical factors is sufficient to explain the slow organizational growth of the Left Opposition. Despite this slowness, the intellectual life of the Communist International is today, even more than yesterday, focused on the struggle against "Trotskyism." The journals and theoretical articles in the newspapers of the Russian Communist Party and other sections are primarily devoted to the struggle against the Left Opposition, sometimes openly, sometimes indirectly. The relentless organizational persecution waged by the apparatus against the opposition is even more symptomatic : sabotage of its meetings by brutal methods ; use of physical force in all its forms ; backroom deals with bourgeois pacifists, French radicals, and Freemasons against "Trotskyists" ; and the dissemination of venomous calumnies by the Stalinist center.

The Stalinists sense more quickly and understand better than the opposition the extent to which our ideas undermine the pillars of their apparatus. However, the Stalinist faction's methods of self-defense are double-edged. Up to a certain point, they operate through intimidation. But by the same token, they prepare a mass reaction against the falsifications and the use of physical force.

When, in July 1917, the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary government labeled the Bolsheviks agents of the German General Staff, this infamous maneuver initially had a real effect on the soldiers, the peasants, and the backward strata of the working class. But when subsequent events clearly vindicated the Bolsheviks, the masses began to say to themselves : the Leninists were consciously slandered ; if they were persecuted so violently, it was because they were right. And mistrust of the Bolsheviks gave way to devotion and intense affection. In a different situation, we are witnessing a similar phenomenon today. Through this monstrous accumulation of slander and repressive measures, the Stalinist bureaucracy undeniably succeeded in intimidating ordinary party members for a time. But by doing so, it paves the way for the mass rehabilitation of the Leninist Bolsheviks in the eyes of the revolutionary masses. There is no doubt about it.

Certainly, we are still very weak today. The Communist Party still has the masses, but it already lacks both theory and strategic direction. The Left Opposition has already developed its Marxist orientation, but it does not yet have the masses with it. The other "left-wing" groups have neither. The Leninbund, which is trying to compensate for the lack of a serious, principled political line with the whims and personal moods of Urbans, is floundering desperately. The Brandlerians, despite the cadres they possess, are tumbling down the steps ; no tactical formula can replace the adoption of a revolutionary strategic position. The SAP has put itself forward as a candidate for the revolutionary leadership of the proletariat—an unfounded claim ! Even the most serious representatives of this "party," as Fritz Sternberg's latest book proves, do not transcend the limits of left-wing centrism. The more they strive to create their own "doctrine," the more they prove they are Thalheimer's disciples. This school has no more future than a corpse.

A new historical party cannot simply emerge because a number of former social democrats have belatedly become convinced of the counter-revolutionary nature of Ebert and Wels's policies. Nor can a new party be improvised from a group of disillusioned communists who have not yet proven their right to lead the proletariat. For a new party to appear, what is needed is, on the one hand, significant historical events that shatter the backbone of the old parties, and on the other hand, a principled position developed by experienced leaders based on historical experience.

When we strive with all our might to regenerate the Communist International and to ensure the continuity of its future development, we are by no means yielding to formal fetishism. We place the fate of the world proletarian revolution above the organizational future of the Communist International. If, despite all our efforts, the worst-case scenario were to materialize, if the Stalinist bureaucracy were to lead the current official parties to their downfall, if, in a certain sense, everything had to start all over again, then the new International would find its source in the ideas and frameworks of the left-wing communist opposition.

Criteria such as "pessimism" and "optimism" are insufficient and do not apply to our political work. It transcends particular stages, defeats, and victories. Our politics is long-term politics.
Postscript

This pamphlet, whose chapters were written at various times, was already finished when a telegram from Berlin brought news of the conflict that had just erupted between the overwhelming majority in the Reichstag and the Papen government, and consequently with the President of the Reich. We will follow the concrete developments of events closely in the pages of Permanente Revolution. We only wish to revisit certain general conclusions that may have seemed questionable at the outset of this pamphlet, but which have since been confirmed by events.

1. The Bonapartist character of the Papen-Schleicher government is fully demonstrated by its isolation in the Reichstag. The agrarian and capitalist circles that are directly behind the presidential government represent an incomparably smaller fraction of the German nation than the percentage of votes obtained by Papen in the Reichstag would suggest.

2. The antagonism between Papen and Hitler is the same antagonism that exists between the agrarian and capitalist elite on the one hand, and the reactionary petty bourgeoisie on the other. Just as the liberal bourgeoisie once used the revolutionary movement of the petty bourgeoisie but prevented it by all means from seizing power, so too is the monopoly bourgeoisie prepared to take Hitler as a lackey but not as its master. Unless absolutely necessary, it will never entrust all power to fascism.

3. The fact that the various factions of the large, middle, and petty bourgeoisie are engaged in an open power struggle, without fearing an extremely risky conflict, proves that the bourgeoisie does not feel directly threatened by the proletariat. The National Socialists and the center, but also the leading figures of the Social Democrats, risked a constitutional conflict only because they were certain it would not escalate into a revolutionary conflict.

4. The Communist Party is the only party whose votes against Papen were dictated by revolutionary aims. But there is still a long way to go from revolutionary aims to revolutionary achievements.

5. The logic of events is such that the struggle for "parliament" and for "democracy" becomes, for every social-democratic worker, a question of power. This is the fundamental meaning of the entire conflict from the point of view of the revolution. The question of power is the question of unity in revolutionary actions of the proletariat. The united front policy toward social democracy must allow, in the near future, in a form respecting workers' democracy, the creation of organs of class struggle, that is to say, workers' councils.

6. Faced with the gifts offered to capitalists and the unprecedented attack on the living standards of the proletariat, the Communist Party must put forward the slogan of workers' control over production.

7. The different fractions of the propertied classes can only quarrel because the revolutionary party is weak.

The revolutionary party could become infinitely stronger if it were to capitalize on the infighting among the propertied classes. But to achieve this, it is necessary to be able to distinguish the different factions according to their social composition and political methods, and not lump them all together. The theory of social fascism, which has completely and definitively failed, must finally be abandoned like a piece of old junk.

Notes

[1] Although he concealed the above-quoted speech from the Party and the Communist International, the Stalinist press launched one of its usual campaigns against him. Manuilsky wrote that I dared to "equate" the fascists with the Jacobins, who are, however, our revolutionary ancestors. The latter assertion is more or less true. Unfortunately, these ancestors have a great many descendants, incapable of using their brains. Echoes of this old polemic can be found in Münzenberg's recent writings against Trotskyism. However, we will not dwell on them.

[2] Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (General Confederation of German Trade Unions) [1919-1933].

[3] Allgemeiner Freier Angestelltenbund (General Free Confederation of Employees) [1919-1933].

[4] The fact that the Brandlerians (see their "Tribune" in Stuttgart on August 27) are parting ways with us on this issue and supporting the charade of Stalin, Manuilsky, Lozovsky, and Münzenberg is not a surprise to us. After setting an example of their united front policy in Saxony in 1923, Brandler-Thälmann supported Stalin's policy toward the Kuomintang and the Anglo-Russian Committee. Can they afford to miss the opportunity to rally to Barbusse's cause ? Otherwise, their political profile would be incomplete.

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The tragedy of the German proletariat

German workers will rise again, Stalinism never will !

March 14, 1933

The most powerful proletariat in Europe, by virtue of its role in production, its social weight, and the strength of its organizations, offered no resistance to Hitler's rise to power and the first violent attacks against workers' organizations. This is the fact from which future strategic calculations must be made.

It would be utter nonsense to think that Germany's future development would follow the Italian path : that Hitler would consolidate his domination step by step without encountering serious resistance ; that German fascism had many years of dominance ahead of it. No, the future of National Socialism must be determined by an analysis of the German and international situation, not by mere historical analogies. But one thing is clear from the outset : if, as early as September 1930, we were demanding that the Communist International set short-term objectives for Germany, now a long-term policy must be developed. Before decisive battles are possible, the vanguard of the German proletariat must find a new direction—that is, clearly understand what has happened, define its responsibility for this great historical defeat, chart new paths, and thus regain its confidence.

The criminal role of social democracy needs no further comment : the creation of the Communist International fourteen years ago was precisely aimed at wresting the proletariat from the demoralizing influence of social democracy. If this has not succeeded thus far, if the German proletariat has proven itself, in a very great historical ordeal, powerless, disarmed, and paralyzed, the direct and immediate blame lies with the post-Leninist leadership of the Communist International. This is the first conclusion that must be urgently drawn.

Under the treacherous blows of the Stalinist bureaucracy, the Left Opposition maintained its loyalty to the official party to the very end. The Bolshevik-Leninists now share the fate of all other communist organizations : our cadres are arrested, our publications banned, our literature confiscated ; Hitler even hastened to shut down the Opposition Bulletin, which is published in Russian. But while the Bolshevik-Leninists, along with the entire proletarian vanguard, suffer all the consequences of fascism's first serious victory, they cannot and will not bear the slightest responsibility for the official policy of the Communist International.

From 1923 onwards, that is, from the very beginning of the struggle against the Left Opposition, the Stalinist leadership did its utmost, albeit indirectly, to help Social Democracy disorient, confuse, and discourage the German proletariat : it held back and restrained the workers, when the situation demanded a bold revolutionary offensive ; it proclaimed the approach of a revolutionary situation, when this already belonged to the past ; it made deals with the rhetoricians and chatterers of the petty bourgeoisie ; it helplessly followed Social Democracy under the pretext of pursuing a united front policy ; it proclaimed the "third period" and the struggle to conquer the streets under conditions of political decline and weakness of the Communist Party ; it replaced serious struggle with leaps, adventures, or parades ; it isolated the communists from the mass trade unions ; It identified social democracy with fascism and refused a united front with mass workers' organizations in the face of attacks by National Socialist gangs ; it sabotaged every local initiative for a defensive united front and, at the same time, systematically deceived the workers about the real balance of power, distorted the facts, presented friends as enemies and enemies as friends, and squeezed the party more and more tightly by the throat, not allowing it to breathe freely, to speak, or to think.

In the very abundant literature devoted to the question of fascism, it suffices to refer to the speech of the official leader of the German party, Thaelmann, who, at the plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, in April 1931, unmasked the "pessimists" in the following terms, that is to say, the people who knew how to face the future : "we were not led astray by the panickers... We firmly and sensibly established that September 14 (1930) was, in a certain way, Hitler's greatest day, and that the days that followed would be not better but worse ; this assessment that we gave of the development of this party is confirmed by events... Today, the fascists no longer have any reason to laugh." Alluding to the fact that social democracy was forming its own defense groups, Thaelmann demonstrated in this speech that these detachments were in no way distinguishable from the shock troops of National Socialism, and that they were both preparing to crush the communists.

Today, Thaelmann is arrested. The Bolshevik-Leninists find themselves, along with Thaelmann, under the blows of triumphant reaction. But Thaelmann's policy is Stalin's policy, that is to say, the official policy of the Communist International. It is precisely this policy that is the cause of the complete demoralization of the party at the moment of danger, when the leaders lose their heads, when party members, having lost the habit of thinking, fall into a state of prostration, and when the highest historical positions are surrendered without a fight. A flawed political theory carries within itself its own punishment. The strength and obstinacy of the apparatus only increase the magnitude of the catastrophe.

Having surrendered to the enemy everything that could be surrendered in such a short time, the Stalinists are trying to rectify what has happened through chaotic actions that only serve to highlight the entire chain of their crimes. Today, while the Communist Party press is being silenced, the apparatus destroyed, and the bloody rag of fascism flies with impunity over Liebknecht's house, the Executive Committee of the Communist International is embarking on the path of the united front not only at the grassroots level but also at the top. This new zigzag, more abrupt than any that came before, was not, however, initiated by the Executive Committee of the Communist International on its own : the Stalinist bureaucracy ceded the initiative to the Second International. It has succeeded in seizing the instrument of the united front, which it had hitherto feared to a mortal degree. Insofar as one can speak of advantages in a situation of panicked retreat, these lie entirely with reformism. Forced to answer a direct question, the Stalinist bureaucracy chooses the worst possible solution : it neither rejects the agreement of the two Internationals nor accepts it ; it plays hide-and-seek. It has lost so much self-confidence, it is so humiliated, that it no longer dares to confront, before the world proletariat, the leaders of the Second International, those blatant agents of the bourgeoisie, those Hindenburg voters, who paved the way for fascism.

In the appeal of the Executive Committee of the Communist International ("To the Workers of All Countries") of March 5, the Stalinists do not speak of "social-fascism" as the principal enemy. Nor do they recall their leader's great discovery : "social democracy and fascism are not antipodes, but twins." They no longer assert that the struggle against fascism requires the prior crushing of social democracy. They do not breathe a word about the impossibility of a united front from above. On the contrary, they meticulously enumerate the instances in the past when the Stalinist bureaucracy, unexpectedly for the workers and for itself, found itself obliged to propose, in passing, on the spur of the moment, a united front to the reformist leaders. Thus, in the gust of the historical storm, artificial and false theories, worthy of charlatans, are scattered.

Referring to the "original conditions of each country" and the supposed impossibility of organizing a united front on an international scale (conveniently forgetting the entire struggle against "exceptionalism," that is, the right-wing theory of national particularities !), the Stalinist bureaucracy recommends that national Communist Parties submit a proposal for a united front to the "Central Committees of the Social Democratic Parties." Just yesterday, this was called capitulating to social fascism ! Thus, the highest lessons of Stalinism over the past four years are swept under the rug, and an entire political system crumbles to dust.

The matter doesn't end there : having just declared that it was impossible to establish conditions for a united front on the international stage, the Executive Committee of the Communist International immediately forgets this and, twenty lines later, formulates the conditions under which a united front is acceptable and permissible in all countries, regardless of differences in national circumstances. The retreat from fascism is accompanied by a panicky retreat from the theoretical tenets of Stalinism. Fragments and debris of ideas and principles are cast aside like ballast.

The conditions for a united front, put forward by the Communist International for all countries (Action Committees against Fascism, demonstrations and strikes against wage cuts), offer nothing new ; on the contrary, they are a schematic, bureaucratized reproduction of the slogans that the left-wing opposition formulated much more precisely and concretely two and a half years ago, which led to its being labeled as social-fascist. A united front based on these principles could yield decisive results in Germany ; but for this to happen, it would have to be implemented in time. Time is the most important factor in politics.

What, then, is the practical value of the proposals of the Executive Committee of the Communist International at present ? For Germany, it is minimal. The united front policy presupposes a "front," that is, firm positions and centralized leadership. The Left Opposition has, in the past, put forward the conditions for a united front as conditions for active defense, with the prospect of a move to the offensive. Today, the German proletariat has reached the stage of disorderly retreat, which does not even include rearguard actions. In these circumstances, spontaneous alliances between communist and social-democratic workers can and will form for isolated and sporadic tasks, but the systematic realization of the united front is inevitably postponed indefinitely. We must no longer harbor any illusions about it.

A year and a half ago, we declared that the key to the situation lay in the hands of the German Communist Party. Today, the Stalinist bureaucracy has let slip that key. Significant events, beyond the Party's control, will be necessary to give the workers the opportunity to pause, regroup, reorganize, and launch an active defense. We do not know precisely when that moment will arrive. Perhaps much sooner than the triumphant counter-revolution anticipates. But in any case, those who drafted the manifesto of the Executive Committee of the Communist International will not be the ones directing the united front policy in Germany.

If the central position has been abandoned to the enemy, the surrounding areas must be reinforced, strongpoints prepared for a future concentric attack. This preparation within Germany involves a critical analysis of the past, maintaining the morale and cohesion of the vanguard fighters, and organizing the rearguard fighters wherever possible, in anticipation of the moment when isolated detachments can unite into a large army. This preparation also entails the defense of proletarian positions in countries closely linked to Germany, or its immediate neighbors : Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic States, Scandinavia, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Switzerland. Fascist Germany must be surrounded by a powerful ring of proletarian positions. Without ceasing for a single minute to try to stop the disorderly retreat of the German workers, it is now necessary to create strong proletarian positions around the borders of Germany for the struggle against fascism.

First and foremost is Austria, which is most directly threatened by the fascist coup. It can be said with certainty that if the Austrian proletariat were to seize power today and transform its country into a revolutionary battleground, Austria would become to the revolution of the German proletariat what Piedmont was to the revolution of the Italian bourgeoisie. It is impossible to foresee how far the Austrian proletariat, driven forward by events but paralyzed by the reformist bureaucracy, will go down this path. The task of communism is to assist events against Austro-Marxism. The means to this end is the policy of the united front. The conditions that the manifesto of the Executive Committee of the Communist International reiterates, so belatedly after the opposition of the Left, thus retain their full force.

The united front policy, however, presents not only advantages but also dangers. It easily gives rise to leaders plotting behind the backs of the masses, passively adapting to the ally, and opportunistic vacillations. These dangers can only be prevented by providing two explicit guarantees : maintaining complete freedom of criticism regarding the ally and restoring complete freedom of criticism within one's own party. Refusing to criticize one's allies leads directly and immediately to capitulation to reformism. The united front policy without internal party democracy—that is, without party control over the apparatus—leaves the leaders free to engage in opportunistic experiments, the inevitable complement to adventurist ventures.

How is the Executive Committee of the Communist International acting in this situation ? Dozens of times, the left-wing opposition predicted that, under the pressure of events, the Stalinists would be forced to abandon their ultra-leftism, and that, once on the path to a united front, they would commit all the opportunistic betrayals they had accused us of the day before. This prediction has come true, once again, word for word.

After making a perilous leap to align itself with the united front, the Executive Committee of the Communist International trampled underfoot the fundamental guarantees that alone could ensure the revolutionary content of the united front policy. The Stalinists took note and adopted the hypocritical and diplomatic demand of the reformists concerning so-called "mutual non-aggression." Renouncing all the traditions of Marxism and Bolshevism, the Executive Committee of the Communist International recommended that Communist Parties, in the event of the united front being established, "renounce attacks against social-democratic organizations during the common struggle." That's how it was worded ! Renouncing "attacks (!) against social democracy" (what a shameful phrase !) implies renouncing the freedom of political criticism, that is, the fundamental function of the revolutionary party.

This capitulation is brought about not by practical necessity, but by panic. The reformists are coming to an agreement and will continue to do so to the extent that the pressure of events, combined with that of the masses, forces them to. The demand for "non-aggression" is blackmail, that is, an attempt by the reformist leaders to gain an additional advantage. Submitting to blackmail means building the united front on rotten foundations and giving the reformist schemers the opportunity to shatter it under any pretext.

Criticism in general, and even more so under the conditions of the united front, must, of course, correspond to the actual situation and not exceed certain limits. The absurdity of "social-fascism" must be rejected : it is not a concession to social democracy but to Marxism. The ally should not be criticized for its betrayals in 1918, but for its poor performance in 1933. Criticism, like political life itself, of which it is the voice, cannot be suspended for even an hour. If communist revelations correspond to reality, they serve the objectives of the united front, propel the temporary ally forward, and, even more importantly, provide a revolutionary education to the proletariat as a whole. The first stage of the shameful and criminal policy that Stalin imposed on the Chinese communists with regard to the Kuomintang was precisely marked by the abandonment of this fundamental obligation.

The situation is no better with regard to the second guarantee. Having abandoned any criticism of social democracy, the Stalinist apparatus doesn't even consider restoring the right to criticism to members of its own party. The shift itself is carried out, as usual, in the form of a bureaucratic revelation. No national congress, no international congress, not even a plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, no preparation in the party press, no analysis of past political events. And this is not surprising : from the very beginning of the discussion within the party, any thinking worker would ask the people in the apparatus : why have the Bolshevik-Leninists been expelled from all the sections, why are they being arrested, deported, and shot in the USSR ? Is it simply because they dig deeper and see further ? The Stalinist bureaucracy cannot accept this conclusion. It is capable of any leap and turn, but it cannot and does not dare to accept a fair confrontation with the Bolshevik-Leninists in front of the workers. Thus, in the struggle for its survival, the apparatus undermines its new direction, ruining in advance its credibility not only with the Social Democrats, but also with the Communist workers.

The publication of the manifesto of the Executive Committee of the Communist International is accompanied by another circumstance, somewhat tangential to the matter at hand, but which sheds considerable light on the current situation of the Communist International and the attitude of the Stalinist leadership towards it. The manifesto was printed in Pravda on March 6th, not as a direct and open appeal in the name of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in Moscow, as had always been the case, but presented as a translation of a document from L'Humanité, transmitted by the TASS news agency in Paris. What an absurd and humiliating trick ! After all the successes, after the implementation of the first Five-Year Plan, after the "liquidation of the classes," after the "entry into socialism," the Stalinist bureaucracy doesn't dare print, under its own name, the manifesto of the Executive Committee of the Communist International ! This is her true attitude towards the Communist International, this is how she really feels in the international arena.

The manifesto was not the only response to the Second International's initiative. Through front organizations—the German and Polish Red Opposition trade unions (RGO), Antifa, and the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGT)—the Communist International convened a "pan-European, workers', and anti-fascist congress" for April. The guest list was, as expected, vague and extensive : "businesses" (it was phrased as such : "businesses," even though communists had been excluded from almost every business in the world, thanks to the efforts of Stalin and Lozovsky), local workers' organizations, revolutionary, reformist, Catholic, and non-partisan groups, sports organizations, anti-fascist groups, and peasant organizations. Furthermore, "We want to invite all isolated individuals who are effectively fighting (!) for the workers' cause." Having ruined the cause of the masses for a long time, the strategists are now appealing to "isolated individuals," those righteous people who have not found a place among the masses, but who, nevertheless, "are effectively fighting for the cause of the workers." Barbusse and General Schönaich will be mobilized once again to save Europe from Hitler.

We have before us the ready-made script for one of those charlatan performances that Stalinists usually use to mask their impotence. What did the Amsterdam bloc of centrists and pacifists do in the fight against the Japanese brigands' attack on China ? Nothing. Out of respect for Stalinist "neutrality," the pacifists didn't even publish a manifesto of protest. Today, they are preparing a reenactment of the Amsterdam congress, not against the war, but against fascism. What will the anti-fascist bloc do with the absent "enterprises" and the powerless "isolated" members ? Nothing. They will produce an empty manifesto, if, this time, they even make it to the congress.

The penchant for "lone wolves" has two extremes : opportunistic and adventurous. Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the past extended a hand to liberals while holding a bomb in their left. The experience of the last ten years proves that after every major defeat, provoked or at least exacerbated by the policies of the Communist International, the Stalinist bureaucracy has invariably tried to salvage its reputation with some grandiose adventure (Estonia, Bulgaria, Canton). Is this danger not still present today ? In any case, we consider it our duty to raise our voices in warning. Adventures that aim to replace the action of the paralyzed masses further disorganize them and worsen the catastrophe.

The conditions of the current world situation, as well as the conditions in each country taken separately, are as deadly for social democracy as they are favorable to the revolutionary party. But the Stalinist bureaucracy has managed to transform the crisis of capitalism and that of reformism into a crisis of communism. Such is the outcome of ten years of unchecked leadership by its epigones.

There are hypocrites who say : the left-wing opposition criticizes a party that has fallen into the hands of the executioner. The scoundrels add : the opposition is helping the executioner. By combining hypocritical sentimentality and a poisonous lie, the Stalinists try to hide the Central Committee behind the apparatus, the apparatus behind the party, and to evade the question of who is responsible for the catastrophe, the flawed strategy, the disastrous regime, the criminal leadership : this is what it means to help the executioners of today and tomorrow.

The policies of the Stalinist bureaucracy in China were no less disastrous than the current policies in Germany. But there, things happened behind the backs of the world proletariat, under circumstances it did not understand. The critical voice of the left-wing opposition in the USSR barely reached the workers of other countries. The China experiment went almost unpunished for the Stalinist apparatus. In Germany, it is different. Every stage of the drama has unfolded before the eyes of the world proletariat. At each stage, the opposition has made its voice heard. The entire course of development was predicted in advance. The Stalinist bureaucracy slandered the opposition, attributed to it ideas and plans that were foreign to it, excluded all those who spoke of a united front, helped the Social Democratic bureaucracy sabotage the unified defense committees at the local level, deprived the workers of any possibility of embarking on the path of mass struggle, disorganized the vanguard, and paralyzed the proletariat. Thus, by opposing the united defense front with the Social Democrats, the Stalinists found themselves aligned with them in a united front of panic and capitulation.

And today, already facing ruins, the leadership of the Communist International fears nothing more than the light and criticism. Let the world revolution perish, but long live false prestige ! The bankrupts sow confusion and cover their tracks. Pravda considers it a "huge political victory" that the German Communist Party, while receiving the first blows, lost "only" 1,200,000 votes, despite an overall increase in voters of four million. Similarly, Stalin, in 1924, considered it a "huge victory" that the German workers, who had retreated without a fight, managed to give the Communist Party 3,600,000 votes. If the proletariat, deceived and disarmed by both apparatuses, gave the Communist Party nearly five million voters this time, it only means that it would have given it two or three times as many, had it had confidence in its leadership. He would have brought him to power, if the party had been able to show that it was capable of seizing and holding onto it. But he gave the proletariat nothing but confusion, zigzags, defeats, and misfortunes.

Yes, five million communists still managed to go to the polls, one by one. But they are neither in the factories nor in the streets. They are bewildered, scattered, demoralized. Under the yoke of the apparatus, they have lost the habit of being independent. The bureaucratic terror of Stalinism paralyzed their will, before the criminal terror of fascism took its turn.

It must be said clearly, unequivocally, openly : Stalinism in Germany has had its August 4th. From now on, the vanguard workers of this country will only speak of the period of Stalinist bureaucracy's domination with a burning sense of shame, with words of hatred and curse. The official Communist Party of Germany is doomed. From now on, it can only lose ground, crumble, and be reduced to nothing. No artificial means can save it. German communism can only be reborn on new foundations and with a new leadership.

The law of uneven development is also reflected in the fate of Stalinism. In different countries, it finds itself at different stages of its decline. To what extent Germany's tragic experience will serve as an impetus for the revival of the other sections of the Communist International, only time will tell. In Germany, at any rate, the sinister song of the Stalinist bureaucracy has ceased to be sung. The German proletariat will rise again ; Stalinism never will. The German vanguard workers must build a new party under the terrible blows of the enemy. The Bolshevik-Leninists will devote all their strength to this task.

Vingt ans de dégénérescence stalinienne

Robert Paris — 2025-10-12T22:05:00Z

Léon Trotsky
Vingt ans de dégénérescence stalinienne

(1938)

Pour répondre correctement à la question posée dans le titre de cet article, il faut tout d'abord établir la différence entre la conquête fondamentale de la Révolution d'Octobre - la propriété nationalisée - et la politique menée par le gouvernement actuel. Il y a une contradiction entre la forme révolutionnaire de la propriété et la politique thermidorienne, c'est-à-dire réactionnaire. Mais jusqu'à présent cette politique n'a pas pu ou n'a pas osé ou n'a pas réussi à renverser encore la forme révolutionnaire de la propriété. Les tendances du gouvernement en place sont diamétralement opposées au programme du bolchevisme. Mais dans la mesure où les institutions érigées par la révolution continuent d'exister, la bureaucratie est obligée d'adapter extérieurement ses tendances aux vieux principes du bolchevisme : elle continue de jurer par les pactes d'Octobre ;il invoque les intérêts du prolétariat et qualifie invariablement le système soviétique de socialiste. On peut dire sans risquer une bévue que dans l'histoire de l'humanité, il n'y a jamais eu de gouvernement aussi porté au mensonge et à l'hypocrisie que la bureaucratie soviétique d'aujourd'hui.

En soi, la préservation de la propriété de l'État sur les moyens de production est d'une importance progressive énorme, dans la mesure où, avec l'aide de l'économie planifiée, elle permet d'atteindre un développement rapide des forces productives. Certes, les statistiques économiques publiées par la bureaucratie ne méritent aucune confiance : elles exagèrent systématiquement les succès tout en masquant les échecs. Il est néanmoins impensable de nier le fait qu'aujourd'hui encore les forces productives de l'Union soviétique se développent encore à un rythme qui n'était et n'est connu dans aucun autre pays du monde. Quiconque refuse de voir ce côté de l'affaire, identifiant le régime soviétique avec le fascisme - comme le fait, par exemple, Max Eastman - jette, comme disent les Allemands, le bébé avec l'eau sale du bain.Le développement des forces productives est le facteur fondamental de la culture humaine. Sans augmenter le pouvoir de l'homme sur la nature, il est même impossible de songer à détruire la domination de l'homme sur l'homme. Le socialisme ne peut être érigé sur l'arriération et la pauvreté. La prémisse technique du socialisme a fait un énorme pas en avant en Union soviétique au cours de ces vingt années.

Mais c'est surtout le mérite de la bureaucratie. Au contraire, la caste dirigeante s'est transformée en le plus grand frein au développement des forces productives. L'économie socialiste doit par essence s'inspirer des intérêts des producteurs et des besoins des consommateurs. Ces intérêts et besoins ne peuvent s'exprimer qu'au travers d'une démocratie florissante de producteurs et de consommateurs. La démocratie, dans ce cas particulier, n'est pas une sorte de principe abstrait. C'est le seul et unique mécanisme concevable pour préparer le système d'économie socialiste et le réaliser dans la vie.

Travailleurs expropriés politiquement

La clique au pouvoir en place a remplacé la démocratie soviétique, de parti, syndicale et coopérative par la domination des fonctionnaires. Mais une bureaucratie, même composée uniquement de génies, ne saurait assurer de ses bureaux les proportions nécessaires entre toutes les branches de l'économie, c'est-à-dire la correspondance nécessaire entre la production et la consommation. Ce que le lexique de la justice stalinienne qualifie de « sabotage », est en réalité l'une des conséquences néfastes des méthodes bureaucratiques de domination. Les manifestations de disproportion, de gaspillage et d'enchevêtrement, sans cesse croissantes, menacent de saper les fondements mêmes de l'économie planifiée. La bureaucratie cherche invariablement « le coupable ». Tel est dans la plupart des cas le sens secret des procès soviétiques de saboteurs.

Trouver une explication du régime existant dans la « soif de pouvoir » personnelle de Staline est bien trop superficiel. Staline n'est pas un individu mais un symbole de caste. Le pouvoir n'est pas quelque chose d'incorporel. Le pouvoir permet de disposer et de s'approprier les valeurs matérielles. Naturellement, l'égalité complète ne peut être atteinte d'un seul coup. Une certaine différenciation des rémunérations du travail est dictée à un stade donné dans l'intérêt d'augmenter la productivité du travail. Cependant, d'une importance décisive pour évaluer la nature de la société est la question suivante : la société évolue-t-elle dans le sens de l'égalité ou dans le sens des privilèges ? La réponse à cette question ne laisse place à aucun doute. La différenciation de la société [soviétique] a depuis longtemps dépassé les limites de la nécessité économique.Les privilèges matériels de la bureaucratie ont grandi comme un glacier. Craignant leur isolement des masses, la bureaucratie cherche à créer une nouvelle main-d'œuvre etl' aristocratie kolkhozienne sous la bannière du stakhanovisme.

Le partage du revenu national détermine à son tour le régime politique. La caste dirigeante ne peut permettre une démocratie producteurs-consommateurs pour la simple raison qu'elle spolie impitoyablement à la fois les producteurs et les consommateurs. On peut admettre comme un fait établi que la bureaucratie dévore pas moins de la moitié du fonds national de consommation, compte tenu bien entendu non seulement du logement, de la nourriture, des vêtements, des moyens de transport et de communication mais aussi des établissements d'enseignement, de la presse, de la littérature, des sports , cinéma, radio, théâtres, musées, etc. On peut donc à juste titre dire que si la bureaucratie est encore contrainte de s'adapter aux institutions et aux traditions de la Révolution d'Octobre, sa politique, qui exprime ses propres intérêts, est directement opposée aux intérêts du peuple et du socialisme.

Rôle de la bureaucratie soviétique

La même contradiction fondamentale peut être corroborée dans toutes les autres sphères de la vie sociale, telles que l'État, l'armée, la famille, l'école, la culture, la science, l'art, etc.

Du point de vue du marxisme, l'État est une machine par laquelle une classe règne sur une autre. La dictature du prolétariat n'est qu'une institution temporaire, indispensable aux travailleurs pour faire face à la résistance des exploiteurs et pour détruire l'exploitation. Dans une société sans classes, l'État, en tant qu'appareil de coercition, doit progressivement dépérir et être remplacé par la libre administration des producteurs et des consommateurs. Mais qu'observe-t-on en réalité ? Vingt ans après la révolution, l'État soviétique est devenu l'appareil de coercition et de contrainte le plus centralisé, despotique et sanguinaire. L'évolution de l'Etat soviétique se déroule donc en totale contradiction avec les principes du programme bolchevique. La raison en est à trouver en ceci, que la société, comme on l'a déjà dit,évolue non pas vers le socialisme mais vers la régénération des contradictions sociales. Si le processus continue dans cette direction, il doit inévitablement conduire à la renaissance des classes, à la liquidation de l'économie planifiée et à la restauration de la propriété capitaliste. Le régime étatique deviendra alors inévitablement fasciste.

La Révolution d'Octobre proclama comme l'une de ses tâches : dissoudre l'armée dans le peuple. On présumait que les forces armées seraient construites sur le principe de la milice. Seul ce type d'organisation de l'armée, faisant du peuple le maître armé de son destin, correspond à la nature de la société socialiste. Au cours de la première décennie, une préparation systématique a été faite pour le passage d'une armée de caserne à une armée de milice. Mais à partir du moment où la bureaucratie a réussi à écraser toute manifestation d'indépendance de la classe ouvrière, elle a ouvertement transformé l'armée en un instrument de sa propre domination. Le système de milice a été complètement mis de côté. Une armée de deux millions est maintenant une armée de caserne purement. Une caste d'officiers avec des généraux et des maréchaux a été rétablie.D'instrument de défense socialiste, l'armée est devenue un instrument de défense des privilèges de la bureaucratie. Les choses ne se sont cependant pas arrêtées là. La lutte entre la clique étroite de Staline et les chefs militaires plus autoritaires et talentueux, véritablement dévoués aux intérêts de la défense, a conduit à la décapitation de l'Armée rouge.

La position de la femme est l'indicateur le plus graphique et le plus révélateur pour évaluer un régime social et une politique de l'État. La Révolution d'Octobre inscrit sur sa bannière l'émancipation de la femme et crée la législation la plus progressiste de l'histoire sur le mariage et la famille. Cela ne signifie pas, bien sûr, qu'une « vie heureuse » était immédiatement réservée à la femme soviétique. Une véritable émancipation des femmes est inconcevable sans un essor général de l'économie et de la culture, sans la destruction de la cellule familiale économique petite-bourgeoise, sans l'introduction d'une préparation alimentaire et d'une éducation socialisées. Pendant ce temps, guidée par son instinct conservateur, la bureaucratie s'est alarmée de la « désintégration » de la famille. Il se mit à chanter des panégyriques au souper familial et à la lessive familiale, c'est-à-dire l'esclavage domestique de la femme.Pour couronner le tout, la bureaucratie a rétabli les sanctions pénales pour les avortements, remettant officiellement les femmes au statut de bêtes de somme. En totale contradiction avec l'ABC du communisme, la caste dirigeante a ainsi restauré le noyau le plus réactionnaire et le plus noir du régime de classe, c'est-à-dire la famille petite-bourgeoise.

Un indicateur graphique

La situation n'est guère meilleure dans le domaine de la culture. La croissance des forces productives a créé les prémisses matérielles d'une nouvelle culture. Mais le développement de la culture est impensable sans critique, sans hésitation et sans erreur, sans travail créateur indépendant, en un mot, sans éveil de la personnalité humaine. La bureaucratie, cependant, refuse de tolérer une pensée indépendante dans un seul domaine d'activité créatrice. Et à sa manière, elle a raison : si la critique s'éveillait dans le domaine de l'art ou de la pédagogie, elle deviendrait inévitablement dirigée contre la bureaucratie, contre ses privilèges, contre son ignorance et son arbitraire. C'est là que se trouve l'explication du fait que la « purge », commencée par le parti, pénétra plus tard dans toutes les sphères de la vie sociale sans exception. Avec le « trotskisme » comme signe,le GPU « purge » les poètes, les astronomes, les pédagogues et les musiciens, et ainsi les meilleures têtes tombent sous le museau des revolvers. Est-il concevable dans de telles conditions de parler de culture « socialiste » ?

Dans le domaine de l'alphabétisation ordinaire, les succès sont incontestables. Des millions de personnes ont appris à lire et à écrire. Parallèlement à cela, cependant, ils ont été privés du droit d'exprimer leurs opinions et leurs intérêts par le biais de la parole écrite. La presse ne sert que la bureaucratie. Les poètes dits « socialistes » n'ont le droit d'écrire que des hymnes à Staline. Le même droit est légué aux prosateurs. La population a le devoir de lire ces hymnes. Il en est de même pour le cinéma, la radio, le théâtre, etc. Un nouveau manuel primé sur l'histoire de la Russie a récemment été introduit dans les écoles. On peut dire sans exagération que ce manuel consiste uniquement en des falsifications, dont le but est de justifier le despotisme de la bureaucratie et l'autocratie personnelle de Staline.Même les manuels d'histoire de l'Église catholique, publiés avec l'approbation du Vatican, sont des modèles de conscience scientifique par rapport aux manuels stalinisés en URSS. Des dizaines de millions de têtes d'enfants sont infectées et empoisonnées par cette littérature méticuleuse.

La Révolution d'Octobre a proclamé le droit de chaque nationnon seulement à un développement culturel indépendant, mais aussi à la séparation de l'État. En fait, la bureaucratie a transformé l'Union soviétique en une nouvelle prison des peuples. Il est vrai que la langue nationale et l'école nationale continuent d'exister : dans ce domaine, le despotisme le plus puissant ne peut plus faire reculer la roue de l'évolution. Mais la langue des diverses nationalités n'est pas un organe de leur développement indépendant, mais l'organe de la domination bureaucratique sur elles. Les gouvernements des républiques nationales sont, bien entendu, nommés par Moscou, ou pour le dire plus précisément, par Staline. Mais ce qui est étonnant, c'est que vingt et dix de ces gouvernements s'avèrent soudainement constitués d'« ennemis du peuple » et d'agents d'un gouvernement étranger. Derrière cette accusation,qui sonne beaucoup trop grossièrement et ridiculement même sur les lèvres de Staline et de Vychinski, se cache en réalité le fait que, dans les républiques nationales, les fonctionnaires, même ceux nommés par le Kremlin, tombent sous la dépendance des conditions et des humeurs locales et s'infectent progressivement avec un esprit d'opposition contre le centralisme étouffant de Moscou. Ils commencent à rêver ou à parler de remplacer le « chef bien-aimé » et de détendre les tentacules d'acier. C'est la vraie raison pour laquelle toutes les républiques nationales de l'URSS, ont été récemment décapitées.tomber dans la dépendance des conditions et des humeurs locales et devenir progressivement infecté par un esprit d'opposition contre le centralisme étouffant de Moscou. Ils commencent à rêver ou à parler de remplacer le « chef bien-aimé » et de détendre les tentacules d'acier. C'est la vraie raison pour laquelle toutes les républiques nationales de l'URSS, ont été récemment décapitées.tomber dans la dépendance des conditions et des humeurs locales et devenir progressivement infecté par un esprit d'opposition contre le centralisme étouffant de Moscou. Ils commencent à rêver ou à parler de remplacer le « chef bien-aimé » et de détendre les tentacules d'acier. C'est la vraie raison pour laquelle toutes les républiques nationales de l'URSS, ont été récemment décapitées.

Stalino-chauvinisme

Il est difficile de trouver dans l'histoire un exemple de réaction non teinté d' antisémitisme . Cette loi historique particulière est également complètement corroborée de nos jours en Union soviétique. Dans son livre intéressant, mais pas profond, Assignment in Utopia , Eugene Lyons, qui a passé de nombreuses années à Moscou, raconte comment la bureaucratie a exploité systématiquement, même si secrètement, les préjugés antisémites afin d'asseoir son pouvoir. Et comment peut-il en être autrement ? Le centralisme bureaucratique est impensable sans le chauvinisme, tandis que l'antisémitisme a toujours été la ligne de moindre résistance en ce qui concerne le chauvinisme.

Dans le domaine des étrangerspolitique, au cours de ces vingt années, il s'est produit un tournant non moins radical que dans les politiques internes. Ce n'est que par inertie ou avec une pensée cachée à l'esprit que la réaction bourgeoise continue d'accuser Staline d'inspirateur de la révolution mondiale. En fait, le Kremlin est devenu l'un des piliers de l'ordre public conservateur. L'époque où le gouvernement de Moscou liait le sort de la République soviétique à celui du prolétariat mondial et des peuples opprimés de l'Est est loin derrière elle. Hormis la question de savoir si la politique du « Front populaire » est bonne ou mauvaise, il se trouve qu'il s'agit de la politique traditionnelle du menchevisme contre laquelle Lénine s'est battu toute sa vie. Il signale le renoncement à la révolution prolétarienne au profit de la démocratie bourgeoise conservatrice.La caste dirigeante de Moscou cherche aujourd'hui une chose et une seule : vivre en paix avec toutes les classes dirigeantes.

La contradiction entre la Révolution d'Octobre et la bureaucratie thermidorienne a trouvé son expression la plus dramatique dans l'anéantissement de l' ancienne génération des bolcheviks. Vychinski, Yezhov, Troyanovsky, Maiski, agents du Komintern et du GPU, journalistes du type Dwianty-Louis Fisher, avocats du type Pritt, ne duperont pas l'opinion publique mondiale. Plus une seule personne sérieuse ne croit plus que des centaines de vieux révolutionnaires, dirigeants du Parti bolchevique sous l'illégalité [tsariste], dirigeants de la guerre civile, diplomates révolutionnaires soviétiques, chefs militaires de l'Armée rouge, chefs de 30 républiques soviétiques nationales, soient devenus tout d'un coup et comme par les commanditaires du fascisme. Le comité d'enquête de New York, composé de personnes impeccables et impartiales, a trouvé, après neuf mois de travail, que les procès de Moscou étaient la contrefaçon la plus grandiose de l'histoire de l'humanité.

Il ne s'agit pas aujourd'hui de prouver que Zinoviev, Kamenev, Smirnov, Piatakov, Serebryakov, Sokolnikov, Radek, Rakovsky, Krestinsky, Tukhachevsky et des centaines d'autres ont été victimes d'un coup monté. Cela a été prouvé. Il s'agit d'expliquer comment et pourquoi la clique du Kremlin a pu se risquer à entreprendre une machination aussi monstrueuse. La réponse à cela découle de tout ce qui a précédé.

Contradiction insoluble

Dans sa lutte pour le pouvoir et les revenus, la bureaucratie est obligée d'abattre et d'abattre les groupes qui sont liés au passé, qui connaissent et se souviennent du programme de la Révolution d'Octobre, qui se consacrent sincèrement aux tâches du socialisme. Le massacre des vieux bolcheviks et des éléments socialistes parmi la génération d'âge moyen et la plus jeune sont les maillons nécessaires de la chaîne de la réaction anti-octobre. C'est pourquoi l'accusateur-procureur aux procès s'est présenté en la personne d'un ancien garde blanc, Vychinski. C'est pourquoi, l'URSS est représentée à Washington par un ancien garde blanc, Troyanovsky, et à Londres par un ancien ministre de Koltchak, Maisky. Et ainsi de suite. Les personnes nécessaires se présentent aux endroits nécessaires.

Presque personne ne se laissera duper par la farce des récentes élections à Moscou. Hitler et Goebbels ont plus d'une fois commis exactement la même chose, exactement de la même manière. Il suffit de lire ce que la presse soviétique elle-même a écrit sur les plébiscites d'Hitler pour saisir le secret du « succès » de Staline. Les expériences parlementaires totalitaires ne témoignent que de ceci : qu'une fois tous les partis écrasés, y compris le sien ; une fois les syndicats étranglés ; une fois la presse, la radio et le cinéma subordonnés à la Gestapo ou à la Guépéou ; si le pain et le travail ne sont donnés qu'aux dociles ou aux silencieux, tandis qu'un revolver est placé à la tempe de chaque électeur, alors il est possible de réaliser des élections « à l'unanimité ». Mais cette unanimité n'est ni éternelle ni stable.Les traditions de la Révolution d'Octobre ont disparu de l'arène officielle, mais elles continuent de vivre dans la mémoire des masses. Sous couvert de machinations juridiques et électorales, les contradictions ne cessent de s'approfondir et ne peuvent manquer de déboucher sur une explosion. La bureaucratie réactionnaire doit être renversée et elle sera renversée. La révolution politique en URSS est inévitable. Il signifiera la libération des éléments de la nouvelle société du joug de la bureaucratie usurpatrice. Ce n'est que si cette condition est donnée que l'URSS pourra se développer dans le sens du socialisme.La bureaucratie réactionnaire doit être renversée et elle sera renversée. La révolution politique en URSS est inévitable. Il signifiera la libération des éléments de la nouvelle société du joug de la bureaucratie usurpatrice. Ce n'est que si cette condition est donnée que l'URSS pourra se développer dans le sens du socialisme.La bureaucratie réactionnaire doit être renversée et elle sera renversée. La révolution politique en URSS est inévitable. Il signifiera la libération des éléments de la nouvelle société du joug de la bureaucratie usurpatrice. Ce n'est que si cette condition est donnée que l'URSS pourra se développer dans le sens du socialisme.

Pourquoi le mouvement trotskyste a échoué...

Robert Paris — 2025-10-11T22:07:00Z

"L'émancipation des ouvriers ne peut être l'oeuvre que des ouvriers eux-mêmes. Il n'y a donc pas de plus grand crime que de tromper les masses, de faire passer des défaites pour des victoires, des amis pour des ennemis, d'acheter des chefs, de fabriquer des légendes, de monter des procès d'imposture, — de faire en un mot ce que font les staliniens. Ces moyens ne peuvent servir qu'à une fin : prolonger la domination d'une coterie déjà condamnée par l'histoire. Ils ne peuvent pas servir à l'émancipation des masses. Voilà pourquoi la IVe Internationale soutient contre le stalinisme une lutte à mort.

Il va sans dire que les masses ne sont pas sans péché. Nous ne sommes pas enclins à les idéaliser. Nous les avons vues en des circonstances variées, à diverses étapes, au milieu des plus grands bouleversements. Nous avons observé leurs faiblesses et leurs qualités. Leurs qualités : la décision, l'abnégation, l'héroïsme trouvaient toujours leur plus haute expression dans les périodes d'essor de la révolution. A ces moments, les bolcheviks furent à la tête des masses. Un autre chapitre de l'histoire s'ouvrit ensuite, quand se révélèrent les faiblesses des opprimés : hétérogénéité, insuffisance de culture, manque d'horizon. Fatiguées, déçues, les masses s'affaissèrent, perdirent la foi en elles-mêmes et cédèrent la place à une nouvelle aristocratie. Dans cette période les bolcheviks (les "trotskistes") se trouvèrent isolés des masses. Nous avons pratiquement parcouru deux cycles semblables : 1897-1905, années de flux ; 1907-1913, années de reflux ; 1917-1923, années marquées par un essor sans précédent dans l'histoire ; puis une nouvelle période de réaction qui n'est pas encore finie. Grâce à ces événements, les "trotskistes" ont appris à connaître le rythme de l'histoire, en d'autres termes la dialectique de la lutte des classes. Ils ont appris et, me semble-t-il, réussi à subordonner à ce rythme objectif leurs desseins subjectifs et leurs programmes. Ils ont appris à ne point désespérer parce que les lois de l'histoire ne dépendent pas de nos goûts individuels ou de nos critériums moraux. Ils ont appris à subordonner leurs goûts individuels à ces lois. Ils ont appris à ne point craindre les ennemis les plus puissants, si la puissance de ces ennemis est en contradiction avec les exigences du développement historique. Ils savent remonter le courant avec la conviction profonde que l'afflux historique d'une puissance nouvelle les portera jusqu'à l'autre rive. Pas tous ; beaucoup se noieront en chemin. Mais participer au mouvement les yeux ouverts, avec une volonté tendue, telle est bien la satisfaction morale par excellence qui puisse être donnée à un être pensant !"

Léon Trotsky dans "Leur morale et la nôtre"

Pourquoi le mouvement trotskyste international a eu du mal à se constituer et est resté faible en nombre et en compétences politiques et sociales ?

Avertissement : nous nous revendiquons du trotskysme et c'est à ce titre que nous dénions tout droit à se revendiquer du trotskysme à des organisations ne faisant aucune propagande ni ne menant aucune action en faveur des soviets, des conseils de travailleurs et de la perspective du pouvoir des conseils ouvriers révolutionnaires, ne faisant aucun effort pour vaincre les ennemis du prolétariat, notamment les réformistes mais aussi les courants pseudo-radicaux militaires ou islamistes notamment.

1°) Le mouvement trotskyste a été décimé, là où il né, en Russie, carrément éradiqué, massacré et aussi discrédité définitivement. Il n'a pas pu renaître car l'essentiel de la politique du stalinisme visait à empêcher une renaissance du mouvement révolutionnaire en Russie puis dans le reste du monde.

2°) Le mouvement trotskyste a été dénoncé, décrié, combattu et ses dirigeants assassinés partout dans le monde par les agents de Staline, spécialement apointés pour cela. Des intellectuels ont été embauchés partout dans le monde pour créditer la thèse « hitléro-trotskyste » et les dirigeants syndicaux aussi ont été manipulés par les officines de Staline.

3°) Ceux qui ont rejoint le mouvement trotskyste, à part un ou deux dirigeants dans chaque pays, ne venaient pas d'une ancienne forrmation communiste et rejoignaient plus par répulsion du stalinisme que par véritable militantisme et formation communiste révolutionnaire

4°) Une grande partie des trotskystes, hors de Russie, ont été coupés du prolétariat, notamment pas la chasse aux trotskystes dans les syndicats.

5°) Le mouvement trotskyste est né dans une phase de défaites successives du prolétariat qui ont marqué les nouveaux militants. Et c'étaient des défaites déterminantes comme celle, sans combat, du prolétariat allemand devant le fascisme. Non seulement mais l'aspect repoussant et démoralisant du stalinisme pour tous ceux qui le combattaient. Même si cela donnait raison à Trotsky, cela ne le renforçait pas. Le basculement des troskystes espagnols dans le sens nationaliste catalan et démocratique petit-bourgeois a signé la défaite de la révolution espagnole.

6°) La mainmise stalinienne sur l'URSS a permis la mainmise sur le mouvement ouvrier communiste mondial.

7°) La campagne mondiale sur les procès de Moscou, relayée par la presse bourgeoise, a contribué à discréditer les trotskystes dans l'opinion ouvrière.

8°) Le mouvement trotskyste, malgré l'influence de Trotsky, a, du coup, été victime de tendances petites bourgeoises qui n'étaient pas compensées par une implantation ouvrière. Il a même rejeté longtemps sa constitution en IVe Internationale, repoussé longtemps son programme de transition, souvent refusé de faire du travail en direction de la classe ouvrière, eu des illusions sur les fronts populaires, parfois même refusé de dénoncer fermement les crimes du stalinisme, etc…

9°) Dans ces conditions, l'assassinat de Trotsky, seul dirigeant révolutionnaire porteur des leçons du passé, a été déterminante pour tuer politiquement le mouvement trotskyste.

10°) Les meilleurs militants trotskystes ont été démoralisés par la guerre et l'après-guerre et particulièrement par l'absence d'une vague révolutionnaire après la guerre, vague éradiquée par avance par le bombardement systématique des quartiers ouvriers des pays vaincus par les forces alliées anglo-américaines. Les bombes atomiques ont achevé de terroriser les peuples, déjà torturés par la barbarie de la guerre dans les deux camps. La guerre mondiale a servi de bain de sng préventif comme pare-feu face aux risques révolutionnaires d'après-guerre. L'influence du stalinisme et du nationalisme ont permis que les révolutions coloniales ne prennent pas un tour prolétarien révolutionnaire.

11°) L'alliance Staline/Hiltler suivie de l'alliance Staline/USA/Angleterre ont transformé l'URSS bureaucratique en agence de l'impérialisme mondial et fait basculer le diagnostic de Trotsky (Etat ouvrier à déformations bureuacratiques) dans le sens des intérêts de la bourgeoisie. Ceux qui sont restés à l'analyse « Etat ouvrier » de la Russie n'en sont pas ressortis plus armés, au contraire. Ils ont continué à prôner la « défense de l'URSS », soi-disant par fidélité à Trotsky, alors même que, Natalia Trotsky et Muniz le soulignaient, la situation mondiale avait changé et que la Russie elle-même n'était plus qu'un facteur contre-révolutionnaire…

12°) Finalement, des groupes trotskystes allaient prendre des positions rompant avec le marxisme révolutionnaire, prêtant au stalinisme la capacité de créer des Etats « ouvriers » sans révolution, sans soviets, sans autre intervention que celle de l'armée de Staline avec l'accord des impérialismes occidentaux ou de l'armée de Mao, ou de celle de Castro ou d'autres encore. Ils allaient soutenir des fausses révolutions, de faux socialismes, des guerilla et autres mouvements situés en dehors de l'action révolurionnaire du prolétariat, et soutenir aussi les gauches bourgeoises, les syndicats bureaucratisés et réformistes, les faux écologistes, les faux féministes, les propagandistes du climat et bien d'autres mouvements qui n'ont rien de révolutionnaires et rien de socialistes.

La défaite de Trotsky en Russie ne voulait pas dire que ce dernier avait eu tort ou était devenu contre-révolutionnaire, contrairement à ce que les staliniens ont prétendu.

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6921

Qui étaient les trotskystes en URSS ?

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article3135

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6830

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6864

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6875

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6526

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6476

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6286

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6035

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article5426

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article4481

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article4464

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article3259
https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6952

Destin d'une révolution isolée et trahie - la contre-révolution stalinienne assassine les opposants communistes

http://www.matierevolution.org/spip.php?article2198

L'assassinat méthodique des dirigeants trotskystes dans le monde

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?breve1035

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?breve890

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6148

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article1438

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article5985

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article5956

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article5613

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6239

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article5968

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article5191

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6149

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6620

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article4850

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6358

Le rôle contre-révolutionnaire du stalinisme, le grand organisateur des défaites prolétariennes des années trente

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6240

Le stalinisme a méthodiquement acheté des intellectuels et les a dressés contre le trotskysme…

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6583

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article3608

« En 1923-24, des gens ont été expulsés de différents partis pour la seule raison qu'ils n'étaient pas d'accord pour condamner immédiatement Trotsky. Par la suite, ces éléments ont été contraints de regrouper leurs forces, sans avoir ni traditions révolutionnaires ni fondement théorique sous leurs pieds. Certains d'entre eux ne se sentaient même pas faire partie d'une organisation révolutionnaire et en ont vite profité pour l'abandonner. Cette dernière catégorie comprend Madeleine et Maurice Paz, et dans une certaine mesure le vieux Loriot et Souvarine qui, n'ayant pas eu le temps de devenir marxiste, est devenu libre penseur, comme je l'ai déjà écrit plus haut. En Allemagne, Urbahns a compromis pendant plusieurs années l'Opposition entre la social-démocratie et le sapronovisme. Enfin, en Belgique, Van Overstraten - et ce fut une grande surprise pour moi - s'est révélé impressionniste et dilettante. Sans compréhension marxiste, il recommence à zéro sur chaque question, comme sur une page blanche, comme un autodidacte politique, malgré sa formation intellectuelle. J'ai rencontré Overstraten à plusieurs congrès et lors de deux ou trois visites qu'il m'a rendu au commissariat militaire. Si je me souviens bien, il ne parlait jamais aux congrès et dans les conversations personnelles, il écoutait plus qu'il ne parlait. Il est tout à fait clair qu'il ne se sentait pas à l'aise dans le Comintern de Lénine : mais maintenant il l'admet ouvertement. Il a perdu la discipline théorique et organisationnelle, et je crains qu'il ne puisse plus la récupérer.
Les oppositionnels d'Europe occidentale n'ont jamais vécu une vie idéologique et politique cohérente, n'ont pas abordé les grandes questions, ne se sont pas impliqués dans la vie interne des autres partis. C'est ainsi que tous ces compagnons de route accidentels (Urbahns, Overstraten, Souvarine, Paz ) apparaissaient aux autres ainsi qu'à nos camarades, et ils se voyaient tels. Mais au fond, ils nous ont causé beaucoup de tort, en bloquant aux idées de l'opposition la voie de l'entrée dans le parti, qu'ils ont déclaré mort et liquidé. Cette approche était beaucoup plus facile et donnait la possibilité de vivre tranquillement dans son coin, avec une heure par semaine de discussions oppositionnelles.
Notre travail à l'étranger ces deux dernières années a été de mettre un terme à ces fictions, à la multiplication des malentendus fondamentaux et de développer les fondements de l'Opposition de gauche internationale. Pendant ces deux années, j'ai passé plus de temps à défricher qu'à construire. Mais c'était un travail préalable absolument nécessaire, si l'on tient compte du fait que le sol est très encombré, non seulement par les ordures de l'appareil officiel, mais aussi par la confusion et le chaos des regroupements d'opposition aléatoires et accidentels. Une organisation oppositionnelle fonctionnelle n'a été pratiquement présente, dans aucun pays, au cours des deux dernières années. La meilleure organisation était probablement le groupe américain, précisément parce qu'il s'est réellement constitué récemment, recevant une forte et nouvelle impulsion du VIe Congrès. »

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/oeuvres/1930/11/nin_21111930.htm

L'œuvre destructrice des procès de Moscou

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article4693

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article3160

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article3150

Le stalinisme s'est mobilisé, par exemple en France, contre les militants ouvriers trotskistes

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6838

Quand les staliniens français étaient mobilisés contre le trotskisme, proclamé ennemi numéro un et agent du fascisme

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article3263

« Oui, la question est de savoir pourquoi nous ne progressons pas en fonction de la valeur de nos idées, qui ne sont pas aussi dénuées de sens que le croient certains de nos amis.

Nous ne progressons pas politiquement. Ce fait est l'expression du recul général du mou\'ement ouvrier dans les quinze dernières années. Quand le mouvèmcnt révolutionnaire décline de façon générale, quand une défaite suit une autre défaite, quand le fascisme s'étend sur le monde entier. Quand le marxisme officiel s'incarne dans la plus formidable machine à duper les travailleurs, il va de soi que les révolutionnaires ne peuvent travailler que contre le courant historique général. Et cela, quand bien même leurs idées sont aussi intelligentes et exactes qu'on peut le souhaiter. »

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/livres/volumes/Tome%2021.pdf
Comment Trotsky critiquait le courant trotskyste de France sur la question syndicale

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article469

« Les militants de l'Opposition de gauche sont exécutés sans procès, et nombre d'entre eux ont sans doute péri dans le cours de la préparation des procès à spectacle, de ces amalgames dont on conçoit sans peine combien Staline eût aimé y faire figurer, dans le rôle d'accusé avouant ses crimes et battant sa coulpe, l'un des « irréductibles » qui n'avaient cessé de le braver depuis des années. Trotsky lui même redoutait, non sans raison, à l'annonce de chaque procès, d'y voir figurer l'un d'entre eux, brisé par les méthodes perfectionnées dont il ne sous estimait pas l'efficacité. Parmi tous les hommes qui n'avaient pas capitulé, Staline pourtant ne réussit finalement qu'à briser le seul Mouralov, celui là même qu'il avait curieusement épargné en le laissant exercer librement sa profession d'agronome dans la région de Novosibirsk. Ce coup très dur pour Trotsky demeura unique. Parmi les accusés des trois grands procès de Moscou ont figuré certes nombre d'anciens dirigeants ou militants de l'Opposition, mais, à l'exception de Mouralov, tous ces hommes avaient déjà « capitulé » des années auparavant et s'étaient reniés publiquement, Zinoviev et Kamenev, Piatakov et Krestinsky dès 1928, Smirnov, Mratchkovsky, Boguslavsky, Ter Vaganian après Radek en 1929, Rakovsky en 1934 enfin. Mais aucun des bolcheviks léninistes maintenus en isolateur depuis des années, restés fidèles à l'organisation et à son programme, n'a finalement collaboré, même sous la torture, aux procès préfabriqués et la majorité d'entre eux ont payé ce refus de leur vie.

Nous n'avons sur ce qu'étaient ces hommes en 1936 qu'un seul témoignage, celui de Victor Serge. Il écrit à Trotsky, le 27 mai 1936, peu après sa libération et son arrivée en Belgique :
« Nous sommes en ce moment fort peu nombreux : quelques centaines, dans les cinq cents. Mais ces cinq cents ne fléchiront plus. Ce sont des hommes trempés, qui ont appris à penser et à sentir par eux mêmes et qui acceptent avec tranquillité la perspective d'une persécution sans fin. Dans les isolateurs, nos camarades sont quelques dizaines au total, sur des centaines de zinoviévistes, droitiers et autres staliniens véreux. Parmi nous, il n'y a pas grande unité de vues. Boris Mikh(ailovitch Eltsine) disait : "C'est le G.P.U. qui fait notre unité". Deux grandes tendances se divisent à peu près par moitié : ceux qui estiment qu'il faut tout réviser, que l'on a commis des fautes depuis le début de la révolution d'Octobre et ceux qui considèrent le bolchevisme à ses débuts comme inattaquable. Les premiers sont enclins à considérer que dans les questions d'organisation vous aviez raison, avec Rosa Luxemburg, dans certains cas, contre Lénine autrefois. En ce sens, il y a un trotskisme dont les attaches remontent loin (personnellement, je suis aussi de cet avis, pensant toutefois que les principes d'organisation de Lénine ont fait leurs preuves dans une période et un pays donné, particulièrement arriéré). Nous nous divisons aussi par moitié sur les problèmes de la démocratie soviétique et de la dictature (les premiers, partisans de la démocratie ouvrière la plus large dans la dictature : mon impression est que cette tendance est en réalité de beaucoup la plus forte). Dans les isolateurs, un groupe dit du "capitalisme d'État" (Goskappisty) s'est détaché : ils professent que le capitalisme d'État vers lequel s'acheminent également Mussolini, Hitler et Staline, est aujourd'hui le pire ennemi du prolétariat. Ils sont peu nombreux, mais il y a parmi eux quelques camarades des plus capables [ ... ] Il devient de plus en plus difficile, sinon impossible de tenir [ ... ] En général, il n'y a plus d'autorités : les vieux se sont discrédités, les jeunes entendent penser par eux-mêmes. Par "vieux", j'entends ici la génération d'opposants de 23 28 dont il ne reste que quelques cadres admirables, des jeunes d'ailleurs comme les Iakovine et les Dingelstedt. Dans les isolateurs et ailleurs, on trouve surtout maintenant les opposants trotskystes de 1930 1933. Une seule autorité subsiste : la vôtre. Vous avez là bas une situation morale incomparable, des dévouements absolus. »

https://www.marxists.org/francais/broue/works/1980/00/broue_19800000l.htm

« Si Staline s'apprêtait à revenir sur le chemin de la révolution, il n'aurait pas exterminé et démoralisé les révolutionnaires. En dernière analyse, Mussolini a raison lorsqu'il écrit dans le « Giornale d'italia » que « personne jusqu'ici n'a porté de coups plus rudes à l'idéal du communisme (de la révolution prolétarienne) ni exterminé de communistes avec autant d'acharnement que Staline. »
Léon Trotsky – 9 mars 1938

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article3088

L'assassinat de Trotsky achève le travail de destruction du trotskysme…

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article6008

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article5975

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article5671

Pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale, plusieurs groupes trotskystes ont viré de bord et quelques rares ont partiellement tenu le cap…

https://www.marxists.org/francais/barta/1945/07/barta_19450702.htm

Les faiblesses du trotskysme en France ont joué un rôle important…

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/oeuvres/1930/11/301125a.htm

Trotsky rappelle à propos des trotskystes américains : « j'écrivais à Cannon :
"Le Parti a seulement une minorité de véritables ouvriers d'usine... Les éléments non prolétariens représentent un levain très nécessaire et je crois que nous pouvons être fiers de la qualité de ces éléments. Mais... notre Parti peut être inondé par des éléments non prolétariens et peut même perdre son caractère révolutionnaire. Evidemment notre tâche n'est pas d'empêcher l'afflux des intellectuels par des méthodes artificielles... mais d'orienter toute l'organisation vers les usines, les grèves, les syndicats...
"Prenons un exemple concret : nous ne pouvons pas consacrer suffisamment ou autant de forces à toutes les usines. Notre organisation locale peut choisir comme champ d'activité durant la période prochaine une, deux ou trois usines dans son rayon et concentrer toutes ses forces sur ces usines. Si nous avons, dans l'une d'elles, deux ou trois ouvriers, nous pouvons créer une commission spéciale de soutien de cinq membres non ouvriers dans le but d'élargir notre influence dans cette usine.
"La même chose doit être faite dans les syndicats. Nous ne pouvons pas introduire des membres non ouvriers dans les syndicats ouvriers. Mais nous pouvons constituer, avec des chances de succès, des commissions de soutien pour l'action orale et littéraire en connection avec nos camarades au sein du syndicat. Les conditions invariables de cette action doivent être : ne pas commander les ouvriers, mais seulement les aider, leur donner des suggestions, les armer de faits, d'idées, de journaux d'usines, de tracts spéciaux, etc.
"Une telle collaboration aurait une énorme importance éducative, d'une part pour les camarades ouvriers, d'autre part pour les membres non ouvriers qui ont besoin d'une solide rééducation.
"Vous avez par exemple, un nombre important d'éléments juifs non travailleurs dans vos rangs. Ils peuvent être un levain de valeur, si le Parti réussit à les extraire peu à peu d'un milieu clos, et à les lier aux ouvriers d'usines au moyen d'une activité quotidienne. Je crois qu'une telle orientation assurerait aussi une atmosphère plus saine à l'intérieur du Parti...
"Nous pouvons poser sans tarder une règle générale : un membre du Parti qui n'a pas gagné au Parti un nouvel ouvrier au cours de trois ou six mois n'est pas un bon membre du Parti.
"Si nous assurions sérieusement une telle orientation générale et si nous en vérifiions chaque semaine les résultats pratiques, nous éviterions un grand danger, celui de voir les intellectuels et les ouvriers en faux col supplanter la minorité ouvrière, la condamner au silence et transformer le Parti en un club de discussion très intelligent, mais absolument inhabitable pour les ouvriers.
"Les mêmes règles devraient être appliquées sous une forme correspondante en ce qui concerne le travail et le recrutement de l'organisation de jeunesse, sans quoi nous courons le danger d'éduquer de bons éléments jeunes en dilettantes révolutionnaires et non en combattants révolutionnaires."
Cette lettre prouve clairement, je l'espère, que je n'ai pas inventé le danger d'une déviation petite-bourgeois… »

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/livres/defmarx/dma7.htm

« La première chose qu'il faut comprendre dans la situation mondiale, et si on ne la comprend pas tout s'embrouille et l'action devient stérile, c'est que l'Etat et le gouvernement russes actuels, loin d'avoir pour base la révolution bolchevique de 1917, ou le moindre de ses restes, représentent face à elle la plus féroce et achevée des contre-révolutions. L'actuel gouvernement russe a contribué à lui seul à la défaite de la révolution mondiale et à l'état de prostration des masses bien plus que tous les gouvernements capitalistes.
Sans Moscou et le stalinisme mondial, ou bien la guerre impérialiste n'aurait pas éclaté, empêchée par la révolution européenne, ou bien la guerre se serait vite et victorieusement transformée en guerre civile. C'est cette dernière direction que prenait l'action spontanée des masses sous l'occupation nazie, action que le stalinisme et le capitalisme mondial ont, sous un étendard unitaire, réorientée vers la guerre impérialiste via les mouvements nationaux. Nous en sommes ainsi arrivés à l'actuelle complète domination réactionnaire du monde par les Trois Grands victorieux, ce qui entraîne une menace continuelle de nouvelle guerre impérialiste et qui donne aux masses une amère sensation de frustration, gage de domination stalinienne et réformiste. La crise du mouvement ouvrier mondial se résume donc dans la capacité organique du stalinisme (la social-démocratie est un second couteau de peu d'importance) à clouer l'activité des masses, pendant et après la guerre, dans le cercueil mis en place par les vieux impérialismes et la contre-révolution russe…

Face à la guerre le parti américain a eu une attitude opportuniste comparable à celle du centrisme et non à celle qui doit être la nôtre. Lui-même l'a définie comme non-soutien, transformation de la guerre impérialiste en vraie guerre contre le fascisme, opposition politique, etc... et de façon générale s'est abstenu d'agitation et de travail spécifique contre la guerre, tant à l'arrière qu'au front. Et la politique de ce parti est apparue face au monde, pendant des années, comme la politique officielle de la IV° Internationale ! D'autre part, ce qui faisait office de centre international l'a tacitement accepté comme bonne. Evidemment, la politique du parti américain a entraîné vers l'opportunisme tous les groupes de la IV° Internationale dans le monde. [...]
Les camarades qui pendant l'occupation, dans de terribles conditions, ont continué la lutte générale pour la révolution sur la base de nos idées, se sont montrés redevables de l'estime et de l'admiration de toute l'Internationale. Notre respect et notre amitié va à tous ceux qui sont tombés et ceux qui continuent. C'est cela même qui nous oblige à signaler les erreurs qui entravent aujourd'hui la croissance de l'organisation et la marche révolutionnaire. Pour résoudre positivement sa crise, pour aider l'Internationale à résoudre la sienne, le parti français doit analyser sa conduite et celle de l'Internationale pendant la guerre impérialiste, et condamner les opportunismes et les vacillements. L'erreur la plus grave en ce domaine vient de la nouvelle direction élue à la Pré-conférence d'avril 1946. Depuis plus d'un an elle n'a toujours pas mis en discussion la politique des principaux partis pendant la guerre impérialiste (...). Son erreur risque d'être davantage mortelle pour notre mouvement quand cette nouvelle direction rechigne à mettre à l'ordre du jour du Congrès mondial en préparation l'attitude des principaux partis face à la guerre impérialiste et aux mouvements nationaux. Une erreur peut être grave ou très grave, mais un parti qui sait les corriger poursuivra son chemin vers la révolution. Une erreur non rectifiée produit la phtisie théorique, l'ankylose organique, la destruction tôt ou tard. (…)

Ce n'est pas, comme le considèrent malheureusement quelques tendances, consubstantiel à notre mouvement. Le critère qui a toujours prévalu dans notre attitude vis-à-vis de la question est celui-ci : la défense de l'U.R.S.S. dans une guerre contre des ennemis extérieurs aide t-elle ou entrave t-elle la révolution mondiale ? [...] La « défense inconditionnelle de l'U.R.S.S. » s'est révélée incompatible avec la défense de la Révolution mondiale. La défense de la Russie doit être abandonnée de toute urgence parce qu'elle lie tous nos mouvements, pèse sur notre progrès théorique, et nous donne aux yeux des masses une physionomie stalinisante. Il est impossible de défendre la Révolution mondiale et la Russie en même temps. C'est l'un ou l'autre. Nous nous prononçons pour la Révolution mondiale, contre la défense de la Russie, et vous invitons à vous prononcer dans le même sens [...] pour être fidèles à la tradition révolutionnaire de la IV° Internationale, nous devons abandonner la théorie trotskyste de la défense de l'U.R.S.S. ; nous produirons ainsi dans l'Internationale la révolution idéologique indispensable pour la réussite de la Révolution mondiale. »

https://www.marxists.org/francais/4int/postwar/1947/06/nt_19470600.htm

L'Etat russe a été présenté par le stalinisme dans tout le mouvement ourier comme premier pays socialiste alors que Lénine et Trotsky affirmaient le contraire….

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article7423

Le mouvement trotskyste en France, le plus… à droite de tout le trotskysme mondial

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article5230

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article3738

Pourquoi la Quatrième Internationale fondée par Léon Trotsky a échoué…

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article4250

Quand l'extrême gauche opportuniste a soutenu les ennemis du prolétariat sous prétexte de lutte contre le fascisme

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article7014

Notre principale divergence avec l'extrême gauche française : ils ne sont pas clairs vis-à-vis de la nature de l'Etat capitaliste !

https://www.matierevolution.fr/spip.php?article5462

L'analyse politique et sociale de Trotsky durant la révolution russe de 1917 avant la révolution d'Octobre

Robert Paris — 2025-10-10T22:05:00Z

L'analyse politique et sociale de Trotsky durant la révolution russe de 1917 avant la révolution d'Octobre

Mai 1917 - Paix et réaction

À la séance du 3 mars 1916 de la douma, M. Milioukov répondait en ces termes à une critique de la gauche : « Je ne suis pas certain que le gouvernement soit en train de nous conduire à la défaite, mais ce dont je suis sûr, c'est qu'une révolution en Russie nous y conduirait indubitablement et que nos ennemis ont par conséquent toute raison de la souhaiter. Si on me disait qu'organiser la Russie pour la victoire équivaut à l'organiser pour la révolution, je répondrais : il vaut mieux, tant que dure la guerre, la laisser en l'état d'inorganisation où elle se trouve. » Cette citation est intéressante à deux points de vue. Non seulement elle prouve que, l'année précédente encore, M. Milioukov considérait que des intérêts pro-allemands étaient à l'œuvre dans toute révolution quelle qu'elle soit, et pas seulement chez les internationalistes, mais aussi qu'elle est l'expression caractéristique d'un sycophante libéral. La prédiction de M. Milioukov est très intéressante : « Je sais qu'une révolution en Russie nous conduirait indubitablement à la défaite ». Pourquoi cette certitude ? En tant qu'historien, M. Milioukov doit savoir qu'il y a eu des révolutions qui ont mené à la victoire. Mais en tant qu'homme d'État impérialiste, M. Milioukov ne peut pas ne pas voir que l'idée de conquérir Constantinople, l'Arménie et la Galicie est incapable de susciter l'enthousiasme des masses révolutionnaires. M. Milioukov sentait et même savait que, dans sa guerre, la révolution ne pouvait amener la victoire.

Évidemment, lorsque la révolution a éclaté, M. Milioukov a tenté aussitôt de l'atteler au char de l'impérialisme allié. C'est pourquoi il fut accueilli avec ravissement par les tintements sonores et métalliques de tous les coffres-forts de Londres, Paris, et New York. Mais cette tentative se heurta à la résistance presque instinctive des ouvriers et des soldats. M. Milioukov a été chassé du gouvernement ; assurément, pour lui, la révolution ne fut pas synonyme de victoire1.

Milioukov était parti, mais la guerre continuait. Un gouvernement de coalition fut formé, composé de démocrates petit-bourgeois et de représentants de la bourgeoisie qui avaient dissimulé jusque-là, pour un temps, leurs griffes impérialistes. Nulle part peut-être cette coalition n'a mieux révélé son caractère contre-révolutionnaire que dans le domaine de la politique internationale, c'est-à-dire avant tout de la guerre. La grande bourgeoisie a envoyé ses représentants au gouvernement pour y défendre l'idée d'« une offensive sur le front et une fidélité inaltérable envers nos alliés » (résolution du congrès du parti cadet). Les démocrates petit-bourgeois, qui se baptisaient « socialistes », sont entrés au gouvernement pour, « sans s'isoler » de la grande bourgeoisie et de ses alliés impérialistes, terminer la guerre le plus vite possible et le moins mal possible pour tous les belligérants : sans annexions, sans indemnités ni tributs, et même avec la garantie de l'autodétermination nationale.

Les ministres capitalistes ont renoncé aux annexions, en attendant des jours plus favorables. En échange de cette concession purement verbale, ils ont obtenu de leurs collègues démocrates petit-bourgeois la promesse ferme de ne pas déserter le capable de reprendre l'offensive. En renonçant (momentanément) à Constantinople, les impérialistes faisaient un sacrifice insignifiant dans la mesure où, après trois ans de guerre, la route vers Constantinople n'avait pas raccourci mais rallongé. Mais les démocrates, en échange de cette renonciation toutes platonique à une très hypothétique Constantinople par les libéraux, ont assumé tout l'héritage du gouvernement tsariste, reconnu tous les traités conclus par ce gouvernement en mis toute l'autorité et le prestige de la révolution au service de la discipline et de l'offensive. Cela impliquait tout d'abord, pour les « leaders » de la révolution, la renonciation à toute politique internationale indépendante, et cette politique conclusion parut toute naturelle au parti petit-bourgeois qui, dès qu'il fut dans la majorité, abandonna volontairement tout le pouvoir qu'il détenait. Ayant chargé le prince Lvof de créer une administration révolutionnaire, M. Chingarev de remettre sur pied les finances de la révolution, M. Konovalov d'organiser l'industrie, la démocratie petite-bourgeoise ne pouvait que laisser le soin à MM. Ribot, Lloyd George et Wilson de défendre les intérêts de la Russie révolutionnaire.

Bien que la révolution, dans sa phase actuelle, n'ait pas changé le caractère de la guerre, elle n'en a pas moins exercé une profonde influence sur l'agent actif de la guerre, c'est-à-dire l'armée. Le soldat a commencé à se demander pourquoi il verse son sang, auquel il donne maintenant plus de prix que sous le tsarisme. Et immédiatement la question des traités secrets s'est posée de façon impérative. Remettre l'armée en état de se battre signifiait dans ces conditions briser la résistance démocratiquement révolutionnaire des soldats, mettre à nouveau en sommeil leur conscience éveillée depuis peu et, jusqu'à ce que la principe de la « révision » des anciens traités soit annoncé, placer l'armée révolutionnaire au service des buts de l'ancien régime. Cette tâche était trop lourde pour l'octobriste-bourbonien 2 Goutchkov, et elle l'a écrasé. Il ne fallait rien de moins qu'un « socialiste » pour la réaliser. Et on l'a trouvé en la personne du « plus populaire » des ministres Kérensky.

En exploitant à fond sa popularité pour accélérer la préparation de l'offensive (sur tout le front impérialiste des Alliés), Kérensky devient naturellement le favori des classes possédantes. Non seulement le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Terechtchenko, approuve la haute estime dans laquelle nos Alliés tiennent les « efforts » de Kérensky, non seulement Rietch, qui critique si sévèrement les ministres de gauche, n'arrête pas de féliciter le ministre de l'Armée et de la Marine Kérensky, mais même Rodzianko considère de son devoir de souligner « les nobles et patriotes tâches » dans lesquelles est engagé notre ministre de l'Armée et de la Marine Kérensky : « Ce jeune homme (pour citer Rodzianko, président octobriste de la Douma) ressuscite chaque jour avec une vigueur redoublée, pour le plus grand bien de son pays et du travail constructif. » Circonstance glorieuse qui n'empêche cependant pas Rodzianko d'espérer qu'une fois que le « travail constructif » de Kérensky aura atteint le niveau convenable les efforts de Goutchkov pourront luis succéder.

Pendant ce temps, le ministère des Affaires étrangères de Terechtchenko s'efforce de persuader les Alliés de sacrifier leurs appétits impérialistes sur l'autel de la démocratie révolutionnaire. Il serait difficile d'imaginer entreprise plus infructueuse et, malgré son caractère tragique et humiliant, plus ridicule que celle-là ! Lorsque M. Terechtchenko, à la manière d'un éditorialiste de journal de province du genre démocratique, tente d'expliquer aux chefs endurcis du brigandage international que la révolution russe est vraiment « un mouvement intellectuel puissant, exprimant la volonté du peuple russe dans sa lutte pour l'égalité […] », etc., quand, de plus, il « ne doute pas » qu'« une union étroite entre la Russie et ses alliés (les chefs endurcis du brigandage international) assurera de la façon la plus complète possible un accord sur toutes les questions qui sont en jeu dans les principes proclamés par la révolution russe », il est difficile de se débarrasser d'un sentiment de dégoût devant un tel mélange d'impuissance, d'hypocrisie et de stupidité.

Dans ce document de Terechtchenko, la bourgeoisie, semble-t-il, s'est réservé tous les passages décisifs : « fidélité inaltérable à la cause des Alliés », « inviolabilité de la promesse de ne pas conclure une paix séparée » et renvoi de la révision des buts de guerre à « un moment favorable », ce qui revient à demander au soldat russe, jusqu'à ce qu'arrive ce « moment favorable », de verser son sang pour ces buts de guerre impérialiste qu'il semble précisément si peu opportun de publier, si peu opportun de réviser ? Tout l'horizon politique de Tsérételli, se révèle dans la fatuité complaisante avec laquelle il recommande à l'attention du congrès panrusse ce document diplomatique qui contient selon lui « des paroles claires et franches, dans le langage d'un gouvernement révolutionnaire, sur les buts de la révolution russe ». On ne peut nier une chose : les appels lâches et impuissants adressés à Lloyd George et à Wilson sont rédigés dans les mêmes termes que ceux du comité exécutif des soviets aux Albert Thomas, Scheidemann et Henderson. Dans les deux textes, il y a tout au long une identité de but et – qui sait ? – peut-être même une identité d'auteur3.

On trouve une parfaite appréciation de ces toutes dernières notes diplomatiques du tandem Terechtchenko-Tseretelli dans un endroit à première vue inattendu : L'Entente, journal publié en français à Petrograd et organe précisément de ces Alliés auxquels Terechtchenko et Tchernov jurent une « indéfectible allégeance ». Nous admettons volontiers, la publication de cette note était attendue avec une certaine inquiétude. » En fait, il n'est pas facile, comme l'admet cet organe officiel, de trouver une formule qui concilie les buts contradictoires des Alliés. « En ce qui concerne la Russie, en particulier, la position du gouvernement provisoire était plutôt délicate et pleine de danger. D'un côté, il était obligé de tenir compte du point de vue du conseil des délégués ouvriers et soldats et, autant que possible, de représenter ce point de vue ; de l'autre, il lui fallait ménager les relations internationales et les puissances amies, auxquelles il était impossible d'imposer la décision du conseil.

« Et le gouvernement provisoirement est sorti de cette épreuve pur et sans tache. »

Dans le document qui est sous nos yeux, nous avons donc les principaux points du catéchisme révolutionnaire couché, enregistrés et scellés par l'autorité du gouvernement provisoire. Rien d'essentiel ne manque. Tous les beaux rêves, tous les jolis mots du dictionnaire sont correctement utilisés. On y trouve l'égalité, la liberté et la justice dans les relations internationales. Donc tout y est4, au moins dans les termes. Le plus rouge des camarades ne peut y trouver à redire ; de ce côté-là, le gouvernement provisoire n'a rien à craindre…

« Mais, et les Alliés ? », demande L'Entente. « S'ils l'étudient attentivement et la lisent entre les lignes (!), à la lumière de la bonne volonté et de l'amitié pour la jeune démocratie russe, les Alliés pourront trouver en divers points de la note… certains passages agréables de nature à raffermir leur confiance quelque peu vacillante. Ils savent bien que la position du gouvernement provisoire n'est pas des plus commodes et que ses efforts en prose ne doivent pas être pris trop à la lettre… La garantie fondamentale que le gouvernement donne aux Alliés consiste en ce que… l'accord signé à Londres le 5 septembre 1914 (engagement à ne pas signer de paix séparée) ne doit pas être révisé. Cela nous satisfait complètement pour le moment. »

Et nous aussi. En fait, il serait difficile d'émettre un jugement plus méprisant sur la « prose » de Terechtchenko-Tsérételli que celui dans le très officiel L'Entente, qui tire son inspiration de l'ambassade de France. Cette appréciation, qui n'est en aucun cas inamicale pour Terechtchenko ou ceux qui sont derrière lui, porte un coup mortel aux « efforts constructifs » de Tsérételli, qui nous a si chaudement recommandé le « langage franc et ouvert » de ce document. « Rien n'a été oublié, jure-t-il devant le congrès, il satisfera la conscience des plus rouges des camarades. »

Mais ils se trompent, ces experts en prose diplomatique : ils ne satisfont personne. N'est-il pas significatif que les événements de la vie réelle répondent aux appels de Kérensky et aux remontrances et aux menaces de Tsérételli par un coup aussi terrible que la révolte des marins de la mer Noire 5 ? On nous avait dit que c'était là, chez les marins, qu'était la citadelle de Kérensky, le foyer du « patriotisme » qui réclamait l'offensive. Les faits ont, une fois de plus, administré une correction impitoyable. En adoptant la position des anciens accords impérialistes en politique étrangère, en capitulant à l'intérieur devant les classes possédantes, il était impossible d'unir l'armée par une combinaison d'enthousiasme révolutionnaire, et de discipline. Et le « gros bâton » de Kérensky s'est, heureusement, révélé beaucoup trop court.

Non, cette voie à coup sûr ne mène nulle part.

Vperiod, juin 1917

Notes

1 Le 1er mai, Milioukov, ministre des Affaires étrangères, entreprit dans une note aux gouvernements alliés d'honorer les engagements du régime tsariste en matière de politique étrangère. Cela provoqua des manifestations de protestation et des affrontements de rue. Il fut chassé du cabinet et remplacé par Tsérételli, jusqu'alors ministre des Finances. Le 18 mai, un gouvernement de coalition fut formé, avec la participation des socialistes. Lvof restait Premier ministre, Kérensky devenait ministre de la Guerre.

2 Octobriste : parti monarchiste et pro-impérialiste qui soutenait le « Manifeste du tsar » d'octobre 1905 ; dirigé par Goutchkov.

3 Au début de la révolution, les modérés des soviets firent appel, par l'intermédiaire du comité exécutif, aux socialistes et au prolétariat des pays belligérants pour qu'ils rompent avec leurs gouvernements impérialistes ; mais peu à peu cette politique révolutionnaire fut abandonnée, et le comité exécutif participa à la honteuse réunion des social-patriotes de Stockholm, malgré les protestations des bolcheviks. Il suffit, pour marquer le caractère non révolutionnaire du comité exécutif, de dire qu'il collabora avec Scheidemann, Albert Thomas (France), Henderson (Angleterre) et autres social-patriotes. Le socialisme modéré agit comme le commis voyageur [en français dans le texte – [N.d.T.] de la diplomatie bourgeoise. Un des documents secrets publiés après l'arrivée au pouvoir des bolcheviks montre le véritable caractère de la conférence de Stockholm, avec laquelle, soit dit en passant, les socialistes indépendants d'Allemagne refusèrent affaire : il s'agit d'un télégramme daté du 18 août, adressé par l'ambassadeur de Russie à Stockholm avec Branting, l'un des organisateurs social-patriotes de la confédération si Kérensky la jugeait inopportune et qu'il userait de son influence sur le comité scandinavo-hollandais à cette fin. Le télégramme concluait en demandant le secret sur cette conversation, afin de ne pas compromettre Branting, car sinon on perdrait une source importante d'information ! Pas étonnant qu'elle ait été une misérable faillite. (Note de Luis C. Fraina, 1918.)

4 En français dans le texte (N.d.T.).

5 À partir du 19 juin 1917 se produisent des révoltes dans la flotte de la mer Noire. L'amiral Koltchak fut renversé et, sous l'influence des bolcheviks, les marins élurent leurs propres chefs.

https://www-marxists-org.translate.goog/archive/trotsky/1917/power/art01.htm?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=fr&_x_tr_hl=fr

Juin 1917 - La double impuissance

Les conditions de la guerre déforment et obscurcissent l'action des forces intérieures de la révolution. Mais son cours n'en restera pas moins déterminé par ces mêmes forces intérieures, c'est-à-dire les classes.

La révolution, qui montait depuis 1912, a vu, dans un premier temps, son élan brisé par la guerre, mais ensuite, grâce à l'intervention héroïque d'une armée exaspérée, elle s'est accélérée dans la combativité sans précédent. La capacité de résistance de l'ancien régime avait été définitivement minée par le déroulement de la guerre. Les partis politique qui auraient pu jouer le rôle de médiateurs entre la monarchie et le peuple se trouvèrent tout à coup suspendus dans les airs en raison des formidables poussées venues d'en bas et furent obligés au dernier moment de faire le saut périlleux vers les rivages sûrs de la révolution. Cela conféra à la révolution, pour un temps, l'apparence extérieure d'une parfaite harmonie nationale. Pour la première fois dans toute son histoire, le libéralisme bourgeois se sentit « lié » aux masses – et c'est cela qui dut lui donner l'idée d'utiliser l'esprit révolutionnaire « universel » au service de la guerre.

Les conditions, les buts, les participants de la guerre ne changèrent pas. Goutchkov et Milioukov, les membres les plus ouvertement pro-impérialistes de l'équipe politique de l'ancien régime, étaient maintenant les maîtres des destinées de la Russie révolutionnaire. Naturellement, la guerre, dont la nature restait fondamentalement la même que sous le tsarisme – contre le même ennemi, avec les mêmes alliés, avec les mêmes engagements internationaux –, devait maintenant se transformer en une « guerre pour la révolution ». Pour les capitalistes, cela équivalait à mobiliser la révolution, avec toutes les forces et les passions qu'elle avait stimulées, au service de l'impérialisme. Les Milioukov consentirent magnanimement à qualifier le « chiffon rouge » d'emblème sacré – à condition que les masses laborieuses se montrent prêtes à mourir avec béatitude, sous ce chiffon rouge, pour Constantinople et les détroits.

Mais le pied fourchu impérialiste de Milioukov dépassait de façon trop voyante. Pour gagner les masses et canaliser leur énergie révolutionnaire vers une offensive sur le front extérieur, il fallait des méthodes plus élaborées et, par-dessus tout, on avait besoin de nouveaux partis politiques, dont les programmes n'aient pas encore été compromis et dont la réputation n'ait pas encore été ternie.

On les trouva. Dans les années de contre-révolution, en particulier lors du dernier boom industriel, le capital avait soumis et dompté intellectuellement plusieurs milliers de révolutionnaires de 1905, sans se soucier de leurs « notions » travaillistes ou marxistes. Et parmi les intellectuels « socialistes » apparurent d'assez nombreux groupes brûlant de prendre part à la répression des luttes sociales et à l'entraînement des masses vers les buts « patriotiques ». Main dans la main avec l'intelligentsia, mise en vedette à l'époque de la contre-révolution, venaient les faiseurs de compromis, qui avaient été définitivement effrayés par l'échec de la révolution de 1905, et depuis lors avaient cultivé un seul et unique talent : être agréable à tout le monde.

L'opposition de la bourgeoisie au tsarisme – sur une base impérialiste toutefois – avait, dès avant la révolution, fourni la base nécessaire à un rapprochement entre socialistes opportunistes et classes possédantes. À la Douma, Kérensky et Tchkéidzé conçurent leur politique comme annexe au bloc progressiste, et les Gvozdiev et Bogdanov « socialistes », participèrent avec les Goutchkov aux comités de l'industrie de guerre. Mais l'existence du tsarisme rendait très difficile la défense ouverte du patriotisme « gouvernemental ». La révolution balaya tous les obstacles de ce genre. La capitulation devant les partis capitalistes s'appela désormais « unité démocratique », la discipline de l'État bourgeois se transforma soudain en « discipline révolutionnaire » et, pour finir, la participation à une guerre de la révolution contre une défaite extérieure.

Cette intelligentsia nationaliste, qui avait été prédite, appelée et entraînée par le social-patriote Strouvé dans son journal Vyekhi, rencontra soudain un soutien inattendu et généreux dans la faiblesse des secteurs les plus arriérés du peuple, qui avaient été organisés de force pour constituer l'armée.

C'est uniquement parce que la révolution a éclaté au cours d'une guerre que les éléments petits-bourgeois de la ville et de la campagne ont pris automatiquement l'apparence d'une force organisée et commencé à exercer sur les membres du conseil des délégués ouvriers et soldats une influence dépassant de loin le pouvoir qu'auraient eu ces classes atomisées et arriérées en toute autre circonstance. L'intelligentsia menchevik-populiste a trouvé dans cette masse de provinciaux attardés, pour la plupart encore à peine éveillés politiquement, un soutien tout à fait naturel au début. En amenant les classes petites-bourgeoises à un accord avec le libéralisme bourgeois, qui venait à nouveau de révéler en beauté son incapacité à guider les masses populaires de façon indépendante, l'intelligentsia menchevik-populiste s'acquit, grâce à la pression des masses, une certaine influence, y compris dans les couches prolétariennes, momentanément reléguées au second plan par l'importance numérique de l'armée.

À première vue, on aurait pu croire que toutes les contradictions de classe avaient disparu, que toute la société avait été replâtrée avec des morceaux d'idéologie menchevik-populiste et que, grâce aux « efforts constructifs » de Kérensky, Tchkéidzé et Dan, une trêve nationale entre les classes avait été conclue. D'où une surprise et une stupeur sans pareilles lorsque s'affirma à nouveau une politique prolétarienne indépendante ; d'où ce concert de lamentations furieuses et, pour tout dire, révoltantes contre les révolutionnaires socialistes, destructeurs de l'harmonie universelle.

Les intellectuels petits-bourgeois, après avoir été hissés par le soviet des délégués ouvriers et soldats à des hauteurs pour lesquelles ils n'étaient absolument pas préparés, furent effrayés par-dessus tout par l'idée de responsabilité et remirent donc respectueusement leur pouvoir au ministère féodalo-capitaliste issu de la Douma du 3 juin. La terreur sacrée du petit-bourgeois devant le pouvoir d'État, très évidente dans le cas des populistes (travaillistes), était voilée, chez les mencheviks-patriotes, par des socialistes d'assumer le fardeau du pouvoir dans une révolution bourgeoise.

Ainsi naquit le « double pouvoir », qu'on pourrait plus justement qualifier de double impuissance. La bourgeoisie détenait l'autorité au nom de l'ordre et de la guerre jusqu'à la victoire ; mais, sans les soviets, elle ne pouvait gouverner ; ces derniers avaient avec le gouvernement des rapports de demi-confiance respectueuse, à laquelle se mêlait la peur que le prolétariat révolutionnaire, par un geste maladroit, ne renverse tout ce bel édifice.

La politique étrangère cyniquement provocatrice de Milioukov amena une crise. Conscient de l'étendue de la panique dans les rangs des leaders petits-bourgeois quand ils étaient confrontés aux problèmes du pouvoir, le parti bourgeois commença à utiliser en ce domaine le chantage pur et simple : en menaçant de faire la grève du gouvernement, c'est-à-dire de cesser de participer au pouvoir, il exigea que le soviet lui fournisse un certain nombre de potiches socialistes, dont la fonction dans le cabinet de coalition devait être de renforcer la confiance des masses dans le gouvernement et, de cette façon, de mettre fin au « double pouvoir ».

Devant l'ultimatum, les mencheviks-patriotes s'empressèrent de laisser tomber leurs derniers restes de préjugés marxistes contre la participation à un gouvernement bourgeois et entraînèrent avec eux les « leaders » travaillistes du soviet qui, pour leur part, n'étaient embarrassés par aucune surcharge de principes ou de préjugés. Cela était particulièrement clair chez Tchernov, qui ne revint des conférences de Kienthal et de Zimmerwald1, où il avait excommunié Vandervelde, Guesde et Sembat, que pour entrer dans le ministère du prince Lvov et de Chingariev. Bien sûr, les mencheviks-patriotes russe firent remarquer que le ministérialisme russe n'avait rien à voir avec le ministérialisme français ou belge, car il était le produit de circonstances très exceptionnelles, prévues par la résolution contre le ministérialisme du congrès d'Amsterdam (1904)2. Pourtant, ils ne faisaient que répéter comme des perroquets les arguments des ministérialistes français et belges, tout en continuant à invoquer constamment la « nature exceptionnelle des circonstances ». Kérensky, dont la théâtralité verbeuse cache néanmoins quelques traces de pertinence, classa quant à lui très correctement le ministérialisme russe dans la même catégorie que celui d'Europe occidentale et déclara dans son discours d'Helsingfors que c'était surtout grâce à lui, Kérensky, que les socialistes russes avaient en deux mois accompli un chemin que les socialistes d'Europe occidentale avaient mis dix ans à parcourir. Marx avait bien raison de dire que la révolution est la locomotive de l'histoire ! Le gouvernement de coalition était condamné par l'histoire avant même sa formation. S'il avait été constitué immédiatement après la chute du tsarisme, comme expression de l'« unité révolutionnaire de la nation », il aurait peut-être pu contenir, pour un temps, l'affrontement des forces de la révolution. Mais le premier gouvernement fut le ministère Goutchkov-Milioukov. Son existence ne dura que le temps de dévoiler l'inanité de l'« unité nationale » et d'éveiller la résistance révolutionnaire du prolétariat aux tentatives de la bourgeoisie pour prostituer la révolution aux intérêts impérialistes. Le gouvernement de coalition, qui apparaissait manifestement comme un pis-aller, ne pouvait dans ces conditions prévenir la catastrophe ; il était lui-même destiné à devenir la principale pomme de discorde, la principale source de conflit et de divergences dans les rangs de la « démocratie révolutionnaire ». Son existence politique – car nous ne parlerons pas de ses « activités » – n'est qu'une lente agonie, décemment enveloppée dans des flots de paroles.

Pour lutter contre la faillite complète dans le domaine économique, en particulier dans celui du ravitaillement, la commission économique du comité exécutif des soviets élabora un plan qui devait étendre la gestion étatique aux branches industrielles les plus importantes. Les mêmes de la commission économique diffèrent des leaders non pas tant par leurs tendances politiques que par une connaissance approfondie de la situation économique du pays. C'est justement pour cette raison qu'ils sont arrivés à des conclusions d'un caractère profondément révolutionnaire. La seule chose dont manque leur organisation, c'est de la force motrice d'une politique révolutionnaire. Le gouvernement, capitaliste dans sa majorité, ne pouvait évidemment pas donner naissance à un système diamétralement opposé aux intérêts égoïstes des classes possédantes. Si Skobelev, le ministre du Travail menchevique, ne le comprenait pas, cela fut en revanche très bien compris par le sérieux et efficace Konovalov, représentant du commerce et de l'industrie.

La démission de Konovalov 3 a porté un coup fatal au gouvernement de coalition. L'ensemble de la presse bourgeoise l'exprima nettement. On recommença alors à jouer sur la terreur panique des dirigeants du soviet : la bourgeoisie menaça d'abandonner le pouvoir nouveau-né devant leur porte. Les « dirigeants » répondirent en faisant croire que rien de spécial ne s'était passé. Puisque le représentant sérieux du capital nous a quittés, invitons M. Bourishkine. Mais Bourishkine refusa avec obstination de participer à des opérations chirurgicales sur la propriété privée. Alors commença la quête d'un ministre du Commerce et de l'Industrie « indépendant », un homme qui n'aurait derrière lui rien ni personne et qui pourrait servir de boîte aux lettres inoffensive pour les revendications contradictoires du travail et du capital. Pendant ce temps, les dépenses continuent sur leur lancée et l'activité gouvernementale consiste surtout à faire marcher la planche à billets, à imprimer des assignats.

Ayant pour collègues et aînés MM. Lvov et Chingariev, Tchernov n'a pas pu étaler, dans les questions agraires, ne serait-ce que le radicalisme verbal si caractéristique de ce représentant typique de la petite bourgeoisie. Pleinement conscient du rôle qui lui était assigné, Tchernov s'est présenté non pas comme le représentant de la révolution agraire, mais comme celui des statistiques agricoles ! Selon l'interprétation libérale bourgeoise, que les ministres ont également adoptée, les masses doivent suspendre le processus révolutionnaire et attendre passivement la convocation de l'Assemblée constituante et, dès que les socialistes-révolutionnaires entrent dans le gouvernement des propriétaires fonciers et des industriels, les attaques des paysans contre le système agricole féodal sont stigmatisées comme de l'anarchie.

En politique internationale, l'effondrement des « plans de paix » annoncés par le gouvernement de coalition s'est produit de façon beaucoup plus rapide et catastrophique qu'on aurait pu s'y attendre. M. Ribot, Premier ministre français, a non seulement rejeté catégoriquement et sans cérémonie le plan de paix russe, tout en réaffirmant solennellement l'absolue nécessité de poursuivre la guerre jusqu'à la « victoire totale », mais encore a refusé aux sociaux-patriotes français leurs passeports pour la conférence de Stockholm, qui avait pourtant été préparée avec la collaboration des collègues et alliés de M. Ribot, les ministres socialistes russes. Le gouvernement italien, dont la politique de conquête coloniale s'est toujours distinguée par un cynisme inouï, par un « égoïsme sacré », répliqua à la formule de « paix sans annexions » par l'annexion séparée de l'Albanie4. Notre gouvernement, ministres socialistes compris, a bloqué pendant deux semaines la publication de la réponse des Alliés, croyant évidemment à l'efficacité d'expédients aussi minables pour éviter la banqueroute de sa politique. En bref, le problème de la situation internationale de la Russie, le problème de savoir pour quelle cause le soldat russe devrait être prêt à se battre et à mourir, est toujours aussi aigu que le jour où le portefeuille des Affaires étrangères fut arraché à Milioukov.

Au ministère de l'Armée et de la Marine, qui continue à s'octroyer la part du lion dans les énergies et les ressources nationales, la politique du verbe et de la rhétorique règne sans partage. Mais les causes matérielles et psychologiques de l'état actuel de l'armée sont trop profondes pour être réglées par la prose et la poésie ministérielles. Le remplacement du général Alexeïev par le général Broussilov signifie sans aucun doute un changement pour ces deux officiers, mais aucun pour l'armée. La préparation du peuple et de l'armée à une « offensive », puis l'abandon soudain de ce slogan pour celui, moins précis, de « préparation à une offensive » montrent que le ministère de l'Armée et de la Marine est toujours aussi peu capable de conduire la nation à la victoire que le ministère de M. Terechtchenko l'était de la conduire à la paix.

L'image de l'impuissance du gouvernement provisoire atteint son apogée avec l'activité du ministère des Affaires étrangères qui, pour employer les termes des délégués les plus loyaux du soviet paysan, remplit « avec partialité » les bureaux des administrations locales de propriétaires féodaux. Les efforts de la partie active de la population qui arrive à obtenir des pouvoirs au niveau communal, par droit de conquête et sans attendre l'Assemblée constituante, sont aussitôt taxés, dans le jargon policier des Dan, d'« anarchie », et rencontrent l'opposition énergique du gouvernement qui, de par sa composition, est incapable de toute action énergique vraiment créatrice. Dans les tout derniers jours, cette politique banqueroutière a trouvé son expression la plus écœurante dans l'incident de Cronstadt5. La campagne infâme et malhonnête de la presse bourgeoise contre Cronstadt, qui est pour elle le symbole de l'internationalisme révolutionnaire et de la méfiance envers le gouvernement de coalition – et donc de la politique indépendante des larges masses populaires –, non seulement gagne le gouvernement et les leaders du soviet, mais a aussi transformé Tsérételli et Skobolev en chefs de file de la honteuse répression contre les marins, soldats et travailleurs de Cronstadt.

Au moment où l'internationalisme supplantait systématiquement le social-patriotisme dans les usines, les ateliers et parmi les soldats du front, les ministres socialistes, soumis envers leurs maîtres, se risquaient au jeu hasardeux de détruire d'un seul coup l'avant-garde prolétarienne révolutionnaire et de préparer ainsi le « moment psychologique » pour l'ouverture de la session du congrès panrusse des soviets. Rallier la démocratie paysanne petite-bourgeoise sous le drapeau du libéralisme bourgeois, allié et prisonnier du capital anglo-français et américain, pour isoler politiquement et « discipliner » le prolétariat : telle est désormais la tâche principale à laquelle le bloc gouvernemental des mencheviks et des social-révolutionnaires consacre toutes ses énergies. Les menaces cyniques de répression sanglante et les provocations à la violence ouverte constituent un élément essentiel de cette politique.

L'agonie du gouvernement de coalition a commencé e jour même de sa naissance. Les révolutionnaires doivent faire tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour empêcher cette agonie de se terminer dans les convulsions de la guerre civile. La seule façon d'y arriver n'est pas dans une politique de soumission et d'esquive, qui ne fait qu'aiguiser l'appétit de politiciens aux dents longues, mais bien plutôt dans une politique offensive sur toute la ligne. Nous ne les laisserons pas nous isoler : nous devons les isoler, eux. Nous devons répondre aux initiatives minables et méprisables du gouvernement de coalition en faisant comprendre même aux secteurs les plus arriérés des masses laborieuses le sens de cette coalition qui parade publiquement sous le masque de la révolution. Aux méthodes des classes possédantes et de leur appendice mencheviks-social-révolutionnaire, que ce soit sur le problème du ravitaillement, nous devons opposer les méthodes du prolétariat. C'est seulement de cette façon qu'on peut isoler le libéralisme et gagner au prolétariat révolutionnaire une influence décisive sur les masses urbaines et rurales. En même temps que la chute inévitable de l'actuel gouvernement se produira celle des leaders actuels du soviet des délégués ouvriers et soldats. L'actuelle minorité du soviet a maintenant la possibilité de préserver l'autorité du soviet en tant que représentant de la révolution et de lui assurer la poursuite de ses fonctions en tant que pouvoir central. Cela deviendra plus clair chaque jour. La période de « double impuissance », avec un gouvernement qui ne peut pas et un soviet qui n'ose pas, doit inévitablement culminer dans une crise d'une gravité sans précédent. Il est de notre devoir de tendre toutes nos énergies en prévision de cette crise, de façon que le problème du pouvoir soit abordé dans toutes ses implications.

Izvestia, 3 juin 1917

Vperiod, 8 juin 1917

Notes

1 Du nom de deux villages suisses où se tinrent deux conférences internationales contre la guerre, les 5-8 septembre 1915 et 24-30 avril 1916. Après la création de la IIIe Internationale, l'union de Zimmerwald fut dissoute.

2 Ce congrès de la IIe Internationale se tint en août 1904. Les social-démocrates allemands, avec Bebel à leur tête, réussirent à faire passer une résolution condamnant l'acceptation par les socialistes français de portefeuilles dans le gouvernement bourgeois.

3 Konovalov était ministre du Commerce dans le premier gouvernement de coalition. Il démissionna le 31 mai 1917.

4 L'Albanie était devenue un État indépendant à la suite de la défaite de la Turquie dans la première guerre des Balkans (traité de Londres, 30 mai 1913). L'Italie envahit l'Albanie en 1914.

5 Début juin, les marins de la Baltique et les masses de Cronstadt se soulevèrent contre le gouvernement provisoire ; l'épithète la plus utilisée contre eux dans la presse russe et étrangère fut celle d'« anarchistes ». Le soviet de Cronstadt avait, par 210 voix contre 40, désavoué le gouvernement provisoire, déclarant qu'il ne reconnaissait que l'autorité du soviet de Petrograd. Cet acte fut déformé en tentative de sécession. Les marins de la Baltique furent une force révolutionnaire active à toutes les étapes de la révolution – contre le tsarisme, contre le gouvernement provisoire et dans le renversement de Kérensky par les bolcheviks. (Note de Luis C. Fraina, 1918.)

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/oeuvres/1917/06/farce.htm

Juillet 1917 - La crise de juillet

Le sang a coulé dans les rues de Petrograd. Un chapitre tragique s'est ajouté à la révolution russe. Qui est responsable ? « Les bolcheviks », répond l'homme de la rue, répétant ce que lui disent ses journaux. L'ensemble de ces tragiques événements se résume, pour la bourgeoisie et les politiciens opportunistes, dans ces mots : arrêtez les meneurs et désarmez les masses. Et l'objectif est d'établir l'« ordre révolutionnaire ». Les social-révolutionnaires et les mencheviks, en arrêtant et en désarmant les bolcheviks, sont prêts à rétablir l'« ordre ». Il n'y a qu'un problème : quel ordre, et pour qui ?

La révolution a soulevé d'immenses espoirs dans les masses. Parmi celles de Petrograd, qui ont joué un rôle dirigeant dans la révolution, ces espoirs, ces attentes étaient entretenues avec une ferveur particulière. C'était la tâche du parti social-démocrate que de transformer ces espoirs et ces attentes en programme politique clairement défini, de façon à diriger l'impatience révolutionnaire des masses vers une action politique organisée. La révolution était confrontée au problème du pouvoir. Nous étions, comme les bolcheviks1, partisans de la remise de tout le pouvoir au comité central des conseils de délégués ouvriers, soldats et paysans. Les classes supérieures, elles, et nous devons y inclure les social-révolutionnaires et les mencheviks, exhortaient les masses à soutenir le gouvernement Milioukov-Goutchkov. Jusqu'au dernier moment, c'est-à-dire jusqu'à la démission de ces personnages, les plus évidemment pro-impérialistes du premier gouvernement provisoire, les deux partis que nous avons mentionnés restèrent fermement solidaires du gouvernement provisoire, les deux partis que nous avons mentionnés restèrent fermement solidaires du gouvernement sur toute la ligne. C'est seulement après le remaniement gouvernemental que les masses apprirent par leurs propres journaux qu'on ne leur avait pas dit toute la vérité, qu'on les avait trompées. On leur avait dit alors qu'elles devaient avoir confiance dans le nouveau gouvernement « de coalition ». La social-démocratie révolutionnaire prédit que le nouveau gouvernement ne différait pas fondamentalement de l'ancien, qu'il ne ferait aucune concession à la révolution et trahirait une fois de plus les espoirs des masses. Et c'est bien ce qui arriva. Après deux mois de faiblesse, de demande de confiance, d'exhortations verbeuses, le gouvernement ne fut plus capable de dissimuler sa position qui consistait à embrouiller les problèmes : il devint évident que les masses, une fois de plus, avaient été trompées, et cette fois plus cruellement que jamais.

L'impatience et la méfiance de la majorité des ouvriers et soldats de Petrograd allaient croissant, non pas de jour en jour mais d'heure en heure. Ces sentiments, alimentés par la guerre qui se prolongeait sans espoir pour tous ceux qui y participaient, par la désorganisation économique, par la préparation occulte de la paralysie des principaux secteurs de la production, trouvèrent leur expression politique immédiate dans le mot d'ordre : « Tout le pouvoir aux soviets ! » La démission des cadets et la démonstration définitive de la faillite interne du gouvernement provisoire persuadèrent encore plus profondément les masses qu'elles avaient raison de s'opposer aux dirigeants officiels des soviets. Les hésitations des social-révolutionnaires et des mencheviks ne firent que mettre de l'huile sur le feu. Les exigences, les persécutions presque, envers la garnison de Petrograd, à laquelle on demandait de commencer une offensive, eurent le même effet. Une explosion devint inévitable.

Tous les partis, y compris les bolcheviks, ont tout fait pour empêcher les masses de manifester le 16 juillet ; mais les masses ont manifesté, et qui plus est, ont manifesté en armes. Tous les agitateurs, tous les représentants de district ont dit le soir du 16 que la manifestation du 17, tant que la question du pouvoir restait en suspens, aurait forcément lieu et qu'aucune mesure ne pourrait retenir le peuple. C'est la seule raison pour laquelle le parti bolchevique et, avec lui, notre organisation ont décidé de ne pas rester à l'écart en se lavant les mains, mais de faire tout ce qui était en leur pouvoir pour transformer le 17 juillet en une manifestation de masse pacifique. L'appel du 17 juillet n'avait pas d'autre signification. Il était bien sûr évident, étant donné l'intervention certaine de bandes contre-révolutionnaires, que des affrontements sanglants se produiraient. Il aurait été possible, il est vrai, de priver les masses de toute direction politique, de les décapiter politiquement pour ainsi dire et, en refusant de les diriger, de les abandonner à leur sort. Mais nous ne pouvions ni ne voulions, en tant que parti ouvrier, adopter cette tactique de Ponce Pilate : nous avons décidé de nous joindre aux masses et de faire corps avec elles, pour introduire dans leur agitation élémentaire le plus grand degré d'organisation possible étant donné les circonstances, et réduire ainsi au minimum le nombre des victimes probables. Les faits sont bien connus. Le sang a coulé. Et maintenant la presse « influente » de la bourgeoisie et d'autres journaux à son service essaient de nous faire porter l'entière responsabilité des conséquences – de la pauvreté, de l'épuisement, de la désaffection et de la rébellion des masses. Pour atteindre ce but, pour compléter ce travail de mobilisation contre-révolutionnaire, contre le parti du prolétariat, des racailles anonymes, semi-anonymes, ou déjà bien connues, se mettent à répandre des accusations de corruption : le sang a coulé à cause des bolcheviks, et les bolcheviks agissent sous les ordres de Guillaume II.

Nous connaissons aujourd'hui des jours d'épreuve. La fermeté des masses, leur sang-froid, la fidélité de leurs « amis », tout cela est soumis à un test. Nous aussi, nous sommes soumis à ce test, et nous en sortirons plus forts et plus unis que de toutes les épreuves précédentes. La vie est avec nous et lutte pour nous. Le nouveau remaniement gouvernemental, imposé par une situation inéluctable et par la misérable timidité des partis au pouvoir, ne changera rien et ne résoudra rien. Il faut un changement radical de tout le système. Il faut un pouvoir révolutionnaire.

La politique de Tsérételli, Kérensky vise directement à désarmer et à affaiblir l'aile gauche de la révolution. Si, avec ces méthodes, ils réussissent à rétablir l'« ordre », ils seront les premiers – après nous, bien sûr – à tomber victimes de cet « ordre ». Mais ils n'y réussiront pas. La contradiction est trop profonde, les problèmes sont trop énormes pour pouvoir être résolus par de simples mesures policières. Après les jours d'épreuve viendront les jours de progrès et de victoire.

Vperiod, juillet 1917

Notes

1 Trotsky était à l'époque membre de l'Organisation interrayons (Mezhrayontsi) qui fusionna avec les bolcheviks en juillet 1917. (N.d.T.)

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/oeuvres/1917/07/journees.htm

Août 1917 - Que s'est-il passé

Personne ne peut expliquer de façon satisfaisante pourquoi il doit y avoir une conférence à Moscou. Mieux : tous ceux qui doivent y participer déclarent (sincèrement ou pas) qu'ils ignorent le but de leur invitation à Moscou. Et presque tous manifestent méfiance et mépris en parlant de la conférence. Mais malgré tout ils y vont tous. Pourquoi ?

Si nous laissons de côté le prolétariat, qui occupe une position spécifique, les participants à la conférence de Moscou peuvent être divisés en trois groupes : les représentants des classes capitalistes, les organisations petites-bourgeoises et le gouvernement.

Les classes possédantes trouvent leur représentation la plus achevée dans le parti constitutionnel-démocrate, les cadets. Derrière eux, il y a les grands propriétaires terriens, les organisations du capital commercial et industriel, les cliques financières, les universités ? Chacun de ces groupes a ses intérêts propres et ses perspectives politiques propres. Mais le danger commun, qui les menace tous, vient des masses de travailleurs, de paysans et de soldats, et ce danger entraîne toutes les classes capitalistes à former une seule et vaste union contre-révolutionnaire. Sans suspendre leurs intrigues monarchiques et leurs conspirations, les cercles de la cour, de la bureautique et de l'état-major général considèrent cependant qu'il est absolument nécessaire en ce moment de soutenir les cadets. Et les libéraux bourgeois, tout en jetant des regards soupçonneux du côté de la clique monarchiste, accordent en ce moment une très grande valeur à son soutien contre la révolution. En ce sens, le parti cadet devient une sorte de représentant général de toutes les variétés d'intérêts de la grande et petite propriété. Toutes les exigences des classes possédantes, toutes les exactions des exploiteurs fusionnent aujourd'hui dans le cynisme capitaliste et l'insolence impérialiste de Milioukov. Sa politique est la suivante : rester à l'affût de tous les faux pas du régime révolutionnaire de toutes ses fautes et de tous ses échecs, en profitant pour le moment de la « collaboration » des mencheviks et des socialistes-révolutionnaires, les mencheviks et des socialistes-révolutionnaires, les compromettre par cette collaboration et attendre son heure. Et, derrière Milioukov, c'est le tsariste Gourko qui attend son heure à lui.

La pseudo-démocratie des socialistes-révolutionnaires et des mencheviks s'appuie sur les masses paysannes, la petite bourgeoisie urbaine et les ouvriers les plus arriérés. À ce propos, il faut noter que, plus on avance, plus il devient clair que la force de l'association réside dans les socialistes-révolutionnaires et que les mencheviks sont la cinquième roue du carrosse. Sous la conduite de ces deux partis, les soviets d'ouvriers et de soldats, qui ont été portés à une hauteur extraordinaire par les convulsions cataclysmiques des masses, perdent rapidement leur importance et retombent dans l'oubli. Pourquoi ? Marx a souligné que, quand l'histoire administre un coup sévère sur le nez des philistins, ils ne cherchent jamais la cause de leur échec dans leur propre incapacité, mais découvrent invariablement la malveillance ou l'intrigue de quelqu'un d'autre.

C'est pourquoi Tsérételli s'empresse de voir dans le « complot » des 16-18 juillet la « paille » qui explique le lamentable échec de toute sa politique. Quand les Lieber, les Gotz et les Voitinsky S.R. et mencheviks ont sauvé l'ordre face à l'« anarchie » (ordre qui, soit dit en passant, n'était pas menacé), ces messieurs ont cru fermement que, comme les oies qui sauvèrent le Capitole, ils méritaient une récompense. Et quand ils se sont aperçus que le mépris de la bourgeoisie envers eux augmentait proportionnellement à leur zèle conciliateur envers le prolétariat, ils ont été stupéfiés. Tsérételli, ce même Tsérételli qui savait si bien jongler avec les lieux communs rebattus, s'est vu liquider comme » un révolutionnaire par trop encombrant. C'était limpide : le régiment de mitrailleur 1 avait « gâché la révolution (en refusant d'obéir, sauf sous certaines conditions, à Kérensky qui leur ordonnait d'aller au front et en participant aux événements des 16-17 juillet).

Et si Tsérételli, avec son parti, s'est retrouvé dans les rangs de la contre-révolution, de Polovtsev et des cadets militaires, pour les aider à désarmer les travailleurs dans l'intérêt de la contre-révolution, ce n'est pas la faute de Tsérételli et de son jeu politique, mais celle du régiment de mitrailleurs égaré par les bolcheviks. Telle est la philosophie de l'histoire professée par les banquiers politiques des philistins !

En réalité, les journées des 16, 17 et 18 juillet ont marqué un tournant dans le cours de la révolution, en démontrant l'incapacité totale des partis dirigeants de la démocratie petite-bourgeoise à prendre en main le pouvoir. Après l'effondrement lamentable du gouvernement de coalition, il est devenu évident qu'il n'y avait pas d'autre solution que la prise du pouvoir par les soviets. Mais les mencheviks et les S.R. ont hésité. Prendre le pouvoir, se sont-ils dit, signifierait rompre avec les banquiers et les diplomates : politique dangereuse. Et quand, malgré le sombre présage des 16-18 juillet, les leaders du soviet ont continué à courir après Efimov, les classes possédantes n'ont pu comprendre que les politiciens du soviet étaient à leur service, tout comme un petit boutiquier est au service est au service d'un banquier, c'est-à-dire chapeau bas. Et c'est ce qui a encouragé la contre-révolution.

Toute l'histoire antérieure de la révolution réside dans ce qu'on appelle le « double pouvoir ». Cette expression, qui vient des libéraux, est à vrai dire très superficielle. On n'a pas épuisé le problème quand on a dit qu'à côté du gouvernement il y avait le soviet, qui s'acquittait d'un nombre considérable de fonctions gouvernementales ; car les Dan et les Tsérételli ont fait tout leur possible pour supprimer, « sans douleur », cette division du pouvoir, en le remettant tout entier au gouvernement. La vérité, c'est que derrière le soviet et derrière le gouvernement il y aurait deux systèmes différents, reposant sur des intérêts de classe différents.

Derrière le soviet, il y avait les organisations de travailleurs qui supplantaient, dans chaque usine l'autocratie des capitalistes et établissaient dans l'industrie un régime républicain incompatible avec l'anarchie capitaliste et exigeant un contrôle d'État irrévocable sur la production. Pour défendre leurs droits de propriété, les capitalistes ont cherché du secours en haut, auprès du gouvernement, l'ont poussé avec une énergie toujours accrue contre les soviets et l'ont forcé à accepter la conclusion qu'il ne possédait pas d'appareil indépendant, c'est-à-dire pas d'instrument de répression contre les masses travailleuses. D'où les lamentations sur le « double pouvoir ».

Derrière le soviet, il y avait l'organisation électorale de l'armée et toute l'administration de la démocratie des soldats. Le gouvernement provisoire, qui s'alignait sur Lloyd George, Ribot et Wilson, reconnaissait les anciennes obligations du tsarisme et pratiquait les anciennes méthodes de la diplomatie secrète, ne pouvait que se heurter à l'hostilité active du nouveau régime de l'armée. L'opposition venue d'en haut avait perdu presque tout son effet au moment où elle atteignait le soviet. D'où les plaintes sur le « double pouvoir », surtout de la part de l'état major-général.

Enfin, le soviet paysan lui aussi, malgré l'opportunisme lamentable et le chauvinisme grossier de ses leaders, était soumis à une pression accrue de la base, où la confiscation de la terre prenait une allure d'autant plus menaçante que le gouvernement s'y opposait plus fortement. On voit jusqu'à quel point ce dernier jouait le rôle de représentant du grand capital dans le fait que la dernière ordonnance policière de Tsérételli ne différait en rien des ordonnances du prince Lvov. Et, partout dans les provinces où les soviets et les comités de paysans tentaient d'instaurer un nouveau régime agraire, ils se trouvaient en conflit aigu avec l'autorité « révolutionnaire » du gouvernement provisoire, qui se transformait de plus en plus en chien de garde de la propriété privée.

La poursuite de la révolution rendait nécessaire le passage de tout le pouvoir aux mains du soviet et son utilisation dans l'intérêt des travailleurs contre les possédants. Et l'approfondissement de la lutte contre les classes capitalistes exige l'attribution du rôle dirigeant, dans les masses laborieuses, à leur fraction la plus résolue, c'est-à-dire au prolétariat industriel. Pour introduire le contrôle sur la production et la distribution, le prolétariat pourrait se réclamer de précédents très importants en Europe occidentale, notamment le prétendu « socialisme de guerre » en Allemagne. Mais comme, en Russie, ce travail d'organisation ne pourrait s'accomplir que sur la base d'une révolution agraire et sous la direction d'un pouvoir réellement révolutionnaire, et le contrôle sur la production et l'organisation progressive de ce pouvoir révolutionnaire prendraient forcément une direction hostile aux intérêts capitalistes. À un moment où les classes possédantes s'efforçaient, à travers le gouvernement provisoire, d'établir une république capitaliste « forte », le passage de tout le pouvoir aux soviets, bien que n'étant absolument pas synonyme de « socialisme », aurait en tout cas brisé l'opposition de la bourgeoisie et, en liaison avec les forces productives existantes et la situation en Europe occidentale, aurait imposé une direction et une transformation de l'organisation économique qui seraient allées dans le sens des intérêts des masses laborieuses. Rejetant les chaînes du pouvoir capitaliste, la révolution serait devenue permanente, c'est-à-dire continue ; elle aurait utilisé son pouvoir non pas pour perpétuer la loi de l'exploitation capitaliste, mais, au contraire, pour la détruire. Ses réalisations ultimes dans ce domaine auraient dépendu des succès de la révolution prolétarienne en Europe. D'un autre côté, la révolution en Russie pourrait donner à la révolution en Europe occidentale un élan d'autant plus grand qu'elle mettrait plus de résolution et de courage à abattre l'opposition de sa propre bourgeoisie. Telle était, et reste, la seule et unique perspective réelle pour la poursuite de la révolution.

Mais, pour les idéologues philistins, cette perspective était « utopique ». Que voulaient-ils, eux ? Ils n'ont jamais été capables de le dire eux-mêmes. Tsérételli a abondamment parlé de « démocratie révolutionnaire », sans comprendre ce que cela signifie réellement. Les social-révolutionnaires ne sont pas les seuls à avoir pris l'habitude de naviguer dans les vagues de la phraséologie démocratique ; les mencheviks, eux aussi, ont abandonné leurs critères de classe dès que ceux-ci ont révélé trop clairement le caractère petit-bourgeois de leur politique. La règle de la « démocratie révolutionnaire » explique tout et justifie tout. Et, quand les Cent-Noirs 2 mettent leurs mains sales dans les poches des bolcheviks, ils le font au nom d'une autorité qui n'est rien moins que celle de la « démocratie révolutionnaire ». Mais n'anticipons pas.

En représentant, comme elle l'a fait, le pouvoir de la bourgeoisie, ou plutôt la neutralisation du pouvoir par la coalition, la démocratie S.R. et menchevique a en effet décapité la révolution. D'un autre côté, en défendant les soviets comme son organe, la démocratie petite-bourgeoise a en fait empêché le gouvernement de créer un appareil administratif quelconque dans les provinces.

Le gouvernement était non seulement impuissant à mal faire. Les soviets, débordant de plans ambitieux, ne pouvaient en réaliser aucun. La république capitaliste, implantée d'en haut, et la démocratie ouvrière, formée par en bas, se paralysant mutuellement. Partout où elles se heurtaient, surgissaient d'innombrables querelles. Le ministre et les commissaires supprimaient l'organe d'auto-gouvernement révolutionnaire, les commandants fulminaient contre les comités de soldats, les soviets allaient et venaient entre les masses et le gouvernement. Les crises se succédaient, les ministres arrivaient et partaient. Plus les mesures d'autorité répressive devenaient inopérantes et incohérentes, plus le mécontentement des masses augmentaient. Vue d'en haut, toute la vie devait avoir l'allure d'un torrent écumeux d'« anarchie ».

Il était évident que le timide dualisme de la « démocratie » petite-bourgeoise portait en lui-même sa faillite. Et plus les problèmes de la révolution s'approfondissaient, plus cette faillite devenait douloureusement évidente. L'État tout entier marchait sur la tête, ou plutôt sur ses deux ou trois têtes. Un geste inconsidéré de la part de Milioukov, Kérensky ou Tsérételli menaçait de renverser tout l'édifice. Et de jour en jour l'alternative apparaissait plus inéluctable : ou le soviet doit assumer le pouvoir, ou le gouvernement capitaliste balaiera le soviet. Il suffisait d'un choc extérieur pour détruire l'équilibre de l'organisation tout entière. Ce choc extérieur donné à un système déjà condamné de l'intérieur prit la forme des événements de s 16-18 juillet. L'« idylle » petite-bourgeoise, bâtie sur l'union « amicale » de deux systèmes qui s'excluent mutuellement, reçut le coup de grâce. Et Tsérételli put consigner dans ses mémoires que son plan pour le salut de la Russie avait été saboté par le régiment des tirailleurs.

Proletarii, n° 1, 13 août 1917

Notes

1 Le premier régiment de mitrailleurs, plus actif que le deuxième, avait soutenu la révolution dès le début et s'était installé à Vyborg, quartier ouvrier de Petrograd. Il fut à la tête des manifestations de juillet.

2 Bandes semi-légales qui écumaient le pays depuis la révolution de 1905, appuyant la répression officielle par le terrorisme. Elles organisaient des pogroms et avaient à leur actif près de 50 000 victimes juives.

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/oeuvres/1917/08/que.htm

Août 1917 - Et maintenant ?

Il est quasiment certain que le gouvernement actuel, qui est l'incarnation même de l'incompétence indécise et malveillante, ne soutiendra pas le choc de l'attaque subie à Moscou et connaîtra de nouveaux remaniements. Ce n'est pas en vain que le général Kornilov explique qu'il ne faut pas craindre une nouvelle crise politique. Une telle crise, à l'heure actuelle, peut être très rapidement surmontée par un nouveau glissement à droite. Savoir si Kérensky obtiendra ou non, dans ces circonstance par rapport au contrôle organisé de la démocratie, qui sera remplacé par rapport au contrôle organisé de la démocratie, qui sera remplacé par un « gouvernement invisible » (et d'autant plus réel) des cliques impérialistes ; savoir si le nouveau gouvernement entretiendra des relations précises avec l'état-major des classes possédantes qui sera sans aucun doute créé par la conférence de Moscou ; savoir quelle sera la place des bonapartistes « socialistes » dans la nouvelle combinaison gouvernementale : tout cela est secondaire. Mais, même si l'attaque de la bourgeoisie devait aboutir à une nouvelle sortie des cadets du gouvernement, le pouvoir usurpé de la « démocratie révolutionnaire » ne serait en aucune façon un pouvoir réellement révolutionnaire et démocratique. Complètement ligotés par leurs compromis contre les travailleurs et les soldats de réserve, les leaders officiels du soviet seraient contraints de poursuivre leur politique de double jeu et d'opportunisme. En quittant le ministère, Konovalov n'a fait que transférer sa mission sur les épaules de Skobelev1. Le ministère Kérensky-Tsérételli, même sans les cadets, continuerait à appliquer un programme semi-cadet. L'élimination des cadets n'est qu'une goutte d'eau dans la mer ; ce qu'il faut, c'est du sang neuf et des méthodes nouvelles.

La conférence de Moscou, en tout cas, clôt et résume toute la phase de la révolution pendant laquelle le rôle dirigeant était tenu par la tactique S.R. et menchevique de coopération avec la bourgeoisie, coopération fondée sur la renonciation aux buts propres de la révolution et leur subordination à l'idée d'une coalition avec les ennemis de la révolution.

La révolution russe est un produit de la guerre. Celle-ci lui a fourni l'instrument nécessaire d'une organisation à l'échelle nationale, c'est-à-dire l'armée. La paysannerie, qui constitue la majeure partie de la population, a été, au moment de la révolution, organisée de force. Les soviets de délégués de soldats ont obligé l'armée à désigner ses représentants politiques, et les masses paysannes ont automatiquement envoyé au soviet les intellectuels semi-libéraux, qui traduisaient le vague de leurs espoirs et de leurs aspirations dans le langage de l'opportunisme mesquin et chicaneur le plus méprisable. L'intelligentsia petite-bourgeoise, qui est, à tous les points de vue, sous la dépendance de la grande bourgeoisie, a pris la direction de la paysannerie. Les soviets de délégués de soldats-paysans ont obtenu une nette majorité sur les représentants des travailleurs. L'avant-garde prolétarienne de Petrograd fut décrétée masse ignorante. La fine fleur de la révolution se révéla, en la personne des S.R. et mencheviks de février, des intellectuels « provinciaux », appuyés sur les paysans. Sur cette base s'éleva, par l'intermédiaire d'élections à deux et trois niveaux, le comité exécutif central. Le soviet de Petrograd, qui, au cours de la première période, remplissait des fonctions à l'échelle de la nation, était soumis depuis le début à l'influence directe des masses révolutionnaires. Le comité central, au contraire, planait dans les nuages des cimes bureaucratiques révolutionnaires, coupé des ouvriers et soldats de Petrograd et hostile à leur égard.

Il suffit de rappeler que le comité central a jugé nécessaire de rappeler des troupes du front pour briser les manifestations de Petrograd qui, au moment de l'arrivée des troupes, avaient déjà été stoppées par les manifestants eux-mêmes. Les dirigeants philistins ont commis un suicide politique quand ils ont refusé de voir autre chose que chaos, anarchie et émeutes dans la tendance – qui était la conséquence naturelle de toute l'orientation du pays – à équiper, à armer la révolution de tout l'appareil de l'autorité. En désarmant les ouvriers et les soldats de Petrograd, les Tsérételli, les Dan, les Tchernov ont désarmé l'avant-garde de la révolution et causé un préjudice irréparable à l'influence de leur propre comité exécutif.

Aujourd'hui, confrontés aux empiétements de la contre-révolution, ces politiciens parlent de rétablir l'autorité et l'importance des soviets. Leur mot d'ordre abstrait de poser la question constitue déjà un procédé profondément réactionnaire. Sous un prétendu appel à l'organisation, c'est une tentative de contourner la question des buts politiques et des méthodes de lutte. Organiser les masses pour « relever l'autorité » des soviets est une entreprise lamentable et inutile. Les masses avaient confiance dans les soviets, elles les suivaient, elles les ont élevés à une hauteur extraordinaire. Et le résultat qu'elles ont pu constater, c'est la reddition des soviets devant les pires ennemis des masses. Il serait puéril de supposer que les masses pourraient ou voudraient recommencer une expérience historique déjà tranchée. Pour que les masses, après avoir perdu confiance dans le centre aujourd'hui dominant de la démocratie, ne perdent pas aussi confiance dans la révolution elle-même, il faut leur fournir un jugement critique sur tout le travail politique accompli jusqu'ici au cours de la révolution, et cela équivaut à une condamnation sans appel de tous les « efforts » des leaders S.R. et mencheviks.

Nous, nous dirons aux masses : ils rejettent toute la responsabilité sur le dos des bolcheviks, mais pourquoi ont-ils été incapables de battre les bolcheviks ? Ils avaient pour eux non seulement la majorité des soviets, mais aussi toute l'autorité du gouvernement, et ils ont quand même trouvé le moyen de se faire battre par un « complot » de ceux qu'ils appellent une bande infime de bolcheviks.

Après les événements des 16-18 juillet, les S.R. et les mencheviks, à Petrograd, n'ont cessé de s'affaiblir, tandis que les bolcheviks se renforçaient. Même chose à Moscou. Cela démontre clairement que la révolution à mesure qu'elle développe, fait que la politique des bolcheviks exprime les exigences tandis que la « majorité » S.R. et menchevique ne fait que perpétuer l'impuissance et l'arriération antérieures des masses. Mais, aujourd'hui cet immobilisme n'est plus de mise ; il doit donc être imposé et renforcé par la répression la plus féroce. Ces gens se battent contre la logique la plus féroce. Ces gens se battent contre la logique même de la révolution, et c'est pourquoi on les trouve dans le même camp que les ennemis de classe conscients de la révolution. Et c'est justement pour cette raison que nous avons le devoir d'affaiblir la confiance qu'on a envers eux, au nom du jour de la révolution qui est notre avenir.

Le caractère absolument vide du mot d'ordre « renforcement des soviets » ressort le plus clairement du monde des relations entre le comité exécutif central et le soviet, appuyé sur les rangs avancés du prolétariat et des soldats qui sont passés de leur côté, marchait de plus en plus résolument vers les positions du socialisme révolutionnaire, le comité exécutif central a systématiquement sapé l'autorité et l'importance du soviet de Petrograd. Pendant des mois entiers, celui-ci n'a pas été convoqué. On lui a, de fait, enlevé son journal, les Izvestia, où les pensées et la vie du prolétariat de Petrograd ne trouvent plus aucune expression. Quand la presse bourgeoise en fureur calomnie et diffame les dirigeants du prolétariat de Petrograd, les Izvestia ne voient rien et n'entendent rien. Dans ces circonstances, quel peut bien être le sens du mot d'ordre « renforcement des soviets » ? Une seule réponse est possible. Il veut dire renforcer le soviet de Petrograd contre le comité exécutif central, qui s'est bureaucratisé et dont la composition est demeurée inchangée. Nous devons obtenir pour le soviet de Petrograd l'indépendance complète d'organisation, de protection et de fonctionnement politique.

C'est là le problème le plus important, et sa résolution est le premier point à l'ordre du jour. Le soviet de Petrograd doit devenir le centre d'une nouvelle mobilisation révolutionnaire des masses de travailleurs, de soldats et de paysans, dans une nouvelle lutte pour le pouvoir. Nous devons soutenir de toutes nos forces l'initiative prise par la conférence des comités d'ouvriers d'usine, pour la convocation du congrès panrusse des délégués ouvriers. Pour que le prolétariat puisse rallier les masses appauvries de soldats et de paysans, sa politique doit être radicale et inexorablement opposée à la tactique du comité exécutif central. Il est clair, d'après la Novaia Zin d'une union entre mencheviks et nous est vaine, réactionnaire et utopique. Ce résultat ne peut être obtenu que si le prolétariat en tant que classe restructure son organisation centrale à l'échelle du pays. Il nous est impossible de prédire tous les tours et détours du cheminement de l'histoire. En tant que parti politique, nous ne pouvons pas être tenus pour responsables du cours de l'histoire. Mais nous n'en sommes que plus responsables devant notre classe : la rendre capable de mener à bien sa mission à travers toutes les déviations du cheminement historique, voilà notre devoir fondamental.

Les classes dirigeantes, avec le « gouvernement de salut 2 », font tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour imposer les problèmes politiques de la révolution à l'attention non seulement des travailleurs, mais aussi de l'armée et des provinces, et sous une forme aussi aiguë que possible. Les S.R. et les mencheviks ont fait et font encore tout ce qu'ils peuvent pour étaler devant les secteurs les plus larges des masses laborieuses du pays la faillite complète de leur tactique. Il appartient maintenant à notre parti, avec énergie, vigilance et insistance, de tirer toutes les conclusions inévitables de la situation actuelle et de se mettre la tête des masses déshéritées et épuisées pour livrer une bataille résolue en faveur de leur dictature révolutionnaire.

Proletarii, n° 4, 17 août 1917

Notes

1 Konovalov, ministre du Commerce dans le gouvernement provisoire du prince Lvov, démissionna le 31 mai 1917.

2 Cf. chap. 2, note 5.

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/oeuvres/1917/08/maintenant.htm

Août 1917 - Le caractère de la révolution russe

Les scribes et politiciens libéraux et S.R.-mencheviques se soucient beaucoup de la signification sociologique de la révolution russe. Est-ce une révolution bourgeoise, ou quelque autre type de révolution bourgeoise, ou quelque autre type de révolution ? À première vue, cette théorisation académique peut paraître un peu énigmatique. Les libéraux n'ont rien à gagner à révéler les intérêts de la classe qui sont derrière « leur » révolution. Quant aux « socialistes » petits-bourgeois, ils n'utilisent pas, en général, mais préfèrent invoquer le « sens commun », autrement dit médiocrité et l'absence de principes. Le fait est que le jugement de Milioukov-Dan, inspiré par Plékhanov, sur le caractère bourgeois de la révolution russe ne contient pas une once de théorie. Ni Yedinstvo, ni Rietch, ni Dieu, ni la Rabotchaia Gazeta ne se cassent la tête pour préciser ce qu'ils entendent par révolution bourgeoise. Le but de leurs manœuvres est purement pratique : il s'agit de démontrer le « droit » de la révolution bourgeoise à exercer le pouvoir. Même si les soviets représentent la majorité de la population politiquement formée, même si dans toutes les élections démocratiques, à la ville comme à la campagne, les partis capitalistes ont été balayés avec éclat, « puisque la révolution a un caractère bourgeois », il est nécessaire de préserver les privilèges de la bourgeoisie et de lui accorder au gouvernement un rôle auquel la configuration des groupes politiques dans le pays ne lui donne absolument pas droit. Si nous devons agir conformément aux principes du parlementarisme démocratique, il est clair que le pouvoir appartient aux sociaux-révolutionnaires, soit seuls, soit alliés aux mencheviks. Mais, comme « notre révolution est une révolution bourgeoise », les principes de la démocratie sont suspendus et les représentants de l'écrasante majorité du peuple reçoivent cinq sièges au ministère, alors que les représentants d'une infime minorité en obtiennent deux fois plus. Au diable la démocratie ! Et vive la sociologie de Plékhanov !

« Je suppose que vous voudriez une révolution bourgeoise sans la bourgeoisie ? », demande finement Plékhanov, appelant à la rescousse Engels et la dialectique.

« C'est exactement ça, interrompt Milioukov. Nous, les cadets, nous serions prêts à abandonner le pouvoir que le peuple, de toute évidence, ne veut pas nous donner. Mais nous ne pouvons pas nous dérober devant la science. » Et il se réfère au « marxisme » de Plékhanov comme autorité.

Puisque notre révolution est une révolution bourgeoise, expliquent Plékhanov, Dan et Potressov, nous devons former une alliance politique entre les travailleurs et les exploiteurs. Et, à la lumière de cette sociologie, la pitrerie de la poignée de mains entre Boublikov et Tsérételli se révèle dans toute sa signification historique.

Il n'y a qu'un ennui, c'est que ce même caractère bourgeois de la révolution, qui sert maintenant à justifier la coalition entre les socialistes et les capitalistes, a, pendant un bon nombre d'années, été considéré par ces mêmes mencheviks comme menant à des conclusions diamétralement opposées.

Puisque dans une révolution bourgeoise, avaient-ils l'habitude de dire, le gouvernement au pouvoir ne peut avoir d'autre fonction que de sauvegarder la domination de la bourgeoisie, il est clair que le socialisme n'a rien à faire avec lui, que sa place n'est pas au gouvernement mais dans l'opposition. Plékhanov considérait que les socialistes ne pouvaient à aucune condition participer à un gouvernement bourgeois, et il attaqué violemment Kautsky, dont la fermeté admettait, sur ce point, certaines exception. « Tempora legesque mutantur 1 », disaient les gentlemen de l'ancien régime. Et il semble que ce soit le cas pour les « lois » de la sociologie de Plékhanov, peu importe la contradiction entre les opinions des mencheviks et de leur leader Plékhanov, car, quand on compare leurs déclarations d'avant la révolution et celles d'aujourd'hui, une pensée unique domine les deux formules : c'est qu'on ne peut pas faire une révolution bourgeoise « sans la bourgeoisie ». À première vue, cela peut paraître une évidence. Mais c'est seulement une sottise.

L'histoire de l'humanité n'a pas commencé avec la conférence de Moscou. Il y a eu des révolutions avant. À la fin du xviiie siècle, il y eut en France une révolution, qu'on appelle, et à juste titre, la « Grande Révolution ». C'était une révolution bourgeoise. Au cours d'une de ses phases, le pouvoir tomba aux mains des jacobins, qui étaient soutenus par les « sans-culottes », c'est-à-dire les travailleurs semi-prolétaires des villes, et qui interposèrent entre eux et les Girondins, le parti libéral de la bourgeoisie, les cadets de l'époque, le rectangle net de la guillotine. C'est seulement la dictature des jacobins qui a donné à la Révolution française son importance historique, qui a fait d'elle la « Grande Révolution ». Et pourtant cette dictature fut instaurée non seulement sans la bourgeoisie, mais encore contre elle et malgré elle. Robespierre, à qui il ne fut pas donné de s'initier aux idées de Plékhanov, renversa toutes les lois de la sociologie et, au lieu de serrer la main des Girondins, il leur coupa la tête. C'était cruel, sans aucun doute. Mais cette cruauté n'a pas empêché la Révolution française de devenir « Grande », dans les limites de son caractère bourgeois. Marx, au nom duquel on commet aujourd'hui tant de méfaits dans notre pays, a dit que « toute la Terreur en France ne fut rien d'autre qu'une méthode plébéienne d'en finir avec les ennemis de la bourgeoisie2 » Et, comme cette bourgeoisie avait très peur de ces méthodes plébéiennes pour en finir avec les ennemis du peuple, les Jacobins non seulement privèrent la bourgeoisie du pouvoir, mais encore lui appliquèrent une loi de fer et de sang chaque fois qu'elle faisait une tentative quelconque pour arrêter ou « modérer » le travail des Jacobins. Il est clair par conséquent que les jacobins ont accompli une révolution bourgeoise sans la bourgeoisie.

À propos de la révolution anglaise de 1648, Engels a écrit : « Pour que la bourgeoisie puisse récolter tous les fruits parvenus à maturité, il fallait que la révolution dépasse de loin ses buts premiers, comme ce fut à nouveau le cas en France en 1793 et en Allemagne en 1848. C'est là certainement une des lois de l'évolution de la société bourgeoise3. » On voit que la loi d'Engels est diamétralement opposée à la construction ingénieuse de Plékhanov que les mencheviks ont adoptée et répandue partout comme étant du marxisme.

On peut bien sûr objecter que les Jacobins appartenaient eux-mêmes à la bourgeoisie, la petite bourgeoisie. C'est tout à fait vrai. Mais n'est-ce pas aussi le cas de la prétendue « démocratie révolutionnaire » dirigée par les S.R. et les mencheviks ? Entre le parti cadet, qui représente les intérêts des propriétaires plus ou moins grands, et les sociaux-révolutionnaires, il n'y a eu aucun parti intermédiaire, dans aucune élection que ce soit, à la ville ou à la campagne. Il s'ensuit avec une certitude mathématique que la petite bourgeoisie doit avoir trouvé sa représentation politique dans les rangs des sociaux-révolutionnaires. Les mencheviks, dont la politique ne diffère pas d'un cheveu de celle des S.R., reflètent les mêmes intérêts de classe. Cela n'est pas contradictoire avec le fait qu'ils sont aussi soutenus par une fraction des travailleurs les plus arriérés et les plus conservateurs et privilégiés. Pourquoi les S.R. ont-ils été incapables d'assumer le pouvoir ? Dans quel sens et pourquoi le caractère « bourgeois » de la révolution russe (si on suppose que tel est le cas) obligerait-il les S.R. et les mencheviks à remplacer les méthodes plébéiennes des Jacobins par le procédé bien élevé d'un accord avec la bourgeoisie contre-révolutionnaire ? Il faut évidemment en chercher la raison non dans le caractère lamentable de notre démocratie petite-bourgeoise. Au lieu d'utiliser le pouvoir qu'elle a en main comme organe de la réalisation des exigences essentielles de l'histoire, notre démocratie frauduleuse a respectueusement repassé tout le pouvoir réel à la clique contre-révolutionnaire et militaro-impérialiste, et Tsérételli, à la conférence de Moscou, a même pu se glorifier de ce que les soviets n'avaient pas abandonné le pouvoir de force, après une défaite dans une lutte courageuse, mais de son plein gré, comme preuve d'auto-effacement politique. Ce n'est pas avec la douceur du veau qui tend le cou au couteau du boucher qu'on peut conquérir de nouveaux mondes.

La différence entre les terroristes de la Convention et les capitulards de Moscou, c'est la différence entre des tigres et des veaux : une différence de courage. Mais cette différence n'est pas fondamentale. Elle ne fait que masquer une différence décisive dans le personnel de la démocratie lui-même. Les Jacobins trouvaient leur base dans le classes de petits possédants ou les non-possédants, incluant l'embryon de prolétariat industriel est sorti de la démocratie imprécise pour occuper dans l'histoire une position où il exerce une influence de première importance. La démocratie petite-bourgeoise perdait ses qualités révolutionnaires les plus précieuses à mesure que ces qualités se développaient dans le prolétariat qui se dégageait de la tutelle petite-bourgeoise. Ce phénomène à son tour est dû au degré incomparablement plus élevé de développement capitaliste en Russie par rapport à la France de la fin du xviiie siècle. Le pouvoir révolutionnaire du prolétariat russe, qui ne peut absolument pas être mesuré d'après son importance numérique, est fondé sur son pouvoir productif immense, qui apparaît plus clairement que jamais en temps de guerre. La menace d'une grève des chemins de fer nous rappelle à nouveau, aujourd'hui, combien tout le pays dépend du travail concentré du prolétariat. Le parti petit-bourgeois-paysan, au tout début de la révolution, était soumis au feu croisé des groupes puissants formés par les classes impérialistes d'un côté et le prolétariat révolutionnaire et internationaliste de l'autre. Dans sa lutte pour exercer une influence propre sur les travailleurs, la petite bourgeoisie n'a cessé de se vanter de son « talent à gérer l'État », de son « patriotisme », et elle est ainsi tombée dans une dépendance servile par rapport aux groupes capitalistes contre-révolutionnaires. En même temps, elle a perdu toute possibilité de liquider ne serait-ce que l'ancienne barbarie qui imprégnait les secteurs de la population qui lui étaient encore attachés. La lutte des S.R. et des mencheviks pour influencer le prolétariat cédait de plus en plus la place à une lutte du parti prolétarien pour obtenir la direction des masses semi-prolétariennes des villes et des villages. Parce qu'ils ont « de leur plein gré » transmis leur pouvoir aux cliques bourgeoises, les S.R. et les mencheviks ont été obligés de transmettre intégralement la mission révolutionnaire au parti du prolétariat. Cela seul suffit à montrer que la tentative pour trancher les questions tactiques fondamentales par une simple référence au caractère « bourgeois » de notre révolution peut seulement réussir à semer la confusion dans l'esprit des travailleurs arriérés et à tromper les paysans.

Au cours de la révolution de 1848 en France, le prolétariat fait déjà des efforts héroïques pour agir de façon autonome. Mais il n'a encore ni théorie révolutionnaire claire ni organisation de classe reconnue. Son importance dans la production est infiniment moindre que la fonction économique actuelle du prolétariat russe. De plus, derrière 1848 il y avait une autre grande révolution, qui avait résolu à sa manière la question agraire, et il en résulta un isolement très net du prolétariat, surtout à Paris, par rapport aux masses paysannes. Notre situation à cet égard est infiniment plus favorable. Les hypothèques sur la terre, les obligations vexatoires en tout genre et l'exploitation rapace de l'Église s'imposent à la révolution comme des problèmes inéluctables, qui exigent des mesures courageuses et sans compromis. L'« isolement » de notre parti par rapport aux S.R. et aux mencheviks ne signifierait pas du tout un isolement du prolétariat par rapport aux masses opprimées des villes et des campagnes. Au contraire, une opposition politique résolue du prolétariat révolutionnaire à la défection perfide des leaders actuels du soviet ne peut qu'entraîner une différenciation salutaire parmi les millions de paysans, arracher les paysans pauvres à l'influence traîtresse des puissants moujiks social-révolutionnaires, et faire du prolétariat socialiste le leader véritable de la révolution populaire, « plébéienne ».

Enfin, une simple référence vide de sens au caractère bourgeois de la révolution russe ne nous dit absolument rien sur le caractère international de son milieu. Et c'est là un facteur de première importance. La grande révolution jacobine se trouva confrontée à une Europe arriérée, féodale et monarchiste. Le régime jacobin tomba, laissant la place au régime bonapartiste, sous le poids de l'effort surhumain qu'il dut fournir pour subsister contre les forces unies du Moyen Age. La révolution russe, au contraire, trouve devant elle une Europe qui l'a distancée de beaucoup et qui est parvenue au degré le plus élevé du développement capitaliste. Le massacre actuel montre que l'Europe a atteint le point de saturation capitaliste, qu'elle ne peut plus continuer à vivre et croître sur la base de la propriété privée des moyens de production. Ce chaos de sang et de ruines est l'insurrection furieuse des forces muettes et sombres de la production, c'est la révolte du fer et de l'acier contre la domination du profit, contre l'esclavage salarié, contre la misérable impasse de nos relations humaines. Le capitalisme, pris dans l'incendie d'une guerre qu'il a lui-même déclenchée, crie à l'humanité par la bouche de ses canons : « Sois victorieuse, ou je t'ensevelirai sous mes ruine quand je tomberai ! »

Toute l'évolution passée, les milliers d'années d'histoire humaine, de lutte des classes, d'accumulation culturelle sont concentrées maintenant dans l'unique problème de la révolution prolétarienne. Il n'y a pas d'autre réponse et pas d'autre issue. Et c'est là ce qui fait la force formidable de la révolution russe. Ce n'est pas une révolution « nationale », dans le royaume des hallucinations des xviiie et xixe siècles. Notre patrie dans le temps, c'est le xxe siècle. Le sort futur de la révolution russe dépend directement du cours et du résultat de la guerre, c'est-à-dire de l'évolution des contradictions de classes en Europe, auxquelles cette guerre impérialiste donne une nature catastrophique.

Les Kérensky et les Kornilov ont commencé trop tôt à parler le langage de dictateurs rivaux. Les Kaledine ont montré les dents trop tôt. Le renégat Tsérételli a saisi trop tôt le doigt méprisant que lui tendait la contre-révolution. Jusqu'à présent, la révolution n'a dit que son premier mot. Elle a encore des réserves formidables en Europe occidentale. Au lieu de la poignée de mains des chefs de gang réactionnaires et des bons à rien de la petite bourgeoisie viendra la grande étreinte du prolétariat russe et du prolétariat d'Europe.

Proletarii, n° 8, 22 août 1917

Notes

1 Les temps et les lois changent.

2 Marx, La bourgeoisie et la contre-révolution.

3 Engels, Socialisme utopique et Socialisme scientifique, Éditions sociales, Paris, 1951, p. 99. (N.d.T.)

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/oeuvres/1917/08/caractere.htm

Septembre 1917 - Discours à la conférence démocratique

Camarades et citoyens ! Nous ne voulons pas entendre de bons conseils, nous voulons un rapport. Même Peschekonov, en guise de rapport, nous a lu une sorte de poème en prose sur les avantages de la coalition. Il a dit que les ministres cadets, dans le gouvernement de coalition, ne s'étaient livrés (Dieu merci !) à aucun sabotage ; ils n'ont fait que rester assis et attendre en disant : « Nous allons simplement voir comment vous, socialistes, vous nous trahissez. » J'ai dit que c'est du sabotage de la part d'un parti politique, un parti capitaliste, i-un parti très influent, que d'entrer dans le gouvernement, à un moment des plus critiques de l'histoire, uniquement pour pouvoir observer de l'intérieur comment les représentants de la démocratie se trahissent, quand de l'extérieur, ce même parti aide Kornilov. Le citoyen Peschekonov a promis alors de m'expliquer la différence entre sabotage et politique. Mais il a oublié de tenir sa promesse. Un autre ministre d'un autre parti, un cadet, a tiré certaines conclusions de son expérience de ministre, mais dans un sens politique plus précis. Je veux parler de Kolochkine. Il a justifié sa démission en disant que les pouvoirs extraordinaires attribués à Kérensky ont réduit les autres ministres à n'être que les exécutants des ordres du ministre-président, et qu'il n'était pas prêt, quant à lui, à accepter cette situation.

Je le dis franchement : en lisant ces mots, j'ai été tenté d'applaudir notre ennemi Kolochkine. Il a parlé ici avec dignité politique et avec dignité humaine. Il y a actuellement de grandes divergences d'opinion parmi nous sur le ministère de coalition démissionnaire, aussi bien que sur celui à venir1. Mais, je vous le demande, y a-t-il une divergence quelconque sur le gouvernement en place aujourd'hui, et qui parle aujourd'hui au nom de la Russie ? Je n'ai pas entendu ici un seul orateur revendiquer l'honneur peu enviable de défendre ce monstre) cinq têtes qu'est le directoire, ou son président Kérensky. (Désordre, applaudissements et protestations de « Vive Kérensky ! ».)

Vous vous souvenez peut-être comment, de cette même tribune, un autre ancien ministre, Tsérételli, a parlé de sa propre expérience, en homme très clairvoyant en-t en diplomate ; il a dit que toute la faute en était au peuple lui-même, car c'était lui qui avait élevé un individu à une j-hauteur telle qu'il ne pouvait que le décevoir. Il n'a pas nommé cet individu, mais vous me croirez tous si je vous affirme qu'il ne pensait pas à Terechtchenko.

Dans le discours qu'il a fait ici, Kérensky a répondu à nos remarques sur la peine de mort 2 en disant : « Vous pouvez me condamner si jamais je signe un seul arrêt de mort. »

Si la peine de mort, peine que Kérensky lui-même a abolie jadis, était nécessaire, alors, je vous le demande, comment Kérensky peut-il dire à la conférence démocratique qu'il n'utilisera jamais la peine de mort ? Et s'il nous dit qu'il juge possible de s'engager à ne pas utiliser la peine de mort contre le peuple, alors je dis qu'en parlant ainsi il a fait de l'introduction de la peine de mort une e chose si futile que c'en est presque criminel. (Cris de « C'est vrai ! ».)

Ce fait reflète la totale dégradation actuelle de la république russe. Cette république n'a ni représentation nationale reconnue ni gouvernement responsable. Et si tous, divisés sur tant d'autres questions, nous sommes d'accord sur un point, c'est bien celui-ci : il est indigne d'un grand peuple, et encore plus d'un peuple qui a accompli une grande révolution, de tolérer que le pouvoir soit concentré dans les mains d'une seule personne, et d'une personne qui n'est pas responsable devant le peuple. (Applaudissements.)

Camarade, de nombreux orateurs ont souligné que, dans la période actuelle, le fardeau du pouvoir est lourd et tyrannique, et ils déconseillent à la démocratie russe, jeune et inexpérimentée, d'assumer ce fardeau ; que peut-on dire alors, je vous le demande, s'il est assumé par une seule personne, qui n'a en aucune occasion montré de talent particulier, ni comme chef d'armée ni comme législateur ? (Cris : « Ça suffit ! » et « continuez ! ».)

Camarades, je regrette infiniment que le point de vue qui s'exprime maintenant avec tant d'énergie dans ces cris de protestation n'ait jusqu'à présent trouvé aucune expression articulée à cette tribune (Désordre et applaudissements.)

Pas un orateur n'est monté à cette tribune pour nous dire : « Pourquoi vous quereller à propos de l'ancienne coalition, pourquoi discuter de la future coalition ? Vous avez Alexandre Kérensky, et cela doit vous suffire ! » Personne n'a dit cela. (Ces mots soulèvent une nouvelle tempête de protestations. « Je me tairai jusqu'à ce que l'ordre soit rétabli dans cette salle », déclare Trotsky d'une voix ferme et décidée. Le président réussit à rétablir l'ordre.)

Notre parti n'a jamais attribué la responsabilité du régime actuel à la mauvaise volonté d'un individu quelconque. Au mois de mai, quand j'ai parlé au soviet des délégués ouvriers et soldats de Petrograd, j'ai dit : « C'est vous, les partis en lutte, qui créez vous-mêmes un régime dans lequel la personne qui portera la plus lourde responsabilité sera obligée, indépendamment de sa propre volonté, de devenir le futur Bonaparte russe.. » (Désordre, cris : « Mensonges ! Démagogie ! »)

Camarades, il ne peut y avoir ici de démagogie, car ce qui est dit ici en fait, c'est simplement que certaines circonstances politiques engendrent inévitablement une tendance vers un régime autocratique.

Quelles sont ces circonstances ? Nous les énonçons comme suit : il se déroule dans la société moderne une lutte grave et acharnée. Ici en Russie, dans une période de révolution, quand les masses, émergeant des profondeur, prennent pour la première fois conscience d'elles-mêmes en tant que classe, classe cruellement blessée à travers des siècles d'oppression, quand elles se conçoivent pour la première fois comme sujets politiques, comme personnes légales, comme classe qui commence à attaquer les fondements de la propriété privée, alors, dans une telle période, la lutte de classe prend une forme des plus intenses et des plus ardentes. La démocratie – ce que nous appelons la démocratie –, c'est l'expression politique de ces masses travailleuses, des ouvriers, des paysans et des soldats. La bureaucratie et la noblesse défendent les droits de la propriété privée. La lutte entre ces deux partis est maintenant inévitable, camarades, car la révolution a, pour parler comme les classes possédantes, libéré les couches inférieures du peuple. La lutte entre ces deux partis, qu'elle prenne une forme ou une autre, s'intensifie et évolue suivant son cours naturel de développement, auquel aucune éloquence et aucun programme ne peuvent résister. Maintenant que les forces motrices de la révolution se sont révélées dans leur séparation, un gouvernement de coalition signifie soit le stade ultime de la stupidité politique, et cela ne peut durer, soit le plus haut degré d'imposture de la part des classes possédantes qui tentent de priver les masses de direction en séduisant les chefs les meilleurs et les plus influents pour les attirer dans un piège, dans le but soit d'abandonner les masses (ou, comme ils disent, les « éléments libérés ») à leurs propre ressources, soit de les noyer dans leur propre sang.

Camarades ! Les défenseurs de la coalition disent qu'un gouvernement purement capitaliste est impossible. Pourquoi un tel gouvernement est-il impossible ? Le populiste Minor a soutenu qu'un ministère socialiste serait aussi éphémère qu'un gouvernement de coalition. Ce n'est un compliment ni pour le ministère de coalition ni pour un ministère socialiste. Je vous le demande : pourquoi ne pourrait-on pas laisser le gouvernement entièrement aux mains des capitalistes ? On nous dit que c'est impossible. Camarades, Tsérételli a soutenu tout à fait justement que cela provoquerait une guerre civile. Donc les relations entre les masses et les classes possédantes sont si tendues que la prise en main du gouvernement par les classes possédantes donnerait le signal de la guerre civile. Tant les contradictions sont aiguës, tendues et fortes, tout à fait indépendamment des projets des bolcheviks !

À un tel moment d'interrègne historique, où les classes possédantes ne peuvent se saisir complètement du pouvoir et où les organes du peuple n'osent pas encore s'en saisir, l'idée d'un arbitre, d'un dictateur, d'un Bonaparte, d'un Napoléon, est née. Voilà pourquoi Kérensky a pu occuper la position qu'il détient maintenant. Ce sont la faiblesse et l'indécision de la démocratie révolutionnaire qui ont créé la position de Kérensky. (Applaudissements.)

Si, une fois de plus, vous répétez l'expérience d'une coalition, alors qu'elle a fait son temps, alors que les cadets sont entrés deux fois dans la coalition et l'ont quittée deux fois 3 – et sur ce point, camarades, il faut noter que leur but dans les deux cas, dans leur entrée comme dans leur sortie, était le même, à savoir saboter le travail du gouvernement révolutionnaire –, alors que vous avez été témoins de l'affaire Kornilov 4, ce faisant vous inviteriez les cadets, j'en suis fermement convaincu, à faire plus que répéter l'expérience précédente.

Bien sûr, on a dit qu'on ne peut accuser le parti cadet tout entier d'avoir participé à la rébellion de Kornilov. Si je ne me trompe, c'est le camarade Znamensky qui nous a dit, à nous les bolcheviks (et ce n'était pas la première fois que nous l'entendions) : « Vous avez protesté quand nous avons rendu responsable l'ensemble de votre parti, en tant que parti, du mouvement du 18 juillet. Alors ne répétez pas l'erreur qu'ont commise quelques-uns d'entre nous, et ne rendez pas tous les cadets responsables de la rébellion de Kornilov. » Cette comparaison est, à mon avis, quelque peu inadéquate, car, si on a accusé (à tort ou à raison, c'est un autre problème) les bolcheviks d'avoir lancé, ou même provoqué, le mouvement des 16-18 juillet, ce ne fut pas pour les inviter à entrer au gouvernement, mais pour les inviter à entrer à la prison Kresty5. (Rires.)

C'est là, camarades, une petite différence que même le citoyen Zaroudny, j'espère, ne contestera pas. Nous vous disons : si vous voulez emprisonner les cadets à cause de la rébellion de Kornilov, alors ne le faites pas sans réfléchir, mais examinez le cas de chaque cadet un à un, et sous tous les angles. (Rires et cris : « Bravo ! »)

Mais, camarades, si vous invitez un parti à entrer au gouvernement, disons par exemple à titre de paradoxe (et seulement à ce titre), le parti bolchevique… (Rires.)

Bien. Si vous voulez un ministère dont le travail consisterai à désarmer les travailleurs, à éloigner la garnison révolutionnaire ou à rappeler le troisième corps de cavalerie, alors je dirai que les bolcheviks, qui sont, en tout ou en partie, liés au mouvement des 16-18 juillet, sont dans leur ensemble, en tant que parti, totalement inaptes à la tâche de désarmer Petrograd, sa garnison et ses ouvriers. (Rires.) Car, camarades, bien que les 16-18 juillet nous n'ayons pas appelé les travailleurs à descendre dans la rue, toutes nos sympathies allaient aux soldats et aux travailleurs qu'on a par la suite désarmés et dispersés ; nous étions en complet accord avec leurs revendications, nous haïssons ce qu'ils haïssaient, nus aimions ce qu'ils aimaient…

(« Vous avez arrêté Tchernov », crie une voix dans la salle ; L'orateur répond.) Si je ne me trompe, Tchernov est ici, et il peut confirmer (Tchernov approuve de la tête) que la violence faite à Tchernov n'a pas été commise par les manifestants, mais par un petit groupe de gens visiblement criminels dont j'ai à nouveau rencontré le chef, qui était prisonnier de droit commun, à la prison Kresty6.

Mais, camarades, la question n'est pas là. S'il s'agissait seulement du parti cadet et de son entrée au gouvernement, le fait qu'un membre ou l'autre de ce parti se cache dans la coulisse avec Kornilov, le fait que Maklakov était au téléphone était au téléphone quand Savinkov négociait avec Kornilov, le fait que Roditchev est allé dans le district du Don pour conclure un accord politique avec Kaledine, tout cela importe peu ; mais ce qui est important, c'est que toute la presse capitaliste de tous les pays a propagé les mensonges, les pensées, les sentiments et les souhaits de la classe capitaliste. Voilà pourquoi je dis qu'il nous est absolument impossible d'envisager la question d'une coalition.

Victor Tchernov, bien sûr, est très optimiste et dit : « Attendons » ; mais, premièrement, la question du pouvoir est une question d'aujourd'hui et, deuxièmement, il affirme, en s'appuyant sur la théorie marxiste (le marxisme de Lieber et Dan, devenu maintenant – ironie de l'histoire – une arme adaptée aux besoins des S.R.), il affirme donc, sur la base de la théorie marxiste : « Il faut attendre, peut-être un nouveau parti démocratique naîtra-t-il au cours de la révolution. » Personnellement, j'ai appris du marxisme que, quand les travailleurs entrent en scène comme force indépendante, chacun de leurs pas, loin de renforcer la démocratie bourgeoise l'affaiblit, en libérant la masse des travailleurs de l'influence capitaliste.

On nous a suggéré d'attendre la renaissance et le renforcement de la démocratie capitaliste et de former alors avec elle un front uni. C'est là la plus grande illusion que l'on puisse se faire. Nous ne voulons pas, camarades, fonder nos espoirs sur l'idée que la démocratie bourgeoise, sous la forme qu'elle avait dans le système capitaliste, peut ressusciter parmi nous.

(Le camarade Trotsky lit la déclaration de la fraction bolchevique7. Pendant sa lecture, des cris : « Pourquoi ? Pourquoi ? », éclatent sur le côté droit de la salle, à propos des clauses sur la nécessité immédiate d'armer les travailleurs. L'orateur répond à ces cris par l'intervention suivante.)

Notes

1 Le 6 août, le deuxième gouvernement de coalition, formé quinze jours auparavant, fut dissous, et un troisième fut formé, qui dura jusqu'à l'insurrection d'octobre.

2 La peine capitale, abolie le 25 mars, fut réintroduite par le gouvernement provisoire le 25 juillet 1917 pour les délits militaires.

3 Première démission des cadets : celle de Milioukov le 15 mai. Deuxième démission : celle des cinq ministres cadets du premier gouvernement de coalition, les 15-16 juillet. Les cadets réintègrent la nouvelle coalition formée par Kérensky le 6 août, avec Nekrassov (Premier ministre adjoint et ministre des Finances).

4 Le commandant en chef Kornilov se rebella contre le gouvernement provisoire et les soviets le 6 septembre, et fit marcher la cavalerie (avec la « Division sauvage » des cosaques du Caucase) contre Petrograd. Les masses révolutionnaires eurent raison de la révolte qui ne dura que cinq jours, et Kornilov fut arrêté le 14 septembre.

5 La prison Kresty fut construite à Petrograd en 1893 sur le modèle américain ; elle pouvait loger plus de mille prisonniers. Trotsky y fut emprisonné du 4 août au 17 septembre.

6 Tchernov échappa au lynchage grâce à l'intervention personnelle de Trotsky le 17 juillet 1917.

7 Cf. supra, 7. Discours à la conférence démocratique, note 1.

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/oeuvres/1917/09/conference.htm

5 Octobre 1917 - Résolution du Soviet de Petrograd sur la Conférence démocratique.

Le Soviet des députés ouvriers et soldats de Petrograd, après avoir discuté de la situation critique lors d'une réunion d'urgence, considère :

1) Le pays est sous la menace d'une nouvelle attaque de la contre-révolution. L'impérialisme international, en étroite alliance avec la bourgeoisie russe, prépare des mesures communes pour étrangler les ouvriers, les soldats et les paysans révolutionnaires. Les organisations contre-révolutionnaires du capital existent toujours, et même maintenant la soi-disant Conférence des personnalités publiques siège à Moscou, qui était le centre organisateur du discours de Kornilov. La Conférence démocratique artificiellement constituée, convoquée dans le but de parvenir à un accord avec les éléments qualifiés, s'est révélée totalement impuissante ; tandis que ses sections de droite lancent des ultimatums et vont en rupture directe avec la démocratie révolutionnaire, pour soutenir le gouvernement dans ses démarches contre-révolutionnaires. Le Gouvernement provisoire, par nombre de ses ordres, s'efforce manifestement de désorganiser les forces de la révolution. Il dissout les organisations révolutionnaires démocratiques de la flotte, a l'intention d'introduire les conspirateurs Kornilov-Cadet dans le gouvernement, nomme le Kornilovite Klembovsky exposé au conseil militaire, etc. Tout cela crée une tension extrême dans la situation et met devant le prolétariat, la paysannerie et les soldats la question de repousser ce qui pourrait arriver dans des actions contre-révolutionnaires dans un proche avenir.

2) La conférence démocratique artificiellement bricolée n'améliore en rien la situation enchevêtrée. Au contraire, incapable, précisément à cause de cette sélection artificielle, de résoudre la question du pouvoir révolutionnaire, elle crée l'apparence de l'impuissance de la démocratie révolutionnaire. En même temps, il fédère en son sein une droite essentiellement antidémocratique, qui lance des ultimatums à la démocratie révolutionnaire et est prête à tout moment à passer dans le camp de la contre-révolution ouverte, en consolidant les positions des encensoirs et des ouvrant ainsi le champ à toutes sortes d'aventures contre-révolutionnaires. Ainsi, la politique de conciliation et d'indécision, au lieu de renforcer l'influence de la démocratie, désorganise ses forces et doit être définitivement abandonnée. Le soi-disant pré-parlement est en train de se transformer en une organisation où les parties les plus conservatrices de la démocratie se voient accorder une place décisive au détriment des organisations révolutionnaires d'ouvriers, de soldats et de paysans. Un tel pré-parlement menace de se transformer en une couverture pour de nouveaux accords avec la bourgeoisie, pour de nouveaux retards de l'Assemblée constituante, pour prolonger davantage la politique impérialiste et, par conséquent, pour aggraver davantage la ruine du pays.

3) Par conséquent, la contre-révolution ne peut être repoussée que par des centres organisés de démocratie révolutionnaire - les Soviets des députés ouvriers, soldats et paysans et leurs organes subsidiaires, qui à l'époque de Kornilov avaient déjà prouvé leur puissance dans la lutte contre l'assaut des ennemis de la révolution - les propriétaires terriens, les capitalistes et les généraux. Seuls les Soviets, représentant la force des masses révolutionnaires prêtes à l'action, ont pu écraser la rébellion armée du général Kornilov et de la bourgeoisie cadette, et eux seuls peuvent sauver la révolution.

4) Les Soviétiques doivent maintenant mobiliser toutes leurs forces pour se préparer à une nouvelle vague de contre-révolution et ne pas se laisser surprendre par elle. Partout où se trouve entre leurs mains la plénitude du pouvoir, ils ne doivent en aucun cas le perdre. Les comités révolutionnaires qu'ils ont créés à l'époque de Kornilov doivent avoir tout leur appareil prêt. Là où les Soviets ne possèdent pas cette pleine puissance, ils doivent renforcer leurs positions de toutes les manières possibles, maintenir leurs organisations en pleine préparation, créer, si nécessaire, des corps spéciaux pour la lutte contre la contre-révolution et surveiller avec vigilance l'organisation des forces ennemies.

5) Afin d'unir et de coordonner les actions de tous les Soviets dans leur lutte contre le danger imminent et de résoudre la question de l'organisation du pouvoir révolutionnaire, la convocation immédiate du Congrès des Soviets des députés ouvriers, soldats et paysans est nécessaire.

https://translate.google.fr/translate?u=https://iskra-research.org/Trotsky/sochineniia/1917/19171005-2.html

Le "trotskysme" en 1917

— Maintenant, c'est fête dans votre rue !...

Deux mois avant Octobre, j'écrivais :

A côté des noms de Tsérételli et de Tchernov, je ne pouvais pas alors encore ranger celui de Staline, philosophe du socialisme dans un seul pays. Je terminais mon article par ces mots :

« La révolution permanente contre le carnage permanent ! Telle est la lutte dont l'enjeu est le sort de l'humanité. »

Jetant un coup d'oeil rétrospectif, deux ans après la révolution d'Octobre, Lénine écrivait :

La véritable marche des idées n'eut, on le voit, rien de commun avec la caricature mensongère qu'en ont faite, profitant de la mort de Lénine et de la vague de réaction, les épigones.

https://www.marxists.org/francais/trotsky/livres/mavie/mv30.htm

History of the Russian Revolution

Robert Paris — 2025-10-03T10:55:00Z

History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-Litovsk

Leon Trotsky

1918

Introduction

The present booklet was, for the most part, written in snatches, in circumstances but little favourable to concentrated works. It was at Brest-Litovsk, between the sittings of the Peace Conference, that the different chapters of this sketch, which has for its main purpose to acquaint the workers of the world with the causes, progress, and meaning of the Russian November Revolution, were put together. History willed it that the delegates of the most revolutionary regime the world has ever known had to sit at the same diplomatic table with the representatives of the most reactionary caste among all the ruling classes. At the sittings of the Peace Conference we did not for one moment forget that we were the representatives of a revolutionary Class. We addressed our speeches to the war-weary workers of all countries, Our energies were sustained by the profound Conviction that the final word in ending the war, as in all other questions, would be said by the European working class. When speaking to Kühlmann and Czernin, we all the time had in our mind's eye our friends and comrades, Karl Liehknecht and Fritz Adler. My own free time I devoted to preparing a pamphlet intended for the workers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and of all other countries. The bourgeois Press of the whole of Europe is unanimous in its slanders and execrations of the proletarian regime in Russia. The Socialist "patriotic" Press, bereft of courage and of faith in its own work, has revealed a total incapacity to understand and to interpret to the working masses the meaning of the Russian Revolution. I want to come to their help by means of the present booklet. I believe that the revolutionary workers of Europe and of other parts of the world will understand us. I believe that they will, in the near future, start on the same Work as we are now engaged in, but that, aided by their greater experience and their more perfect intellectual and technical means, they will perform this work more thoroughly, and will help us to overcome all difficulties.

L. TROTSKY,

BREST-LITOVSK,

February 12, 1918

Part I

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

EVENTS at the present time succeed one another so rapidly that it is difficult to reproduce them from memory even in their simple chronological order. I have no. papers or documents at hand. At the same time the periodical breaks in the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk give me a certain amount of leisure Which, under present conditions, is not likely to recur. I shall, therefore, try to sketch from memory the course and development of the November Revolution, reserving to myself the right to complete and correct my narrative at some future date, with the aid of documentary evidence.

What distinguished our party almost from the very first stage of the Revolution was the firm conviction that the logic of events would eventually place it in power. I am not speaking here of the theoreticians of our party, who, many years before the Revolution, even before the Revolution of 1905, had come to the conclusion, from a close analysis of the class relations in Russia, that the victorious Course of a revolution would inevitably place the power of the State in the hands of the proletariat, supported by the wide masses of the poorest peasantry. The main foundation for this belief was the insignificance of the Russian middle-class democracy and the concentrated character of Russian industry, and, therefore, the immense social importance of the Russian working class. The insignificance of the Russian middle-class democracy is but the obverse side of the power and importance of the proletariat. True, the war temporarily deceived many people on this point, and, above all, it deceived the leading sections of middle-class democracy itself. The war assigned the decisive role in the Revolution to the army, and the old army was the peasantry.

Had the Revolution developed more normally, that is, in conditions of peace-time, such as prevailed in 1912, when it really began, the proletariat would inevitably have taken the leading role throughout, whilst the peasant masses would have been gradually towed along by the proletariat into the revolutionary whirlpool ... But the war imparted an entirely different logic to the course of events. The army had organized the peasantry, not on a political, but on a military basis. Before the peasant masses found themselves united on a common platform of definite revolutionary demands and ideas, they had already become united in regiments, divisions, corps, and armies. The lower middle-class democrats, scattered throughout this army, and playing a leading part in it both in a military and intellectual sense, were almost entirely imbued with middle-class revolutionary sentiments. The deep social discontent of the masses grew ever deeper and strove for expression, particularly owing to the military débâcle of Tsardom. Immediately the Revolution broke out, the advanced sections of the proletariat revived the traditions of 1905 by calling upon the popular masses to organize in representative bodies, viz, the “Councils” of delegates (Soviets).

The army thus had to send representatives to revolutionary bodies before its political consciousness in any way corresponded to the level of the rapidly developing revolutionary events. Whom could the soldiers send as their representatives ? Naturally, only those intellectuals and semi-intellectuals who were to be found in their midst and who possessed at least a minimum amount of political knowledge, and were capable of giving utterance to it. In this way, by the will of the awakening army, the lower middle-class intellectuals found themselves suddenly raised to a position of enormous influence. Doctors, engineers, lawyers, journalists, who in pre-war days had led a humdrum private life and laid no claim of any sort to political influence, became, overnight, representatives of whole corps and armies, and discovered that they were the “leaders” of the Revolution. The haziness of their political ideas fully corresponded to the formless state of the revolutionary consciousness of the masses themselves. They contemptuously looked down upon us as mere sectarians because we were urging the social demands of the working Class and the peasants in a most resolute and uncompromising fashion. At the same time these lower middle-class democrats, in spite of their proud demeanour of revolutionary upstarts, felt a profound diffidence both in their own capacities and in the masses who had raised them to such an unexpectedly high place. Calling themselves Socialists and really regarding themselves as such, these intellectuals looked up to the political authority of the Liberal bourgeoisie, to its knowledge and its methods, with an ill-concealed respect. Hence the endeavour of the lower middle-class leaders to obtain, at all costs, the co-operation of the Liberal middle class by way of an alliance or coalition. The programme of the party of Socialist Revolutionaries, based as it all is on vague humanitarian formulæ, and employing general sentiments and moral constructions in the place of class-war methods, was the most suitable spiritual dress that could have been found for these improvised leaders. Their efforts to find some sort of support for their own intellectual and political helplessness in the impressive political and scientific knowledge of the bourgeoisie found a theoretical Sanction in the teaching of the Mensheviks, who argued that the present Revolution was a bourgeois revolution, and could not, therefore, be carried through without the participation of the bourgeoisie in the Government. A natural bloc was thus formed between the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, expressing both the timid and hesitating political mind of the middle-class intellectuals and its vassal attitude towards Imperialist Liberalism.

To us, it was perfectly clear that the logic of the class struggle would sooner or later destroy this temporary combination and fling aside the leaders of this period of transition. The hegemony of the lower middle-class intellectuals was at the bottom the expression of the fact that the peasantry, suddenly called to take part in organized political life through the machinery of the army, had by sheer weight of numbers pushed aside and overwhelmed the proletariat for the time being. Even more, in so far as the middle-class leaders had been raised to a dizzy height by the powerful mass of the army, the working class itself, with the exception of its advanced sections, could not but become imbued with a certain political respect for them and try to maintain political contact with them for fear of finding themselves divorced from the peasantry. And this was a very serious matter, for the older generation still remembered the lesson of 1905, when the proletariat was crushed, just because the massive peasant reserves had not come up in time for the decisive battles. That is why in the first phase of the new Revolution also the proletarian masses showed themselves highly accessible to the political ideology of the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks – specially as the Revolution had aroused the hitherto slumbering backward masses of workers, and thus made the hazy radicalism of the intellectuals a sort of preparatory school for them. The Council of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Delegates meant in these conditions the predominance of peasant amorphousness over proletarian Socialism, and the predominance of intellectual Radicalism over the peasant amorphousness. The structure of Soviets rose so rapidly to a gigantic height mainly because of the leading part played in their labours by the intellectuals, with their technical knowledge and middle-class connections. But to us it was perfectly clear that this grand structure was built on deep internal contradictions and would, inevitably collapse at the next stage of the Revolution.

THE QUESTION OF WAR.

The Revolution grew directly out of the war, and the latter became the touchstone for all parties and forces of the Revolution. The intellectual leaders had been against the war. Many of them, while the Tsar was still on his throne, considered themselves as belonging to the left wing of the International, and were Zimmerwaldians. But everything changed immediately they felt themselves to be in “responsible” positions. To pursue a revolutionary Socialist policy would have meant in the circumstances a break with their own and the Entente bourgeoisie, but, as we have said, the political impotence of the middle-class intellectuals and semi-intellectuals led them to seek protection in an alliance with bourgeois Liberalism. Hence the pitiful and truly disgraceful role of the middle-class leaders in respect of the question of the war. They confined themselves to lamentations and rhetoric, and addressed secret exhortations and entreaties to the Allied Governments, while, in practice, they walked the same paths as the Liberal bourgeoisie. The soldiers in the trenches were, of course, unable to follow the argument that the war, in which they had fought for three years, had changed its character because certain new personalities, calling themselves Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, were taking part in the Government at Petrograd. Miliukoff had replaced the tchtnovnik Pokrovsky, Terestchenko then succeeded Miliukoff – that meant that bureaucratic perfidy was first replaced by militant Cadet Imperialism, then by unprincipled nebulousness and political servility ; but this did not result in any objective changes, and there seemed no way out of the terrible vicious circle of the war. In this lay the primary cause for the further dissolution of the army. The agitators had been telling the masses of soldiers that the Tsarist Government had been driving them to slaughter for no object or senses ; but those who replaced the Tsar were able neither to change the character of the war in any way nor to make a fight for peace.

During the first months of the Revolution there had been a mere marking of time. This provoked the impatience alike of the army and of the Allied Governments. Hence the offensive of July 1st. It had been demanded by the Allies, who insisted that the old Tsarist bills must be honoured by the Revolution. Frightened at their own impotence and at the growing discontent of the masses, the lower middle-class leaders readily accepted these demands. They, indeed, began to think that an attack by the Russian Army was all that was wanted in order to attain peace. An offensive began to appear to them as a way out of the wilderness, as a means of solving the problem of the situation, as the one hope of salvation. It is difficult to imagine a more monstrous and more criminal illusion. At that time they spoke of the offensive in exactly the same terms in which the Social-Patriots of all countries had spoken at the beginning of the war about the necessity of supporting the cause of national defence, of strengthening the sacred unity of the nation, etc. All their Zimmerwaldian Internationalism vanished as by magic.

To us, who were in opposition, it was clear that the offensive was a terribly perilous step, that it might even endanger the whole Revolution. We warned all and sundry that the army, newly awakened and shaken as it was by the thunder of events which as yet it had only half understood, could not be sent into battle without previously imparting to it new ideas which it could assimilate We warned, remonstrated, threatened., But the parties in power, bound as they were to the bourgeoisie, had no other way left open to them, and naturally treated us with enmity and implacable hatred.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BOLSHEVIKS.

The future historian will be unable, without deep emotion, to look through the Russian papers for May and June 1917, when the minds of the people were being prepared for the offensive. Almost all the articles, without exception, in all the official and semi-official organs were directed against the Bolsheviks. There was scarcely a charge, scarcely a calumny, that was not levelled against us in that period. Of course, the leading role in this campaign was played by the Cadet bourgeoisie, whose class instinct led it to recognize that the question at issue was not merely the offensive, but the entire further course of the Revolution and, in the first place, the form of Government authority. The whole bourgeois machinery for manufacturing “public opinion” was put into motion at full steam. All the Government offices and institutions, publications, public platforms, and university chairs were drawn into the service of this one general aim : of making the Bolsheviks impossible as a political party. In this concentrated effort and in this dramatic newspaper campaign against the Bolsheviks were already contained the first germs of the civil war which was bound to accompany the next phase of the Revolution. The sole aim of all this incitement and slander was to create an impenetrable wall of estrangement and enmity between the labouring masses on the one hand and “educated society” on the other.

The Liberal bourgeoisie understood that it could not win the support of the masses without the help of the lower middle-class democrats, who, as we pointed out above, had temporarily become the leaders of the revolutionary organizations. Consequently, the immediate aim of the political incitements against the Bolsheviks was to bring about an irreconcilable feeling of enmity between our party and the wide ranks of the Socialist intellectuals, who, having broken away from the proletariat, could not but fall into political bondage to the Liberal bourgeoisie.

It was during the first All-Russian Congress of the Soviets that the first alarming crash of thunder occurred, which warned of the coming storm. Our party had projected an armed demonstration at Petrograd for June 23rd. Its proximate object was to bring pressure to bear upon the Congress. “Take over the power in the State ” – this it was that the Petrograd workers wanted to tell the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks who had, come from all parts of the country. “Spurn the bourgeoisie ! Have done with the idea of coalition, and take the reins of power into your own hands !” We were quite certain that if the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks broke with the Liberal bourgeoisie, they would be compelled to seek support from the most energetic and most advanced elements of the proletariat, which would thus obtain the leading role in the Revolution. But that was just what frightened the lower middle-class leaders. In conjunction with the Government, in which they had their own representatives, and shoulder to shoulder with the Liberal and counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie, they opened a truly savage campaign against the projected demonstration so soon as they got, wind of it. Everything possible was set in motion against us. We were at that time a small minority at the Congress, and we gave way ; the demonstration did not take place. But all the same it left a very deep mark in the minds of the two contending parties, and made the gulf between them deeper and their mutual antagonism more acute. At the closed sitting of the Presidential Bureau of the Congress, in which also representatives of the various parties took place, Tsereteli, then a member of the Coalition Government, speaking with all the resoluteness of a narrow-minded lower middle-class doctrinaire, declared that the only danger threatening the Revolution was the Bolsheviks and the Petrograd workers who had been armed by them. He therefore argued that the people “who did not know how to use arms” must be disarmed. Of course, he had in mind the Petrograd workers and that portion of the Petrograd garrison which supported our party. However, no disarming took place, as the political and psychological conditions were not yet ripe enough for such an extreme measure.

To compensate the masses for the loss of their demonstration, the Congress of the Soviets itself organized an unarmed demonstration on July 1st. And that day became the day of our political triumph. The masses turned out in overwhelming numbers, but although they came out in answer to the call of the official Soviet authority – a sort of counterblast to the miscarried demonstration of June 23rd – the workers and soldiers had inscribed on their banners and placards the demands and battle-cries of our party : “Down with the secret treaties !” “Down with the policy of strategical offensives !” “Long live an honourable peace !” “Down with the ten capitalist Ministers !” “All power for the Soviets !” There were only three placards with expressions of confidence in the Coalition Government : one from a Cossack regiment, another from the Plekhanoff group, and a third from the Petrograd “Bund,” an organization consisting largely of non-proletarian elements. This demonstration proved not only to our opponents, but also, to ourselves, that we were far stronger in Petrograd than had been imagined.

THE OFFENSIVE OF JULY 1ST.

As a result of this demonstration of the revolutionary masses a Government crisis seemed inevitable. But the impression made by the demonstration was wiped out by the news from the front announcing that the revolutionary army had taken the offensive. On the very same day when the workers and garrison of Petrograd had been demanding the publication of the secret treaties and a public offer of peace, Kerensky had thrown the revolutionary troops into the offensive. This, of course, was no fortuitous coincidence. Everything had been arranged beforehand, and the moment for the offensive had been chosen not on military, but on political grounds. On July 2nd there was a series of so-called patriotic demonstrations in the streets of Petrograd. The Nevsky Prospekt, the main bourgeois artery, was full of excited groups of people, amongst which officers, journalists, and well-dressed ladies were carrying on a bitter campaign against the Bolsheviks.

The first news of the results of the offensive was favourable, and the leading Liberal organs considered that the chief task had been accomplished – that the blow struck on July 1st, quite apart from what might be its subsequent military developments, would prove fatal to the further progress of the Revolution. It would lead to the re-establishment of the old army discipline and strengthen the commanding position of the Liberal bourgeoisie in the country. We, however, had predicted something else besides. In a special declaration which we read out at the first Congress of the Soviets a few days before the offensive, we had stated that that offensive would inevitably destroy the internal coherence of the army, that it would put different sections of it against one another, and that it would lend an enormous preponderance to the counterrevolutionary elements, since the maintenance of discipline in a shattered army, whose vigour had not been renewed by new ideals, would be impossible without the employment of brutal measures of repression. In other words, we had predicted in that declaration all those consequences which were subsequently comprised under the name of Kornilovism. We considered that the Revolution was running the greatest danger alike in the case of the offensive succeeding (which, however, we did not believe) and in the case of its failing, as we thought to be almost inevitable. The success of the offensive would have the effect of uniting the lower with the upper middle class in common chauvinistic aspirations, thus isolating the revolutionary proletariat, while its failure might lead to the complete collapse of the army, to a chaotic retreat, the loss of more provinces, and the disappointment and despair of the masses.

Events turned out in accordance with the second part of the alternative. The news of the victorious advance of the army did not continue long. It was succeeded by gloomy communications regarding the refusal of many sections of the army to support the attacking troops, the terrible losses among the officers, who sometimes alone formed shock battalions, and so on.

The background to these military events was formed by growing difficulties in the internal life of the country. The Coalition Government had not made a single decisive step forward in the solution of the agrarian, industrial, or national questions. The food supply and transport were becoming more and more dislocated. Local conflicts became more and more frequent. The Socialist Ministers tried to persuade the masses to wait. All decisions and measures were being put off, including the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The insolvency and instability of the regime were obvious. There were two possible ways out : either to hurl the bourgeoisie from power and allow the Revolution to go forward, or to “restrain” the masses by means of brutal repression. Kerensky and Tsereteli were pursuing a middle course, and only succeeded in making the confusion worse confounded. When once the Cadets, by far the cleverer and more far-seeing representatives in the Coalition, saw that the failure of the July offensive might strike a heavy blow not only at the Revolution, but also at the parties standing at the head of affairs, they hastened to step aside for the time being, thus throwing the whole weight of the responsibility on their colleagues of the Left. On July 15th a Ministerial crisis broke out, ostensibly over the Ukrainian question. This was altogether a moment of great political tension in every sense. Deputations and individual delegates arrived from different parts of the front, bearing the tale of the chaos which now reigned supreme in the army as a result of the offensive. The so-called Government Press demanded stern measures of repression. Similar demands commenced to appear more and more frequently in the so-called Socialist Press. Kerensky was more and more rapidly, or, rather, more and more openly, passing over to the side of the Cadets and the Cadet generals, ostentatiously displaying his enmity and, indeed, hatred towards the revolutionary parties in general. The Allied Embassies were exerting pressure on the Government, demanding the re-establishment of discipline and the continuation of the offensive. Confusion reigned supreme in Government circles, whilst the indignation of the workers grew apace and imperatively demanded some outlet. “Seize the opportunity of the resignation of the Cadet Ministers and assume complete control over the Government” : such was the call of the Petrograd workers on the leading Soviet parties, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. I remember the sitting of the Executive Committee of July 15th. The Socialist Ministers reported on the new Government crisis. We waited with intense interest to hear what position they would take up now that the Government had ingloriously gone to pieces at the first serious test provoked by the Coalition policy itself. Tsereteli was the reporter. He explained to us very fully that the concessions he and Terestchenko had made to the Kieff Rada in no way meant the dismemberment of the country, and did not justify the action of the Cadets in leaving the Ministry. Tsereteli charged the Cadet leaders with being doctrinaires on the question of centralism, with a want of understanding of the need of a compromise with the Ukrainians, and so forth. The impression made by the reporter was really a pitiful one. The hopeless doctrinaire of the Coalition accusing the Cadets of being doctrinaires – the Cadets, those sober-minded political champions of Capitalism, who had seized the first opportunity for making their political bailiffs pay the cost for the fateful turn which they had imparted to the course of events by the July offensive. After all the experiences of the Coalition, it might have seemed that there could be only one way out, viz, to break with the Cadets and to form a purely Soviet Government. The correlation of forces inside the Soviets at the time was such that a Soviet Government would have meant, from a party point of view, the concentration of power in the hands of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. We were deliberately aiming at such a result, since the constant re-elections to the Soviets provided the necessary machinery for securing a sufficiently faithful reflection of the growing radicalization of the masses of the workers and soldiers. We foresaw that after the break of the Coalition with the bourgeoisie the radical tendencies would necessarily gain the upper hand on the Soviets. In such conditions the struggle of the proletariat for power would naturally shift to the floor of the Soviet organizations, and would proceed in a painless fashion. On their part, having broken with the bourgeoisie, the lower middle-class democrats would themselves become the target for its attacks, and would, therefore be Compelled to seek a closer alliance with the Socialist Working class, and sooner or later their political amorphousness and irresolution would be overcome by the labouring masses under the influence of our criticism. This is why we urged the two leading Soviet parties to take the reins of power into their own hands, although we ourselves had no confidence in them, and frankly said so.

But even after the Ministerial crisis of July 15th, Tsereteli and those who thought with him did not give up their pet idea of a coalition. They explained to the Executive Committee that the chief Cadet leaders were, it was true, demoralized by doctrinairism and even by counter-revolutionary sympathies, but that in the provinces there were many bourgeois elements who would march side by side with the revolutionary democracy and whose co-operation would be secured by the co-option of some representatives of the upper middle class, in the new Ministry. Dan was already placing high hopes on a new Radical-Democratic party which had been concocted about that time by a few doubtful politicians. The news that the Coalition had broken to pieces only to give rise to a new Coalition spread rapidly throughout Petrograd, and created a wave of dismay and indignation in the workers' and soldiers' quarters. This was the origin of the events of July 16th-18th.

THE JULY DAYS.

Already during the sitting of the Executive Committee we had been informed over the telephone that the machine-gun regiment was getting ready for a demonstration. We then took measures, also over the telephone, to restrain it ; but important events were preparing underneath. Representatives of army units disbanded for insubordination were coming from the front with alarming accounts of repressions, which made the Petrograd garrison very uneasy. The discontent of the Petrograd workers with the official leaders was proving the more acute, as Tsereteli, Dan, and Tshkheidze were obviously bent on falsifying the sentiments of the proletariat by trying to prevent the Petrograd Soviet from giving expression to the new views of the labouring masses. The All-Russian Executive Committee, elected at the June Congress and depending for support on the more backward provinces, was pushing the Petrograd Soviet more and more to the background and was taking into its own hands even the conduct of purely Petrograd affairs. A conflict was inevitable. The workers and soldiers were exerting pressure from below, giving violent expression to their discontent with the official policy of the Soviet, and demanded from our party more drastic action. We considered that in view of the still backward condition of the provinces the hour for such action had not yet struck ; but at the same time we feared lest the events at the front might produce an immense confusion in the ranks of the revolutionary workers and create despair among them.

In the ranks of our party, the attitude towards the events of July 16th-18th was perfectly definite. On the one hand, there was the fear that Petrograd might become isolated from the more backward provinces ; on the other hand, there was the hope that an active and energetic intervention of Petrograd might save the situation. The party propagandists in the lower ranks went hand to hand with the masses and carried on an uncompromising agitation.

There was still some hope that a demonstration of the revolutionary masses might break down the obstinate doctrinairism of the Coalitionists and compel them to realize at last that they could only maintain themselves in power if they completely broke with the bourgeoisie. Contrary to what was said and written at the time in the bourgeois Press, there was no intention whatever in our party of seizing the reins of power by means of an armed rising. It was only a revolutionary demonstration which broke out spontaneously, though guided by us politically. The Central Executive Committee was sitting at the Taurida Palace when the stormy waves of armed soldiers and workers surrounded the Palace on every side. Among the demonstrators there was, undoubtedly, an insignificant minority of Anarchists who were ready to use arms against the Soviet Centre. There were also some, obviously hired, Black Hundred elements who tried to seize the occasion for causing a riot and pogroms. It was from these elements that demands emanated for the arrest of Tchernoff and Tsereteli, for the forcible suppression of the Central Committee, etc. There was even an actual attempt made to arrest Tchernoff. Subsequently, at Kresty Prison, I met a sailor who had taken part in that attempt. He turned out to have been an ordinary criminal and had been imprisoned at the Kresky for burglary. But the bourgeois and compromise-mongers' press had described the whole movement as being merely of a pogrom and counter-revolutionary character, and yet, at the same time, as a Bolshevik maneuver, having as its direct object the seizure of power by armed coercion of the Central Executive Committee.

The movement of July 16th-18th showed with perfect clearness that the leading parties of the Soviet lived in Petrograd in a complete political vacuum. It is true that the garrison was by no means entirely with us at that time. There were among it units which still hesitated, were still undecided and passive. But apart from the ensigns, there was not a single unit among the garrison, which was willing to fight against us in defence of the Government or the leading parties in the Soviet. It was from the front that troops had to be fetched. The entire strategy of Tsereteli, Tchernoff, and others, during those July days was to gain time so as to enable Kerensky to draw “reliable” troops into Petrograd. Delegation after delegation entered the Taurida Palace, which was surrounded by a huge armed crowd, and demanded a complete break with the bourgeoisie, energetic measures of social reform, and the commencement of peace negotiations. We, Bolsheviks, met every new detachment of demonstrators, either in the street or in the Palace, with harangues, calling on them to be calm, and assuring them that with the masses in their present mood the compromise-mongers would be unable to form a new Coalition Ministry. The men of Kronstadt were particularly determined, and it was only with difficulty that we could keep them within the bounds of a bare demonstration. On July 17th the demonstration assumed a still more formidable character – this time under the direct leadership of our party. The Soviet leaders seemed to have lost their heads ; their speeches were of an evasive character ; the answers given by Tchkheidze, the Ulysses, to the delegations were bereft of all political sense. It was clear that the political leaders were but marking time.

On the night of July 17th “trustworthy” troops commenced to arrive from the front. During the sitting of the Executive Committee, the Taurida Palace was suddenly filled with the brass notes of the Marseillaise. The faces of the members of the Presidential Bureau changed immediately. Confidence, which had been so conspicuously lacking during the last few days, once more made its appearance. It was the Volhynian Regiment of the Guards which had arrived, the same regiment which a few months later marched at the head of the November Revolution under our banners.

From that moment everything changed. There was no longer any need to stand on ceremony with the delegations of workers and soldiers or the representatives of the Baltic Fleet. Speeches were delivered from the tribune of the Executive Committee about an armed “rebellion” which had now been “suppressed” by the faithful revolutionary troops. The Bolsheviks were declared to be a counter-revolutionary party.

The fright which the bourgeoisie had undergone during the two days of armed demonstration now became transformed into a raging hate which was displayed not only in the columns of their papers, but also in the streets of Petrograd, especially on the Nevsky Prospekt, where individual workers and soldiers were mercilessly beaten when caught carrying on their “criminal” agitation. Ensigns, officers, members of shock battalions, Knights of St. George, became masters of the situation, and rabid counter-revolutionaries placed themselves at their head. A ruthless suppression of workers' organizations and of institutions of our party was carried out throughout the city. There were arrests, raids, physical ill-treatment, and individual murders. In the night of July 17th-18th the then Minister of Justice, Pereverzeff, issued to the Press “documents” purporting to prove that at the head of the Bolshevik party there stood paid agents of Germany.

The leaders of the Socialist Revolutionary and Menshevik parties had known us too long and too well to believe this accusation, but at the same time they were too closely interested in its success against us to protest against it publicly. Even now one cannot recall, without disgust, the orgy of lies poured forth in the columns of all the bourgeois and Coalitionist Press. Our papers were suppressed. Revolutionary Petrograd then felt that the provinces and the army were as yet far from being with it. For a brief moment the workers were stricken with dismay. In the Petrograd garrison the disbanded regiments were sternly repressed, and individual units were disarmed. All this time the Soviet leaders were busy fabricating a new Ministry to include third-rate middle-class groups which, without in any way strengthening the Government, only deprived it of the last vestiges of revolutionary initiative.

In the meantime, events at the front were taking their course. The whole army had been shaken to its foundation. The soldiers saw that the vast majority of the officers who had camouflaged themselves at the beginning of the Revolution were, in reality, deeply hostile to the new regime. At the Main Headquarters there was now going on quite openly a selection of counter-revolutionary elements. The Bolshevik publications were ruthlessly persecuted. The offensive had long ago given way to a tragic retreat. The bourgeois Press was savagely slandering the army, and although on the eve of the offensive the governing parties had declared that we were an insignificant handful, that the army knew nothing of us and cared less, now that their adventure of the offensive had ended so tragically, these same people and parties were throwing the whole responsibility for the failure on us. The prisons were packed to overflowing with revolutionary soldiers and workers. For the investigation of the affair of July 16th-18th all the old wolves of Tsarist judiciary were recalled ; yet the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks dared demand of Lenin, Zinovieff, and other comrades that they should voluntarily give themselves up to “justice !”

AFTER THE JULY DAYS

The feeling of dismay in the workers' quarters soon passed, and gave way to a new wave of revolutionary enthusiasm, not only among the proletariat, but even among the Petrograd garrison. The Coalitionists were losing all influence, and the wave of Bolshevism commenced to spread throughout the country and penetrated, in spite of all obstacles, even into the army.

The new Coalition Ministry, with Kerensky at its head, now openly entered on the path of repressions. The Ministry re-established the death penalty for soldiers, our papers were put down and our propagandists were arrested. But all this only increased our influence. In spite of all hindrances placed in the way of re-elections to the Petrograd Soviet, the relative strength of the parties had altered to such an extent that on many important questions we were already in a majority. Exactly the same happened in the Moscow Soviet. At that time, in company with many other comrades, I was already in prison at Kresty, having been arrested for taking part in the agitation and organization of the armed rising of July 16th-18th in agreement with the German Government and with the object of aiding the military plans of the Hohenzollerns. The well-known examining magistrate of the Tsarist regime, Alexandroff, who had conducted several prosecutions against revolutionaries, now received the mission to protect the Republic against the counter-revolutionary Bolsheviks. Under the old regime prisoners used to be divided into political and criminal ; now a new terminology was introduced : criminals and Bolsheviks. Amongst the arrested soldiers bitter perplexity reigned. Young men from the villages who had never before taken part in politics, but who had thought that the Revolution had made them free once for all, now stared with amazement at the bolted doors and the grated windows. During our walks in the courtyard they anxiously asked me each time what it all meant and how it would all end. I comforted them by saying that we should come out victorious in the end.

KORNILOFF'S RISING.

The end of August was marked by the rising of General Korniloff. It was the immediate result of the mobilisation of the counter-revolutionary forces, to which the offensive of July had given a great impetus. At the celebrated State Conference at Moscow in the latter half of August, Kerensky tried to take up a position midway between the propertied classes and lower middleclass democrats. The Bolsheviks were regarded as standing altogether outside the law. Kerensky threatened them with “blood and iron” amidst a storm of applause from the propertied sections of the Conference and the traitorous silence of the lower middle-class democrats. But Kerensky's hysterical cries and threats did not satisfy the leaders of the counter-revolutionary cause. They saw only too well the revolutionary wave that was spreading throughout the country, enveloping the workers, the peasants, and the army, and they considered it imperative to employ immediately the most extreme measures in order to teach the masses an unforgettable lesson. In agreement with the propertied bourgeoisie, which saw in him its hero, Korniloff took this risky matter on his shoulders. Kerensky, Savinkoff, Filonenko, and other Socialist Revolutionaries in or about office took part in his plot, but all of them betrayed Korniloff as soon as they saw that if he should come out victorious they themselves would be thrown overboard. I lived through the episode in prison and followed it up in the papers : free access to the papers was the only important difference between Kerensky's prison regime and the old one. The adventure of the Cossack General fell through ; in six months of the Revolution the masses had developed sufficient spirit and strength of organization to repel any open counter-revolutionary attack. The Coalitionist Soviet parties were frightened to the last degree by the possible developments of the Korniloff plot, which threatened to sweep away not only the Bolsheviks, but the whole of the Revolution, together with its leading parties. The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks then set out to “legalize” the position of the Bolsheviks, but only by half and with numerous reservations, scenting possible dangers in the future. The same Kronstadt sailors who, after the July occurrence, had been branded as hooligans and counter-revolutionaries, were now summoned to Petrograd to defend the Revolution against the Korniloff danger. They came without demur, without taunts, without any reminders of the past, and took up the most responsible positions. I had then a perfect right to remind Tsereteli of the words I had thrown at him in May when he was abusing the men of Kronstadt : “When a counter-revolutionary general tries to tie a knot round the throat of the Revolution, the Cadets will be soaping the rope and the Kronstadt sailors will come to help us and to die with us.”

The Soviet organizations displayed everywhere at the rear and at the front their vitality and strength in the fight against the Korniloff rising. Scarcely anywhere did matters come to actual fighting. The revolutionary masses simply paralysed the General's plot. Just as in July the Coalitionists could find no soldiers to fight against us among the Petrograd garrison, so now Korniloff could find no soldiers at the front to fight against the Revolution. He could only act at all by deceit, and the efforts of the propagandists soon put an end to his designs.

Judging by the papers, I hoped for a very rapid development of events and for an early passing of the Government authority into the hands of the Soviets. The growth of the influence and strength of the Bolsheviks was undoubted, and it had now received an irresistible impetus. The Bolsheviks had warned against the Coalition, against the July offensive, and had foretold the Korniloff rebellion. The popular masses could now see that we had been right. At the most anxious moments of the Korniloff plot, when the Caucasian “Savage” Division was marching on Petrograd, the Petrograd Soviet, with the unwilling connivance of the Government, had armed the workers. The regiments which had been summoned against us had long ago become transformed in the hot atmosphere of Petrograd, and were now entirely on our side. The Korniloff attempt was bound finally to open the eyes of the army to the inadmissibility of any further understanding with the bourgeois counter-revolutionaries. One might, therefore, well have expected that the suppression of the Korniloff attempt would be followed by an immediate effort of the revolutionary forces, guided by our party, to obtain power. But events developed more slowly. In spite of the intensity of revolutionary feeling, the masses had become more wary since the severe lesson of the July days, and forswore all spontaneous action, waiting for a direct call and guidance from their leaders. But the leaders of our party, too, were in a waiting mood. In these circumstances the winding up of the Korniloff adventure, although it had fundamentally altered the correlation of forces in our favour, did not lead to any immediate political changes.

THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE SOVIETS.

By that time the predominance of our party in the Petrograd Soviet became definite. This was made evident in a dramatic form in connection with the question of the constitution of the Presidential Bureau. At the time when the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks reigned supreme in the Soviets, they tried all they could to isolate the Bolsheviks. Even when we had at least one-third of the total seats on the Petrograd Soviet, they would not admit a single representative of our party to the Presidential Bureau. After the Petrograd Soviet had passed a resolution in favour of a purely Soviet Government by a somewhat precarious majority, our group demanded the constitution of a Coalition Presidency on the basis of proportional representation. The old Bureau, which included Tchkheidze, Tsereteli, Kerensky, Skobeleff, and Tchernoff, would not hear of this. It is worth while remembering this just now, when the other parties talk of the need of a “united democratic front” and accuse us of exclusiveness. A special meeting of the Petrograd Soviet was called to decide the constitution of the Bureau. Both sides mobilized all their forces and reserves for this struggle. Tsereteli came out with a programmatic speech and argued that the question of the Presidential Bureau was really a question of policy. We thought we should get a little less than half of the votes, and were prepared to consider this as a success. To our own great surprise the voting by roll-call showed more than a hundred majority in our favour. “During six months,” said Tsereteli, “we stood at the head of the Petrograd Soviet and led it from victory to victory. We hope that you will at least remain half that time at the posts you are about to take up.” A similar change of the directing parties took place in the Moscow Soviet. The provincial Soviets, too, passed one after the other into the hands of the Bolsheviks. The time was getting near for the summoning of an All-Russian Congress of Soviets. But the leading group of the Central Executive Committee was trying all it could to put the Congress off to the dim and distant future, in the hope of making it altogether impossible. It was evident that the new Congress would give our party a majority, would elect a new Central Executive Committee corresponding to the new orientation of the parties, and would rob the Coalitionists of their most important stronghold. The struggle for the calling together of the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets thus became a matter of the greatest importance to us.

As against this, the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries made a proposal for the calling together of a Democratic Conference. This body, they thought, they would be able to play off both against us and against Kerensky.

The head of the Government had by this time taken up quite an independent and irresponsible position. He had been raised to power in the first period of the Revolution by the Petrograd Soviet. Kerensky had entered the Ministry in the first instance without any provisional decision of the Soviet, but the latter subsequently approved of the step. After the first Congress of the Soviets the Socialist Ministers were considered to be responsible to the Central Executive Committee. Their Cadet allies were only answerable to their own party. After the July days the Central Executive Committee, meeting the wishes of the bourgeoisie, freed the Socialist Ministers from their responsibility to the Soviets, for the purpose, as it was alleged at the time, of creating a revolutionary dictatorship. This also is worth while remembering just now, when the very same people who were concocting the dictatorship of a small circle are now hurling charges and slanders against the dictatorship of a class.

The Moscow State Conference, at which the artificially selected propertied and democratic representatives balanced one another, had had for its chief aim the consolidation of Kerensky's power over the classes and parties. This aim had only been attained in appearance. In reality the Moscow Conference only revealed Kerensky's complete impotence, for he was almost equally a stranger to the propertied elements and to the lower middle-class democracy. But as the Liberals and the Conservatives applauded his tirades against the democracy, while the Coalitionists gave him a great ovation when he very guardedly disowned the counter-revolutionaries, he gained the impression that he was supported by both sides and disposed of unlimited authority. He threatened the workers and the revolutionary soldiers with blood and iron. His policy went still further along the road of conspiracies with Korniloff, which compromised him in the eyes of the Coalitionists. Tsereteli, in his characteristically vague diplomatic phrases, spoke of “personal” factors in politics and the necessity of circumscribing them. It was this task that the Democratic Conference had to discharge, composed as it was of representatives of the Soviets, Municipal Councils, Zemstvos, trade unions and co-operative societies – all selected in an arbitrary manner. The chief problem, however, was to provide for a sufficiently Conservative complexion of the Conference, to dissolve the Soviets once for all in the amorphous mass of democracy, and to consolidate their own power by means of this new organization against the tide of Bolshevism.

It will not be out of place here to note in a few words the difference between the political role of the Soviets and the democratic organs of self-government. Philistines have more than once pointed out to us that the new Municipal Councils and Zemstvos elected by universal suffrage are incomparably more democratic than the Soviets, and possess a more valid right to represent the whole population. This formal democratic criterion, however, has no real meaning in revolutionary times. Revolution is distinguished by this : that, the, consciousness of the masses undergoes rapid changes. New sections of the population constantly gain experience, revise their views of yesterday, work out new ones, reject old leaders, follow others, and press ever forward. In times of Revolution the (formally) democratic organizations, based on the ponderous mechanism of universal suffrage, inevitably lag behind the development of the political views of the masses. Not so the Soviets. They depend directly on organic groups, such as workshops, factories, mines, companies, regiments, etc. In these cases, of course, there are no such legal guarantees for the perfect accuracy of the elections as in those to Municipal Councils and Zemstvos, but there is the far more important guarantee of the direct and immediate contact of the deputy with his electors. The member of the Town Council or Zemstvo depends on an amorphous mass of electors who invest him with authority for one year, and then dissolve. The Soviet electors, on the other hand, remain in permanent contact with one another by the very conditions of their life and work ; their deputy is always under their direct observation and may at any moment be given new instructions, and, if necessary, may be censured, recalled, and replaced by somebody else.

As the general political evolution of the preceding months of the Revolution had been marked by the growing influence of the Bolsheviks at the expense of the Coalitionist parties, it was quite natural that this process should have been reflected most clearly and fully on the Soviets the Town Councils and Zemstvos, in spite of all their formal democratic character, expressing not so much the sentiments of the masses today as those of yesterday. This explains the gravitation towards the Town Councils and Zemstvos on the part of those parties which have been losing ever more and more their footing in the revolutionary class. This question will again crop up, only on a larger scale, when we come to the Constituent Assembly.

Part II

THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE

The Democratic Conference, called together by Tsereteli and his coadjutors towards the end of September, was of an entirely artificial character, consisting, as it did, of a combination of representatives of Soviets with those of the organs of local self-government in such a proportion as to give a preponderance to the Coalitionist parties. The offspring of helplessness and confusion, the Conference ended in a pitiful fiasco. The propertied bourgeoisie regarded it with the greatest animosity, seeing in it an attempt to drive it from the position to which it had advanced at the Moscow gathering, On the other hand, the revolutionary working class and the masses of the peasantry and soldiers had condemned in advance the methods of adulteration used in calling the Conference together. The immediate task of the Coalitionists was to form a “responsible” Ministry. But even this was not attained. Kerensky did not want and would not allow any principle of responsibility, because the bourgeoisie at his back would not allow it. Non-responsibility before the organs of the so-called democracy meant, in effect, responsibility before the Cadets and the Allied Embassies. For the present this was sufficient for the bourgeoisie. On the question of coalition, the Conference revealed its complete insolvency. The number of votes cast for the principle of a coalition with the bourgeoisie was only little more than that cast against all Coalitions, and a majority of votes was cast against a coalition with the Cadets. But With the exception of the latter, there were no parties among the bourgeoisie worth mentioning with whom a Coalition could be entered into. Tsereteli fully explained this to the assembly. If the assembly did not understand this, so much the worse for it ! And so behind the back of the Conference pourparlers were carried on unabashed with the very Cadets whom it had rejected, it having been decided that the Cadets should be treated not as Cadets, but as public men Pressed from the right and from the left, the lower middle-class democrats submitted to all this mockery of themselves and thereby demonstrated their complete political impotence.

A Council was elected from the Democratic Conference, which it was decided should be completed by the addition of some representatives of the propertied classes ; and this Provisional “Parliament” was to fill the gap until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. The new Coalition Ministry, contrary to Tsereteli's original plan, but in entire accordance with the plans of the bourgeoisie, was to maintain its formal independence as against the Provisional Parliament. The whole proceeding gave the impression of a pitiful and impotent product of a mind divorced from life, behind which could clearly be seen the complete capitulation of the lower middle-class democrats to that same propertied Liberal bourgeoisie which only a month before had openly supported Korniloff's attempt against the Revolution. The whole thing, then, amounted practically to the re-establishment and the perpetuation of the coalition with the Liberal bourgeoisie. There could no longer be any doubt that, quite independent of the composition of the future Constituent Assembly, the Government power would be in the hands of the bourgeoisie, since the Coalitionist parties, in spite of all the preponderance Secured to them by the popular masses, were unalterably bent on a coalition with the Cadets, considering it impossible to form any Government without the aid of the bourgeoisie. The popular masses regarded Miliukoff's party with the greatest hostility. At all elections in the course of the Revolution the Cadets invariably suffered severe defeats ; yet the very same parties, the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who smote the Cadet party at the elections hip and thigh, would, after the elections, invariably reserve for them a place of honour in the Coalition Cabinet. It was natural in these circumstances that the masses began to perceive more and more clearly that the Coalitionist parties were in reality playing the r8le of bailiffs and office-holders for the Liberal bourgeoisie.

DIFFICULTIES AT THE FRONT AND THE REAR.

Meanwhile the internal situation was deteriorating and becoming more and more complicated. The war was dragging along without aim, without sense, without any perspective. The Government was taking no steps to extricate itself from the vicious circle. The ridiculous plan was put forward of sending Skobeleff to Paris in order to influence the Allied Imperialists, but no sensible person attached to it any serious importance. Korniloff surrendered Riga to the Germans in order to terrorize public opinion and so to gain a favourable opportunity for establishing an iron discipline in the army. Petrograd was threatened, and the middle-class elements were Welcoming the danger with evident malignancy. Rodzianko, the former President of the Duma, openly said that the surrender of demoralized Petrograd to the Germans would constitute no great misfortune. He referred to the case of Riga, where, following upon the entry of the Germans, the Soviets were dissolved and strict order was established with the help of the old police. True, the Baltic Fleet would be lost ; but the fleet had been demoralized by revolutionary propaganda, and the loss would, therefore, not be so very great. This cynicism of the garrulous grand seigneur expressed the secret thoughts of wide circles of the bourgeoisie. The handing over of Petrograd to the Germans would not really mean its final loss. By the peace treaty Petrograd would be returned, but it would in the interval have been disciplined by German militarism. The Revolution in the meantime would be decapitated, and could therefore be more easily grappled with. Kerensky's Government had, in fact, no serious intention of defending the capital, and public opinion was being prepared for its possible surrender. Government offices were being transferred from Petrograd to Moscow and other towns.

It was in such circumstances that the Soldiers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet met at a full session. The general feeling was tense and agitated. If the Government was unable to defend Petrograd, let it conclude peace. And if it was incapable of concluding peace, let it clear out. This was how the Soldiers' Section expressed their views of the condition of affairs. This was the first signal of the coming November Revolution.

At the front the position of affairs was going from bad to worse. A cold autumn, wet and muddy, was drawing near. There was the prospect of a fourth winter campaign. The food Supply was becoming worse every day. In the rear they had forgotten about the front. There were no reliefs, no reinforcements, and no warm clothing. The number of deserters was increasing daily. The old army committees, elected at the beginning of the Revolution, still remained in their places and supported Kerensky's policy Re-elections were prohibited. An abyss was formed between the army committees and the masses of the army, and finally the soldiers began to detest the committees. Again and again delegates from the trenches would arrive at Petrograd and ask point-blank, at the sittings of the Soviet “What are we to do now ? Who will end the war, and how shall it be done ? Why is the Petrograd Soviet silent ?”

THE INEVITABLE STRUGGLE FOR POWER.

The Petrograd Soviet was not silent. It demanded the immediate assumption of authority by the central and local Soviets, the immediate transference of the land to the peasants, the establishment of control by the workers over industry, and the immediate initiation of peace negotiations. So long as we had been in opposition, the cry “All power to the Soviets !” was a battle-cry of propaganda, but since we became a majority on all the chief Soviets it imposed upon us the duty of taking up an immediate and direct struggle for power.

In the villages the position of affairs had become complicated and confused to the last degree. The Revolution had promised the land to the peasants, but had forbidden the latter to touch the land till the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. The peasants at first waited patiently, but when they began to lose patience the Coalition Government resorted to measures of repression. In the meantime the prospect of the meeting of the Constituent Assembly was becoming dimmer and dimmer. The bourgeoisie was insisting that the Constituent Assembly should not be summoned until after the conclusion of peace. The peasant masses, on the other hand, were becoming more and more impatient, and what we had predicted at the beginning of the Revolution was now Coming true. The peasant masses began to grab the land on their own authority. Reprisals became more frequent and severe, and the revolutionary land committees began to be arrested – here and there. In some districts Kerensky even proclaimed martial law. Delegates from the villages began to stream to Petrograd, and complained to the Soviet that they were being arrested while trying to carry out the programme of the Soviets and handing over the estates of the private landowners to the peasants' committees. The peasants demanded our protection. We replied that we could only help them if the government power were in our hands. Hence it followed that if the Soviets did not want to become mere talking-shops they were bound to make an effort to get the power into their own hands.

It was absurd to fight for the authority of the Soviets six or eight weeks before the, meeting of the Constituent Assembly – so we were told by the friends on the Right. But we were not in the least infected by this fetichism of the Constituent Assembly. In the first place, there were no guarantees that it would really be summoned. The break-up of the army, the wholesale desertions, the disorganization of the food supply, the agrarian revolution – all went to create an atmosphere but little favourable to the holding of elections to the Assembly. Moreover, the possible surrender of Petrograd to the Germans threatened to make such elections altogether impossible. In the second place, even if the Constituent Assembly were to be summoned under the direction of the old parties, on the old party lists, it could only become a protection for, and a confirmation of, the coalition principle of government. Neither the Socialist Revolutionaries nor the Mensheviks were capable of assuming authority without the help of the bourgeoisie. Only a revolutionary class Could break the vicious circle in which the Revolution was floundering and disintegrating. It was essential that the authority should be snatched from the hands of those elements which directly or indirectly were serving the interests of the bourgeoisie and used the Government machinery for obstructing the revolutionary demands of the people.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOVIET CONGRESS.

All power to the Soviets : such was the demand of our party. In the preceding period this meant, in terms of party divisions, complete authority for the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks as against the coalition with the Liberal bourgeoisie. Now, however, in November 1917, this demand meant the complete supremacy of the revolutionary proletariat, headed now by the Bolshevik party. The question at issue was the dictatorship of the working class, which was leading, or, to be more correct, was capable of leading, the millions of the poorest peasantry. This was the historical meaning of the November rising.

Everything conspired to lead the party along this path. From the very first days of the Revolution we had insisted on the need and the inevitability of the assumption of the entire government authority by the Soviets. The majority of the Soviets, after an intense internal struggle, adopted our standpoint and took up this demand. We were getting ready for the second All-Russian Congress of the Soviets, at which we expected a complete victory for our party. The Central Executive Committee, on the other hand, under the direction of Dan (the cautious Tshkheidze left for the Caucasus in good time) did everything possible to hinder the meeting of the Soviet Congress. After great efforts, supported by the Soviet group at the Democratic Conference, we at last obtained the fixing of a definite date for the Congress November 7th. This date has now become the greatest date in Russian history. As a preliminary, we called together in Petrograd a conference of the Soviets of the Northern Provinces, including also the Baltic Fleet and the Moscow Soviet. We had a definite majority at this conference. We also obtained some protection on the right flank from the left wing of the Socialist Revolutionaries, and laid the foundation for the business-like organization of the November rising.

THE CONFLICT OVER THE PETROGRAD GARRISON.

But even before that, before the conference of the Northern Soviets, something happened which was destined to play a most important part in the corning political struggle.

In the middle of October there appeared at a sitting of the Executive Committee the Soviet representative attached to the staff of the Petrograd military district, who informed us that the Main Headquarters were demanding the despatch of two-thirds of the Petrograd garrison to the front. What for ? For the defence of Petrograd ! The despatch was not to take place immediately, but it was necessary to get ready for it at once. The Staff asked the Petrograd Soviet to approve of this plan. We pricked up our ears. Already at the end of August five revolutionary regiments had been, wholly or in part, removed from Petrograd. This had been done on the demand of the then Commander-in-Chief, Korniloff, who at that very time was preparing to throw the Caucasian “Savage” Division against Petrograd with the object of settling with the revolutionary capital once and for all. We had thus already had the experience of a purely political redistribution of troops, carried out on the pretext of military operations. It may be noted here, by way of anticipation, that documents which fell into our hands after the November Revolution showed, without any p05sibility of doubt, that the proposed evacuation of the Petrograd garrison in reality had absolutely nothing to do with military operations, and was forced on the Commander-in-Chief, Dukhonin, against his will by no other than Kerensky himself, who was anxious to clear Petrograd of the most revolutionary soldiers, that is, of those most hostile to himself.

But this was not known in the middle of October, and our suspicions were met by a storm of patriotic indignation. The military Staff tried to hurry us on, and Kerensky was impatient, as the ground beneath his feet was fast becoming too hot for him. We, however, did not hurry to answer. Certainly, Petrograd was in danger, and the terrible question of the defence of the capital exercised us greatly. But after the experience of the Korniloff days, after Rodzianko's words regarding salvation by a German occupation of Petrograd, how could we be assured that Petrograd would not be wilfully surrendered to the Germans as a punishment for its rebellious spirit ? The Executive Committee refused to give its signature to the demand for the removal of two-thirds of the Petrograd garrison without examination. We declared that we must have proof of the reality of the military need which dictated the demand, and for that purpose some organization to examine the question must be created. Thus arose the idea of establishing, side by side with the Soldiers' Section of the Soviets, that is, with the political representation of the garrison, a purely operative organ in the form of the Military Revolutionary Committee which ultimately acquired enormous power and became practically the instrument of the November Revolution.

Undoubtedly, already at that time, when we were proposing the Creation of an organ to concentrate in its hands all the threads of the purely military direction of the Petrograd garrison, we were clearly realizing that this organ might become an invaluable revolutionary weapon. We were already at that time deliberately and openly steering for a rising and organizing ourselves for it. The opening of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets was fixed, as we said before, for November 7th, and there could be no longer any doubt that it would declare in favour of the assumption of supreme authority by the Soviets. But such a decision would have to be carried out at once, otherwise it would simply become a worthless platonic demonstration. It would have been in accord with the logic of the situation if we had fixed our rising for November 7th. The bourgeois Press, indeed, took this for granted. But the fate of the Congress depended, in the first instance, on the Petrograd garrison. Would it allow Kerensky to surround the Congress and to break it up with the help of a few hundreds or thousands of ensigns, cadets, and members of shock battalions ? The very attempt to get the garrison out of Petrograd – did it not signify that the Government was preparing to break up the Congress of the Soviets ? It would have been strange indeed if it were not, seeing that we were mobilizing quite openly, in face of the whole country, all the strength of the Soviets for the purpose of dealing the Coalition Government a mortal blow.

And so the whole conflict in Petrograd was coming to an issue over the question of the fate of its garrison. In the first place, of course, it affected the soldiers, but the workers, too, evinced the liveliest interest in it, as they feared that on the removal of the troops they might be crushed by the military cadets and Cossacks. The conflict was thus assuming a very acute character, and the question over which it was tending to an issue was very unfavourable to the Kerensky Government.

Parallel with this struggle over the garrison was also going on the previously mentioned struggle for the summoning of the Soviet Congress, in connection with which we were proclaiming openly, in the name of the Petrograd Soviet and the conference of the Soviets of the Northern District, that the second Soviet Congress must dismiss the Kerensky Government and become the real master of Russia. Practically the rising was already proceeding, and was developing in the face of the whole country.

During October the question of the rising played also an important part in the internal life of our party. Lenin, who was in hiding in Finland, wrote numerous letters insisting on more energetic tactics. Amongst the rank and file there was great fermentation and growing discontent, because the Bolshevik Party, now in a majority in the Soviets, was not putting its own battle-cries into practice. On October 28th a secret meeting of the Central Committee of our party took place, at which Lenin was present. On the order of the day was the question of the rising. With only two dissentients it was unanimously decided that the only means of saving the Revolution and the country from complete destruction was an armed rising, which must have for its object the conquest of supreme government authority by the Soviets.

THE DEMOCRATIC COUNCIL AND THE PROVISIONAL PARLIAMENT.

The Democratic Council which arose out of the Democratic Conference inherited all the impotence of the latter. The old Soviet parties, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, had secured for themselves an artificial majority on the Council, apparently for the purpose of exposing still more thoroughly their entire political prostration. Behind the scenes Tsereteli was carrying on intricate negotiations with Kerensky and the representatives of the “propertied elements,” as they began terming them in the Council in order to avoid the “insulting” term “bourgeoisie.” Tsereteli's report on the progress and results of these negotiations sounded very much like a funeral oration over the grave of a whole revolutionary period. It turned out that neither Kerensky nor the propertied elements would agree to the principle of Ministerial responsibility to the new semi-representative body. On the other hand, it was impossible to find “business-like” public men outside the Cadet Party. The organizers of the business had to give in on both points, which capitulation was so much the more delightful as the Democratic Conference had been called together specially for the purpose of putting an end to the irresponsible regime, the Conference, moreover, explicitly rejecting all Coalition with the Cadets. At the last few meetings of the Democratic Council before the new Revolution there was a general atmosphere of great tension and practical impotence. The Council reflected not the progress of the Revolution, but the dissolution of parties whom the Revolution had left far behind.

Already during the session of the Democratic Conference I had raised the question in our party of making a demonstrative exit from the Conference and of boycotting the Democratic Council. It was necessary to demonstrate to the masses by our action that the Coalitionists had brought the Revolution into an impasse. The struggle for the formation of a Soviet Government could only be carried on by revolutionary an methods. It was imperative to wrest the authority from the hands of those who had proved themselves incapable for good and who were fast losing all capability even for active harm. It was necessary to oppose our political method through the mobilization of all forces around the Soviets, through the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets, through a rising, to their method of action through an artificially selected “Provisional Parliament” and a problematic Constituent Assembly. This could only be accomplished by an open and public break with the body created by Tsereteli and his friends, and by concentrating all the attention and strength of the working class on the Soviet organizations. It was for these reasons that I proposed a demonstrative exit from the Democratic Conference and a revolutionary agitation in the factories and among the troops against the attempt to adulterate the will of the Revolution and again to direct its further course into the groove of co-operation with the bourgeoisie. Lenin expressed himself in the same sense in a letter which we received a few days later. But among the leaders of the party there was still considerable hesitation. The July Days had left a very deep impression on the party. The masses of workers and soldiers had shaken off the impression made by the July reprisals much more rapidly than many of our leading comrades who feared the break-up of the Revolution by another premature attempt on the part of the masses. In our group at the Democratic Conference I obtained fifty votes for my proposal against seventy cast in favour of participating in the Democratic Council. But our experience on that Council very soon strengthened the left wing of the party. It became only too evident that the method of compromises bordering on mere swindles, which had for its aim to secure the leadership of the Revolution for the propertied classes assisted by the Coalitionists who had lost all footing amongst the wide masses, was not the way out of the impasse into which the flabby middle-class democrats had brought the Revolution. By the time when the Democratic Council, supplemented by representatives of the propertied classes, became transformed into a “Provisional Parliament,” the psychological readiness of our party to break away from this body was already ripe.

THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES AND THE MENSHEVIKS.

The question before us at the time was whether the Socialist Revolutionaries of the Left would follow us along this path. This group was then in the process of formation, which from our party point of view was much too slow and hesitating. At the beginning of the Revolution, the Socialist Revolutionary Party became by far the strongest in the whole political field. The peasants, soldiers, and even the masses of the workers voted for the Socialist Revolutionaries. They themselves had not expected anything of the kind, and more than once it had seemed as though there was a danger that the party might choke in the waves of its own success. With the exception of the purely capitalist and landowning classes and the well-to-do intellectuals, all and everybody flocked to the banners of the Socialist Revolutionaries. And this entirely corresponded to the first stage in the Revolution, when the class boundaries had not yet had time to make themselves visible, when the yearning after a united revolutionary front found expression in the nebulous programme of a party which was ready to shelter alike the workers afraid of losing contact with the peasantry, the peasants seeking land and freedom, the intellectuals anxious to guide both these classes, and the official trying to adapt himself to the new order of things. When Kerensky, who, under the Tsarist Government, had belonged to the “Group of Toil,” joined the Socialist Revolutionaries after the victory of the Revolution, the popularity of this party began to grow in correspondence with the advance of Kerensky himself along the road of power. Many colonels and generals, out of respect – not always platonic – for the War Minister, hastened to inscribe their names in the rolls of the party of the erstwhile terrorists. The old Socialist Revolutionaries, belonging to the old revolutionary school, were already at that time regarding somewhat uneasily the ever-growing number of “March” Socialist Revolutionaries, that is to say, those members who had only found their revolutionary souls in March, after the Revolution had overthrown the old regime and had raised the Socialist Revolutionaries to power. In this way the party contained in its amorphousness not only the internal contradictions of the developing Revolution, but also all the prejudices of the backward peasant masses and all the sentimentalism, instability, and ambitions of the intellectual sections of the population. It was quite evident that the party could not exist long in such a form. In point of ideas it proved to be impotent from the very beginning. It was the Mensheviks who played the leading political role in the first stages of the Revolution. They had passed through the Marxian school, and had derived from it certain methods and habits which had helped them to find their way sufficiently in the political situation to adulterate “scientificaily” the real meaning of the present class struggle and to secure, in the highest degree possible under the given conditions, the supremacy of the Liberal bourgeoisie. This is the reason why the Mensheviks, who were the direct advocates of the right of the bourgeoisie to power, so quickly spent themselves and were, by the time of the November Revolution, finally reduced almost to a cipher.

The Socialist Revolutionaries were also losing their influence more and more, first among the workers, then in the army, and finally also in the villages. Nevertheless, at the time of the November Revolution they were still numerically a very powerful party. But class antagonisms were undermining it from within. As against its right wing, which in the persons of its most chauvinist elements, such as Avksentieff, Breshko-Breshkovskaya, Savinkoff and others, finally went over to the counter-revolutionaries, a left wing was in process of formation, which tried to maintain a contact with the labouring masses. If we bear in mind the fact that the Socialist Revolutionary Avksentieff, in his capacity as Minister of the Interior, was arresting the peasant land committees consisting almost entirely of Socialist Revolutionaries, for their grappling with the agrarian question on their own authority, the amplitude of disagreements within this party will become sufficiently clear.

In the centre stood the traditional leader of the party, Tchernoff, an experienced writer, well read in Socialist literature, an old hand in party struggles, he was the invariable leader of the party at the time when the party's life concentrated in refugees' circles abroad. The Revolution, which, in its first indiscriminate onward rush, had raised the Socialist Revolutionaries to a tremendous height, automatically also raised Tchernoff, but only to show his complete incapability even among the leading political personages of the first period. Those minor qualifications which secured for Tchernoff a preponderance in the foreign circles of the party proved to be far too light in the scales of the Revolution. He confined himself to abstaining from all responsible decisions, to avoiding and evading all critical issues, to waiting upon events, and to refraining from all positive activity. Such tactics secured to him, for the time being, the position of a centre between the two flanks of the party, the distance between which was growing ever wider and wider. But the unity of the party could no longer be maintained. Savinkoff, the erstwhile terrorist, had taken part in the Korniloff plot, was on most cordial terms with the counterrevolutionary circles of the Cossack officers, and was preparing a crushing blow for the Petrograd workers and soldiers, amongst whom were not a few Socialist Revolutionaries of the Left. As a sop to this left wing, the Centre expelled Savinkoff from the party, but it dared not raise its hand against Kerensky.

In the Provisional Parliament the party showed itself to be hopelessly divided. The three groups acted independently of one another, although all were marching under the same party banner. At the same time none of these groups had any clear idea as to what it wanted. The formal predominance of this party in the Constituent Assembly would only have meant the continuation of the same political sterility and impotence.

THE VOICE OF THE FRONT.

Before leaving the Provisional Parliament, where, according to the political statistics of Kerensky and Tsereteli, we only had about fifty seats, we organized a meeting with the Left Socialist Revolutionary group. They, however, refused to follow us, on the ground that it was necessary for them to prove to the peasantry by a practical experiment the hopelessness of that Parliament. “We think it our duty to warn you,” said one of their leaders, “that if you mean to leave the Provisional Parliament with the object of immediately descending into the street for an open struggle, we shall not follow you.” The bourgeois and Coalitionist Press accused us of aiming at a break-up of the Provisional Parliament for the sole purpose of creating a revolutionary situation. Our group in the Provisional Parliament decided not to wait for the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, but to act independently. The declaration of our party, read from the rostrum of the Provisional Parliament and explaining our reason for breaking away from this institution, was met with a howl of execration and impotent rage from the majority groups. In the Petrograd Soviet, where our action was approved by an overwhelming majority, the leader of the small group of “Internationalist” Mensheviks, Martoff, argued with us that our exit from the Provisional Council of the Republic (such was the official designation of this disreputable institution) would only then have any sense if we intended to pass immediately to an open offensive against the present Government. But that was just what we did intend doing. The agents of the Liberal bourgeoisie were quite right when they accused us of desiring to create a revolutionary situation. We saw that the only way out of the hopeless state of affairs was by means of an open rising and a direct seizure of power.

Again, as during the July days, the Press and all other organs of so-called public opinion were set in motion against us. The most poisonous weapons were once more got out of the arsenals of the July days, where they had been deposited after the Korniloff rising. Vain efforts ! The masses flocked to us irresistibly, and their spirit rose hourly higher and higher. Delegates would arrive from the trenches and ask us, at the sittings of the Petrograd Soviet : “How long will this unbearable situation last ? The soldiers have authorized us to tell you that if by the 15th of November no decisive steps are taken towards peace, the trenches will be evacuated, and the whole army will march back to the rear !” Such a resolve had really spread all along the front. The soldiers were distributing from one sector to the other proclamations drawn up by themselves, Calling on all soldiers not to remain in the trenches after the first snow. “You have forgotten all about us,” the trench delegates would exclaim at the sittings of the Soviet “if you do not find some way out, we shall come here ourselves and scatter our enemies with our bayonets, but you, too, together with them.” Within a few weeks the Petrograd Soviet became the centre of attraction for the whole army. After the change of its policy and the new election of its Presidential Bureau, its resolutions had been infusing into the exhausted and despairing troops new hopes that a way out of the impossible situation might at length be found on the lines laid down by the Bolsheviks, namely, by the publication of the secret treaties and the immediate proposal of an armistice on all fronts. “You say that full authority should pass into the hands of the Soviets ? Then take it. Are you afraid that the front may not support you ? Cast aside all doubt ; the overwhelming mass of the soldiers are entirely on your side.”

In the meantime the conflict regarding the evacuation of the Petrograd garrison was proceeding apace. There were almost daily meetings of the garrison, consisting of company, regimental, and other committees. The influence of our party in the garrison became absolute and quite undivided. The Staff of the Petrograd military district was in a state of extreme confusion. At one time they would try to enter into regular relations with us ; at other times, urged on by the leaders of the Central Executive Committee, they would threaten us with repression.

THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE MILITARY
REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE

We have already mentioned the formation of a special Military Revolutionary Committee attached to the Petrograd Soviet, which was intended by us as a sort of Soviet Staff of the Petrograd garrison, by way of a counter-weight to Kereusky's Staff. “But the existence of two Staffs cannot be tolerated,” urged the doctrinaire representatives of the Coalitionist parties. “Is, however,” we replied, “a state of things tolerable in which the garrison has no confidence in the official Staff and fears that the removal of troops from Petrograd may be dictated by some new counter-revolutionary design ?” “But the creation of a new Staff means an insurrection,” argued the Right ; “your Military Revolutionary Committee will have for its aim not so much the examination of the military intentions and orders of the military authorities, as the preparation and execution of a revolt against the present Government.” This argument was perfectly just, but for this very reason it did not frighten any of us. The necessity of overthrowing the Coalition Government was recognized by the overwhelming majority of the Soviet. The more convincingly the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries were demonstrating that the Military Revolutionary Committee would inevitably become an instrument of revolt, the more readily did the Petrograd Soviet support this new militant organ.

The first business of the Military Revolutionary Committee was to appoint Commissioners to all sections of the Petrograd garrison and to all the most important institutions of the capital and suburbs. We received intelligence from various quarters that the Government, or, rather, the Government parties, were busily organizing and arming their forces. From different stores, Government and private, they were removing rifles, revolvers, machine guns and cartridges for the purpose of arming the cadets, students, and, generally, the young bourgeoisie. It was essential to take some preventive measures at once. Commissioners were appointed to all stores and depots of arms, and they became masters of the situation practically without opposition. True, the commandants and proprietors of the stores tried to refuse them recognition, but it was sufficient for the Commissioners to appeal to the soldiers' committee or to the employees of the particular store in order to break down the opposition almost immediately. Henceforth arms were only issued under direct orders from our Commissioners.

The regiments of the Petrograd garrison, indeed, had had their Commissioners before this, but they used to be appointed by the Central Executive Committee. We have already mentioned that after the June Congress of the Soviets, and particularly after the demonstration of July 1st, which showed the growing strength of the Bolsheviks, the Coalitionist parties had almost entirely shut out the Petrograd Soviet from all practical influence on the course of events m the revolutionary capital. The direction of the affairs of the Petrograd garrison was concentrated in the hands of the Central Executive Committee. Now the question was how to install Soviet Commissioners everywhere. This was only accomplished thanks to the energetic co-operation of the masses of the soldiers. Regiment after regiment would declare, at the end of meetings addressed by speakers from various parties, that they would only recognize the Commissioners appointed by the Petrograd Soviet, and would do nothing without their sanction.

In the appointment of these Commissioners the military organization of the Bolsheviks played a very important part. Already before the July days this organization had done a great deal of propaganda work. On July 18th the cycling battalion, brought into Petrograd by Kerensky, had sacked the villa of Mlle. Krzeszinska, where the military organization of our party was located. The majority of its leaders and many of the rank and file were arrested, the papers were suppressed, and the printing machinery was destroyed. Only very slowly did the party again set up its press, but this time underground. Its military organization embraced only a few hundred men of the Petrograd garrison, but they included many determined and absolutely devoted revolutionary soldiers, young officers, and, principally, ensigns who had been imprisoned by Kerensky during July and August. All these now placed themselves at the disposal of the Military Revolutionary Committee and were appointed to the most responsible militant posts.

It will not be out of place, however, to note here that it was exactly the members of the military organization of our party who, in November, adopted an attitude of extreme caution and even of some scepticism towards the idea of an immediate rising. The exclusive character of the organization and its avowedly military character involuntarily inclined its leaders to overestimate the importance of the purely technical means of an insurrection, and from this point of view we were undoubtedly very weak. Our strength lay in the revolutionary spirit of the masses and in their readiness to fight under our banner.

THE SWELLING TIDE

Side by side with the work of organization a raging and tearing agitation was being carried on. It was a period of incessant meetings at factories, in the Modern and Ciniselli Circuses, in the clubs and barracks. The atmosphere at all these meetings was decidedly electric. Every mention of an insurrection was met with a storm of applause and cries of approval. The bourgeois Press only intensified the general state of alarm. My order to the Sestroretski Small Arms Factory about the issue of 5,000 rifles to the Red Guard called forth an indescribable panic in bourgeois circles. They talked and wrote constantly about a general massacre that was being prepared. This, of course, did not in the least prevent the workers of the Sestroretski Factory from issuing arms to the Red Guards. The more furiously the bourgeois Press slandered and execrated us, the more ardently did the masses respond to our call. It became more and more evident to both sides that the crisis was bound to come to a head in the course of the next few days. The Socialist Revolutionary and Menshevik Press were frantically agitated : “The Revolution is in the greatest danger ! A repetition of the July days is being prepared on an immensely greater scale and will therefore be bound to have still more ruinous results.”

Gorki, in his paper Novaya Zhizn (New Life), daily prophesied the coming collapse of the whole cultural life of the country. In general, the Socialist red paint was vanishing with astonishing rapidly from the bourgeois intellectuals as the stern reign of the working-class dictatorship drew nearer. On the other hand, the soldiers, even of the more backward regiments, were greeting the Commissioners of the Military Revolutionary Committee with enthusiasm. Delegates were arriving from Cossack troops and from the Socialist minority amongst the cadets, promising, in case of an open collision, to secure, at least, the neutrality of their men. It was evident that Kerensky's Government was simply hanging in the air, without any firm ground under its feet.

The Military Staff of the district entered into negotiations with us and proposed a compromise. In order to get an idea of the strength of resistance of our foe we entered into pourparlers. But the nerves of the Staff were all on edge. Now they would admonish, then they would threaten us, and even declared that our Commissioners were illegal – which ban, of course, did not in the least interfere with their work. The Central Executive Committee, in agreement with the Military Staff, appointed Staff Captain Malevsky to be Chief Commissioner for the Petrograd military district, and generously consented to recognize our Commissioners, provided they were subordinated to their Chief Commissioner. This proposal was rejected and the negotiations were broken off.

Prominent Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries would come to us as mediators, reason with and threaten us, foretelling our doom and the doom of the Revolution.

THE PETROGRAD SOVIET DAY

The building of the Smolny Institute was at that time already in the hands of the Petrograd Soviet and of our party. The Mensheviks and the Right Socialist Revolutionaries had moved to Marie Palace, where the scarcely born Provisional Parliament was almost breathing its last. Kerensky made a great speech in the Provisional Parliament, in which, accompanied by the stormy applause of the bourgeois section, he attempted to conceal his impotence behind hysterical threats. The Military Staff made a last attempt at resistance. It sent an invitation to various units of the garrison, asking them to appoint two delegates from each unit to discuss the question of the evacuation of troops from the capital. The conference was fixed for one o'clock, November 4th. The regiments immediately informed us of this invitation, and we at once called a meeting of the garrison over the telephone for eleven o'clock in the morning. Some of the delegates, however, found their way to the Staff, but only to declare that without the permission of the Petrograd Soviet they would not go an inch anywhere. The garrison meeting almost unanimously reaffirmed its loyalty to the Military Revolutionary Committee. Opposition came only from the official representatives of the former Soviet parties, but it found no support whatever among the delegates of the regiments. The attempt of the Military Staff only showed the more clearly that the ground beneath our feet was firm. In the front ranks stood the Volhynian Regiment – the same one which, on the night of July 16th-17th, had marched to the strains of its band into the Taurida Palace for the purpose of putting down the Bolsheviks.

The Central Executive Committee, as was stated above, held possession of the funds and the Press of the Petrograd Soviet. All efforts to obtain possession even of one of these papers had proved of no avail. Hence about the middle of October steps had been taken to establish an independent paper for the Petrograd Soviet. But all the printing establishments were occupied, and their owners boycotted us, with the connivance of the Central Executive Committee. It was, therefore, decided to organize a Petrograd Soviet Day for the purpose of promoting an extended propaganda and collecting money for the establishment of a paper. This day had been fixed a fortnight previously for November 4th, and thus coincided with the date when the insurrection was publicly coming to view. The hostile Press was announcing it as an established fact that in November there would be an armed rising of the Bolsheviks in the streets of Petrograd. No one doubted that there would be a revolt. The only question was when. Efforts were made to guess and to predict, in order to elicit from us either a denial or an admission. All in vain. The Soviet calmly and confidently was forging ahead, paying no heed to the howl of bourgeois public opinion.

November 4th became the day of the review of the forces of the proletarian army. It went off splendidly in all respects. In spite of the warnings emanating from the Right that rivers of blood would flow in the streets of Petrograd on that day, the masses of the people poured out into the streets in huge waves to take part in the meetings of the Soviet. All our oratorical strength was made full use of ; all public places were packed ; meetings went on continuously for hours. These were addressed by speakers from our party ; by delegates who had come from different parts of the country to take part in the Congress of Soviets ; by speakers from the front, from the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, and from the Anarchists. The halls were simply overwhelmed by the masses of workers and soldiers. There had been few such meetings in Petrograd even during the Revolution.

A considerable section of the lower middle class was greatly disturbed – not so much actually frightened as made uneasy by the warnings and slanders of the bourgeois Press. Tens of thousands of people beat in huge waves against the walls of the People's Palace, overflowed into the corridors, and filled the halls. From the columns enormous garlands of human heads, hands, and feet were hanging down like bunches of grapes. The air seemed impregnated with an electric current, such as is fclt at the most critical moments of a revolution. “Down with Kerensky's Government !” “Down with the war !” “All authority to the Soviets !” Not one of the representatives of the former Soviet parties dared step forward before this colossal gathering with a word of opposition. The triumph of the Petrograd Soviet was unique and undivided. The campaign was in reality already won. All that remained was to deal the phantom Government a final military blow.

THE GAINING OVER OF THE WAVERING UNITS

The more cautious elements in our own midst, however, warned us that there were still some units of troops which were not with us – the Cossacks, the Cavalry Regiment, the Semenoff Guards, and the Cyclist Regiment. Propagandists and Commissioners were appointed to these units. Their reports seemed perfectly satisfactory. The heated atmosphere was affecting every one and everything, and even the most conservative elements of the army were unable to withstand the general tendency of the Petrograd garrison.

I went to an open-air meeting of the Semenoff regiment which was considered to be the chief support of the Kerensky Government. The best-known speakers of the Right wing were there. They clung to the conservative regiment of the Guards as to the last prop of the Coalition Ministry. But it was of no avail. The regiment declared in our favour by an overwhelming majority, and did not even allow the former Ministers to finish their speeches. Those groups which still opposed the demands of the Soviet consisted mainly of officers, volunteers, and, generally, of the middle-class intellectuals and semi-intellectuals. The workers and peasant masses were wholly on our side. The cleavage was pretty well along a straight social line.

The central military basis of Petrograd is the Peter and Paul Fortress. We appointed as its commandant a young ensign who soon proved himself to be almost born for the place and in a few hours became complete master of the situation. The “lawful” military authorities stepped aside to wait and see what might happen.

For reasons given above, the Cyclist Regiment was considered by us a very unreliable unit. On November 5th I went to the fortress at about two o'clock in the afternoon. In the courtyard a meeting was being held. The speakers of the Right wing were most cautious and evasive, carefully avoiding any question about Kerensky, whose name, even in soldiers' circles, always gave rise to cries of protest and indignation. They, however, listened to us and adhered to us. At four o'clock the cyclists held a battalion meeting in a neighbouring place, in the Modern Circus. Amongst the speakers was the Quartermaster-General Paradeloff. He, too, spoke very, very cautiously. Far gone were the days when the official and semi-official orators never spoke of the workers' party otherwise than as a band of traitors and hirelings of the German Kaiser. The Assistant-Chief of the Staff came up to me and said : “Let us, for goodness' sake, come to some understanding.” But it was now too late. Against only thirty votes, the battalion declared itself, after a debate, in favour of the assumption of authority by the Soviets.

THE BEGINNING OF THE INSURRECTION

The Kerensky Government was casting about for help from' one quarter to another. It recalled two new cyclist battalions from the front and a mortar battery, and tried to call out some cavalry. The cyclists, when on their way, sent a telegram to the Petrograd Soviet : “We are being taken to Petrograd. We do not know for what purpose. Kindly explain.” We asked them to stop and to send a delegation to us. When the latter arrived, they declared at the meeting of the Soviet that the battalion was entirely on our side. This aroused a new storm of enthusiasm. The battalion was ordered to enter the town immediately.

The number of delegates from the front increased day by day. They came for information on the position of affairs. They took our literature and went back to the front in order to : spread the news that the Petrograd Soviet was carrying on a struggle for the assumption of authority by the workers, soldiers, and peasants. “The trenches will support you,” they told us. The old army committees, on the other hand, which had not been re-elected for the last four or five months, were sending us threatening telegrams. But these frightened no one. We knew perfectly well that the committees were quite out of touch with the masses of the soldiers, as was the Central Executive Committee in regard to the local Soviets.

The Military Revolutionary Committee appointed Commissioners to all the railway stations. They kept all in-coming and out-going trains under close observation, and particularly watched all movements of troops. A continuous telephonic and motor connection was set up with all neighbouring towns and their garrisons. It was the duty of all the Soviets in agreement with the Petrograd Soviet to see to it that no counterrevolutionary troops, or rather troops deceived by the Government, entered Petrograd. The lower ranks of the railway servants at the stations and railway workers gave ready recognition to our Commissioners.

On November 6th a difficulty arose at the Telephone Exchange. We were refused connection. The cadets had entrenched themselves at the Central Telephone Exchange, and under their protection the telephone girls came out in opposition to the Soviet. This was the first manifestation of the future sabotage of the officials and civil servants. The Military Revolutionary Committee sent a detachment to the Telephone Exchange and put two small guns at the entrance. So began thc seizure of the administrative offices. Sailors and Red Guards were stationed in small detachments at the Telegraph Office, at the Post Office, and other public offices, and measures were taken to gain possession of the State Bank. The Soviet Centre, the Smolny Institute, was converted into a fortress. In the attic there we still had, as a legacy from the Central Executive Committee, a score or so of machine guns, but they had been neglected, and the men in charge of them had lost all discipline. We summoned to the Smolny an additional machine-gun detachment, and early in the morning the soldiers were loudly wheeling their machine guns along the long stone Corridors of the Smolny Institute. Some Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, who, were still at the Institute, would now and then put their heads out of the doors with astonished or frightened faces. The Soviet and also the garrison held daily meetings at the Institute.

On the third floor, in a small corner room, the Military Revolutionary Committee was in permanent session. Hither flowed all information regarding the movements of troops, the frame of mind of soldiers and workers, the progress of propaganda in the barracks, the doings of the hooligans, the conferences held by the bourgeois politicians, life in the Winter Palace, and the intentions of the former Soviet parties. Our informants came from every quarter, and included workers, officers, house porters, Socialist cadets, servants, and fashionable ladies. Many brought only ridiculous nonsense ; others, however, gave us very valuable information. The decisive moment was drawing near. It was clear that there could be no turning back.

On November 6th, in the evening, Kerensky came to the Provisional Parliament and demanded its approval of repressive measures against the Bolsheviks – but the Provisional Parliament was in a pitiful state of confusion and well-nigh dissolution. The Cadets were urging the Right Socialist Revolutionaries to accept a vote of confidence ; the Right Socialist Revolutionaries were exerting pressure on the Centre ; the Centre wavered ; and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries were carrying on a policy of Parliamentary opposition. After a number of conferences, discussions and hesitations, the resolution of the Left wing was adopted, condemning the seditious movement of the Soviet, but placing the responsibility for this on the anti-democratic policy of the Government. At the same time, we were daily receiving by post letters informing us of the numberless death sentences passed on us, of infernal machines, of the imminent blowing up of the Smolny Institute, etc. The bourgeois Press was savage with hatred and fear. Gorki, completely forgetting his own Song of the Falcon, continued to prophesy in his paper, the Novaya Zhizn, the coming end of the world.

The members of the Military Revolutionary Committee had not left the Smolny Institute for the last week. They slept in snatches on sofas, constantly wakened by couriers, scouts, cyclists, telegraphists, and telephone bells. The most anxious night was that of November 6th-7th. We were informed from Pavlovsk by telephone that the Government was summoning the artillerists from there and the ensigns from the Peterhoff School. Kerensky had collected in the Winter Palace cadets, officers, and “shockers.” We ordered, by telephone, detachments of trustworthy military guards to bar all entrances to Petrograd and to send agitators to meet the detachments summoned by the Government. If they could not be kept back by reason, then arms were to be employed. All our conversations were carried on perfectly openly over the telephone, and were, therefore, accessible to the Government's agents.

Our Commissioners informed us that our friends were keeping watch over all entrances to Petrograd. A portion of the Oranienbaum cadets did, however, get past our barriers in the night, and we followed up their further movements by telephone. We strengthened the outside guards of the Smolny by summoning another company. We maintained a continuous connection with all parts of the garrison. Squads on duty kept watch in all regiments. Delegates from every unit were constantly, day and night, at the disposal of the Military Revolutionary Committee. An order was issued to put down ruthlessly every Black Hundred agitation, to use arms at the first attempts at street pogroms, and to act, if necessary, without mercy. During this decisive night all the most important points in the city passed into our hands almost without resistance, without fighting, without victims. The State Bank was guarded by Government sentries and an armoured car. The building was surrounded from all sides by our detachments, the armoured car was seized unawares, and the Bank passed into the hands of the Military Revolutionary Committee without a single shot.

On the Neva, below the Franco-Russian Works, stood the cruiser Aurora undergoing repair. Her crew consisted entirely of sailors wholeheartedly devoted to the Revolution. When, at the end of August, Korniloff was threatening Petrograd, the sailors of the Aurora were summoned to protect the Winter Palace. And although they were already extremely hostile to Kerensky's Government, they knew that their duty was to repel the attempt of the counterrevolutionaries, and they took up their positions without a word. When the danger passed, they were again pushed aside. Now, in these days of the November insurrection, they were too dangerous. The Ministry of the Marine gave orders to the Aurora to get under way and leave Petrograd waters. The crew immediately informed us of this fact. We countermanded the order, and the cruiser remained ready, at any moment, to use all her forces on behalf of the Soviet authority.

THE DECISIVE DAY

At the dawn of November 7th the men and women employed at the party's printing works came to the Smolny and informed us that the Government had stopped our chief party paper and also the new organ of the Petrograd Soviet. The printing works had had their doors sealed up by some Government agents. The Military Revolutionary Committee at once countermanded the order, took both papers under its protection, and placed the high honour of protecting the freedom of the Socialist Press from counter-revolutionary attempts on the valiant Volhynian Regiment. After this, work was resumed and went on continuously at the printing office, and both papers came out at the appointed hour.

The Government was still in session in the Winter Palace, but it had already become a mere shadow of its former self. It had ceased to exist politically. In the course of November 7th the Winter Palace was gradually surrounded from all sides by our troops. At one o'clock in the afternoon, in the name of the Military Revolutionary Committee, I announced at the sitting of the Petrograd Soviet that Kerensky's Government no longer existed, and that, pending the decision of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the Government authority would be assumed by the Military Revolutionary Committee.

Lenin had left Finland some days previously and was living in hiding in a working-class quarter in a suburb. On November 7th he came secretly to the Smolny. Judging by the newspapers, he had gained the impression that we were coming to a compromise with the Kerensky Government. The bourgeois Press had shrieked so much about the coming revolt, the march of armed soldiers in the streets, the pillage, and the inevitable rivers of blood, that it did not perceive the insurrection which, in reality, was now taking place, and accepted the negotiations between ourselves and the Military Staff at their face value. All this time, quietly, without any street fighting, without firing or bloodshed, one Government institution after another was being seized by highly disciplined detachments of soldiers, sailors, and Red Guards, in accordance with the exact telephone instructions emanating from the little room on the third floor of the Smolny Institute.

In the evening, the second All-Russian Congress of the Soviets held a preliminary meeting.

The report of the Central Executive Committee was submitted by Dan. He delivered an indictment against the rebels, the usurpers, and sedition-mongers, and tried to frighten the meeting by predicting the inevitable collapse of the insurrection, which in a day or two, he said, would be suppressed by troops from the front. His speech sounded exceedingly unconvincing and very much out of place in a hall in which the overwhelming majority of delegates were following with the greatest enthusiasm the victorious march of the Petrograd rising.

By this time the Winter Palace was surrounded, though not yet taken. From time to time shots were fired from the windows at the besiegers who were slowly and very carefully closing in upon the building. From the Peter and Paul Fortress a few shells were fired at the Palace, their distant sounds reaching the Smolny. Martoff, with impotent indignation, was speaking from the rostrum of civil war, and particularly of the siege of the Winter Palace where, among the other Ministers, there were – oh, horror of horrors ! – members of the Menshevik Party. Two sailors, who had come to give news from the scenes of struggle, took the platform against him. They reminded our accusers of the July offensive, of the whole perfidious policy of the old Government, of the re-establishment of the death penalty for soldiers, of the arrests, of the sacking of revolutionary organizations, and vowed that they would either conquer or die. They it was who brought us the news of the first victims on our side on the Palace Square.

Every one rose as though moved by some invisible signal, and with a unanimity which is only provoked by a deep moral intensity of feeling sung a Funeral March. He who lived through this moment will never forget it. The meeting came to an abrupt end. It was impossible to sit there, calmly discussing the theoretical question as to the method of constructing the Government, with the echo reaching our ears of the fighting and firing at the walls of the Winter Palace, where, as a matter of fact, the fate of this very Government was already being decided.

The taking of the Palace, however, was a protracted business, and this caused some wavering amongst the less determined elements of the Congress. The Right wing, through its spokesmen, prophesied our early doom. All were waiting anxiously for news from the Winter Palace. After some time, Antonoff, who, had been directing the operations, arrived. At once there was dead silence in the hail. The Winter Palace had been taken. Kerensky had taken flight. The other Ministers had been arrested and conveyed to the Peter and Paul Fortress. The first chapter of the November Revolution was at an end.

The Right Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, numbering altogether about sixty persons, that is, about one-tenth of the Congress, left the meeting under protest. As they could do nothing else, they “threw the whole responsibility” for whatever might now happen on the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. The latter were still wavering. Their past bound them closely to Tchernoff's party. The Right wing of this party had now shifted entirely towards the lower middle class and their intellectuals, to the well-to-do peasants in the villages ; in all, decisive questions it was marching hand in hand with the Liberal bourgeoisie against us. The more revolutionary elements of the party, reflecting the Radicalism of the social aspirations of the poorest peasantry, gravitated to the proletariat and its party. They were afraid, however, to cut the umbilical cord which bound them with the old party. When we were about to leave the Provisional Parliament, they refused to follow us and warned us against “adventures.” But the insurrection forced them to choose either for or against the Soviet. Not without hesitation, they were concentrating their forces on the same side of the barricade where we stood.

Part III

THE FORMATION OF THE COUNCIL OF
PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONERS

The victory at Petrograd was complete. The Military Revolutionary Committee had the reins of power completely in its hands. We issued our first decrees abolishing the death penalty, ordering new elections to the army committees, and so on. But here we discovered that we were cut off from the provinces. The superior officials at the railways and in the post and telegraph administration were against us. The old army committees, the Town Councils, and Zemstvos continued to bombard the Smolny Institute with minatory telegrams, proclaiming war against us and promising to sweep away the rebels in a very short time. Our telegrams, decrees, and explanations could not reach the provinces, as the Petrograd Telegraph Agency refused to serve us. The capital being thus isolated from the rest of the country, there readily spread very perturbing and fantastic rumours.

On perceiving that the Soviet had really assumed power, that the members of the old Government had been arrested, and that in the streets of Petrograd armed soldiers were masters of the situation, the bourgeois and Coalitionist Press raised a frenzied campaign against us, the like of which had never been known before. Scarcely a lie or calumny existed which they did not hurl against the Military Revolutionary Committee, its directors and Commissioners.

On November 8th a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet took place, at which were also present the delegates of the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets, the members of the garrison conference, and numerous members of the party. Here, for the first time after an interval of four months, Lenin and Zinoviev took the platform amidst a most enthusiastic Ovation. But mixed with the joy of our victory was some uneasiness as to how the country would receive the news of the insurrection, and whether the Soviets would be able to maintain their power.

In the evening of the same day a meeting of the Congress of the Soviets took place, which was of prime importance. Lenin introduced two decrees, on peace and on the land. Both were adopted unanimously after a short discussion. At this meeting, too, a new central authority was formed – the Council of People's Commissioners.

The Central Committee of our party made an effort to come to an agreement with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. They were invited to take part in the formation of a Soviet Government. But they were undecided : they thought that the new Government ought to be formed from all the parties in the Soviet, on the basis of a coalition. The Mensheviks and the Right Socialist Revolutionaries, however, had broken off relations with the Congress of the Soviets, considering imperative a coalition with anti-Soviet parties. We could do nothing else than suggest that the Left Socialist Revolutionaries should endeavour to get their neighbours on the right to rejoin the revolutionary fold. And whilst they were busying themselves with this hopeless task, we considered ourselves bound to take the whole responsibility of government on our own shoulders. The list of People's Commissioners was consequently made up exclusively of Bolsheviks. There was undoubtedly a certain amount of political danger in this. The transformation was really a bit too, sudden. Just to think of it : the leaders of this party had but yesterday lain under an accusation provided by Article 108 of the Code, that is to say, accused of high treason ! But there was no other choice for us. The other Soviet groups hesitated and refused, preferring to wait upon events before committing themselves. And, after all, we had no doubt that our party alone was capable of producing a really revolutionary Government.

THE FIRST DAYS OF THE NEW REGIME

The decrees regarding land and peace, confirmed by the Soviet Congress, were printed in vast numbers of copies and distributed throughout the length and breadth of the country by delegates from the front, by peasant messengers coming from the villages, and by propagandists whom we sent to the provinces and trenches. At the same time we continued the organization and arming of the Red Guard, who, together with the old garrison and sailors, were performing the arduous guard duties. The Council of People's Commissioners was taking over one Government institution after another, but everywhere were meeting with the passive resistance of the higher and middle officials. The former Soviet parties did everything they Could to get support from these classes and thus to organize a sabotage of the new authority. Our enemies were quite certain that the whole business was a mere episode, that it was only a question of a day or two, perhaps of a week, and the Soviet Government would be overthrown ... At the Smolny, the first foreign Consuls and members of the Embassies put in their appearance, impelled as much by business motives as by curiosity. Newspaper correspondents also hurried thither with their notebooks and cameras. All hastened to get a glimpse of the new Government, certain that in a day or two it would be too late.

In the city complete order reigned. The sailors, soldiers, and Red Guards behaved in these first days with exemplary discipline and maintained stern revolutionary order.

Among our enemies there was a growing fear lest the “episode" should continue too long ; and very soon they began to organize the first attack against the new Government. The initiative emanated from the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. In the previous phases of the Revolution, they had not been anxious, and indeed had not dared, to take the entire power into their hands. In correspondence with their political position as go-betweens, they contented themselves with serving in the Coalition Government in the capacity of assistants, critics, friendly opponents, and apologists for the bourgeoisie. At all elections they conscientiously cast anathemas on the Liberal bourgeoisie, but in the Government they as regularly united with it. Thanks to these tactics, they succeeded in the course of the first six months of the Revolution in completely forfeiting the confidence of the popular masses and of the army, and now the November Revolution had finally hurled them from power. Yet only yesterday they had still considered themselves masters of the situation. The leaders of the Bolsheviks whom they persecuted had been obliged to live “illegally” and in hiding, just as under the Tsardom. Today, however, the Bolsheviks were in power, and the former Ministers and the Coalitionists and their coadjutors were swept aside and left without any influence on the further course of events. They did not want and could not believe that this sudden transformation signified the beginning of a new epoch. They wanted and forced themselves to think that it was all a mere accident, a misunderstanding, which Could be righted by a few energetic speeches and indicting articles, but at every turn they stumbled upon ever increasing and irresistible obstacles. Hence their blind and truly savage hatred towards us.

The bourgeois politicians would not, of course, make up their minds to go into the fire themselves. Instead, they were pushing forward the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who in their struggle against us had acquired all that energy which they had so sadly lacked when they were in semi-power. Their organs were spreading the most fantastic rumours and slanders. In their name appeared proclamations containing direct appeals to the people to destroy the new Government. They, too, organized the officials for sabotage and the cadets for military action against us – throughout November 9th and 10th we continued to receive constant threats by telegram from the army committees, Town Councils, Zemstvos, and the managing committee of the railway union. The Nevsky Prospekt, the chief artery of the bourgeoisie of the capital, became more and more animated. The bourgeois youth were awakening from their torpor, and, urged on by the Press, were unfolding at the Nevsky Prospekt an energetic agitation against the Soviet Government. Helped by crowds of bourgeois cadets, they were disarming individual Red Guardsmen, and in side streets were shooting down sailors and Red Guards. A group of cadets seized the Telephone Exchange. They also made attempts to seize the Telegraph and Post Office. Finally, we were informed that three armoured cars had fallen into the hands of some unknown military organization hostile to us. The bourgeois elements were evidently raising their heads. The press was announcing that we were fast approaching our last hour. Our people intercepted some secret orders from which it was clear that a military organization had been formed against the Petrograd Soviet at the head of which stood a so-called Committee for the Defence of the Revolution, created by the City Council and the old Central Executive Committee. Both in the latter and in the City Council, the Right Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks were the leading parties. This Committee had at its disposal cadets, students, and many counter-revolutionary officers, who, behind the backs of the Coalitionists, were hoping to deliver a death-blow to the Soviets.

THE CADET RISING OF NOVEMBER 11TH

The chief basis for the counter-revolutionary organizations was the Cadet and Engineering Schools, where a considerable quantity of arms and munitions were stored and from which raids were carried out against the institutions of the Revolutionary Government.

Detachments of Red Guards and sailors surrounded the Cadet School and sent parlementaires to demand the surrender of arms. The besieged replied with bullets. The besiegers were marking time, and a crowd collected round them. Now and again a stray shot from within would hit a passer-by. The skirmish seemed to be getting prolonged indefinitely and was threatening to have a demoralizing effect on the revolutionary detachments. It was imperative to resort to drastic measures. The duty of disarming the cadets was then placed on the commander of the Peter and Paul Fortress, Ensign B – who closely surrounded the Cadet School, brought up some armoured cars and artillery, and delivered an ultimatum to the cadets to surrender in ten minutes. They answered with renewed fire from the windows. At the end of the ten minutes, B— commanded the artillery to open fire. The first shots made a wide gaping breach in the walls, and the cadets surrendered, although many of them tried to escape and, in so doing, continued firing at their pursuers. The exasperation and bitterness accompanying every civil war was soon engendered. The sailors undoubtedly committed cruelties on individual cadets. The bourgeois Press afterwards accused the sailors and the Soviet Government of inhumanity and savagery. But it was silent on one point that the Revolution of November 7th-8th had been accomplished without a single shot and without a single victim, and that it was only the counter-revolutionary plot which had been organized by the bourgeoisie and which threw its young men into the cauldron of a civil war against the workers, soldiers, and sailors that led to inevitable atrocities and victims. The events of November 11th effected a radical change in the temper of the Petrograd people. The struggle took on a more tragic aspect. At the same time our enemies at length realized that the position of affairs was much more serious than they had thought, and that the Soviet by no means intended to give up the power it had just won, merely at the bidding of the capitalist Press and cadets.

The clearance of Petrograd of all counterrevolutionary hotbeds went on with great intensity. The cadets were disarmed almost entirely, and those who took part in the rising were arrested and imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress, or taken to Kronstadt. Those papers which had been openly calling for a rising against the Soviet authority were suppressed. An order was also issued for the arrest of some of the leaders of the former Soviet parties whose names appeared in the intercepted counterrevolutionary correspondence. With this, all military resistance to the new authority was finally broken in the capital.

Then followed a prolonged and exhausting struggle with the “Italian” strike of officials, technical staffs, employees of Government departments, etc. These individuals, although belonging for the most part, in point of pay, to the oppressed class, adhere by their mode of life and their psychology to the bourgeoisie. They had faithfully served the State when Tsarism stood at its head, and they continued to serve it faithfully when authority passed into the hands of the Imperialist bourgeoisie. Afterwards, in the next period of the Revolution, they passed over with all their knowledge and their technical skill to the service of the Coalition Government. When, however, the insurgent workers, soldiers, and peasants hurled the exploiting classes from the helm of the State and tried to take the direction of affairs into their own hands, the officials and employees revolted and absolutely refused to support the new Government in any way whatever. As time went on, this sabotage spread more and more, its organizers being, in the main, Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and its financial support being derived from the banks of the Entente Embassies.

KERENSKY'S ADVANCE ON PETROGRAD

The growing stability of the Soviet's power in Petrograd made the middle-class groups transfer all their hopes to military help from outside. The Petrograd Telegraph Agency, the Railway Telegraph, and the Radio-Telegraph Station of Tsarskoye Selo were sending wire after wire reporting that great military forces were moving on Petrograd with the object of suppressing the rebels and establishing order. Kerensky had fled to the front, and the papers of the bourgeois parties were announcing that he was leading numberless troops against the Bolsheviks. We were cut off from the rest of the country, as the telegraph stations refused to send our messages. But the soldiers who, by tens and hundreds, were daily coming to see us to bring messages from their regiments, divisions, and corps, all kept on saying to us : “Don't be afraid of the front ; the whole front is entirely on your side ; give your orders and we are ready at a moment's notice to send a division or a corps to assist you." The army was in the same state as all the rest ; the rank and file were on our side, the upper ten against us. Of course, the upper ten had the technical military machinery in their hands. Various sections of our million-headed army found themselves isolated from one another. We, on our part, were isolated from the army and from the country. Nevertheless, the news of the Soviet's power at Petrograd and of its decrees was, In spite of all obstacles, spreading all over the country, and stirred the provincial Soviets to revolt against the old authority.

The news of Kerensky's march on Petrograd at the head of troops was soon confirmed and took a more definite shape. We were informed from Tsarskoye Selo of the approach of Cossack èchelons who had passed through Luga. A proclamation was distributed in the capital, signed by Kerensky and General Krasnoff, inviting the whole garrison to join the Government's troops who in a few hours' time would occupy Petrograd. The rebellion of the cadets on November 11th was undoubtedly connected with Kerensky's enterprise, but it burst out too soon, owing to our energetic action. An order was issued to the garrison of Tsarskoye Selo to call upon the advancing Cossacks' èchelons to submit to the authority of the Soviet, and, in case of refusal, to disarm them. But the garrison of Tsarskoye Selo was ill-adapted for military operations. It had no artillery and no leaders, as the officers were hostile to the Soviet. The Cossacks seized the radio-telegraph station of Tsarskoye Selo, the most powerful of its kind in the country, and continued to advance. The garrisons of Peterhoff, Krasnoye Selo, and Gatchina showed no initiative and no resolution.

After an almost bloodless victory at Petrograd, the soldiers were convinced that, in future, things would continue the same course : it would be sufficient to send an able agitator to the Cossacks to explain to them the objects of the workers' revolution, and the Cossacks would lay down their arms. It was by means of speeches and fraternization that the Korniloff counterrevolutionary rebellion had been overpowered. It was by means of agitation and the cleverly planned seizure of offices that Kerensky's Government had been deposed without any fighting. The same methods were now being applied by the leaders of the Tsarskoye Selo, Krasnoye Selo, and Gatchina Soviets against the Cossacks of General Krasnoff, but this time without success. The Cossacks did not manifest any great enthusiasm or resolve, and continued to advance. Some of the Cossacks' detached sections reached Gatchina and Krasnoye Selo, a few skirmishes between them and the local garrisons took place, and some of the garrison troops were disarmed. We, at first, had no idea of the size of Kerensky's forces. Some asserted that General Krasnoff was at the head of ten thousand men, others estimated that he could not have more than one thousand, while the papers and manifestoes of the hostile parties were announcing in huge letters that two corps were concentrated near Tsarskoye Selo.

A state of uncertainty also reigned in the Petrograd garrison. Scarcely had they won one bloodless victory than they had to come out against an enemy whose strength was unknown, and wage battles the issue of which was uncertain. The plan of sending fresh agitators and proclamations to the Cossacks was being constantly discussed at garrison conferences, since it seemed inconceivable to the soldiers that the Cossacks could refuse to adopt the standpoint which the Petrograd garrison had fought to assert. Meanwhile, the advance sections of the Cossacks were approaching Petrograd, and we expected that the decisive struggle would take place in the streets of the capital.

The greatest determination was shown by the soldiers of the Red Guard. They demanded arms, munitions, and leaders. But the whole of the military machine was in a state of complete disorganization, partly from neglect and partly from malice. The officers had gone, many of them had fled ; rifles were in one place, munitions in another. Our artillery was in a still worse condition. Guns, gun-carriages, shells were scattered here and there, and had to be searched for in all sorts of places. The regiments were short of engineering tools and field telephones. The revolutionary staff, which tried hard to restore order from above, stumbled against insurmountable obstacles, chiefly in the shape of the sabotage organized by the military technical personnel.

We then decided to make a direct appeal to the working classes. We explained to them that all the conquests of the Revolution were at stake, and that only their energy, initiative, and self-sacrifice could save them and consolidate the new regime of the Workers' and Peasants' Government. This appeal was crowned almost instantly with great practical success. Thousands of workmen came out and moved towards the positions occupied by Kerensky's troops and began to dig trenches. The workmen in the gun factories took in hand the fitting up of guns, the supply of munitions from the military stores, the requisition of horses ; they placed the guns in position, organized the commissariat department, obtained engines, motors, and cars, requisitioned the stocks of provisions and fodder, arranged sanitary colunms – in a word, they built up and prepared for battle that military machine which we had in vain tried to create from above by the authority of the revolutionary General Staff.

When dozens of guns appeared in position, the spirit of our soldiers changed at once. Under cover of artillery they were ready to resist the attack of the Cossacks. The first line consisted of sailors and Red Guards. A few officers, whose political ideas were not ours, but who were honestly devoted to their regiments, led their soldiers to their positions and superintended their activities against Krasnoff's Cossacks.

THE COLLAPSE OF KERENSKY'S ADVENTURE

Meantime the telegraph here and abroad was busy spreading news according to which the Bolsheviks' adventure was at an end. Kerensky had entered Petrograd, and order had been restored by his iron hand. At the same time, the bourgeois Press of Petrograd, comforted by the proximity of Kerensky's troops, was telling its readers about the complete demoralization of the Petrograd garrison, about the Cossacks' irresistible advance and their numerous artillery, and was predicting the coming doom of the Smolny. Our greatest difficulty, as already stated, consisted in the absence of an efficient technical apparatus and of men able to direct the military activities. Even those officers who had conscientiously accompanied their soldiers to the positions declined to accept the post of Commander-in-Chief.

After various attempts to solve the problem we selected, the following combination : a garrison meeting elected a committee of five persons who were charged with supreme control over all operations against the counter-revolutionary troops advancing on Petrograd. This committee then came to an agreement with the Colonel of the General Staff, Muravieff, who during Kerensky's regime had been in opposition, and now, on his own initiative, had offered his services to the Soviet Government.

On November 12th, in the night which was very cold, Muravieff and I motored to the military positions. Carts loaded with provisions, fodder, guns, and munitions were moving all along the road in the same direction. All that had been organized by the workers of various factories. Pickets of Red Guards stopped our car several times in order to verify our pass. Since the first days of the November Revolution all the cars of the city had been commandeered, and without a pass from Smolny no car was allowed to move in the streets or suburbs of the capital. The vigilance of the Red Guard was beyond all praise. Armed with rifles, they had been standing round the small bonfires for hours and hours, and the sight of these young armed workmen standing in the snow in the light of bonfires was the best symbol of the proletarian Revolution.

We found a good number of guns at the positions, and there was no lack of munitions. The decisive action took place on that very day, between Krasnoye Selo and Tsarskoye Selo. After a fierce artillery bombardment, the Cossacks, who had advanced as long as they met with no serious resistance, hastily fell back. They had all along been misled by tales about the atrocities of the Bolsheviks who intended to sell Russia to the Kaiser. They had been made to believe that the whole garrison of Petrograd was impatiently expecting them as liberators. The first serious resistance made havoc in their lines and doomed the whole of Kerensky's adventure.

The retreat of General Krasnoff's Cossacks gave us a chance of retaking the radio station of Tsarskoye Selo, and I at once wired the news of the victory over Kerensky's troops.

Here is the text of the wire –

PULKOVO VILLAGE STAFF, 2.10 a.m.

The night of November 12th-13th will become historical. The attempt of Kerensky to lead counter-revolutionary troops against the capital, the seat of the Revolution, has met with a decisive repulse. Kerensky is in retreat ; we are advancing. Soldiers, sailors, and workmen of Petrograd have shown that they are anxious to, and know how to, assert the will and power of the workers' democracy with their arms. The bourgeoisie strove to isolate the revolutionary army ; Kerensky attempted to crush it under the Cossack's heel. Both attempts have proved a miserable failure.

The great idea of the supreme power of the workers and peasants' democracy has consolidated the ranks of our army and steeled its will. The whole country will now perceive that the power of the Soviets is not a passing event, but an irrefutable fact of the rule of workers, soldiers, and peasants. The repulse of Kerensky is a repulse of the bourgeoisie, the landlords, and the Kornilovites. The repulse of Kerensky is the establishment of the people's right to a peaceful and free life, to land, bread, and power. The Pulkovo detachment has, by its valiant deeds, consolidated the cause of the Workers and Peasants' Revolution. A return to the past is impossible. There are still struggle, obstacles, and sacrifices in front of us. But the road is open and victory is certain.

Revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Government have a right to be proud of their Pulkovo detachment and its Commander, Colonel Walden.

Eternal memory to the fallen ! Glory to the warriors of the Revolution, soldiers and officers faithful to the people !

Long live revolutionary, popular, Socialist Russia

On behalf of the Council of the People's Commissioners,

L. TROTSKY
November 13, 1917

We subsequently learnt from our friends abroad that the German wireless stations had received an order from the High Command not to intercept this message. Thus the first action of the German Government, in respect of the November events, betrayed the fear lest they should cause a fermentation in Germany itself. Austria-Hungary intercepted a portion of our message, and, as far as we know, it became the source of information from which all Europe learned that Kerensky's luckless attempt to regain power had ended in a miserable failure. Signs of fermentation were now apparent among Krasnoff's Cossacks. They began sending scouts to Petrograd and even official delegates to the Smolny. There they were able to see for themselves that perfect order reigned at Petrograd, maintained by the garrison which was supporting the Soviet Government. The disorganization among the Cossacks became the greater as they soon realized the absurdity of the idea of capturing Petrograd by means of a thousand or so cavalrymen, since the promised support from the front was not forthcoming.

Krasnoff, with his Cossacks, retreated towards Gatchina, and when we reached there the following day, the members of his staff were already practically prisoners in the hands of the Cossacks themselves. Our garrison at Gatchina was in occupation of all the most important positions. The Cossacks, although not disarmed, were absolutely incapable of further resistance. They desired one thing only, viz. to be allowed to return to the Don as soon as possible, or at least to the front.

The Gatchina Palace was a curious sight. All the entrances were guarded by strong pickets.

At the gates were artillery and armoured cars. The spacious rooms of the Palace, the walls of which were covered with valuable paintings, were crowded with soldiers and sailors and Red Guardsmen. On the tables of costly wood were scattered soldiers' clothes, pipes, and sardine boxes. One of the rooms was occupied by the staff of General Krasnoff. The floor was covered with mattresses, soldiers' coats, and caps. The representative of the Military Revolutionary Committee who accompanied me entered the room occupied by the staff, lowered his rifle upside down with a clang, and, leaning on it, declared “General Krasnoff, you and your staff are prisoners of the Soviet.” Armed Red Guardsmen immediately took up posts at both doors of the room. Kerensky was not there ; he had fled, as he fled previously from the Winter Palace. General Krasnoff described the circumstances of his escape in his written evidence handed in on November 14th. I publish here this curious document verbatim –

November 14, 1917, 6 p.m.

It was about 3 p.m. when I was summoned by the Commander-in-Chief [Kerensky]. He was very agitated and nervous.

“General,” said he, “you have betrayed me : your own Cossacks here definitely say that they will arrest me and hand me over to the sailors.”

“Yes,” said I “they talk a good deal about it, and I know that there is no sympathy with you anywhere.”

“Do the officers say the same ?"

“Yes ; the officers are exactly those who are the most discontented with you.”

“What shall I do ? I shall have to take my life.”

“If you are an honest man you will go. at once with a white flag to Petrograd and appear before the Revolutionary Committee and talk the matter over as the head of the Government.”

“Yes, I will do that, General”

“I will give you a guard and I will get a sailor to go with you.”

“No ; any one but a sailor. You know Dybenko is here."

“I do not know who Dybenko is.”

“He is my enemy.”

“Well, nothing is to be done. You have engaged in a big game and you must take risks.”

“Very well ; I will go to-night.”

“Why in the night ? That would he a flight. Go openly and calmly ; let everybody see that you are not trying to escape.”

“Very well. Only give me a convoy which I can trust.”

“Agreed.”

I went out, called a Cossack of the 10th Don Cossacks' Regiment, Russkoff, and ordered him to appoint eight Cossacks to form a bodyguard for the Commander-in-Chief.

Half an hour later the Cossacks came in to tell me that they could not find Kerensky anywhere – that he had fled. I raised the alarm and ordered a search to be made for him ; I am inclined to think that he could not have fled from Gatchina and is still hiding somewhere here.

MAJOR-GENERAL KRASNOFF
Commander of The 11th Corps.

Such was the end of this business.

Nevertheless, our opponents did not want to surrender or to admit that the question of government authority had been settled. They Still nourished hopes of help from the front. The leaders of the ex-Soviet parties – Tchernoff, Tsereteli, Avksentieff, Gotz, and others, one after another, went to the front to negotiate with the old army committees gathered at Dukhonin's headquarters, tried to incite him to resist, and, according to the Press, even attempted to form at his quarters a new Ministry. But nothing came of it. The old army committees had lost all their influence, and the front was feverishly busy calling together conferences for the new elections to all the army organizations at the front. At these re-elections the Soviets' regime was everywhere victorious.

Meanwhile our detachments were moving by rail further from Gatchina towards Luga and Pskoff. There they met several trains with “shockers” and Cossacks, who had either been summoned by Kerensky or despatched by various generals. An armed conflict occurred between our troops and one of these Cossack èchelons. But the majority of the soldiers sent from the front to Petrograd, on meeting with the representatives of the Soviet troops, immediately declared that they had been deceived and that they would not raise their arms against the authority of the workers and soldiers.

INTERNAL FRICTIONS

In the meantime the struggle for the establishment of the Soviet regime was spreading all over the country. In Moscow this struggle was particularly protracted and bloody. Perhaps this was due not the least to the fact that the leaders of the Revolution did not act at once with all the determination needed in offensive operations. In a civil war, more than in any other, victory can be secured only by a prompt and continuous offensive. Hesitation is dangerous, negotiations are risky, the policy of marking time is ruinous. One must always remember that the masses of the people have never been in possession of power, that they have always been under the heel of other classes, and that therefore they lack political self-confidence. Any hesitation shown in the revolutionary centres has an immediate deteriorating effect on them. Only when the revolutionary party firmly and unflinchingly speeds to its goal can it help the working masses to overcome all the slavish instincts inherited from centuries and lead the masses to victory. Only a resolute offensive secures victory with a minimum expenditure of strength and with the least losses.

But the attainment of resolute and firm tactics is just the difficulty. The lack of confidence of the masses in their own strength, the lack of experience of power, are reflected also in the leaders who, besides, are all the time under the powerful pressure of bourgeois public opinion.

The bare idea of the possibility of the establishment of a Workers' Government filled our bourgeois Liberals with hatred and spite. These feelings they expressed in the numberless papers they had at their disposal. Next came our intellectuals, who, with all their profession of Radicalism and the socialistic colouring of their thought, were yet harbouring in the depth of their consciousness a most slavish admission of the bourgeoisie's might and its art of ruling. All these intellectuals, with their socialistic plumage, at once shifted towards the Right, regarding the consolidation of the power of the Soviets as the beginning of the end. Following on the heels of the representatives of Liberal professions walked the old bureaucracy, the administrative and technical personnel, all ! those elements who, morally and materially, live on the crumbs falling from the table of the bourgeoisie. The opposition of all these classes was mostly of a passive character, especially after the suppression of the cadet rebellion, but for that very reason it often seemed insurmountable. At every step we were refused assistance. The officials would either leave the Government offices or, remaining there, refused point-blank to work for us. They would not surrender the books or funds. The telephone exchanges refused to connect us. The telegraph offices would mutilate or delay our messages. We could not find translators, stenographers, or even copyists, etc. All that created such an atmosphere that some among us, even some of those at the head of our party, began to doubt whether the working masses would be able, in face of such resistance on the part of the bourgeois classes, to set in order the machinery of Government and remain in power. Here and there were heard voices advising an agreement. But with whom ? With the bourgeois Liberals ? Such a coalition had been already tried, and it drove the Revolution into a terrible bog. The insurrection of Novemher 7th was an act of self-preservation on the part of the masses, after a period of impotence and treason on the part of the Coalition Government. The only coalition which still remained to be tried was the coalition within the ranks of the so-called revolutionary democracy, that is, of all Soviet parties. Such a coalition we had virtually proposed from the very beginning, at the sitting of the second All-Russian Congress on November 7th. The Kerensky Government had just been overturned and we had proposed to the Soviet Congress to take over the government authority. But the parties of the Right had left us and banged the door behind them. And it was the very best they could have done. They represented but an insignificant section at the Congress. They were no longer supported by the masses, since even those sections of the people who, by their apathy, were still supporting them, were gradually drifting over to our side. The coalition with the Right wing of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks would not have broadened the social basis of the Soviet Government ; at the same time it would have introduced into its personnel elements demoralized through and through by political skepticism and by worship of bourgeois Liberalism. All the strength of the new authority lay in the radicalism of its programme, in the determination with which it acted. To tie oneself to the groups of Tchernoff and Tsereteli would have meant to put shackles on the arms and legs of the new authority and to cause the masses to lose confidence in it in no time.

Our nearest neighbours on the right were the so-called “Left” Socialist Revolutionaries. On the whole they were quite ready to support us, but at the same time they desired to form a Coalition Socialist Government. The Central Committee of the Railway Union, the Central Committee of the Post and Telegraph Employees, the Union of Government Officials – all these organizations were against us. At the head of our own party some were urging the need of coming to an agreement with these organizations in some way or other. But on what basis ? All those above mentioned leading organizations of the past regime had already outlived themselves. Their relationship to the lower officials was roughly the same as that of the old army committees to the soldier masses in the trenches. History had drawn a deep line of demarcation between the higher and lower strata. An unprincipled alliance with these worn-out leading organizations of yesterday was doomed to an inevitable collapse. In order to overpower the sabotage and the aristocratic pretensions of those above, it was necessary to lean for support firmly and resolutely on the rank and file. We left to the Socialist Revolutionaries the task of continuing the hopeless attempts to effect a compromise. Our own policy was, on the contrary, to mobilize those who laboured at the bottom of the scale against all those representative bodies which had supported the Kerensky regime. This uncompromising policy caused friction and even a split amongst the leaders of our own party. At the Central Executive Committee, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries protested against the severity of the measures adopted by the new Government, and insisted on the necessity of compromises. The protest was supported by a section of the Bolsheviks, and three People's Commissioners resigned and left the Government. Some other active members of the party expressed their fundamental solidarity with those who had resigned. This made a tremendous impression in various bourgeois and intellectual circles : it was now evident that the Bolsheviks, whom the cadets and the Cossacks of General Krasnoff had failed to crush, were bound to perish, together with the Soviet regime, as a result of internal dissolution. However, the masses never noticed the split at all, and unanimously supported the Council of the People's Commissioners not only against the counterrevolutionary plotters and the saboteurs, but also against all compromise-mongers and sceptics.

THE FATE OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.

When, after Korniloff's adventure, the paramount parties on the Soviets made an attempt to make amends for their previous attitude of indulgence towards the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, they demanded the speedy convocation of the Constituent Assembly. Kerensky, who had just been saved by the Soviets from the too close embrace of his ally Korniloff, was obliged to give in. The Constituent Assembly was fixed for the end of November. But the circumstances had by that time become such that no guarantee whatsoever was available that the Constituent Assembly would, indeed, be called together. Complete disorganization reigned at the front, the number of deserters was growing every day, and the soldiers threatened to leave the trenches in regiments and corps and to withdraw to the rear, devastating everything on their way. In the country districts seizures of private lands and livestock were going on in a most haphazard fashion. Martial law was in consequence proclaimed in many places. Meanwhile the German troops continued to advance, took Riga and threatened Petrograd. The Right wing of the bourgeoisie was openly rejoicing over the danger threatening the revolutionary capital. The Government offices had been evacuated from Petrograd. and Kerensky intended to transfer the seat of his Government to Moscow. All that made the possibility of the Constituent Assembly being called together not only remote, but well-nigh unlikely. From this point of view the November coup d'ètat may have been regarded as the salvation of the Constituent Assembly as well as of the Revolution as a whole. And when we argued that the road to the Constituent Assembly lay not through Tsereteli's Provisional Parliament, but through the seizure of power by the Soviets, we were absolutely sincere. But the endless postponements of the summoning of the Constituent Assembly had not been without effect on it. Announced in the first days of the Revolution, it made its appearance after eight or nine months of a severe struggle between classes and parties. It came too late to have still a chance of playing a constructive r6le. Its intrinsic futility had been predetermined by one single fact which at first might have appeared as of small importance, but which later on affected the fate of the Constituent Assembly tremendously.

During the first phases of the Revolution the party of the Socialist Revolutionaries had been numerically the strongest. I have already mentioned its amorphous condition and its mixed social composition. The Revolution had been irresistibly leading to the internal differentiation among those who were marching under the Populist banner. The left wing of this party, representing a portion of the industrial workers and the great masses of the poorer peasantry, was separating more and more from the rest, and ultimately found itself in an irreconcilable opposition to the leaders of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, who represented the lower and middle bourgeoisie. But the inertia of the party frame and traditions delayed the inevitable split. The proportional system of elections rests, as is well known, entirely on party lists. As these lists had been drawn up two or three months before the November Revolution, the names of the Left and the Right Socialist Revolutionaries figured pêlemêle in the same list, under the banner of the same party. In this way, by the time of the November Revolution, when the Right Socialist Revolutionaries were already arresting members of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, and the Left were joining the Bolsheviks for the overthrow of the Government of the Socialist Revolutionary Kerensky, the old lists were still retaining their validity, and peasants at the elections for the Constituent Assembly were obliged to vote for lists headed by Kerensky's name and containing names of Left Socialist Revolutionaries who were taking part in the conspiracy against him.

The months preceding the November Revolution were marked by an incessant orientation of the masses towards the Left and a wholesale flow of the workers, soldiers, and peasants into the ranks of the Bolsheviks. During the same period the same process was manifesting itself in the ranks of the Socialist Revolutionary Party in the shape of the extension of the Left wing at the expense of the Right. Yet three-fourths of the names figuring on the party lists of the Socialist Revolutionaries were those of the old leaders of the Right wing, whose revolutionary reputation had been forfeited completely during their coalition with the Liberal bourgeoisie.

To this must be added the fact that the elections took place during the first weeks following the November Revolution. The news of the change was spreading in slowly widening circles from the capital to the provinces, from the towns to the villages. In many places the masses of peasantry had a very vague idea of what had taken place in Petrograd and Moscow. They nominally voted for “Land and Liberty,” for their representatives on the land committees, who, for the most part, were following the Populist banner. In effect, they were voting for Kerensky and Avksentieff, who were dissolving those very land committees and arresting their members. The result of it all was a most incredible political paradox : one of the two parties which were to dissolve the Constituent Assembly, viz. the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, was actually elected on the same lists as the party which had obtained the majority in the Constituent Assembly. These facts show clearly what a belated product the Constituent Assembly was in comparison with the actual progress of party warfare and party differentiations. We must now examine the question also from the point of view of principle.

THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND
THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

As Marxists, we have never been worshippers of formal democracy. In a society split into classes, the democratic institutions, far from abolishing the class struggle, only lend the class interests a highly imperfect form of expression. The possessing classes have always at their disposal thousands of means to, pervert and adulterate the will of the labouring masses. In time of revolution democratic institutions form a still less perfect apparatus for the expression of the class struggle. Marx called Revolution “the locomotive of history.” The open and direct struggle for power enables the labouring masses to acquire in a short time a wealth of political experience and thus rapidly to pass from one, stage to another in the process of their mental evolution. The ponderous mechanism of democratic institutions cannot keep pace with this evolution – and this in proportion to the vastness of the country and the imperfection of the technical apparatus at its disposal.

The Right Socialist Revolutionaries were in a majority at the Constituent Assembly. In accordance with parliamentary usage, they should have formed the Government. But the Right Socialist Revolutionaries had had the chance of forming such a Government during the whole period of Revolution before November. Yet they had refrained from doing so, had handed over the lion's share of power to the Liberal bourgeoisie, and exactly for that reason they had lost the last vestige of influence among the most revolutionary sections of the people by the very time when the numerical composition of the Constituent Assembly placed them under the formal obligation to assume the reins of government. The working class, together with the Red Guard, were deeply hostile to the Right Socialist Revolutionaries. The overwhelming majority of the army supported the Bolsheviks. The revolutionary elements in the villages divided their sympathies between the. Left Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks. The sailors, who had been so prominent in all the incidents of the Revolution, were almost to a man with our party. The Right Socialist Revolutionaries had, in fact, been compelled to leave the Soviets, which had assumed power in November, that is, before the Constituent Assembly. On what support could a Ministry formed by such a majority of the Constituent Assembly depend ? It would have had behind it the rich of the villages, intellectuals, and the old officialdom, and perhaps would have found support, for the time being, among the middle class. But such a Government would have been completely deprived of the material apparatus of power. In the centres of political life, like Petrograd, it would have met at once with an uncompromising resistance. If the Soviets had, in accordance with the formal logic of democratic institutions, handed over their power to the party of Kerensky and Tchernoff, the new Govemment, discredited and impotent, would have only succeeded in temporarily confusing the political life of the country, and would have been overthrown by a new rising within a few weeks. The Soviets decided to reduce this belated historical experiment to a minimum, and dissolved the Constituent Assembly on the very day when it assembled.

On this account our party has been made the butt of most violent accusations. No doubt the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly made a very unfavourable impression in the leading quarters of the Socialist parties of the West, and the politically unavoidable and necessary act was denounced there as a piece of party tyranny and sectarian arbitrariness. Kautsky, with his customary pedantry, explained in a series of articles the mutual relationship between the Socialist and Revolutionary tasks of the proletariat and the regime of political democracy. He endeavoured to prove that the observance of the principle of democracy was always, in the last resort, advantageous to the working class. Of course, in a general way, and on the whole, that is true. But Kautsky reduced this historical truth to a piece of professorial banality. If it always, in the end, pays the proletariat to wage its class struggle and even to exercise its dictatorship within the frame of democratic institutions, it does not at all follow that history always affords the chance of such a combination. It does not follow from the Marxian theory at all that history invariably creates conditions which are the most “advantageous” to the proletariat. It is at present difficult to say what course the Revolution would have taken if the Constituent Assembly had been summoned in its second or third month. Very probably the parties of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, which then predominated, would have discredited themselves, together with : the Constituent Assembly, in the eyes not only of the more active elements which were supporting the Soviets, but even in those of the backward popular masses, whose hopes would have been bound up, not with the Soviets, but with the Constituent Assembly. In such circumstances the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly might have been followed by new elections from which the parties of the Left would have emerged in a majority. But the course of events went in a different direction. The elections to the Constituent Assembly took place in the ninth month of the Revolution, and by that time the class struggle had reached such a degree of intensity that it burst, by its internal pressure, the formal framework of democracy.

The proletariat led the army and lower masses of peasantry. These classes were in a state of direct and fierce revolt against the Right Socialist Revolutionaries. Yet, thanks to the cumbrous machinery of democratic elections, this party obtained a majority in the Constituent Assembly, representing the pre-November phase of the Revolution. This was a contradiction which could not be solved within the framework of formal democracy, and only political pedants, who do not clearly realize the revolutionary logic of the relations of classes, can, in face of the situation resulting from the November events, preach to the proletariat banal truths concerning the advantages of democracy for waging the class war.

History chose to put the problem in a form much more concrete and acute. The Constituent Assembly, by its composition, was obliged to hand over the reins of power to the Tchernoff-Kerensky-Tsereteli group. Was this group capable of guiding the Revolution ? Could they find support In the class which formed the backbone of the Revolution ? No. The material class-contents of the Revolution came into an irreconcilable conflict with its democratic forms. Thereby the fate of the Constituent Assembly was decided in advance. Its dissolution appeared as the only Conceivable surgical way out of the contradictory situation which was not of our making, but had been brought about by the preceding course of events.

Part IV

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

At an historical night sitting, the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets adopted the historical Peace Decree. At that time the power of the Soviets was still only consolidating in the most important centres of the country, while the number of people abroad who had confidence in it was quite insignificant. We carried the decrees unanimously, but to many it appeared to be merely a political demonstration. The Compromise-mongers kept repeating at every street corner that our resolution could not lead to any practical results, since, on the one hand, the German Imperialists would not recognize and would not even condescend to talk with us, and, on the other hand, our allies would declare war on us for entering into separate peace negotiations. It was under the shadow of these gloomy predictions that we were making our first steps towards a universal democratic peace. The Decree was accepted on November 8th, when Kerensky and Krasnoff were at the very gates of Petrograd, and on November 20th we communicated over the wireless our proposals for the conclusion of a general peace both to our allies and enemies. By way of reply the Allied Governments addressed, through their military agents, remonstrances to General Dukhonin, the Commander-in-Chief, stating that all further steps on our part towards separate peace negotiations would lead to most serious results. We, on our part, replied on November 24th to this protest by a manifesto to all workers, soldiers, and peasants, declaring that under no circumstances should we allow our army to shed its blood by order of any foreign bourgeoisie. We brushed aside the threats of the Western Imperialists and assumed full responsibility for our peace policy before the international working class. First of all, by way of discharging our previous pledges, we published the secret treaties and declared that we repudiated all that was opposed in them to the interests of the popular masses everywhere. The capitalist Governments tried to play off our disclosures against one another, but the popular masses everywhere understood us and appreciated our action. Not a single Socialist patriotic paper, as far as we know, dared protest against this radical change effected by the Government of workers and peasants in all traditional methods of diplomacy, against our repudiation of its evil and unscrupulous intrigues. We made it the aim and purpose of our diplomacy to enlighten the popular masses, to open their eyes as to the nature of the policy of their respective Governments, and to fuse them in one common struggle against, and hatred of, the bourgeois-capitalist regime. The German bourgeois Press accused us of protracting the negotiations, but the peoples themselves eagerly listened everywhere to the dialogues at Brest, and thereby, in the course of the two and a half months during which the peace negotiations proceeded, a service was rendered to the cause of peace which has been acknowledged even by honest enemies. For the first time the question of peace was raised in such a way that it could no longer be distorted by any machinations behind the scenes.

On December 5th we signed the agreement for the suspension of hostilities along the whole front, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. We again appealed to the Allies to join us and to conduct the peace negotiations together with us. We received no answer, although this time our allies did not try to intimidate us by threats. The peace negotiations began on December 22nd, six weeks after the adoption of the Peace Decree. This shows that the accusations levelled at us by the hireling and Socialist traitor Press, that we had not tried to come to an understanding with the Allies, were nothing but lies. For six weeks we kept on informing them of every step we made, and constantly appealed to them to join us in the peace negotiations. We can face the people of France, Italy, and Great Britain with a clear conscience. We did all we could to prevail upon the belligerent nations to join us in the peace negotiations. The responsibility for our separate peace negotiations rests not upon us, but upon the Imperialists of the West, as well as those Russian parties which all along had been predicting an early death to the Workers' and Peasants' Government and urging the Allies not to take seriously our peace Initiative.

Anyhow, on December 22nd the peace negotiations were opened. Our delegates made a declaration of principles defining the basis of a general democratic peace in the precise terms of the Decree of November 8th. The other side demanded an adjournment of the sittings ; but their resumption was put off, on Kühlmann's motion, from day to day. It was obvious that the delegates of the Quadruple Alliance had considerable difficulty in drawing up their reply to our declaration. At last, on December 25th, the reply came. The diplomats of the Quadruple Alliance adhered to the democratic formulæ of a peace without annexations and contributions on the principle of self-determination of nations. We could see clearly that this was merely a piece of make-believe. But we did not expect even that, for is not hypocrisy the tribute paid by vice to virtue ? The fact that the German Imperialists considered it necessary to pay this tribute to our democratic principles was, in our eyes, evidence of the rather serious internal condition of Germany. But although, on the whole, we had no illusions as to the democratic leanings of Kühlmann and Czernin – we were only too well acquainted with the nature of the German and Austrian ruling classes – it must, nevertheless, be candidly admitted that we did not at the time anticipate that the actual proposals of the German Imperialists would be separated by such a wide gulf from the formulæ presented to us by Kühlmann on December 25th as a sort of plagiarism of the Russian Revolution. We, indeed, did not expect such an acme of impudence.

The masses of the working classes in Russia were deeply impressed by Kühlmann's reply. They read in it the fear of the ruling classes of the Central Empires in face of the discontent and growing impatience of the masses in Germany. On December 28th, a gigantic workers' and soldiers' demonstration took place in Petrograd in favour of a democratic peace. But the next morning our delegates returned from Brest-Litovsk and brought those predatory demands which Kühlmann had presented on behalf of the Central Empires by way of interpretation of his so-called democratic formulæ.

At first it may appear difficult to understand what exactly were the expectations of the German diplomacy when they presented their democratic formulæ in order, two or three days later, to reveal their brutal appetites. The theoretical debates, too, about those democratic formulæfor the most part initiated by Kühlmann himself – may seem to have been rather a risky affair. It ought to have been clear to them from the beginning that on this battlefield the diplomacy of the Central Empires could scarcely gain any laurels. But the secret of Kühlmann's conduct of diplomacy lay in that he was profoundly convinced that we would be ready to play duets with him. The trend of his thought was approximately as follows : Russia must have peace. The Bolsheviks had obtained power thanks to their fight for peace. The Bolsheviks wanted to remain in power. This was only possible on one condition, namely, the conclusion of peace. True, they had committed themselves to a definite democratic peace programme. But what were the diplomats for, if not for disguising black as white ? They, the Germans, would make the position easier for the Bolsheviks by hiding their spoil and plunder beneath a democratic formula. Bolshevik diplomacy would have sufficient grounds for not desiring to probe too deeply for the political essence of their enticing formulae, or, rather, for not revealing it to the eyes of the world. In other words, Kühlmann hoped to come to a tacit understanding with us. He would pay us back in our fine formula, and we should give him an opportunity of obtaining provinces and whole nationalities for the benefit of the Central Empires without any protest on our side. In the eyes of the German working classes, therefore, this violent annexation would receive the sanction of the Russian Revolution. When, during the negotiations, we made it clear that we were not discussing mere empty formulæ and decorative screens hiding a secret bargain, but the democratic foundations of the cohabitation of nations, Kühlmann took it as a malevolent breach of a tacit agreement. He would not for anything in the world budge even an inch from his formula of December 25th. Relying on his refined bureaucratic and legal logic, he tried his best to prove to the world that there was no difference whatever between black and white, and that it was only due to our malicious will that we were insisting on it.

Count Czernin, the representative of Austria-Hungary, played at these negotiations a part which no one would call impressive or dignified. He clumsily seconded and undertook at air critical moments, on behalf of Kühlmann, to make the most violent and cynical declarations. As against this, General Hoffman would often introduce a most refreshing note into the negotiations. Without shamming any great sympathy with the diplomatic niceties of Kühlmann, General Hoffman many times banged his soldier's boot on the table, at which the most intricate legal debates were carried on. For our part, we had not a moment's doubt that at these negotiations General Hoffman's boot was the only serious reality.

The presence of the representatives of the Kieff Rada at the negotiations was a great trump card in Kühlmann's hands. To the Ukrainian lower middle class, who were then in power, their “recognition” by the capitalist Governments of Europe seemed the most important thing in the world. At first, the Rada had offered its services to the Allied Imperialists and got from them some pocket-money. It then sent delegates to Brest-Litovsk in order to obtain from the Austro-German Governments, behind the backs of the peoples of Russia, the recognition of their legitimate birth. Scarcely had the Kieff diplomats entered on the road of “international” relations than they manifested the same out look and the same moral level which had hitherto been a characteristic feature of the petty Balkan politicians. Messrs. Kühlmann and Czernin, of course, did not indulge in any illusions as to the solvency of the new partner at the negotiations. But they realized quite correctly that by the attendance of the Kieff delegates the game was fated to become more complicated, but also more promising to them. At their first appearance at Brest-Litovsk the Kieff delegation defined the Ukraine as a component part of the nascent Federal Republic of Russia. That was an obvious embarrassment to the diplomats of the Central Powers, whose chief concern was to turn the Russian Republic into a new Balkan Peninsula. At their second appearance, the diplomats of the Rada declared, under the dictation of Austro-German diplomacy, that from that moment the Ukraine no longer desired to form part of the Russian Federation and would constitute henceforth an independent Republic.

In order to give the readers a clear idea of the situation in which the Soviet Government was placed at the last stage of the peace negotiations, I think it useful to reproduce here the main passages of the speech which the author of these lines delivered, as the People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, at the sitting of the Central Executive Committee on February 27, 1918.

THE SPEECH OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

“Comrades, – Russia of the Soviets has not only to build the new, but also to sum up the results of the past and, to a certain extent – a very large extent indeed – to settle old accounts, above all, the accounts of the present war which has now lasted three and a half years. The war has been a test of the economic resources of the belligerent nations. The fate of Russia, a poor, backward country, was, a war of attrition, pre-determined from the beginning. In the mighty conflict of the military machines the decisive r6le belonged, in the last resort, to the ability of the respective nations to adapt their industry in the shortest possible time, and thus to turn out again and again, with constantly increasing rapidity and in ever-increasing quantities, the engines of destruction which have been wearing out in no time in this terrible slaughter of nations. At the beginning of the war every, or almost every, country, even the most backward, could be in possession of powerful engines of destruction, since those machines could be obtained from abroad. All backward countries did possess them, including Russia. But the war soon wears out its dead capital, unless it is constantly replenished. The military power of every individual country drawn into the whirlwind of the worldwide war was measured by the ability to make guns, shells, and other engines of destruction by its own means during the war itself. If the war had decided the question of the balance of power in a very short time, Russia, speaking theoretically, might have come out on the victorious side. But the war dragged on, and did so by no means accidentally. The mere fact that during the preceding half-century all international politics had been reduced to the establishment of the so-called balance of power, that IS, to the greatest possible equalization of the military forces of the adversaries, was bound, m view of the strength and Wealth of the modern capitalist nations, to make the war a protracted business. The result has been, first and foremost, the exhaustion of the poorer, less economically developed countries.

Germany proved to be the most powerfull country in the military sense, owing to the mighty development of her industry and the new, rational, up-to-date structure of that industry side by side with the archaic structure of her State. France, with her economic system largely based on small production, proved to be very much behind Germany, while even such a powerful Colonial Empire as England showed herself weaker than Germany, owing to the more conservative, routine-like character of her industries. When the will of History summoned revolutionary Russia to initiate peace negotiations, we had no doubt whatever that, failing the intervention of the decisive power of the world's revolutionary proletariat, we should have to pay in full for over three and a half years of war. We knew perfectly well that German Imperialism was an enemy imbued with the consciousness of its own colossal strength, as manifested so glaringly in the present war.

All the arguments of the bourgeois cliques which keep telling us that we should have been incomparably stronger had we conducted our peace negotiations in conjunction with our Allies are fundamentally wrong. If we were to carry on, at some distant future, the peace negotiations in conjunction with the Allies, we should, in the first place, have had to go on with the war ; but seeing how our country was exhausted and weakened, its continuation, not its cessation, would have led to further exhaustion and ruin. We should thus have had to foot the bill of the war in conditions still more unfavourable to us. Even if the camp which Russia had joined on account of the international intrigues of Tsardom and the bourgeoisie – the camp, that is, at the head of which stands Great Britain – should come out of the war completely victorious (granting for the moment this rather improbable eventuality), it does not follow, comrades, that our country would also have come Out victorious, since Russia, inside this victorious camp, would have been still more exhausted and ruined by the long-drawn-out war than it is now. The masters of that camp, who would have gathered all the fruits of victory – that is, England and America – would, in their treatment of our country, have displayed the same methods which were employed by Germany at the peace negotiations. It would be absurd and childish, in appraising the policy of the Imperialist Countries, to start from other premises than their naked self-interest and material strength. Hence, if we, as a nation, are now weakened in the face of the Imperialist world, we are so. not because we broke away from the fiery circle of the war after previously shaking off the chains of international military obligations – no, we are weakened by the same policy of Tsardom and the bourgeois classes against which we fought, as a revolutionary party, both before and during the war.

You remember, comrades, the conditions in which our delegates went to Brest-Litovsk last time, direct from one of the sittings of the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets. We had informed you then of the state of negotiations and of the demands of the enemy. These demands, as you no doubt remember, amounted to disguised, or rather semi-disguised, annexationist claims to Lithuania, Courland, part of Livonia, the Moon Sound Islands, and a semi-masked indemnity which we then computed at six to eight or even ten thousand million roubles. In the interval, which lasted ten days, serious disturbances broke out in Austria and strikes took place among the labouring masses there – the first act of recognition of our methods of conducting the peace negotiations on the part of the proletariat of the Central Powers in face of the annexationist demands of German Imperialism. How miserable are the allegations of the bourgeois Press, that it took us two months' talk with Kühlmann before we discovered that the German Imperialists would demand robbers' terms. No, we knew that beforehand. But we tried to turn our “conversations” with the representatives of German Imperialism into a means of strengthening those forces which were struggling against it. We did not promise in this connection any miracles, but we asserted that our way was the only way still left at the disposal of revolutionary democracy for securing the chances of its further development.

“One may complain that the proletariat of other countries, especially of the Central Empires, is passing to an open revolutionary struggle too slowly. Yes, the tempo of its advance is much too slow. But in Austria-Hungary we saw a movement which assumed the proportions of a national event and which was a direct and immediate result of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations.

Before we departed from here we discussed the matter together, and we said that we had no reason to believe that that wave would sweep away the Austro-Hungarian militarism. Had we been convinced to the contrary, we should have certainly given the pledge so eagerly demanded from us by certain persons, namely, that we should never sign a separate treaty with Germany. I said at the time that it was impossible for us to make such a pledge, as it would have been tantamount to pledging ourselves to defeat German Imperialism. We held the secret of no such victory in our hands, and in so far as we could not pledge ourselves to Change the balance and correlation of the world's powers in a very short period of time, we openly and honestly declared that the revolutionary Government might, under certain circumstances, be compelled to accept an annexationist peace. For not the acceptance of a peace forced upon us by the course of events, but an attempt to hide its predatory character from our own people would have been the beginning of the end of the revolutionary Government.

At the same time we pointed out that we were departing for Brest in order to continue the negotiations in circumstances which were apparently becoming more favourable to us and less advantageous to our adversaries. We were watching the events in Austria-Hungary, and various circumstances made us think that, as hinted at by Socialist spokesmen in the Reichstag, Germany was on the eve of similar events. Such were our hopes, and then in the course of the first days of our new stay at Brest the wireless brought us via Vilna the first news that a tremendous strike movement had broken out in Berlin, which, like the movement in Austria-Hungary, was the direct result of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. But, as it often happens, in consequence of the “dialectical,” double-edged, character of the class struggle, it was just this powerful swing of the proletarian movement, such as Germany had never seen before, that aroused the propertied classes and caused them to close their ranks and to take up a more irreconcilable attitude. The German ruling classes are only too well imbued with the instinct of self-preservation, and they understood that any, even partial concession, under such circumstances, when they were being pressed by the masses of their own people, would have been tantamount to a capitulation before the idea of revolution. That is “why, after the first period of conferences, when Kühlmann had been deliberately delaying the negotiations by either postponing the sittings or wasting them on minor questions of form, he, as soon as the strike had been suppressed and his masters, he felt, were for the time being out of danger, reverted to his old accents of complete self-confidence, and redoubled his aggressiveness. Our negotiations became complicated owing to the participation of the Kieff Rada. We reported the facts of the case last time. The Rada delegates made their appearance at a time when the Rada still represented a fairly strong organization in the Ukraine and when the issue of the struggle had not yet been decided. Just at that moment we made the Rada an official offer to conclude with us a definite agreement, the principal term of which was our demand that the Rada should proclaim Kaledin and Korniloff enemies of the Revolution and refrain from interfering in our fight against them. The Kieff delegates arrived at the moment when we were cherishing hopes of coming to an agreement with it on both heads. We had already made clear to the Rada that so long as it was recognized by the Ukrainian people we should admit it to the negotiations as an independent member of the Conference. But in proportion as things in Russia and the Ukraine developed, and the antagonism between the democratic masses and the Rada was becoming deeper and deeper, the readiness of the Rada also increased to conclude any sort of peace with the Central Powers, and, if necessary, to invite German Imperialism to intervene in the internal affairs of the Ukrainian Republic in order to support the Rada against the Russian Revolution.

On February 9th we learned that the peace negotiations between the Rada and the Central Powers had been successfully completed behind our backs. February 9th was the birthday of Prince Leopold of Bavaria, and, as is the custom in monarchical countries, the solemn, historical act of signing the treaty was fixed for this festal day – whether with the Rada's agreement or not we do not know. General Hoffman caused the artillery to fire a salute in honour of Leopold of Bavaria, having previously asked the Ukrainians' permission to do so, as, according to that treaty, Brest-Litovsk had been incorporated with the Ukraine.

However, at the very moment when General Hoffman was asking the Kieff Rada for permission to fire a salute in honour of Prince Leopold, events had advanced so far that, with the exception of Brest-Litovsk, but little territory was left under the Rada's authority. On the strength of telegrams which we had received from Petrograd we officially informed the delegates of the Central Powers that the Kieff Rada was no longer in existence – a fact which was by no means immaterial for the course of the peace negotiations. We proposed to Count Czernin to send representatives, accompanied by our officers, to the territory of the Ukraine in order to see on the spot whether his co-partner, the Kieff Rada, was still in existence or not. Czernin at first seemed to jump at the idea, but when we raised the question whether the treaty with the Kieff delegation would only be signed after the return of his messengers or not, he began to hesitate and promised to consult K4llhmann, and having done so, sent us a reply in the negative. This was on February 8th, and on the following day they were obliged to sign the treaty. That brooked no delay, not only because of Prince Leopold's birthday, but also because of a more serious circumstance, which, of course, Kühlmann had explained to Czernin : “If we send our representatives to the Ukraine now, they may find that the Rada is no longer in existence, and then we should have to face the Russian delegates only ; which of course would greatly thwart our chances at the negotiations.” We were told by the Austro-Hungarian delegates : “Leave alone the question of principles, place the problem on a practical footing – then the German delegates will try to meet you. It is impossible that the Germans should desire to continue the war for the sake, for instance, of the Moon Sound Islands, if you formulate your demands more concretely ...” We answered : “ Very well, we are ready to test the conciliatory attitude of your colleagues, the German delegates. So far we have been discussing the question of the right of self-determination of Lithuanians, Poles, Letts, Esthonians, etc., and have elucidated the fact that there is no chance for the self-determination of these small nations. Let us now see what kind of self-determination you intend to allot to the Russian people, and what are the military strategical plans and devices behind your seizure of the Moon Islands. The Moon Islands, as part of the Esthonian Republic, as a possession of the Russian Federal Republic, have a defensive value, while in the hands of Germany they are means of offence and constitute a menace to the most vital centres of our country, particularly to Petrograd.” But, of course, Hoffman had not the slightest intention of making any concessions. Then the decisive moment came. We could not declare war – we were too weak. The army was in a state of complete internal dissolution. In order to save our country from ruin it was necessary to re-establish the internal organization of the labouring masses. This moral union could be established only by constructive work in the villages, in the workshop and the factory. The masses, who had passed through the colossal suffering and the catastrophic experiences of the war, had to be brought back to the fields and factories, where they could be rejuvenated morally and physically by work and thus be enabled to create the necessary internal discipline. There was no other way of salvation for our country, which had to pay the penalty for the sins committed by Tsardom and the bourgeoisie. We were forced to get out of the war and lead our army out of the slaughter. At the same time we declared to German Imperialism, straight in the face : “The peace terms which you force us to accept are those of violence and plunder. We cannot allow you, diplomats, to tell the German workers : ‘You branded our demands as annexationist ; look here, those demands have been signed by the Russian Revolution !' Yes, we are weak, ‘we cannot fight at present, but we have enough of revolutionary courage to tell you that we will never of our own free will sign the terms which you are writing with your sword across the bodies of the living peoples'.” We refused to give our signatures, and I believe, comrades, that we acted as we ought to have acted.

Comrades, I do not want to say that a further advance of the Germans against us is out of the question. Such a statement would be too risky, considering the power of the German Imperialist Party. But I think that by the position we have taken up on the question we have made any advance a very embarrassing affair for the German militarists. What would happen if they should nevertheless advance ? There is only one answer to this question. If it is still possible to raise the spirit in the most revolutionary and healthy elements in our exhausted country, reduced as it is to desperate straits, if it is still possible for Russia to rise for the defence of our Revolution and the territories of the Revolution, it is possible only as a result of the present situation, as a result of our coming out of the war and of our refusal to sign the peace treaty.

THE SECOND WAR AND THE SIGNING OF PEACE.

The German Government, during the first days after the breaking off of the negotiations, hesitated, uncertain as to which course to. choose. The politicians and diplomats thought apparently that the chief thing bad been accomplished, and that there was no need to run after our signatures. The military, however, were in all circumstances prepared to break through the framework outlined by the German Government in the Brest-Litovsk treaty. Professor Kriege, adviser to the German delegation, told one of our delegates that in the present conditions there could be no question of a new German offensive against Russia. Count Mirbach, then at the head of the German mission in Russia, left for Berlin assuring us that a satisfactory agreement on the exchange of prisoners had been reached. But all this did not prevent General Hoffman from announcing, on the fifth day after the breaking off of the negotiations, the end of the armistice, the seven days' notice being antedated by him from the day of the last sitting at Brest. It would be truly out of place to waste time here, in righteous indignation at this dishonourable act, for it is but in keeping with the general diplomatic and military morality of all the governing classes.

The new German offensive developed under conditions which were deadly to Russia. Instead of the agreed seven days' warning, we only had two days'. This spread a panic in the ranks of the army, already in a state of chronic dissolution. There could scarcely be any question of resistance. The soldiers would not believe that the Germans would advance, after we had declared the state of war at an end. The panic-stricken retreat paralysed even the will of those individual regiments which were ready to take up fighting positions. In the working-class quarters of Petrograd and Moscow the indignation at the treacherous and truly buccaneering German attack knew no bounds. The workers were ready, in those tragic days and nights, to enlist in the army in their tens of thousands. But the necessary organization was lagging far behind. Individual guerrilla detachments, full of enthusiasm, perceived their helplessness at the first serious encounter with the German regular troops, and this was, of course, followed by a further depression of spirits. The old army, long ago mortally wounded, was falling to pieces, and was only blocking up all ways and by-ways. The new army, on the other hand, was arising much too slowly amidst the general exhaustion and the terrible dislocation of industry and transport. The only real serious obstacle in the path of the German advance was the huge distances.

Austria-Hungary had her eyes chiefly on the Ukraine. Through its delegates the Rada had made a direct request to the Central Empires for military help against the Soviets, which by that time had obtained complete victory throughout Ukrainia. In this way the Ukrainian lower middle-class democracy, in its fight with the workers and the poorest peasantry, had voluntarily opened the gates to foreign invasion.

At the same time the Government of Svinhufvud was seeking the help of German bayonets against the Finnish proletariat. German militarism was assuming quite openly, in the face of the whole world, the role of executioner of the Russian workers' and peasants' revolution.

In the ranks of our party there arose a heated discussion as to whether we should, under such conditions, submit to the German ultimatum and sign a new treaty which – we were all quite convinced of that – would contain far more onerous conditions than those we had been offered at Brest-Litovsk. The representatives of one school of thought considered that at the present moment, when the Germans were effectively intervening in the internal struggles on the territory of the Russian Republic, it was unthinkable to make peace in one part of Russia and remain passive whilst in the north and south the German troops were establishing a regime of bourgeois dictatorship. Another school of thought, at the head of which stood Lenin, argued that every interval, every breathing space, however short, would be of the greatest value for the internal consolidation of Russia and for the restoration of her capacity for self-defence. After our absolute inability to defend ourselves at the present moment from the attacks of the enemy had been demonstrated so tragically before the whole country and the whole world, our conclusion of peace would be understood everywhere as an act forced on us by the cruel law of the correlation of forces. It would be mere Childishness to base our action on abstract revolutionary morals. The question at issue was not how to perish with honour, but how, in the end, we could live through to victory. The Russian revolution wants to live, must live, and must by all possible means refuse to be drawn into battle far beyond her strength she must win time in the expectation that the revolutionary movement in the West would come to her aid. German Imperialism was still at close and fierce grip with British and American militarism. Only for this reason was it possible to conclude peace between Germany and Russia. We must not let this opportunity slip by. The well-being of the Revolution was the supreme law I We must accept the peace which we dared not refuse we must gain some time for intensive work in the interior, including the reconstruction of our army.

At the Congress of the Communist Party, just as at the fourth Congress of the Soviets, those in favour of peace were in a majority. Many of those who in January had been opposed to signing the Brest peace treaty were now in favour of peace. “At that time,” said they, “our signature would have been understood by the British and French workers as a miserable capitulation without any attempt to avoid it ; even the base insinuations of the Anglo-French chauvinists about a secret agreement between the Soviet Government and the Germans might have met with some acceptance in certain sections of the Western European workers, had we then signed the peace treaty. But after our refusal to sign, after the new German offensive against us, after our attempt at resistance, after our military weakness has been demonstrated to the whole world with such awful clearness, no one will dare reproach us with having capitulated without a struggle.” The Brest-Litovsk treaty, the second, more onerous edition, was duly signed and ratified.

In the meantime, in the Ukraine and in Finland the executioners were going on with their grim work, threatening more and more the most vital centres of Great Russia. Thus, the question of the very existence of Russia as an independent country became indissolubly bound up with the question of a European revolution.

CONCLUSION

When our party was assuming the reins of Government, we knew beforehand “what difficulties we should undoubtedly meet on our way. Economically the country had been exhausted by the war to the last degree. The Revolution had destroyed the old administrative machinery without having had the opportunity of creating a new one m its place. Millions of workers had been forcibly torn away from the economic life of the country, thrown out of their class, and morally and mentally shattered by three years of war. A colossal war industry on an insufficiently developed economic foundation had sucked up the very life-blood of the nation, and its demobilization presented the greatest difficulties. The phenomena inseparable from economic and political anarchy had spread widely throughout the country. The Russian peasantry had been for centuries welded together by the barbarous discipline of the land and bent down from above by the iron discipline of Tsardom. The state of our economic development had undermined the one discipline and the Revolution destroyed the other. Psychologically, the Revolution meant an awakening of human individuality in the peasant masses. The anarchical form in which this awakening found expression was but the inevitable result of the previous repression. It will only be possible to arrive at the establishment of a new order of things, based on the control of production by the producers themselves, by a general internal deliverance from the anarchical forms of the Revolution.

On the other hand, the propertied classes, although forcibly removed from power, refuse to give up their positions without a fight. The Revolution has raised in an acute form the question of private property in land and the means of production, that is, the question. of the life and death of the exploiting classes. Politically this means a constant – sometlmes covert, sometimes overt – bitter civil war. In its turn, civil war necessarily brings in its train anarchist tendencies in the movement of the labouring masses.

In view of the dislocation of finance, industry, transport, and the food supply, a protracted civil war, therefore, is bound to cause gigantic difficulties in the way of the constructive work of organization. Nevertheless, the Soviet regime has every right to look forward to the future with confidence. Only an exact inventory of the resources of the country ; only a national universal plan of organization of production ; only a prudent and economical distribution of all products can save the country. And this is just Socialism. Either a descent to the state of a mere colony, or a Socialist transformation – such is the alternative which faces our country.

This war has undermined the foundations of the entire capitalist world, and in this lies our invincible strength. The Imperialist ring which is choking us will be broken by a proletarian revolution. We no more doubt this for one moment than we ever doubted the final downfall of Tsardorn during the long decades of our underground work.

To struggle, to close our ranks, to establish discipline of labour and a Socialist order, to increase the productivity of labour, and not to be balked by any obstacle – such is our watchword. History is working for us. A proletarian revolution in Europe and America will break out sooner or later, and it will free not only the Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and Finland, but the whole of suffering humanity.

Matière et Révolution

Le bolchevisme de Lénine n'est pas ce qu'en comprend… Lutte ouvrière

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Léon Trotsky Vingt ans de dégénérescence stalinienne (1938)

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Mai 1917 - Paix et réaction

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Le "trotskysme" en 1917

History of the Russian Revolution

Léon Trotsky
Vingt ans de dégénérescence stalinienne

(1938)