What did reformism, Stalinism, and Trotskyism propose in the face of the rise of fascism in Germany ?

What did reformism, Stalinism, and Trotskyism propose in the face of the rise of fascism in Germany ?

"The rise to power of the ’National Socialists’ would mean, above all, the extermination of the elite of the German proletariat, the destruction of its organizations, and the loss of its confidence in its own strength and its future. Since the contradictions and antagonisms in Germany have reached an extreme degree of gravity, the infernal work of Italian fascism will appear as a rather pale and almost humanitarian experience compared to the crimes of which German National Socialism will be capable. ’Retreat ?’ you say, prophets of yesterday of the ’third period.’ Leaders and institutions may retreat. Isolated individuals may hide. But the working class will know neither where to retreat nor where to hide in the face of fascist power. Indeed, if we admit the monstrous and the unbelievable as possible—that is, that the party actually turns away from the struggle and thus delivers the proletariat to its mortal enemy—this can only mean one thing : savage fighting will break out not before the fascists come to power, but "Afterwards, that is to say, under conditions a hundred times more favorable to fascism than today. The struggle of the proletariat, betrayed by its own leadership, caught off guard, disoriented and desperate, against the fascist regime would transform into a series of terrible, bloody, and irreparable convulsions. Ten proletarian uprisings, ten successive defeats, would weaken and exhaust the German working class less than its retreat today before fascism, while the question of who should be master in Germany is not yet resolved."

Leon Trotsky

excerpt from "The key to the world situation lies in Germany" (November 1931)

The turning point of the Communist International and the situation in Germany

September 26, 1930

1. The origins of the final turning point

In our time, tactical shifts, even very significant ones, are absolutely inevitable. They result from abrupt changes in the objective situation (instability of international relations ; sudden and irregular fluctuations in the economic climate ; brutal repercussions of economic fluctuations at the political level ; impulsive movements of the masses who feel they are in a hopeless situation, etc.). The careful study of changes in the objective situation is today a much more important and, at the same time, infinitely more difficult task than before the war, during the era of the "organic" development of capitalism. The party leadership now finds itself in the position of a driver navigating a winding mountain road. A poorly timed turn, excessive speed, exposes both the passengers and the vehicle to very serious, even fatal, dangers.

The leadership of the Communist International has given us, in recent years, examples of very abrupt shifts. The most recent one we have observed in recent months. What is the reason for the shifts in the Communist International since Lenin’s death ? Is it due to changes in the objective situation ? No. It can be stated with absolute certainty that, since 1923, the Communist International has not made any timely tactical shifts based on a correct analysis of the changes that have occurred in objective conditions. On the contrary, each shift is in fact the result of an unbearable worsening of the contradiction between the line of the Communist International and the objective situation. And we are witnessing this once again today.

The Ninth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, the Sixth Congress, and especially the Tenth Plenum, had all been geared towards a sudden and linear expansion of the revolution ("the third period"), an expansion that the objective situation at that time completely precluded, following the severe defeats in England and China, the weakening of communist parties worldwide, and above all, the conditions of commercial and industrial expansion experienced by a whole series of capitalist countries. The tactical shift of the Communist International from February 1928 onward was thus in total contradiction with the actual course of history. This contradiction gave rise to adventurist tendencies, the prolonged isolation of parties, their organizational weakening, and so on. The leadership of the Communist International only made another shift in February 1930, when these phenomena had already taken on a distinctly threatening character ; this shift was a retreat and a step to the right in relation to the tactics of the "third period." By an ironic twist of fate, with no mercy for conformity, this new tactical shift of the Communist International coincided with a new turning point in the objective situation. The unprecedentedly serious international crisis undoubtedly opened new prospects for the radicalization of the masses and social upheaval. It was precisely under these conditions that a leftward turn was both possible and necessary : ​​it was necessary to accelerate the revolutionary upsurge. This would have been entirely correct and necessary if, during the last three years, the leadership of the Communist International had taken full advantage of the period of economic recovery, coupled with the waning of the revolutionary movement, to strengthen the party’s position within mass organizations, and primarily within the trade unions. Under these conditions, the driver could and should have shifted from second to third gear in 1930, or at least prepared to do so in the near future. In fact, the opposite process occurred. To avoid falling into the abyss, the driver had to downshift from third, which he had shifted into too early, back to second. If he had followed a sound strategic line, he would have been forced to accelerate.

This is the blatant contradiction between tactical necessities and strategic perspectives, in which, as a logical consequence of the errors of their leadership, the communist parties of a whole series of countries find themselves today.

It is in Germany that this contradiction manifests itself in its clearest and most dangerous form. Indeed, the recent elections there revealed a completely original balance of power, which is the result not only of the two periods of stabilization in Germany since the war, but also of the three periods of errors of the Communist International.
2. The parliamentary victory of the Communist Party in light of revolutionary tasks

Today, the official press of the Communist International presents the election results in Germany as a resounding victory for communism ; this victory, they claim, puts the slogan "Soviet Germany" on the agenda. Optimistic bureaucrats refuse to consider the significance of the balance of power revealed by the election statistics. They analyze the increase in communist votes independently of revolutionary tasks and the obstacles arising from the objective situation.

The Communist Party obtained approximately 4,600,000 votes, compared to 3,300,000 in 1928. This gain of 1,300,000 votes is enormous from the perspective of "normal" parliamentary procedures, given the overall increase in the number of voters. However, the Communist Party’s gains seem quite insignificant compared to the meteoric rise of the Fascists, who jumped from 800,000 votes to 6,400,000. The fact that the Social Democrats, despite significant losses, retained their key figures and garnered more working-class votes than the Communist Party is equally important in assessing the election results.

However, if one seeks to identify the domestic and international conditions most likely to force the working class toward communism, no better example can be found than the current situation in Germany : the noose of the Young Plan, the economic crisis, the decadence of the leadership, the crisis of parliamentarism, and the frightening way in which the ruling social democracy is unmasking itself. Despite gaining 1,300,000 votes, the German Communist Party’s place in the country’s social life remains small and disproportionate to the concrete historical circumstances.

The weakness of communism’s position is inextricably linked to the politics and internal functioning of the Communist International ; it becomes even more glaringly apparent when we compare the current social role of the Communist Party with its concrete and urgent tasks in the present historical conditions.

It is true that the Communist Party itself did not expect such an increase. But this proves that, with its repeated mistakes and defeats, the leadership of the Communist Party has lost the habit of ambitious perspectives and goals. Yesterday, it underestimated its own capabilities ; today, it is once again underestimating the difficulties. One danger is thus multiplied by another.

The first quality of a truly revolutionary party is knowing how to face reality.
3. The hesitations of the upper bourgeoisie

At every turning point in the road of history, at every social crisis, it is necessary to re-examine the problem of the relationships existing between the three classes of present-day society : the big bourgeoisie with finance capital at its head, the petty bourgeoisie oscillating between the two main camps, and, finally, the proletariat.

The upper bourgeoisie, which constitutes only a tiny fraction of the nation, cannot maintain its power without support from the petty bourgeoisie in both towns and villages—that is, from the last remaining representatives of the old middle classes—and from the masses who now constitute the new middle classes. Currently, this support takes two main forms, politically antagonistic but historically complementary : social democracy and fascism. In the person of social democracy, the petty bourgeoisie, which is subservient to finance capital, draws millions of workers along with it.

Divided, the German upper bourgeoisie is currently hesitant. Internal disagreements concern only the choice of treatment for the current social crisis. Social-democratic solutions repel a segment of the upper bourgeoisie because their results are uncertain and they risk incurring excessive overhead costs (taxes, social legislation, wages). Fascist intervention appears to the other segment as too risky and unjustified by the situation. In other words, the financial bourgeoisie as a whole is unsure of its assessment of the situation because it has not yet found sufficient grounds to proclaim the advent of its "third period," in which social democracy must inevitably give way to fascism ; moreover, everyone knows that in the final reckoning, social democracy will be rewarded for its services with a general pogrom. The hesitations of the upper bourgeoisie—given the weakening of its main parties—between social democracy and fascism are the most obvious symptom of a pre-revolutionary situation. It is clear that these hesitations would cease immediately upon the emergence of a truly revolutionary situation.
4. The petty bourgeoisie and fascism

For the social crisis to lead to proletarian revolution, it is essential, among other conditions, that the petty-bourgeois classes decisively shift to the side of the proletariat. This allows the proletariat to take the lead of the nation and govern it.

The latest elections reveal a reverse surge, and therein lies their essential symptomatic value. Under the blows of the crisis, the petty bourgeoisie has shifted not to the side of the proletarian revolution, but to the side of the most extreme imperialist reaction, dragging significant sections of the proletariat along with it.

The gigantic growth of National Socialism reflects two essential facts : a profound social crisis, wrenching the petty-bourgeois masses from their equilibrium, and the absence of a revolutionary party that would, from this moment on, play a recognized leading role in the eyes of the masses. If the Communist Party is the party of revolutionary hope, fascism, as a mass movement, is the party of counter-revolutionary despair. When revolutionary hope seizes the entire mass of the proletariat, the latter inevitably draws significant and ever-widening sections of the petty bourgeoisie along with it on the path to revolution. Yet, in this respect, the elections present precisely the opposite picture : counter-revolutionary despair has seized the petty-bourgeois mass with such force that it has drawn significant sections of the proletariat along with it.

How can this be explained ? In the past, we have observed (Italy, Germany) a sudden strengthening of fascism, victorious or at least threatening, following an exhausted or failed revolutionary situation, at the end of a revolutionary crisis, during which the proletarian vanguard had revealed its inability to take the lead of the nation, to transform the fate of all classes, including that of the petty bourgeoisie. This is precisely what gave fascism its enormous strength in Italy. But today in Germany, it is not a question of the outcome of a revolutionary situation but of its approach. The leading party officials, optimistic by nature, conclude that fascism, having arrived "too late," is doomed to a swift and inevitable defeat (Die Rote Fahne). These people refuse to learn. Fascism arrives "too late," if we refer to past revolutionary crises. But it appears early enough—at the dawn—for the new revolutionary crisis.

The fact that he was able to occupy such a strong starting position on the eve of a revolutionary period, and not at its end, is not the weak point of fascism but the weak point of communism. The petty bourgeoisie, therefore, does not need further disillusionment regarding the Communist Party’s capacity to improve its lot ; it relies on past experience, it remembers the lessons of 1923, the capricious leaps of the Maslow-Thaelmann ultra-left course, the opportunistic impotence of the same Thaelmann, the empty rhetoric of the "third period," and so on. Finally, and this is the crux of the matter, its distrust of the proletarian revolution is fueled by the distrust that millions of social-democratic workers feel toward the Communist Party. The petty bourgeoisie, even though events have completely torn it from its conservative rut, can only turn to the side of social revolution if the latter has the sympathy of the majority of workers. This very important condition is precisely lacking in Germany, and this is no accident.

The programmatic declaration of the German Communist Party before the elections was entirely and solely devoted to fascism as the principal enemy. However, fascism emerged victorious from the elections, having garnered not only millions of semi-proletarian elements but also hundreds of thousands of industrial workers. This demonstrates that, despite the parliamentary victory of the Communist Party, the proletarian revolution suffered a serious overall defeat in these elections—a defeat that is obviously not decisive, but preliminary, and which should serve as a warning. It could become decisive, and inevitably will, if the Communist Party is unable to assess its partial parliamentary victory in light of this "preliminary" defeat of the revolution and to draw all the necessary conclusions.

Fascism has become a real danger in Germany ; it is the expression of the acute impasse of the bourgeois regime, of the conservative role of social democracy in the face of this regime, and of the accumulated weakness of the Communist Party, incapable of overthrowing this regime. Anyone who denies this is either blind or a braggart.

In 1923, Brandler, despite all our warnings, monstrously overestimated the strength of fascism. From this miscalculation of the balance of power arose a defensive policy, characterized by waiting, evasion, and cowardice. This is what doomed the revolution. Such events inevitably leave their mark on the conscience of all classes of the nation. The overestimation of fascism by the communist leadership created one of the causes of its subsequent strengthening. The opposite error—that is, the underestimation of fascism by the current leadership of the communist party—could lead the revolution to an even more serious defeat for many years to come.

The question of the pace of development, which obviously does not depend solely on us, gives this danger a particular urgency. The feverish episodes recorded by the political climate and revealed during the elections suggest that the pace of development of the national crisis could be very rapid. In other words, the course of events could, in the very near future, bring to the fore in Germany, at a new historical level, the old tragic contradiction between the maturity of the revolutionary situation on the one hand, and the weakness and strategic deficiencies of the revolutionary party on the other. This must be stated clearly, openly, and, above all, soon enough.
5. The Communist Party and the Working Class.

It would be a monstrous mistake to console oneself by thinking that the Bolshevik party, which in April 1917, after Lenin’s arrival, began preparing to seize power, had fewer than 80,000 members and drew in its wake, even in Petrograd, barely a third of the workers and an even smaller proportion of the soldiers. The situation in Russia was entirely different. It was only in March that the revolutionary parties emerged from clandestinity, after three years of interruption of the political life, however stifled, that existed before the war. During the war, the working class had been renewed by approximately 40%. The overwhelming mass of the proletariat did not know the Bolsheviks, had never even heard of them. The vote for the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries in March and June was simply the expression of its first hesitant steps after its awakening. In this vote, there was not a trace of disappointment with the Bolsheviks or of accumulated mistrust, which can only be the result of the party’s errors, concretely confirmed by the masses. On the contrary, each day of the revolutionary experience of 1917 detached the masses from the conciliators and pushed them toward the Bolsheviks. Hence the tumultuous, irresistible growth of the party and, above all, of its influence.

Fundamentally, the situation in Germany differs on this point and many others. The emergence of the German Communist Party on the political scene is not a recent phenomenon. In 1923, the majority of the working class supported it, whether openly or not. In 1924, during a period of decline, it garnered 3,600,000 votes, a higher percentage of the working class than it is today. This means that the workers who remained with the Social Democrats, as well as those who voted for the National Socialists this time, did so not out of mere ignorance, not because their awakening was only recent, not because they didn’t yet know what the Communist Party was, but because they didn’t believe in it based on their own experience of recent years.

It must not be forgotten that in February 1928, the Ninth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International signaled a strengthened, extraordinary, and implacable struggle against the "social-fascists." German social democracy was in power for almost the entire period, and each of its actions revealed its criminal and infamous role to the masses. A gigantic economic crisis crowned it all. It is difficult to imagine conditions more favorable to the weakening of social democracy. Yet, on the whole, it maintained its positions. How can this surprising fact be explained ? Simply by the fact that the leadership of the Communist Party, through its entire policy, aided social democracy by supporting it on its left wing.

This in no way means that the vote of five to six million workers for Social Democracy expresses their complete and unwavering confidence in it. Social Democratic workers should not be taken for blind. They are not so naive about their leaders, but they see no other way out in the current situation. We are speaking, of course, of ordinary workers, not of the labor aristocracy and bureaucracy. The policies of the Communist Party do not inspire their confidence, not because the Communist Party is a revolutionary party, but because they do not believe it can achieve a revolutionary victory and do not want to risk their lives in vain. By voting, with heavy hearts, for Social Democracy, these workers are not demonstrating their confidence in it ; on the contrary, they are expressing their distrust of the Communist Party. This is where the enormous difference lies between the situation of the German Communists and that of the Russian Bolsheviks in 1917.

But the difficulties are not limited to this problem. A deep-seated distrust of the leadership has accumulated within the party, and especially among the workers who support it or simply vote for it. This exacerbates what is called the "disproportion" between the party’s influence and its membership ; in Germany, such a disproportion undoubtedly exists, and it is particularly evident at the level of labor within the trade unions. The official explanation for this disproportion is so flawed that the party is unable to "strengthen" its influence at the organizational level. The masses are considered purely passive material, whose adherence or non-adherence to the party depends solely on the secretary’s ability to coerce each worker. The bureaucrat fails to understand that the workers have their own thoughts, their own experiences, their own will, and their own active or passive policies toward the party. By voting for the party, the worker votes for its flag, for the October Revolution, for his future revolution. But by refusing to join the Communist Party or to follow it in the trade union struggle, he expresses his distrust of the party’s day-to-day policies. This "disproportion" is ultimately one of the channels through which the masses’ distrust of the current leadership of the Communist International is expressed. And this distrust, created and reinforced by the errors, defeats, bluffs, and cynical deceptions of the masses from 1923 to 1930, represents one of the main obstacles on the road to the victory of the proletarian revolution.

Without self-confidence, the party will not win over the class. If it does not win over the proletariat, it will not wrest the petty-bourgeois masses from fascism. These two facts are inextricably linked.
6. Return to the "second period" or forward, once again, to the "third period" ?

If we adopt the official terminology of centrism, the problem must be formulated as follows. The leadership of the Communist International imposed the tactics of the "third period"—that is, the tactic of immediate revolutionary uprising—on the national sections at a time (1928) that was essentially characterized by features of the "second period" : the stabilization of the bourgeoisie and the ebb and decline of the revolution. The turning point that occurred in 1930 marked the rejection of the "third period" tactics and a return to the tactics of the "second period." While this turning point was making its way through the bureaucratic apparatus, very significant symptoms clearly demonstrated, at least in Germany, the effective return to the "third period." Does this not prove the necessity of a new turn toward the tactics of the "third period," which have just been abandoned ?

We use these terms to make the problem more accessible to those whose minds are clouded by the methodology and terminology of the centrist bureaucracy. But in no way do we endorse this terminology, which masks the combination of Stalinist bureaucracy with Bukharinist metaphysics. We reject the apocalyptic conception of the "third" period as the last : their number until the victory of the proletariat is a matter of the balance of power and changes in the situation ; all this can only be verified through action. But we reject the very essence of strategic schematism, with its numbered periods. There are no abstract, pre-established tactics, whether for the "second" or the "third" period. Naturally, victory and the conquest of power cannot be achieved without an armed uprising. But how does one achieve an uprising ?

The methods and pace of mass mobilization depend not only on the objective situation in general, but also, and above all, on the state of the proletariat at the beginning of the social crisis in the country, on the relations between the party and the class, between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie, etc. The state of the proletariat at the threshold of the "third period" depends in turn on the tactics applied by the party in the preceding period.

The normal and natural tactical shift, corresponding to the current turning point in the situation in Germany, should have been an acceleration of the pace, a progression of slogans and methods of struggle. But this tactical shift would only have been normal and natural if the pace and slogans of yesterday’s struggle had corresponded to the conditions of the preceding period. But this was not the case. The acute contradiction between ultra-left policy and the stabilization of the situation is one of the causes of this tactical shift. This is why, at the very moment when the new turn in the objective situation, along with the general unfavorable regrouping of political forces, has brought communism a significant gain in votes, the party finds itself strategically and tactically more disoriented, embarrassed, and bewildered than ever before.

To explain the contradiction into which the German Communist Party, like the majority of other sections of the Communist International, but much more profoundly, has fallen, let us use the simplest comparison. To jump over a barrier, one must first gather momentum by running. The higher the barrier, the more important it is to start running in time, neither too late nor too early, to reach the obstacle with the necessary force. However, since February 1928, and especially since June 1929, the German Communist Party has done nothing but gather momentum. It is no wonder that the party began to run out of steam and drag its feet. The Communist International finally gave an order : "Slow down !" But no sooner had the breathless party regained a more normal pace than a seemingly real, not imaginary, barrier appeared before it, one that threatened to demand a revolutionary leap. Would the distance alone be enough to gather momentum ? Should the turning point have been abandoned and replaced with a counter-turn ? - these are the tactical and strategic questions that the German party is facing in all their urgency.

For the party’s leading cadres to be able to find a correct answer to these questions, they must be able to assess the path forward, in conjunction with an analysis of the strategy of recent years and its consequences, as revealed in the elections. If, counterbalancing this, the bureaucracy were to succeed, through its cries of victory, in stifling the voice of political self-criticism, the proletariat would inevitably be drawn into a catastrophe more terrible than that of 1923.
7. Possible variants of further development

The revolutionary situation, which presents the proletariat with the immediate problem of seizing power, is composed of objective and subjective elements that are interconnected and largely mutually dependent. However, this interdependence is relative. The law of uneven development applies equally fully to the factors of the revolutionary situation. The insufficient development of any one of these factors can lead to the following alternative : either the revolutionary situation will not even reach explosion and will subside, or, having reached explosion, it will end in the defeat of the revolutionary class. What, in this respect, is the situation in Germany today ?

1. We are undoubtedly facing a profound national crisis (economy, international situation). The normal path of the bourgeois parliamentary regime offers no way out.

2. The political crisis of the ruling class and its system of government is absolutely undeniable. It is not a parliamentary crisis but a crisis of class domination by the bourgeoisie.

3. However, the revolutionary class is still deeply divided by internal contradictions. The strengthening of the revolutionary party at the expense of the reformist party is in its very early stages and is, for the moment, occurring at a pace that is far from commensurate with the depth of the crisis.

4. From the beginning of the crisis, the petty bourgeoisie has occupied a position which threatens the current system of capital domination, but which is at the same time mortally hostile to the proletarian revolution.

In other words, we are faced with the fundamental objective conditions for the proletarian revolution ; one of its political conditions exists (the state of the ruling class) ; the other political condition (the state of the proletariat) is only just beginning to evolve in the direction of revolution, but, due to the legacy of the past, cannot evolve rapidly ; finally, the third political condition (the state of the petty bourgeoisie) leans not toward the proletarian revolution but toward the bourgeois counter-revolution. This last condition will only evolve favorably if radical changes occur within the proletariat itself, that is, if social democracy is politically liquidated. We are thus confronted with a profoundly contradictory situation. Some of its components place the proletarian revolution on the agenda ; but others preclude any possibility of victory in the very near future, because they imply a profound prior modification of the balance of political forces.

Theoretically, one can imagine certain variations in the future development of the current situation in Germany. These variations depend as much on objective causes, including the policies of class enemies, as on the attitude of the Communist Party itself. Let us outline four possible developments.

1. The Communist Party, frightened by its own strategy (the third period), is proceeding cautiously, seeking to avoid any risky action ; it is letting a revolutionary situation slip away without a fight. This will be a repetition, in another form, of Brandler’s policy of 1921-1923. Brandlerians and semi-Brandlerians, both inside and outside the party, will push in this direction, which reflects the pressure from social democracy.

2. Under the influence of its electoral success, the party, on the contrary, made a brutal turn to the left, launching itself into a direct struggle for power and, having become the party of an active minority, suffered a catastrophic defeat. Fascism, the strident and foolish agitation of the apparatus, which in no way raises the consciousness of the masses but on the contrary obscures it, the despair and impatience of a part of the working class, and especially of unemployed youth, all these things push in this direction.

3. It is also possible that the leadership, without renouncing anything, will strive empirically to find a middle ground between the first two options and thus commit a new series of errors ; but it will take so long to overcome the mistrust of the proletarian and semi-proletarian masses that, during this same period, objective conditions will have time to evolve in a direction unfavorable to the revolution, giving way to a new period of stabilization. The German party is being pushed above all in this eclectic direction, which combines general subservience with adventurism in specific cases, by the Stalinist leadership in Moscow, which fears taking a clear position and is preparing an alibi in advance, that is, the possibility of shifting responsibility onto the "executors," to the right or the left depending on the results. This is a policy we know well, one that sacrifices the historical and international interests of the proletariat to the "prestige" interests of the bureaucratic leadership. The theoretical presuppositions of such an orientation are already given in Pravda of September 16.

4. Let us conclude with the most favorable, or rather the only favorable, scenario : thanks to the efforts of its best and most conscientious members, the German party is fully aware of all the contradictions of the current situation. Through a just, bold, and flexible policy, the party still has time, given the present circumstances, to unite the majority of the proletariat and to persuade the semi-proletarian masses and the most exploited strata of the petty bourgeoisie to switch sides. The proletarian vanguard, as leader of the nation of workers and the oppressed, will achieve victory. The task of the Bolshevik-Leninists (of the Left Opposition) is to help the party steer its policy in this direction.

It would be completely pointless to try to guess which of these scenarios is most likely to occur in the near future. Such questions are solved through struggle, not conjecture.

A relentless ideological struggle against the centrist leadership of the Communist International is an indispensable element of this fight. Moscow has already signaled a policy of bureaucratic prestige, which covers up past mistakes and prepares the ground for future ones, through its hypocritical cries about the new triumph of the line.

While unbelievably exaggerating the party’s victory, equally unbelievably minimizing the difficulties, and even interpreting the fascists’ success as a positive factor in the proletarian revolution, Pravda nevertheless expresses a small reservation : "The party’s successes must not go to its head." The perfidious policy of Stalinist leadership is once again true to form. The analysis of the situation is conducted in the spirit of the uncritical ultra-leftist, consciously pushing the party down the path of adventurism. At the same time, Stalin prepares an alibi with the ritual phrase about "the vertigo of success." It is precisely this short-sighted and unscrupulous policy that could doom the German revolution.
8. Where is the way out ?

Above, we have given an analysis, without any embellishment or indulgence, of the difficulties and dangers that fall entirely within the subjective political sphere ; they stem primarily from the errors and crimes of the epigones’ leadership and, today, manifestly jeopardize the new revolutionary situation that, in our opinion, is emerging. Officials will either ignore our analysis or replenish their stock of insults. But this is not about these incorrigible officials, but about the fate of the German proletariat. Within the party, including the apparatus, there are many people who are observing and reflecting, and whom the acute nature of the situation will force to reflect with redoubled intensity tomorrow. It is to them that we address our analysis and conclusions.

Every crisis situation contains significant elements of uncertainty. Mindsets, opinions, and forces—both hostile and allied—are formed within the very process of the crisis. It is impossible to predict them mathematically in advance. They must be assessed in the struggle, through struggle, and policy must be adjusted accordingly based on these real-life observations.

Can the strength of the conservative resistance of the social-democratic workers be estimated in advance ? No. In light of the events of recent years, this strength appears immense. But the crux of the matter is that the party’s misguided policy, which found its most complete expression in the absurd theory of social-fascism, is what has most fostered the cohesion of social democracy. To measure the true capacity for resistance of social democracy, another measuring instrument must be found, namely, that the communists adopt the correct tactics. If this condition is met—and it is no small condition—the extent to which social democracy is being eaten away from within will be revealed in a relatively short time.

What has been said above also applies to fascism, but in a different form. It developed under different conditions, thanks to the leaven of the Zinoviev-Stalinist strategy. What is its offensive strength ? How stable is it ? Has it reached its peak, as professional optimists tell us, or is it only in its infancy ? It is impossible to predict this mechanically. It can only be determined through action. It is precisely with regard to fascism, which is a razor in the hands of the class enemy, that a misguided policy of the Communist Party can, in a very short time, lead to a fatal result. On the other hand, a correct policy can—albeit in the much longer term—undermine the positions of fascism.

During crises within the regime, the revolutionary party is far stronger in extra-parliamentary mass struggles than within the framework of parliamentarism. However, this is contingent on one condition : that it correctly understands the situation and is capable of practically linking the real needs of the masses to the tasks of seizing power. Currently, everything boils down to this.

It would be a grave mistake to see only difficulties and dangers in the current German situation. No, the situation also offers enormous opportunities, provided it is thoroughly analyzed and directly utilized.

What is needed for that ?

1. A forced turn "to the right", while the situation is evolving "to the left", requires careful, conscientious and skillful examination of the subsequent evolution of the other components of the situation.

The abstract opposition between the methods of the second and third periods must be immediately rejected. The situation must be taken as it is, with all its contradictions and within the dynamic interplay of its development. It is necessary to adapt carefully to the real changes in this situation and to act upon it in a way that promotes its effective development, not out of complacency with the schemes of Molotov or Kuusinen.

Navigating the situation is the most difficult and crucial task. It cannot be accomplished through bureaucratic methods. Statistics, however important, are insufficient for this purpose. Daily, in-depth listening to the proletariat and workers in general is essential. It is necessary not only to put forward vital and compelling slogans, but also to be concerned with how they are adopted by the masses. Only a party with tens of thousands of local branches, gathering their testimonies, examining all the issues, and actively developing a collective position can achieve such a goal.

2. The internal workings of the party are inextricably linked to this problem. People appointed by Moscow, regardless of the party’s trust or distrust of them, cannot lead the masses in an assault on capitalist society. The more artificial the current party system is, the deeper the crisis will be at the crucial moment of decision. Of all the "turning points," the most urgent and necessary concerns the party’s internal system. It is a matter of life or death.

3. The change in the party’s regime is both a condition and a consequence of the change in orientation. One is unthinkable without the other. The party must break free from this hypocritical, conventional atmosphere, where real ideals are silenced and fictitious values ​​are glorified—in short, from the pernicious atmosphere of Stalinism, which is the result not of ideological and political influence, but of a gross material dependence of the apparatus and the command methods that derive from it.

To free the party from its bureaucratic prison, it is essential to comprehensively examine the "general line" of the German leadership, from 1923 onward, and even from the events of March 1921. The Left Opposition has offered, in a series of documents and theoretical works, its assessment of every stage of the disastrous official policy of the Communist International. This critique must become one of the party’s core principles. It will not succeed in evading it or sweeping it under the rug. The party will not rise to the challenge of its grand tasks without a free and open assessment of its present in light of its past.

4. If the Communist Party, despite extraordinarily favorable conditions, proved powerless to seriously shake the social-democratic edifice with the formula of "social-fascism," then real fascism now threatens this same edifice not with the purely verbal formulas of a fictitious radicalism, but with the chemical formulas of explosives. However true it may be that social democracy, through all its policies, has prepared the way for the flourishing of fascism, it remains no less true that fascism is a mortal threat, especially to social democracy itself, whose very splendor is inextricably linked to the forms and methods of the democratic, parliamentary, and pacifist state.

There is no doubt that the leaders of the Social Democratic Party and a thin layer of the labor aristocracy ultimately prefer a fascist victory to the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. But precisely, the imminence of this choice is at the root of the immense difficulties the Social Democratic leadership faces with its own workers. The policy of a united front of the workers against fascism stems from the entire situation. It offers the Communist Party enormous possibilities. But the condition for success lies in abandoning the practice and theory of "social fascism," whose harmfulness is becoming dangerous under the current circumstances.

The social crisis will inevitably cause deep cracks in the social-democratic edifice. The radicalization of the masses will also affect social-democratic workers long before they cease to be social democrats. We will inevitably have to conclude agreements against fascism with the various social-democratic organizations and factions, setting precise conditions for the leaders in the eyes of the masses. Only fearful opportunists, allies of Chiang Kai-shek and Wan Jingwei, can bind themselves in advance to these agreements through a formal obligation. We must abandon the empty pronouncements of officials against the united front and return to the unified policy as formulated by Lenin and always implemented by the Bolsheviks, particularly in 1917.

5. The problem of unemployment is one of the most important elements of the current political crisis. The struggle against capitalism and for the seven-hour workday remains on the agenda. But only the slogan of broad and systematic cooperation with the USSR can raise this struggle to the level of revolutionary tasks. In its programmatic declaration for the elections, the Central Committee of the German Communist Party states that, upon coming to power, the Communists will develop cooperation with the USSR. This is beyond doubt. But the historical perspective must not be opposed to the political tasks of the moment. It is today that workers, and first and foremost the unemployed, must be mobilized under the slogan of broad economic cooperation with the Soviet Republic. The Gosplan of the USSR must develop, with the participation of German Communists and specialists, a plan for economic cooperation that, starting with unemployment, expands into general cooperation encompassing the main branches of the economy. The problem is not promising economic reorganization after seizing power, but actually seizing power. The problem is not promising cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union, but winning the masses over to this cooperation today by closely linking it to the crisis and unemployment and developing it into a massive plan for the social reorganization of both countries.

6. The political crisis in Germany calls into question the regime established in Europe by the Treaty of Versailles. The Central Committee of the German Communist Party says that once in power, the German proletariat will liquidate the Versailles documents. And that’s all ? The abolition of the Treaty of Versailles would thus be the highest achievement of the proletarian revolution ! What will replace it ? This negative way of framing the problem brings the party closer to the National Socialists. United Soviet States of Europe—that is the only correct slogan offering a solution to the fragmentation of Europe, which threatens not only Germany but all of Europe with total economic and cultural decadence.

The slogan of proletarian unification of Europe is also a crucial weapon in the fight against the abject chauvinism of the fascists, against their crusade against France. The most dangerous and incorrect policy is that of passively adapting to the enemy, of pretending to be him. To the slogans of national despair and national madness, we must oppose the slogans that propose an international solution. But for this to happen, it is essential to cleanse the party of the poison of National Socialism, the core element of which is the theory of socialism in one country.

To condense everything said above into a simple formula, let us pose the question in the following way : should the tactics of the German Communist Party, in the immediate period, be placed under the sign of the offensive or the defensive ? To this we answer : the defensive.

If the confrontation were to take place today, as a consequence of the offensive by the Communist Party, the proletarian vanguard would be shattered against the bloc constituted by the State and fascism, the majority of the working class would remain in a fearful and perplexed neutrality, while the petty bourgeoisie, for the most part, would directly support fascism.

A defensive position implies a policy of rapprochement with the majority of the German working class and a united front with social-democratic and non-party workers against the fascist danger.

To deny this danger, to minimize it, to treat it lightly is the greatest crime that can be committed today against the proletarian revolution in Germany.

What will the Communist Party "defend" ? The Weimar Constitution ? No, we’ll leave that to Brandler. The Communist Party must call for the defense of the material and intellectual positions that the working class has already won in the German state. The fate of its political and trade union organizations, its newspapers and printing presses, its clubs and libraries, is at stake. The communist worker must say to the social-democratic worker : "The policies of our parties are irreconcilable ; but if the fascists come tonight to destroy your organization’s headquarters, I will come to your aid, arms in hand. Do you promise that if this same danger threatens my organization, you will rush to my aid ?" This is the essence of the politics of the present period. All agitation must be conducted in this spirit.

The more we develop this agitation with perseverance, with seriousness, with reflection, without the shouting and boasting of which the workers are so weary, the more relevant the defensive organizational measures that we will propose in each factory, in each working-class district, will be, the less danger there will be that the attack of the fascists will take us by surprise, the greater the assurance that this attack will unite and not divide the ranks of the workers.

Indeed, the fascists, due to their meteoric rise and the petty-bourgeois, impatient, and undisciplined nature of their army, will be inclined to launch an attack in the near future. Attempting to compete with them now in this arena would be not only a desperate measure but also deadly dangerous. On the contrary, the more the fascists appear to the social-democratic workers and the entire working masses as the attacking side, the greater our chances not only of crushing the fascist offensive but also of launching a victorious counter-offensive. The defense must be vigilant, active, and courageous. The general staff must keep a watchful eye on the entire battlefield and take into account all changes so as not to miss another reversal of fortune when the time comes to give the signal for the general assault.

There are strategists who always, under any circumstances, advocate a defensive stance. The Brandlerians, for example, are among them. To be surprised that they still speak of defense today would be utterly childish ; they always do. The Brandlerians are one of the mouthpieces of social democracy. We must, however, engage with the social-democratic workers on the defensive in order to then draw them into a decisive offensive. The Brandlerians are completely incapable of this. When the balance of power shifts radically in favor of proletarian revolution, the Brandlerians will once again appear as a dead weight and an obstacle to the revolution. This is why a defensive policy aimed at rapprochement with the social-democratic masses must in no way imply a softening of the contradictions with the Brandlerian leadership, behind which there are not, and never will be, the masses.

Within the framework of the regrouping of forces described above, and the tasks of the proletarian vanguard, the methods of physical repression applied by the Stalinist bureaucracy in Germany and other countries against the Bolshevik-Leninists take on a very particular significance. This constitutes a direct service rendered to the Social Democratic police and the shock troops of fascism. In total contradiction with the traditions of the proletarian revolutionary movement, these methods perfectly suit the mentality of the petty-bourgeois bureaucrats, who cling to their guaranteed salaries from above and fear losing them with the irruption of democracy within the party. The infamies of the Stalinists must be the subject of a broad and as concrete an explanation as possible, aimed at unmasking the role of the most unworthy officials within the party apparatus. The experience of the USSR and other countries proves that those who fight most frenetically against the left-wing opposition are despicable individuals who desperately need to conceal their faults and crimes from the leadership : squandering of public funds, abuse of power, or simply utter incompetence. It is quite clear that denouncing the brutal exploits of the Stalinist apparatus against the Bolshevik-Leninists will be all the more successful the more broadly we develop our general agitation based on the tasks outlined above.

If we have examined the problem of the tactical shift of the Communist International solely in light of the German situation, it is because the German crisis has once again placed the German Communist Party at the center of attention of the world proletarian vanguard, and because, in the light of this crisis, all problems appear with the greatest clarity. It would not be difficult to demonstrate that what is said here applies, to a greater or lesser extent, to other countries as well.

In France, all the forms taken by the class struggle since the war are infinitely less acute and decisive than in Germany. But the general trends of development are the same, not to mention, of course, the direct dependence that links the fate of France to that of Germany. The turning points of the Communist International are, in any case, universal in nature. The French Communist Party, proclaimed by Molotov as the leading candidate for power as early as 1928, has pursued a completely suicidal policy over the past two years. In particular, it failed to foresee the economic boom. A tactical shift was announced in France just as the economic recovery was giving way to a crisis. Thus, the same contradictions, the same difficulties, and the same tasks that we discussed in relation to Germany are also on the agenda in France.

IN WHAT WAYS IS THE CURRENT POLICY OF THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY WRONG ?

(Letter to a German communist worker, member of the German Communist Party)
December 8, 1931

Germany is living through one of its greatest historical moments ; the fate of the German people, the fate of Europe, and, to a large extent, the fate of all humanity for decades to come, depend on it. When you place a ball at the top of a pyramid, a slight push is enough to make it roll either to the right or to the left. This is the situation Germany is approaching hour by hour. Some forces want the ball to roll to the right and break the back of the working class. Others want to keep the ball at the top. This is utopian. The ball cannot remain on the apex of the pyramid. The communists would like the ball to roll to the left and break the back of capitalism. It is not enough to want something ; one must be able to do it. Let us try once again to calmly examine the situation : Is the policy currently being pursued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany right or wrong ?

What does Hitler want ?
Fascists are growing very rapidly. Communists are also growing, but much more slowly. This growth of both extremes proves that the ball cannot remain at the top of the pyramid. The rapid growth of fascists implies that the ball could roll to the right. This constitutes an immense danger.

Hitler tries to convince people that he is against a coup d’état. To strangle democracy once and for all, he claims to have come to power through the only democratic means. Can we really take him at his word ?

It is clear that if the fascists were certain of obtaining an absolute majority of seats in the next elections through peaceful means, they might prefer that path. In fact, it is closed to them. It would be foolish to think that the Nazis will continue to grow at the same rate as today for an extended period. Sooner or later, their social reservoir will run dry.

Fascism contains such terrible contradictions that the moment is near when the tide will cease to balance the tide. This moment may come long before the fascists have managed to gather more than half the votes. It will be impossible for them to stop because they will have nothing left to hope for. They will be forced to resort to a coup d’état.

But even without mentioning that, the democratic path is blocked for the fascists. The tremendous growth of political antagonisms in the country and, above all, the agitation of fascist thugs will inevitably lead to a situation where the closer the fascists get to the majority, the more volatile the atmosphere will become, and the more skirmishes and battles will multiply. From this perspective, civil war is absolutely unavoidable. The question of the fascists seizing power will be resolved not by a vote but by the civil war that the fascists are preparing and provoking.

Can we imagine for a single moment that Hitler and his advisors don’t understand and foresee this ? That would be to take them for fools. There is no greater crime in politics than counting on the stupidity of a powerful enemy. Since Hitler cannot possibly be unaware that the path to power leads through a very harsh civil war, his speeches about the democratic and peaceful way are therefore nothing but a cover, that is to say, a war stratagem. We must be all the more vigilant.

What lies behind Hitler’s war stratagem ?
His calculation is quite clear and obvious : he seeks to lull his adversary into complacency with the longer-term prospect of Nazi parliamentary expansion, so that at the opportune moment he can deliver a fatal blow to the lulled enemy. It is entirely possible that Hitler’s admiration for democratic parliamentarism is intended to help him forge a coalition in the near future in which fascists occupy the most important positions, which they will then use... for a coup d’état. Indeed, it is more than evident that a coalition of the center with the fascists would not be a step towards a "democratic" solution to the problem, but would serve as a springboard for a coup d’état under the most favorable conditions for fascism.

We must aim close.
Everything proves that the outcome, even independently of the will of the fascist high command, will occur within the next few months, if not weeks. This circumstance is of enormous importance for the formulation of a just policy. If we accept that the fascists will seize power in two or three months, it will be ten times more difficult to fight against them next year than this year. Revolutionary plans of all kinds, drawn up two, three, or five years in advance, are nothing but pathetic and shameful chatter if the working class allows the fascists to come to power in the next two, three, or five months. The time factor in military operations, as in politics during revolutionary crises, is of decisive importance. To illustrate this idea, let us take an example. Hugo Urbahns, who considers himself a "left-wing communist," declares that the German Communist Party has failed, that it is politically dead, and he proposes to build a new party. If Urbahns were right, it would mean that the victory of the fascists is assured, because it takes years to create a new party (moreover, it is absolutely not proven that Urbahns’ party will be better than Thaelmann’s : when Urbahns was in charge of the party, there were no fewer mistakes).

If fascism were to actually seize power, it would mean not only the physical liquidation of the Communist Party, but also its complete political bankruptcy. The millions of workers who make up the proletariat would never forgive the Communist International and its German section for a shameful defeat inflicted by hordes of human dust. Therefore, the rise of the fascists to power would, in all likelihood, necessitate the creation of a new revolutionary party and a new international. It would be a terrible historical catastrophe. Only true liquidators—those who, hiding behind empty rhetoric, are in fact preparing to capitulate cowardly before the battle even begins—consider all of this inevitable. We Bolshevik-Leninists, whom the Stalinists call "Trotskyists," have nothing in common with such people. We firmly believe that victory over the fascists is possible not after they come to power, not after five, ten or twenty years of their domination, but today, in the current situation, in the months or weeks to come.

Thaelmann believes that the victory of fascism is inevitable.
To win, a just policy is necessary. This implies, in particular, that a policy must be adapted to the present situation, to the current realignment of forces, and not calculated for a situation that will arise in one, two, or three years, when the question of power will have long since been resolved.

The entire problem stems from the fact that the policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany is based, partly consciously and partly unconsciously, on the recognition of the inevitable victory of fascism. Indeed, in its appeal for a "united red front," published on November 29, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany starts from the premise that it is impossible to defeat fascism without first defeating German social democracy.

Thaelmann repeats this idea ad nauseam in his article. Is this idea correct ? Historically, it is absolutely true. But this does not mean at all that we can resolve the issues on the agenda simply by repeating it. This idea, correct from the perspective of revolutionary strategy as a whole, becomes a lie, even a reactionary one, once translated into the language of tactics. Is it true that to eliminate unemployment and poverty, capitalism must first be destroyed ? It is. But only the most foolish person would conclude from this that we should not fight with all our might today against the measures that allow capitalism to increase the misery of the workers.

Can we hope that the Communist Party will overthrow social democracy and fascism in the coming months ? No sensible person who can read and do arithmetic would venture such a statement. Politically, the question is this : can we, today, in the coming months—that is, despite the presence of social democracy, unfortunately still very powerful, albeit weakened—mount successfully against the onslaught of fascism ? The Central Committee of the German Communist Party answers in the negative. In other words, Thälmann considers the victory of fascism inevitable.

Let’s return to the Russian experience !
To present my idea as clearly and concretely as possible, I will revisit the experience of the Kornilov uprising. On August 26, 1917 (old calendar), General Komilov launched a Cossack detachment and a savage division on Petrograd. In power was Kerensky, a servant of the bourgeoisie and three-quarters allied with Kornilov. Lenin was in hiding, accused of being in the service of the Hohenzolems ; at that time, I was imprisoned on the same charge in a cell at the Kresty. What was the attitude of the Bolsheviks then ? They also had the right to say : "To defeat Kornilov’s gang, we must defeat Kerensky’s gang." They said it more than once, because it was correct and necessary for future propaganda. But it was absolutely insufficient to resist Kornilov on August 26 and the days that followed, and to prevent him from slaughtering the proletariat of Petrograd. That is why the Bolsheviks were not content with simply issuing a general appeal to the workers and soldiers : Break with the conciliators and support the united red front of the Bolsheviks ! No, the Bolsheviks proposed a united front of struggle to the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, and created joint organizations for the struggle with them. Was this correct or incorrect ? Let Thaelmann answer me. To show even more clearly what the united front looked like, I will mention the following episode : released from prison thanks to bail paid by the trade union organizations, I went directly from my cell to a session of the People’s Defense Committee, where, with the Menshevik Dan and the Socialist Revolutionary Gots, who were Kerensky’s allies and who had kept me in prison, I examined and resolved the problems of the struggle against Kornilov. Was this correct or incorrect ? Let Remmele answer me.

Is Brüning a "lesser evil" ?
Social democracy supports Brüning, votes for him, and takes responsibility for his policies before the masses, based on the assertion that the Brüning government is a "lesser evil." This is the viewpoint the Rote Fahne (Red Flag) is trying to attribute to me, under the pretext that I protested against the stupid and shameful participation of the communists in Hitler’s referendum. But did the German Left Opposition, and I in particular, demand that the communists vote for Brüning and support him ? We Marxists consider Brüning and Hitler, as well as Braun, to be representatives of one and the same system. The question of which of them is a "lesser evil" is meaningless, because their system, against which we are fighting, needs all of its elements. But today, these elements are in conflict, and the party of the proletariat must absolutely use this conflict in the interest of the revolution.

There are seven notes in a scale. Asking which note is the "best"—C, D, or G—is meaningless. However, a musician must know when and which key to strike. Asking abstractly whether Brüning or Hitler is the lesser evil is equally meaningless. But one must know which of these keys to strike. Is that clear ? For those who don’t understand, let’s take another example. If one of my enemies poisons me daily with small doses of poison, and another wants to shoot me from behind, I would first wrest the revolver from my second enemy’s hands, which would give me the opportunity to finish off the first. But that doesn’t mean that poison is a "lesser evil" compared to the revolver.

Unfortunately, the leaders of the German Communist Party found themselves on the same footing as the Social Democrats, merely reversing the roles : the Social Democrats voted for Brüning, calling him the lesser evil ; the Communists, who absolutely refused to trust Brüning and Braun (and they were quite right), took to the streets to support Hitler’s referendum, that is, the fascists’ attempt to overthrow Brüning. In doing so, they acknowledged that Hitler was the lesser evil, since a victory in the referendum would bring Hitler to power, not the proletariat. Frankly, it’s a bit embarrassing to explain something so basic ! It’s bad, very bad, that musicians like Remmele, instead of distinguishing the notes, play the piano with their boots.

It is not a question of the workers who have left social democracy, but of those who remain.
Thousands upon thousands of Noskes, Welses, and Hilferdings will ultimately prefer fascism to communism. But to do so, they must definitively break with the workers—something they have not yet done. Social democracy, with all its internal antagonisms, is now entering into a sharp conflict with the fascists. Our task is to use this conflict, not to reconcile the two adversaries against us at the crucial moment.

Now, we must turn against fascism by forming a single front. And this front of direct struggle against fascism, common to the entire proletariat, must be used for a flank attack, but one that will be all the more effective against social democracy.

We must demonstrate in practice the utmost eagerness to conclude a united front against fascists with the social democrats wherever they are willing to join. When we tell social-democratic workers, "Abandon your leaders and join our united front outside of any party," we are merely adding another empty phrase to thousands of others. We must know how to detach workers from their leaders in action. And the action now is the struggle against fascism.

There is no doubt that there are, and will continue to be, social-democratic workers ready to fight against fascism shoulder to shoulder with communist workers, independently of and even against the will of social-democratic organizations. Obviously, the closest possible ties must be established with these vanguard workers. But for the moment, they are few in number. The German worker is educated in a spirit of organization and discipline. This has its strengths and its weaknesses. The overwhelming majority of social-democratic workers want to fight against the fascists, but, for the time being, only with their organization. It is impossible to skip this step. We must help social-democratic workers to test, in practice—in a new and exceptional situation—the worth of their organizations and their leaders when it comes to the life or death of the working class.

The social-democratic bloc against the fascists must be forced to unite
. Unfortunately, there are many terrified opportunists in the Central Committee of the Communist Party. They have heard that opportunism is a love for blocs.

That is why they are against blocs. They do not understand the difference that can exist between an arrangement at the parliamentary level and a combat agreement, even the most modest, concerning a strike or the protection of typesetters against fascist gangs.

Electoral agreements and parliamentary bargains concluded by the revolutionary party with the social democrats generally serve the social democrats. A practical agreement for mass actions, for militant aims, is always made to the benefit of the revolutionary party. The Anglo-Russian Committee was an unacceptable form of bloc between two leaderships, on a vague and misleading common political platform that did not compel any action. Maintaining this bloc during the general strike, when the General Council was acting as a strikebreaker, amounted to a policy of treason for the Stalinists.

No common platform with the Social Democrats or the leaders of the German trade unions, no joint publications, no flags, no joint posters ! March separately, strike together ! Agree only on how to strike, on whom to strike, and when ! We can agree on this point with the devil, his grandmother, and even with Noske and Grzesinski. On the sole condition that we don’t tie our own hands.

Finally, a practical set of measures must be developed quickly, not with the aim of "unmasking" social democracy (in front of the communists), but with the aim of effectively combating fascism. This program must address the protection of factories, the freedom of action of factory committees, the inviolability of workers’ organizations and institutions, the issue of arms depots that fascists could seize, the measures to be taken in case of danger, that is to say, the militant actions of social-democratic communist detachments, etc.

In the fight against fascism, factory committees play a crucial role. A particularly well-thought-out action plan is essential. Every factory must be transformed into an anti-fascist fortress, complete with its own commander and combat teams. Maps of the barracks and other fascist strongholds in every city and district must be obtained. The fascists are trying to encircle revolutionary centers. The encircler must be surrounded. Agreement on this matter with social-democratic and trade union organizations is not only permissible but imperative. To refuse it in the name of "principled" considerations (in reality, through bureaucratic stupidity or, worse still, cowardice) is tantamount to directly aiding fascism.

As early as November 1930, that is, a year ago, we proposed a practical program agreed upon with the Social Democratic workers. What has been done in this direction ? Almost nothing. The Central Committee of the Communist Party has been preoccupied with everything except what constituted its immediate task. How much precious time has been wasted ! In truth, there isn’t much left. The program of action must be purely practical, purely concrete, without any artificial "demands," without any ulterior motives, so that every average Social Democratic worker can say to themselves : what the Communists are proposing is absolutely essential for the struggle against fascism. On this basis, we must lead the Social Democratic workers by example and criticize their leaders who, inevitably, will oppose and hinder the movement. Only on this path is victory possible.

A Good Quote from Lenin
 : Today’s epigones—that is, Lenin’s very poor disciples—like to fill their gaps in knowledge at every turn with quotations that are often entirely inappropriate. For a Marxist, it is not the quotation but the correct method that allows the question to be resolved. But with the correct method, it is not difficult to find the appropriate quotation. When introducing the analogy with Kornilov’s uprising earlier, I thought to myself : surely we can find in Lenin a theoretical interpretation of our bloc with the conciliators in the struggle against Kornilov. And indeed, in the second part of Volume XIV of the Russian edition, I found the following lines in a letter from Lenin to the Central Committee, dated early September 1917 :

Even now, we must not support Kerensky’s government. That would be a betrayal of our principles. The question will be asked : shouldn’t we then fight against Kornilov ? Of course we should. But it’s not the same thing ; there’s a line between the two. And some Bolsheviks cross that line, giving in to the spirit of "conciliation" and allowing themselves to be swept along by the flow of events.
We are waging and will continue to wage war against Kornilov, but we are not supporting Kerensky ; on the contrary, we are exposing his weakness. There is a difference. A rather subtle difference, but absolutely essential, and one that must not be forgotten.
So, what does the change in our tactics after Kornilov’s revolt consist of ? It consists
in the fact that we are changing the form of our struggle against Kerensky. Without in the least lessening our hostility towards him, without retracting any of the words we have spoken against him, without abandoning our goal of overthrowing him, we say : we must take the moment into account ; we will not try to overthrow him immediately. We will now fight him in another way, specifically by highlighting Kerensky’s weakness and hesitations in the eyes of the people (who are fighting Kornilov).
We propose nothing else : total independence of the Communist organization and its press, complete freedom of Communist criticism, even with regard to social democracy and the trade unions. Only the most despicable opportunists could accept the alienation of the Communist Party’s freedom (for example, through joining the Kuomintang).

We are not part of it.

We must not back down from our critique of social democracy. We must not forget the past. We will settle all our historical accounts in due course, including our account with Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. Similarly, we Russian Bolsheviks have finally presented a comprehensive indictment to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries for the persecutions, slander, arrests, and murders of workers, soldiers, and peasants.

But we presented this note two months after having used the personal score-settling between Kerensky and Kornilov, between the "democrats" and the fascists, to more effectively repel the fascists. It was only thanks to this that we won.

If the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany adopts the position expressed in Lenin’s quotation, the entire attitude toward the social-democratic masses and the trade union organizations will change immediately : instead of articles and speeches that are convincing only to those already convinced, the agitators will find common ground with hundreds of thousands and millions of new workers. Differentiation within social democracy will accelerate. The fascists will soon realize that it is no longer a matter of deceiving Brüning, Braun, and Wels, but of engaging in open struggle with the entire working class. A profound differentiation within fascism will inevitably occur on this basis. Only this path makes victory possible.

But this victory must be desired. Now, among the communist civil servants, there are, alas, quite a few cowardly careerists and bureaucrats who cherish their cushy positions, their salaries, and even more so, their own skins. These individuals are very prone to parade ultra-leftist rhetoric, which masks a pitiful and contemptible fatalism. "One cannot fight fascism without having defeated social democracy !" says the fierce revolutionary, and... he prepares his passport for exile.

Communist workers, you number in the hundreds of thousands, in the millions, and you have nowhere to go ; there won’t be enough passports for you. If fascism comes to power, it will roll over your heads and spines like a terrifying tank. Salvation lies only in a merciless struggle. Only joining forces with the social-democratic workers in the struggle can bring victory. Hurry, communist workers, for your time is running out !

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January 1932

Leon Trotsky

The German Revolution and the Stalinist Bureaucracy

Vital problems of the German proletariat

The shift within the Communist International, linked to the changing situation, presents the Left Communist Opposition with new and extremely important tasks. Its forces are diminished. But each current is developing in parallel with its own tasks. Understanding them clearly is one of the most important guarantees of victory.

Preface

Because of its extreme backwardness, Russian capitalism has proven to be the weakest link in the imperialist chain. German capitalism appears in the current crisis as the weakest link for the opposite reason : it is the most advanced capitalism in a Europe that finds itself in a dead-end situation. The more the dynamic character of the productive forces in Germany asserts itself, the more they are stifled in the European state system, akin to the cages of a pathetic provincial menagerie. Every turn in the situation confronts German capitalism with the very tasks it had tried to solve through war. Through the Hohenzollern government, the German bourgeoisie prepared to "organize Europe." Through the Brüning-Curtius government, it attempted to achieve... a customs union with Austria. What a terrifying reduction of tasks, possibilities, and prospects ! But this union, too, had to be abandoned. The European system has feet of clay. If a few million Austrians unite with Germany, France’s great saving hegemony could collapse.

Europe, and especially Germany, cannot progress along the capitalist path. If the current crisis were temporarily overcome through the automatic workings of capitalist forces—at the expense of the workers—this would imply the imminent resurgence of all contradictions in an even more concentrated form.

Europe’s weight in the global economy can only diminish. American policies—the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan, the Hoover Moratorium—are firmly entrenched in the European front. Europe is being subjected to American control.

The decay of capitalism entails social and cultural decay. The path of systematic differentiation of nations, of the growth of the proletariat at the cost of a shrinking middle class, is blocked. A further slowing of the social crisis can only mean the impoverishment of the petty bourgeoisie and the degeneration of ever-larger sections of the proletariat into lumpenproletariat. This danger, the most serious of all, is choking the German vanguard.

The social-democratic bureaucracy is the most rotten part of decaying capitalist Europe. It began its historical journey under the banner of Marx and Engels. Its objective was the overthrow of bourgeois domination. The powerful rise of capitalism absorbed it and dragged it along in its wake. In the name of reform, it renounced revolution, first in deeds and then in words. Kautsky, of course, continued to defend revolutionary rhetoric for a long time, adapting it to the needs of reformism. Bernstein, on the contrary, demanded that revolution be renounced : capitalism is entering a period of peaceful prosperity, without crisis or war. An exemplary prediction. It may seem that there is an irreconcilable contradiction between Kautsky and Bernstein. In fact, they complemented each other symmetrically, like the left and right boots of reformism.

War broke out. Social democracy supported the war in the name of future prosperity. Instead of prosperity, there was decline. Today, the question is no longer whether the necessity of revolution stems from the bankruptcy of capitalism, nor whether workers can be reconciled with capitalism through reforms. The new policy of social democracy is to save bourgeois society by abandoning reforms.

But the decline of social democracy did not end there. The current crisis of dying capitalism has forced social democracy to renounce the fruits of a long economic and political struggle and to reduce German workers to the standard of living of their fathers, grandfathers, and even great-grandfathers. There is no historical picture more tragic and at the same time more repulsive than the pernicious decay of reformism amidst the ruins of all its conquests and all its hopes. The theater is searching for modernism. Let it therefore stage Hauptmann’s The Weavers more often, the most relevant of all plays. But let the theater director not forget to reserve the front rows for the leaders of social democracy.

Moreover, they have no use for spectacles : they have reached the absolute limit of their capacity to adapt. There is a threshold below which the German working class cannot accept descending for long. However, the bourgeois regime, fighting for its existence, refuses to acknowledge this threshold. Brüning’s emergency decrees are merely a first step, a test of the waters. The Brüning regime maintains itself thanks to the cowardly and treacherous support of the Social Democratic bureaucracy, which itself relies on the lukewarm and sullen confidence of a segment of the proletariat. The system of bureaucratic decrees is unstable, uncertain, and unsustainable. Capital needs a different, more decisive policy. The support of the Social Democrats, who cannot forget their own workers, is not only insufficient for it to achieve its goals, but is already beginning to hinder it. The era of half-measures is over. To try to find a way out, the bourgeoisie must definitively free itself from the pressure of workers’ organizations ; it must sweep them away, break them, disperse them.

Here begins the historical mission of fascism. It puts back in the saddle classes that are immediately above the proletariat and fear being thrown into its ranks ; it organizes them, militarizes them with the means of finance capital, under the cover of the official State, and sends them to crush proletarian organizations, from the most revolutionary to the most moderate.

Fascism is not merely a system of repression, violence, and police terror. Fascism is a specific type of state founded on the extirpation of all elements of proletarian democracy within bourgeois society. The task of fascism is not only to crush the communist vanguard, but also to maintain the entire class in a state of forced atomization. For this, it is not enough to physically exterminate the most revolutionary stratum of the workers. It is necessary to crush all free and independent organizations, destroy all the proletariat’s bases of support, and annihilate the results of three-quarters of a century of work by social democracy and the trade unions. For it is on this work that, in the final analysis, the Communist Party is founded.

Social democracy laid the groundwork for the victory of fascism. But in doing so, it also laid the groundwork for its own political demise. It is entirely fair to hold social democracy responsible for Brüning’s exceptional legislation and the threat of fascist barbarity. But it is absurd to equate social democracy with fascism.

Through its policies during the Revolution of 1848, the liberal bourgeoisie paved the way for the triumph of the counter-revolution, which subsequently rendered liberalism powerless. Marx and Engels denounced the German liberal bourgeoisie just as vehemently as Lassalle, and in greater depth. But when the Lassalleans lumped the feudal counter-revolution and the liberal bourgeoisie together in the same reactionary category, Marx and Engels rightly condemned this misguided ultra-leftism. The Lassalleans’ flawed position, on occasion, made them complicit with the monarchy, despite the overall progressive nature of their work, which was infinitely more significant than that of the liberals.

The theory of "social-fascism" reproduces the fundamental error of the Lassalleans on new historical grounds. By attaching the same fascist label to both the National Socialists and the Social Democrats, the Stalinist bureaucracy is drawn into actions such as supporting Hitler’s referendum : this is no better than the Lassalleans’ alliances with Bismarck.

In their struggle against social democracy, German communists must at the present stage rely on two distinct positions :
a) the political responsibility of social democracy with regard to the power of fascism,
b) the absolute incompatibility that exists between fascism and the workers’ organizations on which social democracy is based.

The contradictions of German capitalism have reached such a level of tension that an explosion is inevitable. The adaptability of social democracy has reached the point of near self-destruction. The errors of the Stalinist bureaucracy have reached the brink of catastrophe. These are the three terms of the equation that characterizes the situation in Germany. Everything hangs by a thread.

When one follows the German situation in newspapers that arrive almost a week late, when a manuscript takes another week to travel the distance between Constantinople and Berlin, and when it takes weeks for a pamphlet to reach its reader, one involuntarily wonders : won’t it be too late ? And each time the answer is : no, the armies engaged in this struggle are too vast for us to fear a simultaneous and decisive victory. The forces of the German proletariat are not exhausted. They haven’t even begun their march yet. The logic of events will speak with increasing force each day. This justifies the author’s attempt to make his voice heard, even with a delay of several weeks—that is, of an entire historical period.

The Stalinist bureaucracy decided it would carry out its work more easily if it imprisoned the author of these lines in Prinkipo. It persuaded the Social Democrat Hermann Müller to refuse a visa to... a "Menshevik" : the united front was thus achieved without hesitation or procrastination. Today, the Stalinists declare in the official Soviet newspapers that I am "defending" Brüning’s government in agreement with the Social Democrats, who are scrambling to secure my entry into Germany. Rather than be outraged by this baseness, it’s better to laugh at this stupidity. But let’s not laugh for too long, for we have little time.

There is no doubt that the unfolding situation will prove our assertions correct. But how will history provide this proof : through the collapse of the Stalinist faction or through the victory of Marxist policy ? That is the crux of the matter. It concerns the fate of the German people, and not just them.

The questions examined in this pamphlet are not new. For nine years now, the leadership of the Communist International has been engaged in revising values ​​and striving to disorganize the international vanguard of the proletariat through tactical convulsions, the sum of which is what is called the "General Line." The Russian Left Opposition (the Bolshevik-Leninists) was formed on the basis not only of Russian problems but also of international ones. And the problems of Germany’s revolutionary development were not the least of their concerns. Serious disagreements in this area arose as early as 1923. The author of these pages has spoken on the issues debated on several occasions. A significant portion of his critical works has even been published in German. This pamphlet is in keeping with the theoretical and political work of the Left Opposition. Much of what is only mentioned here in passing was the subject of detailed study in its time. I must refer the reader in particular to my books : "The International Revolution and the Communist International," "The Permanent Revolution," etc. Now that the disagreements appear to everyone as a major historical problem, their origins can be better and more deeply appreciated. For a serious revolutionary, for a genuine Marxist, this is absolutely essential. Eclectics live on episodic thoughts, on improvisations that arise under the pressure of events. Marxist cadres, capable of leading the proletarian revolution, educate themselves through a thorough, continuous, and sustained study of the tasks and the divergences.

Prinkipo, January 27, 1932.

1. Social democracy

The "iron front" was originally the bloc formed by the powerful social-democratic trade unions, strong in numbers, and the impotent groups of bourgeois "republicans," who had lost all support among the people and all confidence. If corpses are useless in the struggle, they are good enough to prevent the living from fighting. The social-democratic leaders use their bourgeois allies to restrain the workers’ organizations. The struggle, the struggle... that’s all anyone talks about. But what if we can ultimately do without fighting ? Will the fascists ever truly move from words to action ? As for the social democrats, they never have, and yet they are no worse than the others.

In the face of real danger, Social Democracy places its hopes not in the "Iron Front" but in the Prussian police. A miscalculation ! The fact that a significant portion of the police were chosen from among Social Democratic workers is entirely meaningless. Here again, existence shapes conscience. The worker, having become a policeman in the service of the capitalist state, is a bourgeois policeman, not a worker. In recent years, these policemen have had to confront revolutionary workers far more often than National Socialist students. Such an environment leaves its mark. And the essential point is that every policeman knows that governments change, but the police remain.

An article in the New Year’s issue of the social-democratic newspaper Das freie Wort (what a pathetic paper !) explains the profound meaning of the policy of "tolerance." Faced with the police and the Reichswehr, Hitler, it seems, will never be able to come to power. Indeed, the Reichswehr, according to the constitution, is directly subordinate to the President of the Republic. Consequently, fascism is not dangerous as long as there is a president at the head of state who is faithful to the constitution. The Brüning government must be supported until the presidential elections, in order to elect, by allying with the parliamentary bourgeoisie, a constitutional president, and thus block Hitler’s path to power for seven years. We reproduce the content of article [1] exactly. A mass party, which draws millions of people into its wake (towards socialism !), believes that the question of which class will be in power in today’s thoroughly shaken Germany depends not on the militancy of the German proletariat, not on the assault columns of fascism, nor even on the composition of the Reichswehr, but on whether or not the pure spirit of the Weimar Constitution (with the necessary amount of camphor and mothballs) will be installed in the presidential palace. And what will happen if, in a certain situation, the spirit of Weimar admits, in agreement with Bettmann-Hollweg, that "necessity knows no law" ? And what will happen if the fragile shell of the Weimar spirit, despite the camphor and mothballs, tears open at the least opportune moment ? And what if... but there is no end to such questions.

The reformist politicians, these skillful wheeler-dealers, these old hands of intrigue and careerism, these men experienced in parliamentary and ministerial schemes, turn out - one cannot find a more tender expression - to be perfect fools, as soon as the course of events throws them out of their usual sphere and confronts them with important facts.

To place one’s hope in a president is also to place one’s hope in the "State." Faced with the coming confrontation between the proletariat and the fascist petty bourgeoisie—these two camps constitute the overwhelming majority of the German nation—the Marxists of Vorwärts are calling on the night watchman for help. "State, intervene !" (Staat, greif zu !). ​​This means :

"Brüning, do not force us to defend ourselves with the forces of the workers’ organizations, for that will set the whole proletariat in motion, and then the movement will surpass the bald heads of the government : originally an anti-fascist movement, it will end up as a communist movement."

To this, Brüning, if he didn’t prefer to remain silent, could reply : "I couldn’t overcome fascism with the police forces, even if I wanted to ; but I wouldn’t want to, even if I could. Turning the Reichswehr against the fascists would mean cutting the Reichswehr in two, if not turning it entirely against me ; and what’s even more important : turning the bureaucratic apparatus against the fascists would mean giving the workers free rein, restoring to them total freedom of action : the consequences would be the same as those you Social Democrats fear, and which I, for that reason, fear all the more." The appeals of Social Democracy will produce on the state apparatus, on the judges, on the Reichswehr, on the police, the opposite effect to that intended. The most "loyal," "neutral," and least National Socialist-affiliated civil servant reasons as follows : "The Social Democrats have millions of people behind them ; they have immense resources at their disposal : the press, parliament, municipalities ; their very survival is at stake ; they are assured of the support of the Communists in the fight against the Fascists ; and yet, these all-powerful gentlemen are turning to me, a mere civil servant, to save them from the attack of a party with millions of members, whose leaders could be my superiors tomorrow : the Social Democrats’ situation must be dire and without any prospects... It’s time for me, a civil servant, to think about my own survival." The result is that the "loyal," "neutral" civil servant who hesitated until yesterday will inevitably take precautionary measures, that is, will align himself with the National Socialists to secure his future. This is how reformists who outlive themselves end up working for fascists because of their bureaucratic line.

A parasite of the bourgeoisie, social democracy is condemned to a miserable ideological parasitism. Sometimes it borrows the ideas of bourgeois economists, sometimes it tries to use scraps of Marxism. Having included in my pamphlet arguments against the Communist Party’s participation in Hitler’s referendum, Hilferding concludes : "In truth, there is nothing to add to these lines to explain the social democracy’s tactics regarding the Brüning government." And Remmele and Thalheimer declare : "Look, Hilferding is relying on Trotsky." And a fascist rag adds : in this affair, Trotsky is being paid with a promise of a visa. A Stalinist journalist enters the scene and telegraphs the fascist newspaper’s declaration to Moscow. The editorial staff of Izvestia, where the unfortunate Radek happens to be, prints the telegram. This chain of events deserves to be noted before moving on.

Let us return to more serious matters. Hitler can afford the luxury of a struggle against Brüning only because the entire bourgeois regime rests on the backs of half the working class, the half led by Hilferding and his associates. If the Social Democrats had not pursued a policy of class betrayal, Hitler, quite apart from never having acquired the power he possesses today, would have clung to Brüning’s government as to a lifeline. If the Communists had overthrown Brüning with the Social Democrats, it would have been an event of enormous political significance. Its consequences, in any case, would have far exceeded the Social Democratic leadership. Hilferding attempts to justify his betrayal in our critique, where we demanded that the Communists acknowledge Hilferding’s betrayal as a fact.

Although Hilferding has "nothing to add" to Trotsky’s words, he nevertheless adds something : the balance of power, he says, is such that even if joint actions by communist and social-democratic workers were to take place, it would be impossible "even by intensifying the struggle, to overthrow the adversary and seize power." The crux of the matter lies in this remark, made in passing and without supporting evidence. According to Hilferding, in contemporary Germany, where the proletariat constitutes the majority of the population and the decisive productive force of society, the joint struggle of social democracy and the Communist Party could not possibly deliver power to the proletariat ! But then, at what point is power likely to pass into the hands of the proletariat ? Before the war, there was the prospect of the automatic growth of capitalism, the growth of the proletariat, and the parallel growth of social democracy. The war brought this process to an end, and now no force in the world is capable of restoring it. The decay of capitalism means that the question of power must be resolved on the basis of the current productive forces. By prolonging the agony of the capitalist system, social democracy leads only to further economic decline, the disintegration of the proletariat, and social gangrene. It has no other prospects ; and tomorrow will be worse than today, and the day after, worse than tomorrow. But already the leaders of social democracy no longer dare to face the future. They possess all the flaws of a ruling class doomed to disappear : indifference, paralysis of will, a tendency to turn away from events and to hope for miracles. If you think about it, Tarnov’s economic research serves the same purpose as the comforting pronouncements of some Rasputin...

The Social Democrats, allied with the Communists, could not seize power. There he is, the educated petty bourgeois (gebildet), infinitely cowardly and arrogant, filled from head to toe with mistrust and contempt for the masses. The Social Democrats and the Communist Party together have about 40% of the vote, not counting the fact that the betrayals of the Social Democrats and the errors of the Communist Party are driving millions of workers into the camp of indifference or even into that of National Socialism. The mere fact that these two parties were to undertake joint actions would considerably increase the political strength of the proletariat, while offering new prospects to the masses. But let’s start with the 40%. Brüning or Hitler might have more. But only these three groups—the proletariat, the center party, or the fascists—can govern Germany. The educated petit bourgeois is imbued to the very core of this truth : the representative of capital needs only 20% of the vote to govern, because the bourgeoisie owns the banks, the trusts, the cartels, the railways. It is true that our educated petit bourgeois was preparing, twelve years ago, to "socialize" all of this. Anything can happen ! A program of socialization—yes, expropriation of the expropriators—no, because that is already Bolshevism.

We analyzed the balance of power above by focusing on the parliamentary level. But this is a distorting mirror. The parliamentary representation of an oppressed class is considerably less than its actual strength, and conversely, the representation of the bourgeoisie, even the day before its fall, will always be a charade of its imagined strength. Only revolutionary struggle lays bare the true balance of power by sweeping away everything that might conceal it. In the direct and immediate struggle for power, the proletariat develops a force infinitely greater than its expression in parliament, provided, however, that internal sabotage, Austro-Marxism, or other forms of betrayal do not paralyze it. Let us recall once again the incomparable lesson of history : when the Bolsheviks had seized, and firmly seized, power, they held only a third of the votes in the Constituent Assembly, which, with the Left SRs, amounted to less than 40%. And despite the appalling economic destruction, the war, the betrayal of European social democracy and especially that of German social democracy, despite the postwar weariness, despite the development of a Thermidorian mindset, the first workers’ state has held for fourteen years. What then can be said of Germany ? When the social-democratic worker rises up with the communist worker to seize power, the task will be nine-tenth accomplished.

And yet, Hilferding argues, if the Social Democrats had voted against the Brüning government and thus overthrown it, the result would have been the rise of the fascists to power. Certainly, at the parliamentary level, the situation appears this way ; but the parliamentary level is not our concern here. The Social Democrats could only refuse to support Brüning if they committed themselves to the path of revolutionary struggle. It was either support for Brüning or the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat. There is no third option. A Social Democratic vote against Brüning would have immediately altered the balance of power, not on the parliamentary chessboard, where the pieces would suddenly have been under the table, but in the arena of the revolutionary class struggle. With such a turning point, the forces of the working class would not have doubled but multiplied tenfold, because the moral factor is not the least important in the class struggle, especially during major historical turning points. A high-voltage moral current would have swept through all levels of the people. The proletariat would have confidently declared itself the only one capable of giving a new, higher direction to the life of this great nation. The disintegration and demoralization of Hitler’s army would have begun even before the decisive battles. Certainly, the clashes could not have been avoided ; but the firm will to prevail and a bold offensive would have made victory infinitely easier than even the most optimistic revolutionary imagines today.

For this to happen, only one thing is needed : a shift in social democracy onto the path of revolution. After the experience of the years 1914-1932, it would be a ridiculous illusion to expect a voluntary shift on the part of the leadership. As for the majority of social-democratic workers, it’s a different matter : they can and will make the shift ; they simply need help. But it will be a shift not only against the bourgeois state, but also against the ruling circles of their own party.

And here, our Austro-Marxist, who "has nothing to add" to our words, will once again try to counter us with quotes from our own work : have we not written, in fact, that the policy of the Stalinist bureaucracy presented itself as a series of errors, have we not condemned the participation of the Communist Party in Hitler’s referendum ?

We have written about it and we have condemned it. But we are fighting against the leadership of the Communist International precisely because it is incapable of shattering social democracy, of wresting the masses from its influence, and of freeing the engine of history from its rusty brake. Through its missteps, its errors, and its bureaucratic ultimacity, the Stalinist bureaucracy allows social democracy to maintain itself and to land on its feet every time.

The Communist Party is a proletarian, anti-bourgeois party, even if it is misled. Social democracy, despite its working-class composition, is an entirely bourgeois party, very skillfully led in "normal" conditions from the perspective of the bourgeoisie’s objectives ; but this party is worthless in conditions of social crisis. The social-democratic leaders are forced, even against their will, to admit the bourgeois character of their party. Regarding the crisis and unemployment, Tarnov repeats the worn-out phrases about the "shame of capitalist civilization," in the same way that a Protestant pastor speaks of the sin of wealth ; Tarnov speaks of socialism as a priest speaks of reward in the afterlife. But he expresses himself quite differently on concrete issues : "If on September 14th this specter (of unemployment) had not loomed over the ballot boxes, that day would have had a completely different character in German history" (report to the Leipzig Congress). Social democracy lost voters and seats because capitalism revealed its true face in the crisis. The crisis did not strengthen the "socialist" party, but on the contrary, it weakened it, just as it reduced the circulation of goods, the money in bank coffers, the arrogance of Hoover and Ford, the income of the Prince of Monaco, etc. The most optimistic assessments of the economic situation are now to be found not in bourgeois newspapers but in social-democratic newspapers. Could there be a more irrefutable demonstration of the bourgeois character of this party ? If the sickness of capitalism implies the sickness of social democracy, then the imminent death of capitalism can only mean the imminent death of social democracy. A party that relies on the workers but serves the bourgeoisie cannot, in a period of extreme intensification of the class struggle, fail to feel the breath of the grave.

Notes

[1] The article is modestly signed with the initials EH. These must be reproduced for our descendants. Generations of workers from different countries have not labored in vain. Great thinkers and revolutionary fighters have not passed through this world without leaving their mark. EH exists, he watches over us, and he shows the German proletariat the way forward.
Malicious tongues claim that EH is related to E. Heilmann, who disgraced himself during the war with particularly despicable chauvinism. It’s hard to believe : such a brilliant mind !

2. Democracy and Fascism

The 11th Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International acknowledged the need to put an end to the erroneous views based on the "liberal construction of the contradiction between fascism and bourgeois democracy, between the parliamentary forms of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and its openly fascist forms..." The core of this Stalinist philosophy is very simple : starting from the Marxist denial of an absolute contradiction, it derives from this a denial of contradiction in general, even relative contradiction. This is the typical error of vulgar leftism. For if there is no contradiction between democracy and fascism, even at the level of the forms that bourgeois domination takes, these two regimes must simply coincide. Hence the conclusion : social democracy = fascism. But why then is social democracy called social fascism ? What exactly the term "social" means in this relationship, we have so far received no explanation [1].

However, the decisions of the plenums of the Executive Committee of the Communist International do not alter the fundamental nature of things. A contradiction exists between fascism and democracy. It is not "absolute," or, to use Marxist terminology, it does not express the domination of two irreconcilable classes. Rather, it designates two different systems of domination of one and the same class. These two systems—parliamentary democracy and fascist—rely on different combinations of oppressed and exploited classes and inevitably come into acute conflict with one another.

Social democracy, today the main representative of the bourgeois parliamentary system, relies on the workers. Fascism relies on the petty bourgeoisie. Social democracy cannot have any influence without a mass workers’ organization. Fascism can only establish its power once workers’ organizations have been destroyed. Parliament is the main arena of social democracy. The fascist system is founded on the destruction of parliamentarism. For the monopoly bourgeoisie, parliamentary and fascist systems are merely different instruments of its domination : it resorts to one or the other depending on historical conditions. But for both social democracy and fascism, the choice of one instrument or the other has independent significance ; indeed, it is a matter of political life or death.

The fascist regime sees its turn coming when the "normal" means—military and police—of the bourgeois dictatorship, with their parliamentary cover, prove insufficient to maintain social equilibrium. Through the agents of fascism, capital mobilizes the masses of the enraged petty bourgeoisie, the bands of the declassed and demoralized lumpenproletariat, all those countless human beings whom finance capital itself has plunged into rage and despair. The bourgeoisie demands a finished product from fascism : having accepted the methods of civil war, it wants peace for many years to come. And the agents of fascism, using the petty bourgeoisie as a battering ram and destroying all obstacles in their path, will bring their work to a successful conclusion. The victory of fascism results in finance capital seizing all organs and institutions of domination, leadership, and education in its iron grip : the state apparatus with its army, municipalities, universities, schools, press, trade unions, and cooperatives. The fascization of the state entails not only the "Mussolinization" of forms and methods of government—in this area, changes ultimately play a secondary role—but above all, the crushing of workers’ organizations. The proletariat must be reduced to a state of complete apathy, and a network of institutions must be created that penetrates deeply into the masses to prevent any independent crystallization of the proletariat. This is precisely the essence of the fascist regime.

What has just been said in no way contradicts the fact that a transitional regime between the democratic and fascist systems, combining features of both, can exist for a specific period : this is the general law of the replacement of one system by another, even if they are irreconcilably hostile to one another. There are times when the bourgeoisie relies on both social democracy and fascism, that is, when it simultaneously uses its conciliatory and terrorist agents. Such, in a certain sense, was Kerensky’s government during the last months of its existence : it relied halfway on the Soviets and at the same time conspired with Kornilov. Such is Brüning’s government, dancing on a tightrope between the two irreconcilable camps, with the pendulum of emergency decrees in its hands. But such a situation of the state and the government can only be temporary. It is characteristic of the transition period : social democracy is about to see its mission expire, while neither communism nor fascism is yet ready to seize power.

Italian communists, who have long grappled with the problem of fascism, have repeatedly protested against the widespread but erroneous use of this concept. At the time of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International, Ercoli was still developing positions on the question of fascism that are now considered "Trotskyist." Defining fascism as the most consistent and complete system of reaction, Ercoli explained : "This assertion is based neither on terrorist and cruel acts, nor on the large number of workers and peasants killed, nor on the ferocity of the various types of torture widely employed, nor on the severity of the sentences ; it is motivated by the systematic destruction of all forms of autonomous mass organization." Ercoli is absolutely right : the essence and role of fascism aim at the total liquidation of all workers’ organizations and the prevention of any resurgence of them. In developed capitalist society, this objective cannot be achieved through police means alone. The only way to reach it is to counter the pressure of the proletariat—when it wanes—with the pressure of the petty-bourgeois masses gripped by despair. It is precisely this particular system of capitalist reaction that has entered history under the name of fascism.

"The problem of the relations between fascism and social democracy," wrote Ercoli, "falls precisely within this domain (that is, the irreconcilable opposition between fascism and workers’ organizations). From this perspective, fascism is clearly distinguished from all other reactionary regimes that have been established so far in the contemporary capitalist world. It rejects any compromise with social democracy, it persecutes it fiercely ; it has deprived it of any possibility of legal existence ; it has forced it into emigration." This is what this article, printed in the leading organ of the Communist International, declared ! Subsequently, Manuilsky suggested to Molotov the brilliant idea of ​​the "third period." France, Germany, and Poland were placed at the "forefront of the revolutionary offensive." The conquest of power was proclaimed an immediate task. And since, faced with the proletarian uprising, all parties except the Communist Party were counter-revolutionary, it was no longer necessary to distinguish between fascism and social democracy. The theory of social fascism was endorsed. The bureaucrats of the Communist International changed their tune. Ercoli hastened to demonstrate that while truth was dear to him, Molotov was even dearer, and... wrote a report defending the theory of social fascism. "Italian social democracy," he declared in February 1930, "is becoming fascist with extreme ease." Alas, it is with even greater ease that the functionaries of official communism are becoming subservient.

Our critique of the theory and practice of the "Third Period" was, predictably, declared counter-revolutionary. The cruel experience, which cost the proletarian vanguard so dearly, made a turning point necessary at this level as well. The "Third Period," along with Molotov, was expelled from the Communist International. But the theory of social-fascism remained as the only fully mature fruit of the Third Period. Here, there could be no change : only Molotov had aligned himself with the Third Period ; Stalin, on the other hand, had become entangled in the theory of social-fascism himself.

As an epigraph to its studies on social-fascism, the Rote Fahne (Red Flag) placed these words of Stalin : "Fascism is the fighting organization of the bourgeoisie, which relies on the active support of social democracy. Social democracy is objectively the moderate wing of fascism." As is generally the case with Stalin when he attempts to generalize, the first sentence contradicts the second. That the bourgeoisie relies on social democracy and that fascism is the fighting organization of the bourgeoisie is entirely indisputable and has been stated for a long time. But from this only follows the fact that both social democracy and fascism are instruments of the big bourgeoisie. It is impossible to understand, however, why social democracy is also portrayed as the "wing" of fascism. A second definition from the same author is no more profound : social democracy and fascism are not adversaries but, on the contrary, twins... Twins can be cruel adversaries ; moreover, it is not at all necessary for allies to be born on the same day to the same mother. In Stalin’s construction, not only is formal logic lacking, but also dialectic. The power of this formula lies in the fact that no one dares to criticize it.

Between democracy and fascism, there is no difference from the point of view of "class content," Werner Hirsch, following Stalin, teaches us (Die Internationale, January 1932). The transition from democracy to fascism can take on the character of an "organic process," that is to say, occur "gradually and deliberately." This reasoning might be surprising if his successors hadn’t taught us to stop being surprised.

Between democracy and fascism there is no "class difference." This must mean, of course, that both democracy and fascism have a bourgeois character. We didn’t need January 1932 to realize this. But the ruling class does not live in isolation. It exists in specific relationships with other classes. In the "democratic" regime of developed capitalist society, the bourgeoisie relies primarily on the working class, which has been co-opted by reformists. This system finds its most complete expression in England, under both Labour and Conservative governments. In a fascist regime, at least in its initial stages, capital relies on the petty bourgeoisie to destroy the organizations of the proletariat. Italy, for example ! Is there a difference in the "class content" of these two regimes ? If we only ask the question about the ruling class, there is no difference. But if we consider the situation and the reciprocal relationships between all classes from the point of view of the proletariat, the difference is very great.

Over several decades, workers have built, within bourgeois democracy, by using it while simultaneously struggling against it, their bastions, their bases, their centers of proletarian democracy : trade unions, parties, training clubs, sports organizations, cooperatives, and so on. The proletariat can come to power not through the formal framework of bourgeois democracy but through revolutionary means : this is demonstrated by both theory and experience. But it is precisely for this revolutionary path that the proletariat needs bases of support for proletarian democracy within the bourgeois state. The work of the Second International, when it still played a progressive historical role, was reduced to the creation of such bases.

The primary and sole function of fascism is to destroy all bastions of proletarian democracy down to their very foundations. Does this have any "class significance" for the proletariat ? Let the great theorists consider this question. Having undeniably labeled the regime bourgeois, Hirsch, like his mentors, overlooks one crucial detail : the proletariat’s place within this regime. They substitute a dry sociological abstraction for the historical process. But the class struggle is waged on the ground of history, not in the stratosphere of sociology. The starting point for the struggle against fascism is not the abstraction of the democratic state, but the living organizations of the proletariat, where all its experience is concentrated and which shape the future.

The fact that the transition from democracy to fascism can be "organic" or "progressive" obviously means nothing more than that it is possible to deprive the proletariat, without any upheaval or struggle, not only of its material gains—a certain standard of living, social legislation, civil and political rights—but also of the principal instrument of these gains, namely its organizations. Thus, this "cold" transition to fascism presupposes the most appalling political capitulation of the proletariat imaginable.

Werner Hirsch’s theoretical reasoning is not accidental : while elaborating on Stalin’s pronouncements, it simultaneously generalizes all the current agitation within the Communist Party. His main objective is to demonstrate that there is no difference between Hitler’s regime and Brüning’s. Thaelmann and Remmele currently see this as the quintessence of Bolshevik policy.

The matter is not limited to Germany. The idea that a fascist victory will bring nothing new is being zealously propagated in all sections of the Communist International. In the January issue of the French journal *Les Cahiers du bolchevisme*, we read : "The Trotskyists who act in practice like Breitscheid accept the famous social-democratic theory of the lesser evil, according to which Brüning is not as bad as Hitler, according to which it is less unpleasant to starve to death under Brüning than under Hitler, and infinitely preferable to be shot by Groener than by Frick." This quotation is not the most foolish, even if, to give it its due, it is quite foolish. However, it expresses, alas, the very essence of the political philosophy of the leaders of the Communist International.

The fact is that Stalinists compare two regimes from the perspective of vulgar democracy. Indeed, if one applies the formal "democratic" criterion to Brüning’s regime, the conclusion is indisputable : only the skin and bones of the proud Weimar Constitution remain. But for us, the question is not thereby resolved. The question must be considered from the perspective of proletarian democracy. This is the only reliable criterion when it comes to knowing where and when the fascist regime replaces the "normal" police response of decaying capitalism.

Is Brüning "better" than Hitler (is he more likeable ?), a question, it must be admitted, hardly concerns us. But one only needs to look at the map of workers’ organizations to see that fascism has not yet won in Germany. Gigantic obstacles and forces still stand in the way of victory.

Brüning’s current regime is a bureaucratic dictatorship, or more precisely, a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, enforced by military and police means. The petty fascist bourgeoisie and the proletarian organizations are, so to speak, in a balance. If the workers’ organizations were united in soviets, if the factory committees fought for control of production, one could speak of a dual power. Due to the dispersion of the proletariat and the tactical impotence of its vanguard, this is not yet possible. But the very fact that powerful workers’ organizations exist, capable under certain conditions of mounting a swift and decisive counterattack against fascism, prevents Hitler from seizing power and grants the bureaucratic apparatus a certain degree of "independence."

Brüning’s dictatorship is a caricature of Bonapartism. This dictatorship is unstable, flimsy, and provisional. It does not mark the beginning of a new social equilibrium but rather heralds the imminent end of the old one. Relying directly on only a small minority of the bourgeoisie, Brüning, tolerated by the Social Democrats against the will of the workers, and threatened by fascism, is capable of wielding power in the form of decrees, but not in reality. Dissolving parliament with its consent, promulgating a few decrees against the workers, declaring a Christmas truce, using it to settle a few minor scores, dispersing a hundred meetings, closing a dozen newspapers, exchanging letters with Hitler worthy of a provincial grocer—that is all Brüning can accomplish. For anything more significant, his reach is insufficient.

Brüning is forced to tolerate the existence of workers’ organizations insofar as he has not yet decided to hand power back to Hitler and lacks the independent force necessary to liquidate them. Brüning is forced to tolerate and protect the fascists insofar as he mortally fears a workers’ victory. Brüning’s regime is a transitional one, which cannot last long and foreshadows catastrophe. The current government survives only because the main camps have not yet assessed their strength. The real battle has not yet begun. It still lies ahead. It is a dictatorship of bureaucratic impotence that fills the pause before the fight, before the open confrontation between the two sides.

Those self-proclaimed experts who boast that they see no difference "between Brüning and Hitler" are actually saying : it doesn’t matter whether our organizations still exist or have already been destroyed. Beneath this pseudo-radical rhetoric lies the most ignoble passivity : in any case, we cannot avoid defeat ! Read carefully the quote from the French Stalinist journal : the whole question is whether it is better to starve with Brüning or with Hitler. We are not asking how and under what conditions it is better to die, but how to fight and win. Our conclusion is this : we must engage in the general struggle before Brüning’s bureaucratic dictatorship is replaced by the fascist regime, that is, before the workers’ organizations are crushed. We must prepare for the general struggle by developing, expanding, and intensifying individual struggles. But for this, we must have a correct perspective and, above all, not proclaim an enemy victorious when they are still far from victory.

We are getting to the heart of the matter : therein lies the strategic key to the situation, the starting point for the struggle. Every conscious worker, and all the more so every communist, must realize the emptiness, the nullity, the rot of the Stalinist bureaucracy’s discussions, where they claim that Brüning and Hitler are one and the same. "You’re mixing everything up !" we reply. "You’re shamefully muddying the waters because you’re afraid of difficulties, of important tasks. You’re capitulating before the fight, you’re proclaiming that we’ve already suffered a defeat. You’re lying ! The working class is divided, weakened by the reformists, disoriented by the errors of its own vanguard, but it is not yet defeated, its forces are not yet exhausted... No, the proletariat of Germany is still powerful. The most optimistic calculations will prove completely outdated the day revolutionary energy forces its way into the arena of action."

The Brüning regime is a preparatory regime. For what ? Either for the victory of fascism or for the victory of the proletariat. This regime is preparatory because both sides are preparing for the decisive battle. To equate Brüning with Hitler is to identify the situation before the battle with the situation after defeat ; it means considering defeat inevitable in advance, it means calling for capitulation without a fight. The overwhelming majority of workers, particularly communists, do not want this. The Stalinist bureaucracy, naturally, does not want it either. We must not be content with good intentions that Hitler will use to pave his hell, but understand the objective meaning of the policy, its orientation, its tendencies. We must fully expose the passive, cowardly, wait-and-see, capitulating, and declamatory nature of the policy of Stalin, Manuilsky, Thälmann, and Remmele. Revolutionary workers must understand that the Communist Party holds the key to the situation ; but with this key the Stalinist bureaucracy is trying to close the doors leading to revolutionary action.

Notes

[1] Among metaphysicians (people who think anti-dialectically), the same abstraction fulfills two, three, or even more functions, often completely opposed. "Democracy" in general and "fascism" in particular, as we have seen, are in no way different from one another. But this does not preclude the existence of "the dictatorship of the workers and peasants" (for China, India, Spain) on Earth. Dictatorship of the proletariat ? No. Capitalist dictatorship ? No. So which one ? Democratic ! It turns out that a pure form of democracy, above classes, still exists on Earth. And yet the 11th Plenum explained that democracy is in no way different from fascism. In that case, does "democratic dictatorship" differ from... fascist dictatorship ?
Only a very naive person could expect an honest and serious answer from the Stalinists on this matter of principle. In reality, there will only be a few more insults, that’s all. And yet, the very wrong with the revolution in the East is linked to this issue.

3. Bureaucratic ultimaism

When the newspapers of the new Socialist Workers’ Party (SAP) denounce the "party egoism" of Social Democracy and the Communist Party ; when Seydewitz asserts that for him "class interests are above party interests"—they are falling into political sentimentality or, worse, concealing their own party’s interests beneath sentimental phrases. This is a path that leads nowhere. When reaction demands that the interests of the nation be placed above the interests of classes, we Marxists explain that, under the guise of the interests of the "whole," reaction is defending the interests of the exploiting class. The interests of a nation cannot be formulated except from the perspective of the ruling class or the class that claims to occupy the ruling position. The interests of a class cannot be formulated except in the form of a program ; a program cannot be defended except by founding a party.

A class, considered in and of itself, is merely raw material for exploitation. The proletariat begins to play an independent role only when it transforms from a social class in itself into a political class in its own right. This can only happen through the party ; the party is the historical organ through which the proletariat attains class consciousness. To say, "The class is above the party," is tantamount to asserting that the class in its raw state is superior to the class attaining class consciousness. This is not only incorrect but also reactionary. This petty-bourgeois theory is entirely unnecessary to justify the need for a united front.

The class’s progression toward consciousness—that is, the result of the revolutionary party’s work, which draws the proletariat along with it—is a complex and contradictory process. The class is not homogeneous. Its different parts will reach consciousness by different paths and at different paces. The bourgeoisie plays an active role in this process. It creates its own organs within the working class or uses existing ones to pit certain strata of workers against others. Different parties operate simultaneously within the proletariat. This is why it remains politically divided for much of its historical development. This explains why the problem of a united front arises at certain particularly critical periods.

When it pursues a just policy, the Communist Party expresses the historical interests of the proletariat. Its task is to win over the majority of the proletariat : only in this way is socialist revolution possible. The Communist Party can fulfill its mission only by maintaining complete and total political and organizational independence from other parties and organizations, whether they operate within or outside the working class. Failure to respect this fundamental requirement of Marxist policy is the most serious of all crimes against the interests of the proletariat as a class. The Chinese revolution of 1925–1927 was lost precisely because the Communist International, led by Stalin and Bukharin, forced the Chinese Communist Party to join the Kuomintang, the party of the Chinese bourgeoisie, and submit to its discipline. The experience of Stalinist policy with regard to the Kuomintang will forever be recorded in history as the catastrophic sabotage of a revolution by its leaders. The Stalinist theory of "two-component parties, worker and peasant," as applied to the East, was the generalization and legitimization of the practice with regard to the Kuomintang. The application of this theory in Japan, India, Indonesia, and Korea undermined the authority of communism and delayed the revolutionary development of the proletariat for many years. The same perfidious policy was pursued, albeit less cynically, in the United States, England, and throughout Europe until 1928.

The struggle of the Left Opposition for the complete and unconditional independence of the Communist Party and its policies, under all historical conditions and at every stage of the proletariat’s development, caused extreme tension in relations between the opposition and Stalin’s faction at the very moment when he allied himself with Chiang Kai-shek, Wan Tin-wei, Purcell, Radich, Lafollette, and others. It is needless to recall that Thaelmann and Remmele, as well as Brandler and Thalheimer, were all entirely on Stalin’s side against the Bolshevik-Leninists in this struggle. Therefore, we need no lessons from Stalin and Thaelmann regarding the independence of the Communist Party’s policies !

But the proletariat attains revolutionary consciousness not through formal education, but through the class struggle, which brooks no interruption. To fight, the proletariat needs unity within its ranks. This is true both for localized economic conflicts within the confines of a factory and for "national" political struggles, such as the fight against fascism. Therefore, the united front tactic is not something occasional or artificial, nor a clever maneuver—no, it arises completely and entirely from the objective conditions of the proletariat’s development. The passage in the Communist Manifesto, which states that communists will not oppose the proletariat, that they have no other objectives and tasks than those of the proletariat, expresses the idea that the party’s struggle to win the majority of the class must, in no way, contradict the workers’ need to unite their ranks in the struggle.

The Rote Fahne rightly condemns the assertion that "class interests are above party interests." In fact, there is a coincidence between the well-understood interests of the class and the correctly formulated tasks of the party. As long as the matter remains confined to this historical and philosophical assertion, the Rote Fahne’s position is unassailable. But the political conclusions it draws from this directly violate Marxism.

The fundamental identity of the interests of the proletariat and the tasks of the Communist Party does not mean that the proletariat as a whole is already conscious of its interests, nor that the party will formulate them correctly under any circumstances. The very necessity of the party stems precisely from the fact that the proletariat is not born with a ready-made understanding of its historical interests. The party’s task is to teach and demonstrate to the proletariat its right to leadership based on the experience of struggle. However, the Stalinist bureaucracy believes that the proletariat can simply be required to submit at the mere sight of the party passport bearing the seal of the Communist International.

Any united front not placed beforehand under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Rote Fahne reiterates, is directed against the interests of the proletariat. Anyone who does not recognize the leadership of the Communist Party is thereby a "counter-revolutionary." The worker is forced to take the Communist organization at its word and in advance. Starting from the principle of the identical tasks of the party and the class, the bureaucrat arrogates to himself the right to give orders to the class. The historical task that the Communist Party still has to accomplish—the unification of the overwhelming majority of workers under its banner—is transformed by the bureaucrat into an ultimatum, a revolver held to the temple of the working class. Dialectical thought is replaced by formalistic, administrative, and bureaucratic thinking.

The historical task that needs to be accomplished is considered already accomplished. The trust that needs to be earned is considered already earned. Clearly, this is an easy way out. But it doesn’t get us very far. In politics, we must start from what exists, not from what we wish there were, nor from what will be. If we take it to its logical conclusion, the position of the Stalinist bureaucracy is, in essence, the negation of the party. Indeed, what is the point of all its historical work if the proletariat must recognize in advance the leadership of Thälmann and Remmele ?

The party has the right to demand of a worker who wants to join the communist ranks : you must accept our program, our statutes, and the leadership of our elected bodies. But it is absurd and criminal to impose the same requirement, or even part of it, a priori on the working masses or workers’ organizations, when it comes to joint action for clearly defined militant tasks. This undermines the very foundations of the party, which can only fulfill its function within the framework of proper relations with the working class. Instead of issuing a unilateral ultimatum that irritates and offends the workers, a precise program of joint action must be proposed : this is the surest way to gain effective leadership.

Ultimism is an attempt to coerce the working class when it cannot be persuaded : if you, the workers, do not recognize the leadership of Thälmann-Remmele-Neumann, we will not allow you to form a united front. A treacherous enemy could not have imagined a more disadvantageous situation than the one in which the leaders of the Communist Party have placed themselves. On this path, they are rushing to their doom.

The leadership of the German Communist Party only underscores its ultimacity more clearly when, in its appeals, it backtracks in a purely casuistic manner : "We are not asking you to accept our communist views in advance." This sounds like an excuse for a policy that has no excuse. When the party declares that it refuses to engage in any negotiations whatsoever with other organizations, but that it allows social-democratic workers to break with their organization and place themselves under the leadership of the Communist Party, without calling themselves communists, this amounts to pure ultimacity. The retreat regarding "communist views" is utterly ridiculous : calling oneself a communist does not deter a worker who is ready to break with their party today to take part in the struggle under communist leadership. The worker is unfamiliar with diplomatic subterfuge and the game of labels. They judge policy and organization on their substance. They remain committed to social democracy as long as they do not trust the communist leadership. It is safe to say that the majority of social-democratic workers remain in their party today not because they trust the reformist leadership, but solely because they do not yet trust the communist leadership. However, they want to fight against fascism from this moment on. If the next stage of the common struggle is outlined for them, they will demand that their organization commit to it. If they sense resistance from their organization, they may even break with it.

Instead of helping social-democratic workers find their way through experience, the Central Committee of the Communist Party is helping the social-democratic leaders against the workers. Their reluctance to fight, their fear of struggle, their inability to fight—the Wels and Hilferdings are now successfully concealing these by referring to the Communist Party’s unwillingness to participate in a common struggle. The Communist Party’s stubborn, stupid, absurd refusal of a united front policy has become, under current conditions, the primary political resource of social democracy. This is precisely why social democracy, with its characteristic parasitism, clings so tightly to our critique of the Stalin-Thaelmann ultimatist policy.

The official leaders of the Communist International today pontificate with an air of self-importance about raising the party’s theoretical level and studying "the history of Bolshevism." In fact, "the level" is only declining ; the lessons of Bolshevism are being forgotten, distorted, and trampled underfoot. However, it is very easy to find in the history of the Russian party the precursor to the current policy of the German Central Committee : the late Bogdanov, founder of ultimadism (or otzovism). As early as 1905, he believed it was impossible for Bolsheviks to participate in the St. Petersburg Soviet unless the Soviet first recognized the Social Democratic leadership. Under Bogdanov’s influence, the St. Petersburg office of the Bolshevik Central Committee adopted the following resolution in October 1905 : to present the St. Petersburg Soviet with a motion demanding that it recognize the party leadership ; otherwise, to withdraw from the Soviet. The young lawyer Krassikov, then a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee, presented this ultimatum at the plenary session of the Soviet. The workers’ deputies, among whom were also Bolsheviks, looked at each other in astonishment, then moved on to the agenda. No one left the Soviet. Soon, Lenin arrived from abroad and gave the ultimatum-makers a stern dressing-down : one cannot, he said, force the masses to skip the necessary stages of their own political development through ultimatums.

Bogdanov, however, did not abandon his methodology and subsequently created an "ultimatist" or "otzovist" faction : a name given to them because they tended to force the Bolsheviks to withdraw from any organization that refused to accept the ultimatum they presented from above : "recognize our leadership in advance." The ultimatists tried to apply their policy not only in the Soviet, but also in the parliamentary system, in professional organizations, and, in general, in all legal or semi-legal organizations of the working class.

Lenin’s struggle against ultimatism was a struggle for the establishment of correct relations between the party and the working class. In the old Bolshevik party, the ultimatists never managed to play any significant role ; otherwise, the victory of Bolshevism would have been impossible. Bolshevism drew its strength from its careful and nuanced approach to the working class. When he came to power, Lenin continued the struggle against ultimatism, particularly and especially with regard to the trade unions. "If today in Russia," he wrote, "after two and a half years of extraordinary victories over the bourgeoisie of Russia and the Entente, we were to make ’recognition of the dictatorship’ a condition of joining the trade unions, we would be making a mistake, we would be undermining our influence over the masses, we would be helping the Mensheviks. Indeed, the entire task of the communists consists in knowing how to convince the laggards, in knowing how to work among them, and not in cutting themselves off from them with childish ’left-wing’ slogans." (The infantile disorder of communism, leftism.) This is all the more imperative for the communist parties of the West, which represent only a minority of the working class.

However, the situation in the USSR has changed radically in recent times. The Communist Party, now in power, is developing a different kind of relationship between the vanguard and the working class : one involving an element of constraint. Lenin’s struggle against the bureaucracy of the Party and the Soviets was fundamentally a struggle not against the poor organization of offices, administrative delays, negligence, and so on, but against the subjugation of the working class to the apparatus, against the transformation of the Party bureaucracy into a new "ruling" layer. Lenin’s advice before his death—to create a proletarian control commission, independent of the Central Committee, and to remove Stalin and his faction from the Party apparatus—was directed against the bureaucratic degeneration of the Party. For a number of reasons, which we cannot go into here, the Party ignored this advice. The bureaucratic degeneration of the Party has been pushed to its extreme in recent years. The Stalinist apparatus does nothing but give orders. The language of command is the language of ultimacity. Every worker must acknowledge in advance that all decisions of the Central Committee, past, present, and future, are infallible. Claims to infallibility have grown all the more as policy has become more flawed.

Having taken control of the apparatus of the Communist International, the Stalinist faction naturally exported its methods to the foreign sections, that is, to the communist parties of capitalist countries. The policy of the German leadership mirrored the policy of the Moscow leadership.

Thaelmann sees how the Stalinist bureaucracy rules by proclaiming counter-revolutionaries all those who do not recognize its infallibility. In what way is Thaelmann worse than Stalin ? If the working class does not humbly submit to his leadership, it is because the working class is counter-revolutionary. Those who point out to Thaelmann the disastrous nature of ultimatics are doubly counter-revolutionary. Lenin’s complete works are among the most counter-revolutionary. It is not without reason that Stalin ruthlessly censored them, particularly foreign-language editions.

If ultimatics is harmful under any circumstances ; if, in the USSR, it signifies the squandering of the party’s moral capital, it is doubly unjustified in Western parties, which are only now beginning to accumulate their moral capital. In the Soviet Union, the victorious revolution at least created the material conditions for bureaucratic ultimatics in the form of the repressive apparatus. In capitalist countries, including Germany, ultimatics transforms into a powerless caricature that hinders the Communist Party’s march to power. Thaelmann-Remmele’s ultimatics is, above all, ridiculous. And ridicule is deadly, especially when it comes to the party of the revolution.

Let us for a moment transport the problem to the political arena of England, where the Communist Party (as a result of the disastrous errors of the Stalinist bureaucracy) still represents only a tiny fraction of the proletariat. If we accept that any form of united front, unless it is communist, is "counter-revolutionary," it becomes clear that the British proletariat must postpone the struggle until the Communist Party is at its head. But the Communist Party cannot assume leadership of the class except on the basis of the latter’s revolutionary experience. Now, experience can only take on a revolutionary character if the party draws millions of workers into the struggle. And it is only possible to draw non-communist masses, and even more so organized masses, into the struggle on the basis of the united front policy. We fall into a vicious circle from which bureaucratic ultimacity offers no escape. But revolutionary dialectics has long since pointed the way out, based on a multitude of examples in the most diverse fields : combination of the struggle for power and the struggle for reforms ; complete independence of the party but unity of the trade unions ; struggle against the bourgeois regime, while using its institutions ; implacable criticism of parliamentarism from the parliamentary tribune ; merciless struggle against reformism, while concluding practical agreements with the reformists for partial tasks.

In England, the inconsistency of ultimatics is glaringly obvious, given the extraordinary weakness of the Communist Party. In Germany, the disastrous nature of ultimatics is somewhat masked by the party’s large membership and its growth. But the German party is growing under the pressure of circumstances, not thanks to the leadership’s policies ; not because of ultimatics, but in spite of it. Moreover, numerical growth is not decisive : the political relationship between the party and the working class is what matters. On this fundamental front, the situation is not improving, because the German party has erected the barbed wire of ultimatics between itself and the working class.

4. The Stalinists’ zigzags on the united front question

The former Social Democrat Torchors (Düsseldorf), who switched to the Communist Party, said in an official report that she delivered on behalf of the party in Frankfurt around mid-January :

"The Social Democratic leaders have already been sufficiently exposed, and maneuvering in this direction by proposing unity at the top is simply a waste of energy." We quote from the Frankfurt communist newspaper, which heaps praise on this report. "The Social Democratic leaders have already been sufficiently exposed." Enough for the speaker, who has moved from Social Democracy to the Communist Party (which, of course, is entirely to her credit), but not enough for the millions of workers who vote for Social Democracy and tolerate the reformist bureaucracy of the trade unions at its head.

However, it is pointless to refer to a single report. In the latest of the Rote Fahne appeals (January 28) that reached me, it is once again demonstrated that it is only permissible to create a united front against the leaders of social democracy and without them. Why ? Because "no one who has lived through and endured the actions of these ’leaders’ for the past eight years will believe them." But what, we ask ourselves, is to be done with those who have entered politics less than eighteen years ago, or even less than eighteen months ago ? Since the beginning of the war, new political generations have come of age ; they must themselves experience the older generation, even if only on a very small scale. "It is precisely," Lenin taught the ultra-leftists, "that we must not believe that what has run its course for us has run its course for the class, has run its course for the masses." But the older generation of social democrats, who experienced these eighteen years, have by no means broken with their leaders. On the contrary, it is precisely within social democracy that many "old guard" remain, bound to the party by strong traditions. It is regrettable, of course, that the masses are taking so long to learn. But to a large extent, the fault lies with the communist "educators," who have failed to expose the criminal nature of reformism in concrete terms. At the very least, we must take advantage of the new situation, while the masses’ attention is focused to the utmost on the mortal danger, to subject the reformists to a new test that will perhaps, this time, be decisive.

Without concealing or moderating in any way our opinion of the leaders of social democracy, we can and must say to the social-democratic workers : "Since, on the one hand, you agree to fight with us, and on the other hand, you do not yet want to break with your leaders, here is what we propose : compel them to undertake a common struggle with us for such and such practical tasks, by such and such means ; as far as we, the communists, are ready." What could be simpler, clearer, more convincing than that ?

It was precisely in this sense that I wrote - with the deliberate intention of arousing genuine terror or feigned indignation in fools and charlatans - that, in the struggle against fascism, we were prepared to make militant practical agreements with the devil, with his grandmother, and even with Noske and Zörgiebel [1].

The official party violates its own rigid position at every turn. In its calls for a "united red front" (with itself), it invariably puts forward the demand for "unlimited freedom of demonstrations, meetings, coalitions, and the proletarian press." This is an absolutely correct slogan. But insofar as the Communist Party speaks of proletarian newspapers, meetings, etc., and not just communist ones, it is in fact advancing the slogan of a united front with social democracy itself, which publishes workers’ newspapers, convenes assemblies, and so on. The height of absurdity is to put forward political slogans, which contain the idea of ​​a united front with social democracy, and then refuse practical agreements to fight on those very slogans.

Münzenberg, in whom general principles and mercantile common sense clash, wrote in November in *Der rote Aufbau* : "It is true that National Socialism is the most reactionary, chauvinistic, and ferocious wing of the fascist movement in Germany, and that indeed, all left-wing circles (!) have the greatest interest in opposing the strengthening of the influence and power of this wing of German fascism." If Hitler’s party is the "most reactionary, most ferocious" wing, then the Brüning government is less ferocious and less reactionary. Münzenberg thus arrives, almost stealthily, at the theory of the "lesser evil." To maintain the appearance of orthodoxy, Münzenberg distinguishes between different kinds of fascism : mild, medium, and strong, as if they were Turkish tobacco. But if all the "left-wing circles" (and what are their names ?) are interested in victory over fascism, wouldn’t it be necessary to subject these "left-wing circles" to a practical test ?

Wasn’t it clear that we should have seized upon Breitscheid’s diplomatic and ambiguous proposal immediately, putting forward our own practical, concrete, and well-developed program for a joint struggle against fascism, and demanding a joint meeting of the leadership of both parties, with the participation of the leadership of the free trade unions ? At the same time, we should have vigorously disseminated this program at all levels of both parties and among the masses. The negotiations should have taken place in full public view : the press should have provided daily reports, without exaggeration or absurd fabrications. Workers are infinitely more receptive to such concrete action that hits the mark than to the constant clamoring about "social fascism." If the problem had been framed in this way, social democracy could not have, even for a moment, hidden behind the cardboard facade of the "iron front."

Reread Lenin’s *Left-Wing Communism : An Infantile Disorder* : it is the most relevant book today. It is precisely in relation to situations analogous to the one we have today in Germany that Lenin speaks—and we quote verbatim—of the "absolute necessity for the vanguard of the proletariat, for its conscious part, for the Communist Party, to maneuver, to reach agreements, compromises with the various groups of proletarians, the various parties of workers and smallholders... The key is to know how to apply this tactic in such a way as to raise, and not lower, the general level of consciousness of the proletariat, its revolutionary spirit, its capacity to struggle and to win." But what is the attitude of the Communist Party ? In its newspapers, it repeats daily that for it, only "the united front that will be directed against Brüning, Severing, Leipart, Hitler, and their ilk" is acceptable. Faced with the proletarian uprising, there is no doubt that there will be no difference between Brüning, Severing, Leipart, and Hitler. The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks allied themselves with the Cadets and Kornilovians against the Bolshevik uprising in October : Kerensky led the Black Hundred Cossack general, Krasnov, to Petrograd ; the Mensheviks supported Kornilov and Krasnov ; and the Socialist Revolutionaries organized the Junker uprising under the leadership of monarchist officers.

But this absolutely does not mean that Brüning, Severing, Leipart, and Hitler still belong to the same camp under all circumstances. Their interests now diverge. For social democracy, the question at this moment is less about defending the foundations of capitalist society against proletarian revolution than about defending the semi-parliamentary bourgeois system against fascism. It would be utter folly to refuse to make use of this antagonism.

"To wage war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie...," wrote Lenin in Children’s Disease, "and to renounce a priori any maneuvering, any exploitation of the oppositions of interests (even if momentary) which divide our enemies, any agreement and compromise with possible allies (even if temporary, unreliable, wavering, conditional), is this not utterly ridiculous ?" We quote verbatim again : the words in parentheses underlined by us are Lenin’s.

And further on : "One can only triumph over a more powerful adversary at the cost of extreme strain and on the express condition of exploiting, in the most meticulous, attentive, circumspect, and intelligent way, the slightest ’crack’ between the enemies." What are Thaelmann and Remmele, led by Manuilsky, doing ? The crack between social democracy and fascism—and what a crack it is !—they are trying with all their might to plug it using the theory of social fascism and the practice of sabotaging the united front.

Lenin demanded that every "opportunity to secure a numerically strong ally be used, even if that ally is temporary, faltering, conditional, unstable, and unreliable. Anyone who hasn’t grasped this truth has understood nothing of Marxism, nor, in general, of contemporary scientific socialism." Look, prophets of the new Stalinist school : it is stated here clearly and precisely that you have understood nothing of Marxism. This is what Lenin said about you : acknowledge receipt !

But without a victory over social democracy, the Stalinists retort, there can be no victory over fascism. Is this true ? In a certain sense, it is. But the converse is also true : victory over Italian social democracy is impossible without a victory over Italian fascism. Fascism, like social democracy, is an instrument of the bourgeoisie. As long as capital dominates, social democracy and fascism will continue to exist in various combinations. Thus, all problems boil down to a single denominator : the proletariat must overthrow the bourgeois regime.

But it is precisely today, as this regime falters in Germany, that fascism comes to its rescue. To overthrow this defender, we are told, we must first put an end to social democracy... Such a rigid schematism places us in a vicious circle. We can only escape it through action. The nature of this action is determined not by the interplay of abstract categories, but by the real relationships of living, historical forces.

No, the bureaucrats keep repeating, let’s liquidate social democracy "first." How ? It’s very simple : by ordering the party organizations to recruit one hundred thousand new members within a certain timeframe. Pure propaganda instead of political struggle, a bureaucrat’s plan instead of a dialectical strategy. And what if the actual development of the class struggle were to pose the question of fascism to the working class today, as a matter of life or death ? Then the working class must turn its back on the problem, it must be lulled to sleep, it must be convinced that the fight against fascism is a secondary task, that this task can wait, that it will resolve itself, that fascism already effectively dominates, that Hitler will bring nothing new, that there’s no need to fear Hitler, that Hitler is merely paving the way for the communists.

Perhaps this is an exaggeration ? No, it is the true and obvious guiding principle of the leaders of the Communist Party. They do not always pursue it to its logical conclusion. When confronted by the masses, they often backtrack on their latest conclusions, conflating different positions, confusing the workers and themselves ; but every time they try to extricate themselves, they start from the premise of the inevitable victory of fascism.

On October 14th of last year, Remmele, one of the three official leaders of the Communist Party, declared in the Reichstag : "Mr. Brüning himself has said very clearly : when they (the fascists) are in power, the united front of the proletariat will be realized and sweep everything away" (loud applause from the Communist benches). That Brüning seeks to frighten the bourgeoisie and the Social Democrats with such a prospect is understandable : he is defending his power. That Remmele should console the workers with this prospect is shameful : he is paving the way for Hitler’s power, for this entire prospect is fundamentally false and demonstrates a complete misunderstanding of mass psychology and the dialectic of revolutionary struggle. If the German proletariat, which is now a direct witness to all events, allows the fascists to come to power—that is, if it displays an absolutely criminal blindness and passivity—there is decidedly no reason to count on the fact that, after the fascists come to power, the same proletariat will shake off its passivity and "sweep everything away" : in any case, that is not what happened in Italy. Remmele reasons entirely in the spirit of the petty-bourgeois French rhetoricians of the 19th century, who demonstrated a total inability to rally the masses to their cause, but who, on the other hand, were firmly convinced that, when Louis Bonaparte took the helm of the Republic, the people would immediately rise up to defend them and "sweep everything away." However, the people, who had allowed the adventurer Louis Bonaparte to come to power, proved, of course, incapable of sweeping him away afterward. This required new major events, historical upheavals, including war.

For Remmele, the united front of the proletariat, as we have seen, is only achievable after Hitler comes to power. Could there be a more pathetic admission of his own inadequacy ? Since we, Remmele and Co., are incapable of uniting the proletariat, we entrust this task to Hitler. When he has united the proletariat for us, we will show ourselves in all our strength. Then comes a boastful declaration : "We are the victors of tomorrow, and the question is no longer : who will crush whom ? That question has already been resolved (applause from the Communist benches). There is only one question left : when will we overthrow the bourgeoisie ?" That’s all ! In Russian, they call that reaching for the stars. We are the victors of tomorrow. For that, all we lack today is the united front.

Hitler will give it to us tomorrow, when he comes to power. So tomorrow’s victor won’t be Remmele, but Hitler. But get this through your heads : the communists’ victory is still a long way off.

Remmele himself senses that his optimism is faltering, and he tries to bolster it. "These fascist gentlemen don’t frighten us ; they’ll wear themselves out faster than any other government (’quite true,’ from the communist benches)." The proof : the fascists want inflation of the paper money, and that’s ruin for the masses ; therefore, everything will turn out perfectly. This is how Remmele’s verbal inflation misleads the German workers.

Here we have the programmatic speech of an official party leader, printed in large numbers and intended for the Communist Party’s membership drive : a ready-made party membership form is printed at the end of the speech. This programmatic speech is entirely built on capitulation to fascism. "We do not fear" Hitler’s rise to power. But this is, in fact, an inverted formula of cowardice. "We" do not consider ourselves capable of preventing Hitler from coming to power ; worse : we, bureaucrats, are so corrupt that we don’t dare seriously consider fighting Hitler. That is why, "we are not afraid." What are you not afraid of : fighting Hitler ? No, they are not afraid... of Hitler’s victory. They are not afraid of shirking the fight. They are not afraid of acknowledging their own cowardice. Shame, thrice shame ! In one of my last pamphlets, I wrote that the Stalinist bureaucracy was preparing to lay a trap for Hitler...in the form of state power. The communist scribblers, from Münzenberg to Ullstein and from Mosse to Münzenberg, immediately declared : "Trotsky is slandering the Communist Party." Isn’t it clear : out of hostility toward communism, out of hatred for the German proletariat, out of a burning desire to save German capitalism, Trotsky attributes a plan of capitulation to the Stalinist bureaucracy ? In fact, I have only summarized Remmele’s programmatic speech and Thaelmann’s theoretical article. Where, then, is the slander ?

Thaelmann and Remmele remain fully faithful to the Stalinist gospel. Let us recall once again what Stalin taught in the autumn of 1923, when everything in Germany, as today, hung by a thread : "The Communists," Stalin wrote to Zinoviev and Bukharin, "should they strive (at the present stage) to seize power without the Social Democrats, are they already ready for that—that, in my opinion, is the heart of the matter... If today in Germany power falls, so to speak, and the Communists pick it up, they will collapse spectacularly. That is in the best-case scenario. And in the worst, they will be torn to pieces and rejected... Obviously, the Fascists are watching, but it is more advantageous for us if the Fascists attack first : this will rally the entire working class around the Communists... In my opinion, the Germans must be restrained, not encouraged."

In his pamphlet on the Mass Strike, Langner writes : "Brandler’s assertion that the October struggle (1923) brought about a ’decisive defeat’ is nothing more than an attempt to gloss over opportunist errors and the opportunistic capitulation without a fight" (p. 101). This is quite true. But who was the instigator of the "capitulation without a fight" ? Who was "restraining" it instead of "encouraging" it ? In 1931, Stalin merely elaborated on his 1923 formula : let the fascists seize power, and they will only be paving the way for us. Obviously, it is far less dangerous to attack Brandler than Stalin : the Langners know this well...

It is true that in the last two months—and the resolute protests of the left have certainly played a part in this—a shift has occurred : the Communist Party no longer says that Hitler must seize power in order to quickly exhaust himself ; today, it insists more on the opposite aspect of the question : the struggle against fascism must not be postponed until Hitler comes to power ; the struggle must be waged now, by rousing the workers against Brüning’s decrees, by broadening and deepening the struggle in the economic and political arena. This is entirely correct. Everything the representatives of the Communist Party say in this context is indisputable. On this point, there is no disagreement between us. But the main question remains : how to move from words to action ?

The overwhelming majority of party members and a significant portion of the apparatus—of this we have no doubt—sincerely desire the struggle. But we must face reality : this struggle is not happening ; it is nowhere in sight. Brüning’s decrees have passed with impunity. The Christmas truce has not been broken. The policy of impromptu partial strikes, judging by the accounts given by the Communist Party itself, has not yielded any serious results so far. The workers see this. They cannot be swayed by a single cry.

The Communist Party blames social democracy for the passivity of the masses. Historically, this is undeniable. But we are not historians, but revolutionary political activists. This is not about historical research, but about finding a way out of the impasse.

The SAP, which at the beginning of its existence formally raised (particularly in the articles of Rosenfeld and Seydewitz) the question of the struggle against fascism and linked the counter-attack to Hitler’s rise to power, has taken a certain step forward. Its press now demands the rapid organization of resistance to fascism, by rousing the workers against famine and police oppression. We readily acknowledge that the change in the SAP’s position occurred under the influence of communist critique : one of communism’s tasks is to advance centrism by critiquing its hybrid nature. But this is insufficient : the fruits of this critique must be used politically, by proposing that the SAP move from words to action. The SAP must be subjected to a practical, public, and clear test : not by interpreting isolated quotations—that would not suffice—but by proposing to agree on specific practical means of resistance. If the SAP reveals its shortcomings, the authority of the Communist Party will be strengthened, and the intermediate party will be quickly eliminated. What is there to fear ?

It is not true, however, that the SAP doesn’t want to fight seriously. Several factions exist within it. Today, insofar as the matter boils down to abstract propaganda for a united front, internal contradictions lie dormant. When the struggle begins, they will resurface. Only the Communist Party stands to gain from this.

But the main question remains : that of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). If it rejects the practical proposals accepted by the SAP, this will create a new situation. The centrists, who would like to maintain an equal distance from the Communist Party and the Social Democrats, railing against one or the other and strengthening themselves at the expense of both (this is the philosophy developed by Urbahns), would immediately find themselves in a precarious position, because it would become clear that it is precisely the Social Democrats who are sabotaging the revolutionary struggle. Isn’t that a significant advantage ? The SAP workers would then resolutely turn their gaze toward the Communist Party.

But the refusal of Wels and Co. to accept the action program agreed upon by the SAP would not go unpunished, even for the Social Democrats. The Vorwärts would immediately lose the opportunity to complain about the Communist Party’s passivity. The attraction to the united front would immediately grow among the Social Democratic workers. And that would be tantamount to an attraction to the Communist Party. Isn’t that clear ?

At each of these stages and at each of these turning points, the Communist Party would discover new possibilities. Instead of the monotonous repetition of the same ready-made formulas before the same audience, it would gain the possibility of mobilizing new strata, educating them on the basis of lived experience, tempering them, and strengthening its hegemony within the working class.

There can be no discussion about the fact that the Communist Party is simultaneously relinquishing its independent leadership of strikes, demonstrations, and political campaigns. It retains its full freedom of action. It waits for no one.

But based on his actions, he actively maneuvers towards other workers’ organizations, destroys the compartmentalization among workers, brings to light the contradictions of reformism and centrism, and advances revolutionary crystallization in the proletariat.

Notes

[1] The French journal Les Cahiers du bolchevisme, the most stupid and ignorant of all the productions of the Stalinist bureaucracy, eagerly seized upon the allusion to the devil’s grandmother, obviously without suspecting in the slightest that it has a very long history in Marxist literature. The time is near, let us hope, when the revolutionary workers will send their ignorant and dishonest teachers to the aforementioned grandmother, so that they may learn their lesson there.

5. Historical background on the issue of the united front

Considerations regarding the united front policy stem from the fundamental and imperative necessities of the class struggle (in the Marxist, not bureaucratic, sense of these words) that it is impossible to read the objections of the Stalinist bureaucracy without blushing with indignation and shame. One can explain the simplest ideas daily to the most backward and ignorant workers or peasants without growing weary ; in this case, the aim is to mobilize new social strata. But what a misfortune it is when one has to demonstrate and explain elementary ideas to people whose brains have been crushed by the bureaucratic press ! What can be done with the "leaders," who have no logical arguments at their disposal, but who, on the other hand, have a repertoire of international insults at hand ? The fundamental positions of Marxism are labeled with a single term : "counter-revolution" ! This word is terribly devalued in the mouths of those who, so far at least, have demonstrated in no way their capacity to make a revolution. But what about the decisions of the first four congresses of the Communist International ? Does the Stalinist bureaucracy recognize them, yes or no ?

The documents are very much alive and have retained their full significance to this day. I am extracting from them—for they are very numerous—the theses I drafted between the Third and Fourth Congresses for the French Communist Party. They had been adopted by the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party and the Executive Committee of the Communist International, and published at that time in various languages ​​in communist publications. We reproduce verbatim the section of the theses devoted to the argument and defense of the united front policy :

"...It is quite evident that the activity of the proletariat as a class does not cease during the preparatory period for the revolution. Conflicts with employers, with the bourgeoisie, with state power, initiated by one side or the other, follow one another. In these conflicts, insofar as they concern the vital interests of the entire working class, or its majority, or one or another of its parts, the working masses feel the necessity of unity of action... The party that mechanically opposes this necessity... will inevitably be condemned in the conscience of the workers. The
problem of the united front arises from the need to ensure the working class the possibility of a united front in the struggle against capital, despite the inevitable split in our time of political organizations that rely on the working class. Anyone who does not understand this task considers the party as a propaganda association, and not as an organization for mass action.
If the Communist Party had not radically broken And definitively, with social democracy, it would never have become the party of the proletarian revolution. If the Communist Party had not sought the organizational means to make possible at every moment joint and coordinated actions between the communist and non-communist (including social-democratic) working masses, it would have thereby demonstrated its inability to win over the majority of the working class through mass action.
It is not enough to separate communists from reformists, nor to bind them together through organizational discipline ; this organization must learn to direct all the collective actions of the proletariat in every area of ​​its real struggle.
This is the second letter of the ABC of Communism.
Does the united front extend only to the working masses or does it also include the opportunist leaders ? The very act of asking this question stems from a misunderstanding. If we could simply rally the working masses around our banner... without going through the reformist organizations, parties or trade unions, that would obviously be better. But then, the very question of a united front would not arise in its current form.
Leaving aside all other considerations, it is in our interest to draw the reformists out of their hiding places and place them beside us, facing the fighting masses. By applying this correct tactic, we can only gain. The communist who has doubts or apprehensions on this point is like the swimmer who has adopted the theories on the best way to swim, but who doesn’t dare to jump into the water.
By concluding an agreement with other organizations, we naturally impose upon ourselves a certain discipline of action.
But this discipline cannot be absolute. Should the reformists hinder the struggle, clearly to the detriment of the movement, in order to counterbalance the situation and the mood of the masses, we, as an independent organization, always retain the right to carry the struggle through to the end, without our temporary half-allies.
This policy can only be seen as a rapprochement with the reformists from the perspective of a journalist who believes he is distancing himself from reformism when, without leaving his newsroom, he continues to criticize it in the same terms, and who fears confronting it before the working masses and giving them the opportunity to judge communists and reformists on equal footing—the conditions of mass struggle. This supposedly revolutionary fear of "rapprochement" fundamentally conceals a political passivity that strives to maintain the status quo, where communists and reformists have their clearly defined spheres of influence, their regular attendees at their meetings, their press, and where all of this creates the illusion of a serious political struggle.
On the question of the united front, we see a passive and indecisive tendency emerging, masked by verbal intransigence. From the outset, the following paradox is striking : the right-wing elements of the party, with their centrist and pacifist tendencies, appear as the most implacable opponents of the united front, hiding behind the banner of revolutionary intransigence. Conversely, those elements who, in the most difficult moments, were entirely aligned with the positions of the Third International, are now speaking out in favor of the united front. In fact, today it is the supporters of a passive and wait-and-see tactic who are intervening under the mask of a pseudo-revolutionary intransigence" (Trotsky, The First Five Years of the Communist International ; pp. 345-378 of the Russian edition).

Wouldn’t you say these lines were written today against Stalin, Manuilsky, Thaelmann, Remmele, and Neumann ? In fact, they were written ten years ago against Frossard, Cachin, Charles Rappoport, Daniel Renoult, and other French opportunists hiding behind ultra-leftist rhetoric. Were the theses cited—and we pose this question directly to the Stalinist bureaucracy—already "counter-revolutionary" when they expressed the policy of the Russian Politburo, headed by Lenin, and defined the policy of the Communist International ? Don’t try to tell us that conditions have changed since then : this isn’t a matter of circumstance but, as stated in the texts themselves, of the very ABCs of communism.

Ten years ago, the Communist International explained the essence of the united front policy as follows : the Communist Party demonstrates in practice to the masses and their organizations that it is ready to fight alongside them, even for the most modest objectives, provided these objectives align with the historical development of the proletariat ; in this struggle, the Communist Party takes into account, at every moment, the true state of mind of the class ; it addresses itself not only to the masses, but also to organizations whose leadership is recognized by the masses ; before the masses, it compels reformist organizations to take a public stance on the real tasks of the class struggle. The united front policy accelerates the revolutionary awakening of the class, revealing in practice that it is not the Communist Party’s desire for splitting, but the deliberate sabotage of the social-democratic leaders that undermines the common struggle. It is clear that these ideas have not aged in the slightest.

How then can we explain the Communist International’s abandonment of the united front policy ? By the failures and fiascos this policy has experienced in the past. If these failures, whose causes lie not in the policy itself but in the politicians, had been highlighted, analyzed, and studied at the time, the German Communist Party would have been perfectly equipped to face the current situation, both strategically and tactically. But the Stalinist bureaucracy acted like the nearsighted monkey in the fable : having put his glasses on his tail and cleaned them to no avail, he decided they were useless and smashed them against a stone. Everyone acts as they see fit, but it’s not the glasses’ fault.

The errors in the united front policy were twofold. Most often, the leading organs of the Communist Party addressed the reformists, proposing a common struggle based on radical slogans that were neither derived from the situation nor aligned with the level of consciousness of the masses. These proposals were like blank shots. The masses remained uninvolved, and the reformist leaders interpreted the communists’ proposal as a plot to destroy social democracy. In all these cases, it was a purely formal application of the united front policy, which never went beyond the stage of mere declarations ; in fact, by its very nature, it can only produce results based on a realistic assessment of the situation and the state of the masses. The weapon of "open letters," used too frequently and incorrectly, jammed and had to be abandoned.

Another type of distortion took on a far more fatal character. In the hands of the Stalinist leadership, the united front policy was transformed into a search for alliances at the cost of abandoning the independence of the Communist Party. Relying on Moscow and believing themselves all-powerful, the bureaucrats of the Communist International seriously believed they could command the masses, impose a path upon them, curb the agrarian movement and strikes in China, buy an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek at the price of abandoning the independent policy of the Communist Party, re-educate the bureaucracy of the trade unions—the main pillars of British imperialism—behind a banquet table in London or in the spa towns of the Caucasus, transform Croatian bourgeois, like Radich, into communists, and so on. Moreover, this stemmed from the best intentions in the world : to accelerate development by doing for the masses what they were not yet ready to do. It is worth recalling that in a number of countries, particularly Austria, the bureaucrats of the Communist International have recently attempted to artificially create, from the top down, a "left-wing" social democracy intended to serve as a bridge to communism. This charade, too, has led only to failure. The results of all these experiments and ventures have been invariably catastrophic. The global revolutionary movement has been set back several years.

It was then that Manuilsky decided to break the glasses, and Kuusinen, to avoid making another mistake, proclaimed everyone a fascist except for himself and his friends. Today, the matter is simpler and clearer, and henceforth, there can be no more errors. What united front can there be with "social-fascists" against national-fascists, or with "left-wing social-fascists" against "right-wing social-fascists" ? Having thus executed a complete about-face, the Stalinist bureaucracy was forced to declare the resolutions of the first four congresses of the International counter-revolutionary.

6 Lessons from the Russian experience

In one of our previous works, we referred to the Bolshevik experience in the struggle against Kornilov : the official leaders responded with grumbles of disapproval. Let us recall once again the heart of the matter, to show more precisely and in more detail how the Stalinist school draws lessons from the past.

In July-August 1917, the head of government, Kerensky, practically implemented the program of Commander-in-Chief Kornilov : he reinstated field military courts and the death penalty for soldiers on the front, removed all influence over state affairs from the conciliatory Soviets, repressed the peasants, doubled the price of bread (within the framework of the state monopoly on the wheat trade), prepared the evacuation of revolutionary Petrograd and assembled counter-revolutionary troops on the outskirts of the capital, in agreement with Kornilov, promised the Allies a new offensive on the front, etc. Such was the general political situation.

On August 26, Kornilov broke with Kerensky because of the latter’s hesitations and launched his troops on Petrograd. The Bolshevik party was in a semi-legal situation. Its leaders, starting with Lenin, were either in hiding or in prison, accused of liaising with the Hohenzollern leadership. Bolshevik newspapers were banned. The prosecutions came from Kerensky’s government, which was supported on its left by the conciliatory Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

What did the Bolshevik party do ? It didn’t hesitate for a moment to conclude a practical agreement with its jailers, Kerensky, Tseretelli, and Dan, to fight against Kornilov. Revolutionary defense committees were created everywhere, where the Bolsheviks were in the minority. This didn’t prevent them from playing a leading role : in agreements aimed at developing revolutionary action among the masses, the most consistent and daring revolutionary party always wins. The Bolsheviks were at the forefront, destroying the barriers that separated them from the Menshevik workers and especially the SR soldiers, and drawing them into their ranks.

Perhaps the Bolsheviks acted this way only because they were caught off guard ? No, the Bolsheviks had, dozens, hundreds of times in the preceding months, demanded a joint struggle from the Mensheviks against the mobilizing counter-revolution. As early as May 27, when Tseretelli called for repressive measures against the Bolshevik sailors, Trotsky declared at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet : "If a counter-revolutionary general tries to put a noose around the neck of the revolution, the Cadets will pull the rope, but the sailors of Kronstadt will come to fight and die with us." This proved entirely true. During the days when Kornilov was advancing, Kerensky addressed the sailors of the cruiser Aurora, asking them to take upon themselves the defense of the Winter Palace. The sailors were all Bolsheviks. They hated Kerensky. But this did not prevent them from vigilantly protecting the Winter Palace. Their representatives went to the "Kresty" prison to meet Trotsky, who was imprisoned there, and asked him : shouldn’t Kerensky be arrested ? But the question was somewhat of a joke : the sailors understood that Kornilov had to be crushed first, and then Kerensky dealt with. Thanks to sound political leadership, the sailors of the Aurora had a better understanding than Thaelmann’s Central Committee.

The Rote Fahne calls our historical analysis "erroneous." Why ? That’s a pointless question. Can we really expect sensible objections from these people ? They’ve been ordered from Moscow, under threat of dismissal, to bark at the mere mention of Trotsky’s name. They’re carrying out the order as best they can. According to them, Trotsky "has made an erroneous comparison between Brüning’s current struggle ’against’ Hitler and the Bolsheviks’ struggle during Kornilov’s reactionary uprising in early September 1917 : immediately confronted with an acute revolutionary situation, the Bolsheviks were fighting the Mensheviks to gain a majority in the Soviets, and armed in the struggle against Kornilov, they were simultaneously attacking Kerensky on his flanks. Trotsky thus presents support for Brüning and the Prussian government as the lesser of two evils" (Rote Fahne, December 22).

It is difficult to refute all this nonsense. I supposedly compare the Bolsheviks’ struggle against Kornilov with Brüning’s struggle against Hitler. I am not overestimating the intellectual capabilities of the Rote Fahne editorial staff, but these people could not possibly have failed to understand my point. I compare the Bolsheviks’ struggle against Kornilov with that of the German Communist Party against Hitler. In what way is this comparison "erroneous" ? The Bolsheviks, writes the Rote Fahne, were at that time fighting the Mensheviks to gain a majority in the Soviets. But the German Communist Party, too, was fighting the Social Democrats to gain a majority among the working class. In Russia, we were on the verge of "an acute revolutionary situation." Quite right. However, if the Bolsheviks had adopted Thälmann’s position in August, a counter-revolutionary situation could have arisen instead of a revolutionary one.

During the last days of August, Kornilov was crushed, not by force of arms, but by the sheer unity of the masses. The day after September 3, Lenin proposed the following compromise to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in the press : "You have the majority in the Soviets," he told them, "take power, and we will support you against the bourgeoisie. Guarantee us complete freedom of agitation, and we promise you a peaceful struggle for the majority in the Soviets." Such was the opportunist Lenin ! The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries rejected the compromise, that is, yet another proposal for a united front against the bourgeoisie. This rejection became a powerful weapon in the hands of the Bolsheviks for preparing the armed uprising that, seven weeks later, swept away the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.

So far, there has been only one victorious proletarian revolution in the world. I do not, by any means, believe that we made no mistakes on the path to victory ; however, I think that our experience holds a certain importance for the Communist Party of Germany. I draw a historical analogy between two very similar and related situations. What is the response of the leaders of the Communist Party of Germany ? Insults.

Only the ultra-left group Roter Kämpfer, armed with all its expertise, attempted to seriously criticize our comparison. It believes that the Bolsheviks acted correctly in August, "because Kornilov was the representative of the Tsarist counter-revolution. This means that his struggle was that of feudal reaction against the bourgeois revolution. Under these conditions, a tactical agreement between the workers and the bourgeoisie and its SR and Menshevik appendages was not only necessary but inevitable, since the interests of both classes coincided in repelling the feudal counter-revolution." But since Hitler represents the bourgeois, not the feudal, counter-revolution, the social democracy that supports the bourgeoisie cannot engage against Hitler. This is why there is no united front in Germany and why Trotsky’s comparison is flawed.

All of this sounds very solid. But in fact, there isn’t a single word of it that’s true. The Russian bourgeoisie in August 1917 didn’t oppose the feudal reaction at all : all the landowners supported the Cadet Party, which opposed the expropriation of landowners. Kornilov proclaimed himself a republican, "son of a peasant," and a supporter of agrarian reform and a Constituent Assembly. The entire bourgeoisie supported Kornilov. The agreement between the Bolsheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks became possible only because the conciliators had temporarily broken with the bourgeoisie : it was fear of Kornilov that had driven them to do so. The conciliators understood that once Kornilov won a victory, the bourgeoisie would cease to need them and would allow Kornilov to crush them. Within these limits, we see that there is a total analogy with the relationship that exists between social democracy and fascism.

The difference doesn’t begin at all where the theorists of the Red Fighters see it. In Russia, the petty-bourgeois masses, especially the peasantry, leaned not to the right but to the left. Kornilov didn’t rely on the petty bourgeoisie. It is precisely for this reason that his movement wasn’t fascist. It was a bourgeois counter-revolution—and absolutely not a feudal one—led by a scheming general. Therein lay his weakness. Kornilov relied on the sympathy of the entire bourgeoisie and on the military support of the officers, the Junkers, that is, the younger generation of that same bourgeoisie. This proved insufficient. But in the event of a misguided Bolshevik policy, Kornilov’s victory was by no means out of the question.

We see that the Roter Kämpfer’s arguments against the united front in Germany are based on the fact that its theorists do not understand either the Russian situation or the German situation [1].

Feeling unsure of its footing on the ice of Russian history, the Rote Fahne tries to approach the question from another angle. For Trotsky, only the National Socialists are fascists. "An exceptional situation, the dictatorial lowering of wages, the de facto prohibition of strikes... all this is not fascism for Trotsky. But all this our party must endure." The impotent fury of these people is disarming. Where and when did I propose to "endure" the Brüning government ? And what does "endure" even mean ? If it refers to parliamentary or extra-parliamentary support for the Brüning government, it’s shameful for communists to even speak of it. But in a broader, historical sense, you, you loudmouths, are forced to "endure" the Brüning government because you are too weak to overthrow it.

All the arguments that the Rote Fahne directs against me concerning German affairs could just as easily have been directed against the Bolsheviks in 1917. One could say : "For the Bolsheviks, Kornilov’s policy begins with Kornilov. But, in fact, isn’t Kerensky a Kornilovist ? Isn’t his policy aimed at crushing the revolution ? Isn’t he threatening the peasants with punitive expeditions ? Isn’t he organizing lockouts ? Isn’t Lenin in hiding ? And all this we have to put up with ?"

As far as I can recall, not a single Bolshevik dared to venture such an argument. But if one had, the response would have been something like this : "We accuse Kerensky of preparing and facilitating Kornilov’s rise to power. But does that absolve us of the obligation to respond to Kornilov’s offensive ? We accuse the doorman of half-opening the gates to the looter. But does that mean we should neglect the gate ?" Since the Brüning government, thanks to the benevolence of the Social Democrats, has plunged the proletariat up to its knees in capitulation to fascism, you conclude : up to the knees, up to the waist, or completely—isn’t it all the same ? No, it’s not the same. He who has sunk up to his knees in the swamp can still get out. But for someone who has sunk in up to their head, there is no hope of coming back out.

Lenin wrote about the ultra-left : "They speak very highly of us Bolsheviks. Sometimes one feels like saying to them : if you praised us less, you would understand Bolshevik tactics better and know them better !"

Notes

[1] All the other positions of this group are of the same caliber and present themselves as a repetition of the grossest errors of the Stalinist bureaucracy, accompanied by even more ultra-leftist grimaces. Fascism is already triumphant, Hitler is not an independent threat, and the workers do not want to fight. If this is the case, and if enough time remains, the theorists of the Roter Kämpfer should use this respite and read good books instead of writing bad articles. Long ago, Marx explained to Weitling that ignorance could not lead to good results.

7. Lessons from the Italian experience

Italian fascism arose directly from the uprising of the Italian proletariat, betrayed by the reformists. Since the end of the war, the revolutionary movement in Italy had been steadily gaining momentum and, in September 1920, culminated in the workers’ takeover of factories and mills. The dictatorship of the proletariat was a reality ; it simply needed to be organized and its consequences fully realized. Social democracy became frightened and retreated. After bold and heroic efforts, the proletariat found itself facing a void. The collapse of the revolutionary movement was the most important prerequisite for the rise of fascism. In September, the revolutionary offensive of the proletariat stalled ; by November, the first major attack by the fascists had taken place (the capture of Bologna).

In truth, the proletariat was still capable, after the September catastrophe, of waging defensive battles. But the Social Democrats had only one concern : to withdraw the workers from the fight at the cost of constant concessions. The Social Democrats hoped that a submissive attitude on the part of the workers would turn bourgeois "public opinion" against the fascists. Moreover, the reformists even counted on the support of Victor Emmanuel. Until the very last moment, they did everything in their power to dissuade the workers from fighting against Mussolini’s gangs. But this was to no avail. Following the lead of the upper bourgeoisie, the crown sided with the fascists. Having become convinced at the last minute that it was impossible to stop fascism through docility, the Social Democrats called on the workers to launch a general strike. But this call was a fiasco. The reformers had kept the powder wet for so long, fearing it would catch fire, that when they finally approached a lit match with a trembling hand, the powder did not catch fire.

Two years after its emergence, fascism was in power. It consolidated its position thanks to the fact that the first period of its domination coincided with a favorable economic climate, following the depression of 1921-1922. The fascists used the offensive force of the petty bourgeoisie to crush the retreating proletariat. But this did not happen immediately. Already in power, Mussolini proceeded cautiously : he did not yet have a ready-made model. For the first two years, even the constitution remained unchanged. The fascist government was a coalition. Fascist gangs, meanwhile, wielded sticks, knives, and revolvers. Only gradually was the fascist state created, which entailed the complete suppression of all independent mass organizations.

Mussolini achieved this result at the cost of the bureaucratization of the Fascist Party. After harnessing the offensive force of the petty bourgeoisie, Fascism strangled it in the vise of the bourgeois state. It could not act otherwise, for the disenchantment of the masses it had amassed was becoming its most immediate danger. Bureaucratized Fascism came remarkably close to other forms of military and police dictatorship. It no longer possessed its former social base. Fascism’s main reserve, the petty bourgeoisie, was exhausted. Only historical inertia allowed the Fascist state to maintain the proletariat in a state of dispersion and impotence. The balance of power shifted automatically in favor of the proletariat. This shift must lead to revolution. The defeat of Fascism would be one of the most catastrophic events in European history. But the facts prove that all these processes take time. The fascist state has been in place for ten years. How much longer will it last ? Without venturing to set a timeframe, one can confidently say that Hitler’s victory in Germany would mean another long reprieve for Mussolini. Hitler’s defeat would mark the beginning of the end for Mussolini.

In its policy toward Hitler, German social democracy did not invent a single word : it merely repeated, more emphatically, what the Italian reformists had accomplished in their time, albeit with greater temperament. The latter explained fascism as a postwar psychosis ; German social democracy saw it as a "Versailles" psychosis, or even a psychosis of crisis. In both cases, the reformists turned a blind eye to the organic nature of fascism, as a mass movement born of imperialist decline.

Fearing revolutionary mobilization of the workers, the Italian reformists placed all their hopes in the "State." Their rallying cry was : "Victor Emmanuel, intervene !" German social democracy does not have such a democratic resource as a monarch faithful to the constitution. Well, it must be content with a president. "Hindenburg, intervene !"

In the struggle against Mussolini—that is, in the retreat before him—Turati coined the brilliant phrase : "One must have the courage to be a coward." The German reformists are less frivolous in their slogans. They demand "courage to endure unpopularity" (Mut zur Unpopularität). It’s the same thing. One shouldn’t fear unpopularity when one cowardly accommodates oneself to the enemy.

The same causes produce the same effects. If the course of events depended solely on the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, Hitler’s career would be assured.

However, it must be acknowledged that, for its part, the German Communist Party did not learn much from the Italian experience.

The Italian Communist Party emerged almost simultaneously with fascism. But the same conditions of revolutionary retreat that brought fascism to power hampered the development of the Communist Party. It failed to grasp the magnitude of the fascist danger, clung to revolutionary illusions, was irreconcilably opposed to the united front policy, in short, suffered from all the typical growing pains. This is hardly surprising : it was only two years old. It saw fascism as nothing more than "capitalist reaction." The Communist Party failed to discern the specific characteristics of fascism, which stem from the mobilization of the petty bourgeoisie against the proletariat. According to information from my Italian friends, with the sole exception of Gramsci, the Communist Party did not believe a fascist seizure of power was possible. Since the proletarian revolution had been defeated, since capitalism had held firm, and since the counter-revolution had triumphed, what counter-revolutionary coup could possibly still occur ? The bourgeoisie cannot rise up against itself ! This was the fundamental political orientation of the Italian Communist Party. However, it must not be forgotten that Italian fascism was then a new phenomenon, still in its formative stages : it would have been difficult even for a more experienced party to discern its specific characteristics.

The leadership of the German Communist Party today reproduces almost verbatim the initial position of Italian communism : fascism is merely capitalist reaction ; the differences between the various forms of capitalist reaction are irrelevant from the proletariat’s point of view. This vulgar radicalism is all the less excusable given that the German party is much older than the Italian party was at the same time ; moreover, Marxism has been enriched today by Italy’s tragic experience. To assert that fascism is already in place or to deny the very possibility of its coming to power amounts to the same thing politically. Ignoring the specific nature of fascism can only paralyze the will to fight against it.

The primary blame obviously lies with the leadership of the Communist International. Italian communists, more than any others, should have raised their voices to warn against these errors. But Stalin and Manuilsky forced them to disregard the most important lessons of their own defeat. We have seen how hastily Ercoli hastened to abandon the positions of social fascism, that is, the positions of passively awaiting a fascist victory in Germany.

International social democracy long consoled itself by saying that Bolshevism was conceivable only in a backward country. It then applied the same assertion to fascism. German social democracy must now understand, at its own expense, the falsity of this consolation : its petty-bourgeois fellow travelers have joined, and continue to join, the fascist camp, while the workers are leaving it for the Communist Party. Only fascism and Bolshevism are developing in Germany. Although Russia, on the one hand, and Italy, on the other, are infinitely more backward countries than Germany, both have nevertheless served as arenas for the development of political movements characteristic of imperialist capitalism. Advanced Germany must reproduce the processes that are already complete in Russia and Italy. The fundamental problem of German development can now be formulated as follows : to follow the Russian path or the Italian path ?

Obviously, this does not mean that Germany’s highly developed social structure is unimportant for the future of Bolshevism and Fascism. Italy is, to a greater extent than Germany, a petty-bourgeois and peasant country. It suffices to recall that in Germany there are 9.8 million people working in agriculture and forestry, and 18.5 million in industry and commerce—almost twice as many. In Italy, for every 10.3 million people working in agriculture and forestry, there are 6.4 million working in industry and commerce. These raw, aggregate figures still fall far short of conveying the significant specific weight of the proletariat in the life of the German nation. Even the enormous number of unemployed is proof, in reverse, of the social power of the German proletariat. The key is to translate this power into revolutionary political terms.

The last major defeat of the German proletariat, which can be placed on the same historical level as the September Days in Italy, dates back to 1923. During the eight years that followed, many wounds healed, and a new generation arose. The Communist Party of Germany represents an infinitely greater force than the Italian communists did in 1922. The specific weight of the proletariat ; the considerable length of time that has passed since its last defeat ; and the immense strength of the Communist Party—these are the three advantages that are of enormous importance in the overall assessment of the situation and the prospects.

But to use these advantages, one must understand them. Which is not the case. Thaelmann’s position in 1932 mirrors Bordiga’s position in 1922. It is on this point that the danger becomes particularly grave. But here, too, there is an additional advantage that did not exist ten years ago. Within the ranks of the German revolutionaries, there is a Marxist opposition that draws upon the experience of the last decade. This opposition is numerically small, but events are giving its voice exceptional force. Under certain conditions, a slight push can trigger an avalanche. The critical impetus of the left-wing opposition can contribute to a timely change in the policy of the proletarian vanguard. This is what our task boils down to today !

8. Through the United Front – towards the Soviets, Supreme Organs of the United Front

The veneration of Soviets in words is as widespread in "left-wing" circles as the misunderstanding of their historical function. Soviets are most often defined as the organs of the struggle for power, the organs of the uprising, and finally, the organs of dictatorship. These definitions are formally correct. But they do not exhaust the historical function of Soviets. And above all, they do not explain why Soviets are precisely what is necessary in the struggle for power. The answer to this question is as follows : just as the trade union is the elementary form of the united front in the economic struggle, so too is the Soviet the highest form of the united front when the time comes for the proletariat to struggle for power.

The Soviet itself possesses no miraculous power. It is merely the class representative of the proletariat, with all its strengths and weaknesses. But it is precisely this, and only this, that makes the Soviet the organizational possibility for workers of different political tendencies and at different stages of development to unite their efforts in the revolutionary struggle for power. In the current pre-revolutionary situation, the vanguard German workers must have a very clear understanding of the historical function of the Soviets as organs of the united front.

If, during the preparatory period, the Communist Party had succeeded in completely eliminating all other parties from the ranks of the proletariat, and in gathering under its banner, both politically and organizationally, the overwhelming majority of workers, the Soviets would be of no necessity.

But, as historical experience proves, there is no reason to believe that the Communist Party, in any country whatsoever - in countries with an old capitalist culture even less than in backward countries - succeeds in occupying such a totally hegemonic position within the working class, especially before the proletarian revolution.

Present-day Germany shows us precisely that the task of the direct and immediate struggle for power confronts the proletariat long before it is fully united under the banner of the Communist Party. The revolutionary situation, at the political level, is characterized precisely by the fact that all groups and all strata of the proletariat, or at least their overwhelming majority, aspire to unite their efforts to change the existing regime. However, this does not mean that all understand how to proceed, and even less that they are ready to break with their parties and join the ranks of the Communist Party. Political consciousness does not mature in such a linear and uniform way ; profound internal differences persist even in revolutionary times when all processes occur in leaps and bounds. But at the same time, the need for an organization above parties, encompassing the entire class, becomes particularly pressing. Giving form to this need is the historical mission of the Soviets. This is their immense role. In a revolutionary situation, they are the highest organizational expression of proletarian unity. Anyone who hasn’t grasped this has completely misunderstood the Soviet question. Thaelmann, Neumann, and Remmele can give all the speeches and write all the articles they want about the future "Soviet Germany." But their current policies are sabotaging the creation of Soviets in Germany.

Being so far removed from events, not knowing directly what the masses are feeling, and lacking the ability to take the pulse of the working class on a daily basis, it is very difficult for me to foresee the transitional forms that will lead to the creation of Soviets in Germany. Furthermore, I have suggested that Soviets could be an extension of factory committees : in saying this, I relied primarily on the experience of 1923. But it is clear that this is not the only path. Under the pressure of unemployment and poverty on the one hand, and under the fascist pressure on the other, the need for revolutionary unity may take the direct form of Soviets, bypassing factory committees. But whatever path leads to Soviets, they will be nothing other than the organizational expression of the proletariat’s strengths and weaknesses, its internal differences, and its general aspiration to overcome them—in short, the organs of the united class front.

In Germany, the Social Democrats and the Communist Party share influence over the majority of the working class. The Social Democratic leadership does everything it can to alienate the workers. The Communist Party leadership opposes the influx of workers with all its might. This results in the emergence of a third party, accompanied by a relatively slow shift in the balance of power in favor of the Communists. Even if the Communist Party were to pursue a correct policy, the need for revolutionary class unity would grow among the workers far more rapidly than the Communist Party’s dominance within the class. The necessity of establishing Soviets would thus remain fully apparent.

The creation of Soviets presupposes the agreement of the various parties and organizations of the working class, beginning with the factories ; this agreement must cover both the necessity of Soviets and the timing and method of their formation. This means : Soviets are the fully realized form of the united front in the revolutionary era, and their emergence must be preceded by the policy of the united front in the preparatory period.

Is it necessary to reiterate that during the first six months of 1917 in Russia, it was the conciliators, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and Mensheviks who held the majority in the Soviets ? The Bolshevik party, without for a moment relinquishing its revolutionary independence as a party, simultaneously respected organizational discipline in relation to the majority within the framework of Soviet activity. It is clear that in Germany, the Communist Party will occupy a much more prominent position than the Bolsheviks did in the Soviets in March 1917, from the very establishment of the first Soviet. It is entirely possible that the Communists will very quickly gain a majority in the Soviets. This will in no way diminish their significance as instruments of a united front, since, initially, the minority—the Social Democrats, the non-party members, the Catholic workers, etc.—will be largely absent. - will still number in the millions, and the surest way to ruin yourself, even in the most revolutionary situation, is to disregard such a minority. But all that is the music of the future. Today, the Communist Party is the minority. That’s where we must start.

What has been said does not, of course, mean that the path to Soviets necessarily requires a prior agreement with Wels, Hilferding, Breitscheid, etc. In 1918, Hilferding wondered how to include Soviets in the Weimar Constitution without harming it ; one might think that his mind is currently occupied with the following problem : how to include fascist barracks in the Weimar Constitution without harming Social Democracy ? The creation of Soviets must be carried out when the general condition of the proletariat allows it, even if this is against the will of the Social Democratic leadership. To achieve this, it is necessary to detach the Social Democratic base from the leadership : but this goal cannot be achieved by pretending it has already been accomplished. To detach millions of Social Democratic workers from their reactionary leaders, it is precisely necessary to show these workers that we are ready to enter the Soviets even with these "leaders."

However, we cannot consider as excluded a priori the fact that even the upper stratum of social democracy will be forced to step onto the white-hot plate of the Soviets, to try to repeat the maneuver of Ebert, Scheidemann, Haase and Co. in 1918-1919 : everything will depend, then, less on the ill will of these gentlemen than on the force and conditions in which history will seize them in its pincers.

The emergence of the first significant local Soviet, in which Social Democratic and Communist workers would be present not as individuals but as organizations, would have a considerable effect on the entire German working class. Not only Social Democratic and non-party workers, but also liberal and Catholic workers, would not be able to resist this centripetal force for long. All parts of the German proletariat, especially those most inclined and capable of organizing, would be drawn to the Soviets like metal filings to a magnet. The Communist Party would find in the Soviets a new and exceptionally favorable battleground for achieving a leading role in the proletarian revolution. It can be considered certain that the overwhelming majority of Social Democratic workers, and even a significant portion of the Social Democratic apparatus, would be drawn into the Soviets immediately, if the leadership of the Communist Party were not so zealous in helping the Social Democratic leaders to halt the pressure from the masses.

If the Communist Party deems unacceptable any agreement with factory committees, social-democratic organizations, trade unions, etc., on a specific program of practical tasks, this means only that it deems unacceptable to create Soviets with social democracy. Since there can be no strictly communist Soviets, as they would be of no use to anyone, the Communist Party’s rejection of agreements and joint actions with other working-class parties means nothing other than the rejection of Soviets altogether.

The Rote Fahne will likely respond to this reasoning with a barrage of insults and will prove, as if by magic, that I am Brüning’s election agent, Wels’s secret ally, and so on. I am ready to take responsibility for all these articles, but on one condition : that the Rote Fahne, for its part, explain to the German workers how, when, and in what form Soviets can be created in Germany without the united front policy towards other workers’ organizations.

To shed light on the question of the Soviets, as organs of the united front, the reflections offered on this subject by one of the Communist Party’s provincial newspapers, the Klassenkampf (Halle-Mersenburg), are very instructive. "All workers’ organizations," the newspaper ironically remarks, "in their present form, with all their errors and weaknesses, must be united in broad defensive anti-fascist alliances. What does this mean ? We can dispense with lengthy theoretical explanations ; history has been the harsh teacher of the German working class on this matter : the crushing of the 1918-1919 revolution was the price the German working class paid for the united front of all workers’ organizations, which was nothing but a formless mass." Here we have an unparalleled example of superficial chatter !

The united front of 1918-1919 was essentially achieved through the Soviets. Should the Spartacists have joined the Soviets or not ? If we take this quote literally, they should have remained separate from the Soviets. But since the Spartacists represented a small minority of the working class and could not possibly replace the Social Democrats with their own Soviets, their isolation from the Soviets would simply have meant their isolation from the revolution. If the united front had this appearance of a "formless mass," the fault lay not with the Soviets as organs of the united front, but with the political state of the working class itself—that is, with the weakness of the Spartacist Union and the extraordinary strength of the Social Democrats. Generally speaking, the united front cannot replace a powerful revolutionary party. It can only help to strengthen it. This applies equally to the Soviets. The fear of the weak Spartacist Union of missing an exceptional opportunity drove it to ultra-leftist actions and premature interventions. Conversely, if the Spartacists had remained outside the united front, that is, the Soviets, these negative traits would undoubtedly have been even more pronounced.

Have these people truly learned nothing from the experience of the German revolution of 1918-1919 ? Have they even read *Childhood Illness* ? The Stalinist regime truly wreaked havoc on minds ! After bureaucratizing the Soviets in the USSR, the epigones now consider them a mere technical instrument in the hands of the party apparatus. They have forgotten that the Soviets were created as workers’ parliaments, and that they attracted the masses because they offered the possibility of bringing together all sections of the working class, regardless of party affiliation ; they have forgotten that this is precisely where the gigantic educational and revolutionary power of the Soviets lay. Everything is forgotten, confused, distorted. Oh, thrice-cursed epigones ! The problem of the relationship between the party and the Soviets is of decisive importance for revolutionary policy. The current course of the Communist Party is, in fact, aimed at substituting the party for the Soviets ; However, Hugo Urbahns, never missing an opportunity to increase the confusion, is preparing to replace the party with Soviets. According to the report published by the SAZ, Urbahns declared at a meeting held in Berlin in January, while criticizing the Communist Party’s claims to lead the working class : "Leadership will be in the hands of the Soviets, elected by the masses themselves and not chosen according to the will and whim of a single party" (massive approval). It is perfectly understandable that the Communist Party’s ultimacity irritates the workers, who are inclined to applaud any protest against bureaucratic bluster. But this does not change the fact that Urbahns’s position on this issue, too, has nothing in common with Marxism. It is indisputable that the workers "themselves" will elect the Soviets. The only question is whom they will elect. We must enter the Soviets along with all other organizations, whatever they may be, with "all their errors and weaknesses." But to think that the Soviets can "on their own" lead the proletariat’s struggle for power amounts to propagating a crude fetishism of the Soviet. Everything depends on the party that leads the Soviets. That is why, unlike Urbahns, the Bolshevik-Leninists do not deny the Communist Party the right to lead the Soviets ; on the contrary, they declare : only on the basis of the united front, only through mass organizations, can the Communist Party achieve a leading position in the future Soviets and lead the proletariat to the conquest of power.

(....)

11. The contradiction between the economic successes of the USSR and the bureaucratization of the regime

It is impossible to lay the foundations for a revolutionary policy in "a single country." The problem of the German revolution is currently inextricably linked to the question of political leadership in the USSR. This link must be understood in all its consequences.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is the response to the resistance of the propertied classes. The limitations placed on freedoms stem from the military regime of the revolution, that is, from the conditions of class warfare. From this perspective, it is quite clear that the internal consolidation of the Soviet Republic, its economic growth, the weakening of bourgeois resistance, and above all, the successful "liquidation" of the last capitalist class, the kulaks, should lead to the flourishing of democracy within the party, the trade unions, and the Soviets.

The Stalinists never tire of repeating that "we have already entered socialism," that the current collectivization in itself marks the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, and that the next Five-Year Plan must bring these processes to their conclusion. If this is so, why has this process led to the total crushing of the party, the trade unions, and the Soviets by the bureaucratic apparatus, which, in turn, has taken on the character of Bonapartism in its publicity ? Why, during the famine and the civil war, did the party thrive so intensely, why did it never occur to anyone to question whether or not one could criticize Lenin or the Central Committee as a whole, whereas now the slightest disagreement with Stalin leads to expulsion from the party and repressive administrative measures ?

The threat of war from imperialist states cannot in any way explain, much less justify, the development of bureaucratic despotism. When classes are more or less liquidated in a national socialist society, this marks the beginning of the withering away of the state. If a socialist society can mount a victorious resistance against an external enemy, it does so as a socialist society, not as a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and even less as a state of the dictatorship of the bureaucracy.

But we are not talking about the withering away of the dictatorship : it is still too early because we have not yet "entered socialism." We are talking about something else. We are asking : what explains the bureaucratic degeneration of the dictatorship ? Where does this glaring, monstrous, terrifying contradiction come from, between the successes of socialist construction and the regime of personal dictatorship that relies on an impersonal apparatus, that holds the country’s ruling class by the throat ? How can we explain that politics and the economy are developing in completely opposite directions ?

The economic successes are very significant. The October Revolution has already been fully justified from an economic standpoint. The high rates of economic growth are irrefutable proof that socialist methods offer an immense advantage, even for accomplishing production tasks that, in the West, have been resolved using capitalist methods. Will not the benefits of a socialist economy in advanced countries be tremendous ?

However, the question posed by the October Revolution is not yet resolved, even in draft form.

The Stalinist bureaucracy labels the economy "socialist" based on its premises and tendencies. But this is not enough. The economic successes of the Soviet Union are occurring on a still underdeveloped economic foundation. Nationalized industry is going through stages that advanced capitalist nations have long since passed through. The working woman in line has her own criterion for socialism, and this criterion of the "consumer," to use the bureaucrat’s contemptuous expression, is in reality quite decisive. In the conflict between the worker’s perspective and that of the bureaucrat, we, the Left Opposition, stand with the worker against the bureaucrat who exaggerates the achievements, glosses over the accumulating contradictions, and holds a knife to the worker’s throat to prevent her from criticizing.

Last year, we abruptly shifted from equal pay to differentiated (piece-rate) wages. It is undeniable that the principle of equal pay for labor is unrealizable when the level of productive forces, and consequently of culture in general, is low. This also implies that the problem of socialism is not resolved solely at the level of social forms of property ownership, but presupposes a certain level of technological power within society. However, the growth of technological power inevitably causes productive forces to spill over national borders.

By reverting to piece-rate wages, which had been prematurely abolished, the bureaucracy labeled equal pay a "kulak" principle. This is a blatant absurdity that reveals the depths of hypocrisy and lies into which the Stalinists have sunk. In fact, they should have said : "We have advanced too quickly with egalitarian methods of remunerating labor ; we are still far from socialism ; we are still poor, and we must return to semi-capitalist or kulak methods." Let us reiterate that there is no contradiction here with the socialist objective. There is only an irreconcilable contradiction with the bureaucratic falsification of reality.

The return to piece-rate wages is a consequence of the resistance posed by economic underdevelopment. Many more such setbacks are likely, especially in agriculture where excessive administrative progress has been made.

Industrialization and collectivization are carried out using unilateral, uncontrolled, and bureaucratic methods of command that bypass the working masses. Trade unions are deprived of any possibility of influencing the relationship between consumption and accumulation. Differentiation within the peasantry has been temporarily eliminated, less economically than administratively. The social measures taken by the bureaucracy regarding the liquidation of classes are terribly ahead of the fundamental process of the development of the productive forces.

This leads to an increase in industrial production costs, low production quality, higher prices, shortages of consumer goods, and raises the threat of a resurgence of unemployment.

The extreme tension in the country’s political atmosphere stemmed from the contradictions between the growth of the Soviet economy and the economic policies of the bureaucracy, which was sometimes monstrously behind the economy’s needs (1923-1928), and at other times, frightened by its own backwardness, embarked on a desperate attempt to catch up with purely administrative measures (1928-1932). Here too, a leftward zigzag followed a rightward one. With these two zigzags, the bureaucracy repeatedly found itself at odds with economic realities and, consequently, with the workers’ state of mind. It could not tolerate their criticism, neither when it was lagging behind nor when it was rushing ahead.

The bureaucracy can exert its pressure on workers and peasants only by depriving them of the opportunity to participate in solving the problems of their own work and their entire future. This is where the greatest danger lies. The constant fear of mass resistance creates a political "short circuit" of personal and bureaucratic dictatorship.

Does this imply that the pace of industrialization and collectivization must be slowed ? For a certain period, undoubtedly. But this period may be short-lived. The participation of workers in the management of the country, its politics, and its economy ; real control over the bureaucracy ; and a growing sense of responsibility among leaders toward those they lead—all of this can only have a beneficial influence on production, reduce internal friction, minimize costly economic fluctuations, ensure a healthier distribution of forces and resources, and ultimately increase the overall growth rate. Soviet democracy is a vital necessity, especially for the economy. Conversely, bureaucracy harbors tragic economic surprises.

Looking broadly at the history of the epigone period in the development of the USSR, it is easy to conclude that the fundamental political premise of the regime’s bureaucratization was the weariness of the masses following the upheavals of the revolution and the civil war. Famine and epidemics raged across the country. Political issues took a back seat. Everyone’s thoughts were fixated on a piece of bread. During War Communism, everyone received the same starvation ration. The transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP) brought the first economic successes. The rations became more plentiful, but not everyone received them. The establishment of a market economy led to the calculation of production costs, basic rationalization, and the dismissal of surplus workers from factories. These economic successes were accompanied for a long period by rising unemployment.

It must not be forgotten for a moment that the strengthening of the apparatus’s power relied on unemployment. After years of famine, the reserve army of the unemployed terrified all the machine-working proletarians. The removal of independent and critical workers from the factories, and the blacklisting of opposition figures, became one of the most important and effective instruments in the hands of the Stalinist bureaucracy. Without this circumstance, it would not have succeeded in stifling Lenin’s party.

Subsequent economic successes gradually led to the depletion of the reserve army of industrial workers (the hidden overpopulation of villages, masked by collectivization, remains acutely apparent). The industrial worker no longer fears being dismissed from the factory. His daily experience teaches him that the shortsightedness and arbitrariness of the bureaucracy have considerably complicated the resolution of his problems. The Soviet press denounces certain workshops and enterprises where not enough room is given to workers’ initiative, their inventiveness, etc. : as if the initiative of the proletariat could be confined to the workshops, as if the workshops could be oases of productive democracy, when in reality the proletariat is crushed within the party, the Soviets, and the trade unions.

The general condition of the proletariat today is quite different from what it was in 1922-1923. The proletariat has grown both numerically and culturally. Having accomplished a monumental amount of work, which is at the root of the regeneration and growth of the economy, the workers feel their self-confidence returning and increasing. This heightened self-confidence is beginning to transform into discontent with the bureaucratic regime.

The suppression of the party, the flourishing of personal rule, and the rise of arbitrary power might give the impression of a weakening of the Soviet system. But this is not the case. The Soviet system has been considerably strengthened. At the same time, the contradiction between this system and the bureaucratic stranglehold has significantly worsened. The Stalinist apparatus is watching with terror as economic successes do not strengthen but, on the contrary, undermine its position. In the struggle to maintain its power, it is already forced to tighten the screws, prohibiting any form of "self-criticism" other than Byzantine praise for its leaders.

This is not the first time in history that economic development has clashed with the political situation in which it occurred. But it is crucial to understand precisely what conditions are generating this discontent. The rising wave of opposition is in no way directed against the socialist state, Soviet structures, or the Communist Party. The discontent is directed against the apparatus and its personification, Stalin. This explains the recent outbreak of a fierce campaign against so-called "Trotskyist smuggling."

The adversary is likely to be elusive ; he is everywhere and nowhere. He emerges in workshops, in schools, insinuates himself into historical journals and all textbooks. This means that facts and documents confound the bureaucracy, revealing its inconsistencies and errors. The past cannot be recalled calmly and objectively ; it must be rewritten, every crack through which suspicion can creep regarding the infallibility of the apparatus and its leader must be plugged. We have before us all the hallmarks of a ruling class that has lost its mind. Yaroslavsky, Yaroslavsky himself, has proven unreliable ! These are not chance incidents, mere details, or personal conflicts : the crux of the matter is that the economic successes, which initially strengthened the bureaucracy, are now, due to the dialectic of their development, at odds with the bureaucracy. It is for this reason that at the last party conference, that is to say at the congress of the Stalinist apparatus, Trotskyism, thrice beaten and crushed, was declared "vanguard of the bourgeois counter-revolution".

This stupid and politically ludicrous resolution sheds light on some of Stalin’s very "practical" plans for settling personal scores. It’s not for nothing that Lenin warned the party against appointing Stalin as General Secretary : "This cook can only cook spicy dishes..." And this cook hasn’t yet exhausted his culinary repertoire.

Despite the tightening of theoretical and administrative controls, Stalin’s personal dictatorship is clearly nearing its end. The apparatus is completely fractured. The Yaroslavsky crack is just one of hundreds of cracks that today remain unnamed. The fact that this new political crisis is ripening on the basis of the manifest and undeniable successes of the Soviet economy, the growth of the proletariat, and the initial successes of collectivized agriculture is sufficient guarantee that the liquidation of bureaucratic despotism will coincide not with a collapse of the Soviet system, as might have been feared just three or four years ago, but rather with its liberation, its growth, its flourishing.

But it is precisely in its later period that the Stalinist bureaucracy is capable of doing the most harm. The question of its prestige has become its central political issue. If apolitical historians are excluded from the party solely because they failed to celebrate Stalin’s exploits in 1917, can the plebiscitary regime admit to acknowledging the errors committed in 1931-1932 ? Can it renounce the theory of social fascism ? Can it disavow Stalin, who summed up the heart of the German problem in the following formula : let the fascists come to power first, and then our turn will come ?

The objective conditions in Germany are so imperative that if the leadership of the German Communist Party possessed the necessary freedom of action, it would undoubtedly have already turned to us. But it is not free. While the Left Opposition is promoting the ideas and slogans of Bolshevism, validated by the victory of 1917, the Stalinist clique is ordering by telegram the launch of an international campaign against "Trotskyism." The campaign is being waged not on the basis of the problems of the German revolution, which is a matter of life or death for the world proletariat, but on the basis of a paltry and falsifying article by Stalin on matters of Bolshevism’s history. It is difficult to imagine a greater disproportion between the tasks at hand and the meager ideological resources of the official leadership. Such is the humiliating, undignified, and profoundly tragic situation of the Communist International.

The problem of the Stalinist regime and the problem of the German revolution are inextricably linked. Future events will either unravel or resolve this link in the interests of both the Russian and German revolutions.

13. The strike strategy

On the trade union question, the Communist leadership definitively muddled the party. The general aim of the "third period" was to create parallel unions. The assumption was that the mass movement would overwhelm the existing organizations and that the organs of the RGO (Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition) would become the initiative committees for the economic struggle. To carry out this plan, only one tiny detail was missing : the mass movement. During spring floods, the water sweeps away a great many barricades. Let’s try removing the barricade, decided Lozovsky ; perhaps the spring waters will start flowing.

The reformist unions resisted. The Communist Party excluded itself from the factories. As a result, it was decided to make some partial adjustments to union policy. The Communist Party refused to call on unorganized workers to join the reformist unions. But it also opposed leaving the unions. While creating parallel organizations, it revived the slogan of struggle within the reformist organizations in order to gain influence there. The whole system is a model of self-sabotage.

The Rote Fahne complains that many communists consider it pointless to participate in reformist unions. "What’s the point of reviving this business ?" they declare. And indeed : what is the purpose ? If the serious aim is to seize control of the old unions, then the unorganized must be called upon to join : it is the new strata that can create a base for a left wing. But in this case, parallel unions—that is, a competing agency for recruiting workers—must not be created.

The leadership’s policy toward reformist trade unions reaches the same heights of confusion as on other issues. The Rote Fahne of January 28th criticized the communist activists of the Düsseldorf metalworkers’ union for promoting the slogan of "ruthless struggle against the participation of union leaders" in supporting the Brüning government. These opportunistic demands are unacceptable because they presuppose (!) that the reformists are likely to renounce support for Brüning and his emergency laws. Frankly, it all sounds like a bad joke ! The Rote Fahne believes it is sufficient to heap insults upon the leaders, but unacceptable to subject them to the political test of the masses.

However, reformist unions currently offer an extraordinarily favorable field of action. The Social Democratic Party still has the opportunity to deceive workers with its political rhetoric ; on the other hand, the dead end of capitalism stands before the unions like a prison wall. The 200,000 or 300,000 workers organized in independent red unions can become a valuable catalyst within the reformist unions.

At the end of January, a communist conference of works councils from across the country was held in Berlin. The Rote Fahne (Red Flag) published the following report : "Works Councils Forge the Red Workers’ Front" (February 2). One would search in vain for information on the composition of the conference, or on the number of workers and businesses represented. Unlike the Bolsheviks, who meticulously and publicly recorded every shift in the balance of power within the working class, the German Stalinists, imitating their Russian counterparts, are playing a game of hide-and-seek. They refuse to acknowledge that the communist works councils represent only 4% of the total, compared to 84% for the Social Democrats ! The assessment of the "third period" policy is contained in this report. Will labeling the isolation of communists within businesses a "united red front" actually improve matters ?

The prolonged crisis of capitalism is drawing the most painful and dangerous dividing line within the proletariat : between those who work and the unemployed. The fact that reformists are predominant in the workplaces, and communists among the unemployed, paralyzes both parts of the proletariat. Those who have jobs can wait longer. The unemployed are more impatient. Today, their impatience has a revolutionary character. But if the Communist Party fails to find the forms and slogans of struggle that, by uniting the unemployed and those who work, will open the prospect of a revolutionary outcome, the impatience of the unemployed will inevitably turn against the Communist Party.

In 1917, despite the Bolshevik party’s political correctness and the rapid development of the revolution, the most disadvantaged and impatient segments of the proletariat, even in Petrograd as early as September-October, began to turn away from Bolshevism and toward the syndicalists and anarchists. Had the October Revolution not erupted in time, the disintegration of the proletariat would have become acute and would have led to the revolution’s decay. In Germany, the anarchists are useless : the National Socialists can take their place, combining anarchist demagoguery with their openly reactionary aims.

The workers are by no means immune once and for all from the influence of the fascists. The proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie appear as communicating vessels, especially in the present conditions, when the reserve army of the proletariat cannot help but supply small shopkeepers, peddlers, etc., and the enraged petty bourgeoisie, proletarians and lumpenproletarians.

Employees, technical and administrative staff, and certain levels of civil servants were once a significant pillar of social democracy. Today, these elements have either shifted or are shifting to the National Socialists. They may, if they haven’t already begun to do so, draw the working-class elite along with them. In this way, National Socialism penetrates the proletariat from above.

However, its potential penetration from below, that is, through the unemployed, is far more dangerous. No class can live long without prospects and hope. The unemployed are not a class, but they already constitute a very compact and stable social stratum, which is trying in vain to escape unbearable living conditions. If it is true, in general, that only proletarian revolution can save Germany from decay and disintegration, this is true first and foremost for the millions of unemployed.

Given the Communist Party’s weakness in businesses and unions, its numerical growth solves nothing. In a nation shaken by crisis and riddled with contradictions, a far-left party can find tens of thousands of new supporters, especially if the entire party apparatus is, for the sake of "competition," focused exclusively on individual recruitment. What is decisive is the relationship between the party and the working class. A communist worker elected to a factory committee or to the leadership of their union is more important than thousands of new members, recruited here and there, joining the party today only to leave tomorrow.

But this individual influx of new members will not last forever. If it persists in postponing the struggle until it has definitively ousted the reformists, the Communist Party will soon realize that at a certain point, social democracy will cease to lose influence to the Communist Party and that, conversely, the fascists will begin to demoralize the unemployed, the Communist Party’s main base. A political party cannot with impunity refrain from mobilizing its forces for the tasks arising from the situation. The Communist Party is striving to trigger sectoral strikes to pave the way for a mass struggle. Successes in this area are meager. As always, the Stalinists are preoccupied with self-criticism : "We don’t yet know how to organize...", "we don’t yet know how to lead...", moreover, "we" always means "you." The theory of the infamous March Days of 1921 is making a reappearance ; To "electrify" the proletariat through offensive actions by minority groups. But the workers have no need to be "electrified." They want to be given clear perspectives and to be helped to create the beginnings of a mass movement.

In their strategy of strikes, it is clear that the Communist Party relies on isolated quotations from Lenin, as interpreted by Lozovsky and Manuilsky. Certainly, there were periods when the Mensheviks fought against "strike mania," while the Bolsheviks spearheaded each new strike, drawing ever-larger masses into the movement. This coincided with a period of awakening of new strata of the working class. Such was the Bolsheviks’ tactic in 1905, during the period of industrial expansion that preceded the war, in the early months of the February Revolution.

But in the period immediately preceding October, from the conflict of July 1917, the tactics of the Bolsheviks were different : they did not push for strikes, they restrained them because each major strike tended to turn into a decisive confrontation, while the political premises were not yet ripe.

This did not prevent them, during these months, from taking the lead in all the strikes that broke out despite their warnings, mainly in the most backward sectors of industry (textiles, leather, etc.).

While the Bolsheviks boldly launched strikes in the interest of the revolution under certain conditions, they also prevented workers from striking under other conditions, again in the interest of the revolution. In this area, as in all others, there is no ready-made formula. The strike tactics for each period were always part of a comprehensive strategy, and the connection between the part and the whole was clear to the vanguard workers.

What is the current situation in Germany ? Workers who have jobs are not resisting wage cuts because they fear the unemployed. This is hardly surprising : when there are several million unemployed, the traditional strike, organized by unions, is a hopeless struggle. It is doubly doomed when there is political antagonism between the unemployed and those who have jobs. This does not preclude sectoral strikes, particularly in the most backward sectors of industry. On the other hand, it is the workers in the most important sectors who, in such a situation, are most inclined to listen to the voice of reformist leaders. Attempts by the Communist Party to trigger a strike without changing the overall situation within the proletariat amount to little more than small partisan operations which, even if successful, have no lasting impact.

According to accounts from communist workers (see, for example, *Der rote Aufbau*), many workers in factories declare that sectoral strikes are currently meaningless, that only a general strike can lift workers out of poverty. "General strike" here means "prospects for struggle." Workers are all the less enthusiastic about sectoral strikes because they are directly confronted by state power : monopoly capital speaks to workers in the language of Brüning’s exceptional laws [1].

At the dawn of the workers’ movement, agitators often refrained from developing revolutionary and socialist perspectives so as not to frighten the workers they sought to draw into a strike. Today, the situation is entirely the opposite. The leading strata of German workers can only decide to participate in an economic struggle if the general prospects of the coming struggle are clear to them. They do not find these prospects with the communist leadership.

Regarding the tactics of the March 1921 uprisings in Germany ("electrifying" the minority of the proletariat instead of winning over the majority), the author of these lines declared at the Third Congress : "When the overwhelming majority of the working class does not find itself in the movement, does not sympathize with it, or even doubts its success, when the minority, on the other hand, rushes forward and mechanically tries to push the workers into strikes, in that case this impatient minority, in the person of the party, can come into conflict with the working class and break its head in the process."

Should we then abandon the strike as a form of struggle ? No, not abandon it, but create the essential political and organizational foundations. Restoring union unity is one of them. The reformist bureaucracy naturally opposes this. Until now, the split has secured it the best possible position. But the direct threat of fascism is changing the situation within the unions, to the great disadvantage of the bureaucracy. The desire for unity is growing. Leipart’s clique can still try, in the current situation, to refuse to restore unity : this will double or triple the influence of the communists within the unions. If unity is achieved, so much the better ; a wide field of activity will open up before the communists. We need no half-measures, but a radical shift !

Without a broad campaign against the high cost of living, for a reduction in the working week, against wage cuts, without the participation of the unemployed in this struggle, without the application of the united front policy, small, improvised strikes will never lead to a unified struggle.

Left-wing social democrats speak of the necessity, "in the event of fascists coming to power," of resorting to a general strike. It is quite possible that Leipart himself makes such threats behind closed doors. The Rote Fahne refers to this as Luxemburgism. This is slandering the great revolutionary. While Rosa Luxemburg may have overestimated the specific importance of the general strike in the question of power, she understood perfectly well that one should not call for a general strike arbitrarily, that it is prepared by the entire previous trajectory of the workers’ movement, by the policies of the party and the unions. In the mouths of left-wing social democrats, the general strike is above all a comforting myth that allows them to escape the grim reality.

For many years, French social democrats promised to resort to a general strike in the event of war. The Basel Congress of 1912 even promised to resort to a revolutionary uprising. But the threat of a strike and an uprising was, in both cases, nothing more than a farcical bombast. It is not at all a question of the opposition between a strike and an uprising, but rather of an abstract, formal, purely verbal attitude toward both. The pre-war, Bebelian social democrat was a reformist, armed with the abstract concept of revolution ; the post-war reformist, brandishing the threat of a general strike, is already a veritable caricature.

The communist leadership’s attitude toward the general strike is, of course, much more serious. But it lacks clarity, even on this issue. Yet clarity is essential. The general strike is a very important means of struggle, but it is not a universal remedy. There are situations where the general strike risks weakening the workers more than their direct enemy. The strike must be an important element of strategic calculation, but not a panacea in which all strategy is lost.

Generally speaking, the general strike is the instrument of struggle of the weak against the strong, or, more precisely, of the one who, at the beginning of the struggle, feels the weakest against the one he considers the strongest : when I personally cannot use an important instrument, I at least try to prevent the enemy from using it ; if I cannot fire a cannon, I will at least remove its firing pin. Such is the "idea" of the general strike.

The general strike has always appeared as an instrument of struggle against an established state power that controls the railways, the telegraph, the military and police forces, etc. By paralyzing the state apparatus, the general strike either "frightened" the power, or created the premises for a revolutionary solution to the question of power.

The general strike proves to be a particularly effective means of struggle when only revolutionary enthusiasm unites the working masses, the absence of organization and a combat leadership preventing them from assessing the balance of power in advance or developing a plan of operations. It is reasonable to assume that the anti-fascist revolution in Italy, the beginning of which will be marked by a number of localized conflicts, will inevitably pass through the stage of the general strike. Only through this means will the Italian working class, currently fragmented, regain awareness of its unified status and gauge the strength of the enemy’s resistance that it must overthrow.

A general strike would be an appropriate form of struggle against fascism in Germany only if fascism were already in power and firmly controlled the state apparatus. But the slogan of a general strike is merely an empty formula if the goal is to crush fascism in its attempt to seize power.

During Kornilov’s march on Petrograd, neither the Bolsheviks nor the Soviets as a whole considered calling a general strike. On the railways, workers struggled to transport revolutionary troops and hold back Kornilov’s convoys. Factories only stopped to the extent that workers had to leave for the front. Enterprises working for the revolutionary front redoubled their efforts.

There was no question of a general strike during the October Revolution. On the eve of the revolution, the vast majority of factories and regiments had already rallied to the leadership of the Bolshevik Soviet. Calling the factories to a general strike under these circumstances would have weakened oneself, not the enemy. On the railways, the workers were striving to support the uprising ; the office workers, while feigning neutrality, were aiding the counter-revolution. A general railway strike was pointless ; the question was resolved when the workers gained the upper hand.

If, in Germany, the struggle erupts from localized conflicts triggered by fascist provocation, it is unlikely that a call for a general strike will meet the demands of the situation. A general strike would primarily mean cutting one city off from another, one district from another, and even one factory from another. It would be more difficult to find and mobilize the unemployed. Under these conditions, the fascists, who have no shortage of leadership, can gain a certain advantage thanks to their centralized command. Admittedly, their rank and file are so fragmented that even then, the fascists’ attempt can be repelled. But that is another aspect of the problem.

The question of railway communications must be approached not from the point of view of the "prestige" of the general strike which implies that everyone goes on strike, but from the point of view of its usefulness in the fight : for whom and against whom will the lines of communication be used during the confrontation ?

Consequently, we must prepare not for a general strike but to resist the fascists. This implies : creating resistance bases everywhere, shock detachments, reserves, local headquarters and command centers, effective communication, and very simple mobilization plans.

What the local organizations accomplished in a corner of the province, in Bruchsal or Klingental, where the communists, along with the SAP and the trade unions, created a defense organization despite the boycott by the reformist leadership, is an example for the entire country, despite its modest size. O powerful leaders, O seven-times-wise strategists, we want to cry out to them, take a lesson from the workers of Bruchsal and Klingental, imitate them, broaden their experience, take a lesson from the workers of Bruchsal and Klingental !

The German working class possesses powerful political, economic, and sporting organizations. This is what distinguishes the "Brüning regime" from the "Hitler regime." Brüning deserves no credit for this : bureaucratic weakness is not a merit. But we must face facts. The main, crucial, fundamental fact is that the working class in Germany still fully controls its organizations. The misuse of its strength is the sole reason for its weakness. Simply extend the experience of Bruchsal and Klingental to the entire country, and Germany will present a completely different face. Under these conditions, the working class will be able to resort to forms of struggle against the fascists that are far more effective and direct than the general strike. If the evolution of the situation made the use of the general strike necessary (such a situation could arise from a certain type of relationship between the fascists and the organs of the State), the system of defense committees formed on the basis of the united front would guarantee in advance the success of the mass strike.

The struggle would not end there. Indeed, what exactly is the organization in Bruchsal and Klingental ? One must be able to discern what is important in seemingly minor events : this local defense committee is in fact the local committee of workers’ deputies ; it doesn’t call itself that, nor is it aware of it, because it’s a small, provincial place. Here too, quantity determines quality. Transport this experience to Berlin and you’ll have the Berlin Soviet of Workers’ Deputies !

Notes

[1] Some ultra-left groups (for example, the Italian Bordigist group) believe that a united front is only acceptable for economic struggles. Today, even more than in the past, it is impossible to separate economic struggles from political struggles. The example of Germany, where tariff agreements are abolished and wages are reduced by government decrees, should make this truth clear even to toddlers. It is worth noting in passing that, currently, Stalinists are reviving many of the old prejudices of the Bordigists. It is no wonder that the "Prometeo" group, which learns nothing and has not progressed an inch, is now, in this era of ultra-left zigzags within the Communist International, much closer to the Stalinists than to us.

(....)

15. Is the situation hopeless ?

It is a difficult task to mobilize the majority of the German working class for an offensive all at once. After the defeats of 1919, 1921, and 1923, after the adventures of the "third period," German workers, already firmly controlled by powerful conservative organizations, have seen centers of resistance develop within their ranks. But this organizational strength of the German workers, which has thus far prevented any penetration of fascism into their ranks, opens up the widest possibilities for defensive struggles.

It must be borne in mind that a united front policy is far more effective in defense than in attack. The conservative or backward strata of the proletariat are more easily drawn into a struggle to defend existing gains than to conquer new ones.

Brüning’s emergency decrees and the threat from Hitler are, in this sense, an "ideal" wake-up call for the united front policy. This is not about defense in the most basic and obvious sense of the word. Under these conditions, it is possible to win over the vast majority of the working class to the united front. Moreover, the objectives of the struggle cannot fail to find sympathy among the lower strata of the petty bourgeoisie, including the shopkeepers in working-class neighborhoods and districts.

Despite all the difficulties and dangers, the current situation in Germany presents enormous advantages for the revolutionary party ; it imperatively dictates a clear strategic plan : from defense to offense. Without for a single moment abandoning its primary objective, which remains the conquest of power, the Communist Party is adopting a defensive position for immediate action. It is time to restore to the formula "Class against class" its true meaning !

The resistance of the workers to the offensive of capital and the State will inevitably provoke a redoubled offensive by fascism. However timid the first steps of the defense may have been, the reaction of the adversary will quickly close the ranks of the united front, broaden its tasks, necessitate the application of more decisive methods, expel the reactionary layers of the bureaucracy from the united front, strengthen the influence of the communists, while breaking down the barriers between workers, and thus prepare the way for the shift from defense to offense.

If, in defensive battles, the Communist Party gains the upper hand—and with a just policy, this is beyond doubt—it must under no circumstances seek the agreement of the reformist and centrist leaderships before going on the offensive. The masses decide : from the moment they break away from the reformist leadership, an agreement with the latter becomes meaningless. Perpetuating the united front would demonstrate a complete misunderstanding of the dialectic of revolutionary struggle and would transform the united front from a springboard into a barrier.

The most difficult political situations are, in a certain sense, the easiest : they admit only one solution. When a task is clearly defined by its name, in principle it has already been solved : from a united front for defense to the conquest of power under the banner of communism.

What are the chances of success ? The situation is difficult. Ultra-left ultimacity supports reformism. Reformism supports the bureaucratic dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Brüning’s bureaucratic dictatorship worsens the country’s economic agony and fuels fascism.

The situation is very difficult and very dangerous, but by no means hopeless. The Stalinist apparatus, benefiting from usurped authority and the material resources of the October Revolution, is very strong, but it is not all-powerful. The dialectic of class struggle is stronger. It is simply a matter of knowing how to support it at the right time.

Today, many people "on the left" express great pessimism about the fate of Germany. In 1923, they say, when fascism was still very weak and the Communist Party enjoyed great influence in the trade unions and factory committees, the proletariat did not win the victory ; how could one expect a victory today, when the party has weakened and fascism is incomparably stronger ?

This argument, convincing at first glance, is in fact entirely fallacious. In 1923, the struggle was halted : faced with the specter of fascism, the party refused to fight. Where there is no struggle, there can be no victory. It is precisely the strength of fascism and its pressure that today preclude any possibility of refusing to fight. We must fight. And if the German working class takes up the fight, it can win. It must win.

Just yesterday, the top brass were declaring : "We’re not afraid of the fascists coming to power ; they’ll quickly exhaust themselves, etc." This idea prevailed at the party’s highest levels for several months. Had it taken root permanently, it would have meant that the Communist Party was trying to anesthetize the proletariat before Hitler cut off its head. That was the main danger. Today, no one defends this idea anymore. We have won a first victory. The idea that fascism must be crushed before it comes to power has penetrated the working masses. This is an important victory. All future agitation must stem from this.

The working masses are dejected. Unemployment and want overwhelm them. But the leadership’s confusion, the mess it has created, torments them even more. The workers understand that it is impossible to let Hitler come to power. But how ? No solution is in sight. The leaders are of no help ; on the contrary, they are an obstacle. But the workers want to fight.

There is a surprising fact that, as far as one can tell from a distance, has not been fully appreciated : the miners of Hirsch-Dunker have declared that the capitalist system must be replaced by the socialist system ! This means that they will agree tomorrow to create Soviets as a form of organization for the entire working class. Perhaps they agree even today : one only has to ask them ! This symptom alone is a hundred times more important than all the impressionistic pronouncements of those gentlemen, men of letters and eloquent speakers, who disdainfully complain about the masses.

Indeed, a certain passivity is evident within the ranks of the Communist Party, despite the clamor of the party apparatus. And why is that ? Grassroots communists are attending their cell meetings less and less frequently, where they are bombarded with empty rhetoric. Ideas coming from above cannot be applied either in the factory or on the street. The worker is aware of the irreconcilable contradiction between what he needs when facing the masses and what he is given in official party meetings. The artificial atmosphere, created by a loud, boastful apparatus that cannot tolerate objections, is becoming unbearable for ordinary party members. Hence the emptiness and coldness of the meetings. This reflects not a refusal to fight, but a political disarray and a muted protest against an all-powerful but foolish leadership.

This disarray within the proletariat is an encouragement to the fascists. They continue their offensive. The danger grows. But precisely this awareness of the fascist danger will extraordinarily sensitize the vanguard workers and create a favorable atmosphere for putting forward clear and simple proposals, leading to action.

Referring to the example of Braunschweig, Münzenberg wrote last November : "Today, there can be no doubt that this united front will one day spontaneously emerge under the growing pressure of fascist terror and attacks." Münzenberg does not explain why the Central Committee, of which he is a member, did not make the events in Braunschweig the starting point for a bold united front policy. No matter : Münzenberg, although thereby acknowledging his own inconsistency, is correct in his prediction.

The approach of the fascist threat can only lead to the radicalization of social-democratic workers and even significant sections of the reformist apparatus. The revolutionary wing of the SAP will undoubtedly take a step forward. Under these circumstances, a shift in the communist apparatus is more or less inevitable, even at the cost of internal divisions and splits. It is for such a development that we must prepare.

A turning point for the Stalinists is inevitable. Certain symptoms already reveal the strength of the pressure exerted from the rank and file : some arguments are no longer being used, the rhetoric is becoming increasingly confused, the slogans more and more ambiguous ; at the same time, those who were imprudent enough to understand the party’s tasks before the Central Committee were expelled are being excluded. These are unmistakable symptoms, but for now, they are only symptoms.

On several occasions in the past, the Stalinist bureaucracy wasted hundreds of tons of paper in a polemic against counter-revolutionary "Trotskyism", only to make a 180° turn and try to implement the program of the left opposition, often, in truth, with a fatal delay.

In China, the turning point came too late and in such a way that it effectively dealt the final blow to the revolution (the Canton uprising !). In England, the "turning point" was initiated by the adversary, namely the General Council, which broke with the Stalinists when it no longer needed them. In the USSR, the turning point of 1928 came just in time to save the dictatorship from imminent catastrophe. It is not difficult to explain the differences between these three important examples. In China, the young and inexperienced Communist Party blindly followed Moscow’s leadership ; in fact, the voice of the left-wing opposition did not have time to reach China. The same thing happened in England. In the USSR, the left-wing opposition was present and waged a relentless campaign against the policy toward the kulaks.

In China and England, Stalin and Co. took risks from a distance ; in the USSR, the danger hung over their own heads.

The political advantage of the German working class already lies in the fact that all the problems have been raised openly and in a timely manner ; the authority of the leadership of the Communist International is considerably undermined ; the Marxist opposition is acting on the spot, in Germany itself ; the vanguard of the proletariat includes thousands of experienced and critical elements, who are able to raise their voices and are already beginning to make them heard.

In Germany, the left-wing opposition is numerically small. But its political influence can prove decisive at a sudden historical turning point. Just as a switchman can, by opportunely pulling a lever, send a heavily laden train onto another track, so too can the small opposition, by firmly and confidently pulling the ideological lever, force the train of the German Communist Party and, above all, the heavy convoy of the German proletariat to change course.

Events are proving, more and more each day, the correctness of our position. When the ceiling starts burning above their heads, even the most obtuse bureaucrats no longer care about their prestige. And the secret advisors then jump out the window, wearing only their underwear. The pedagogy of facts will aid our self-criticism.

Will the German Communist Party succeed in making this shift in time ? We can only speak of it now in a conditional manner. Without the frenzy of the "Third Period," the German proletariat would already be in power. If the Communist Party had accepted the program of action put forward by the Left Opposition after the last Reichstag elections, victory would have been assured. Today, it is not possible to speak of victory with certainty. But we can call the shift that will allow German workers to enter the struggle, before fascism seizes control of the state apparatus, opportune.

To achieve this turning point, an immense effort is needed. The vanguard elements of communism, both inside and outside the party, must not be afraid to act. They must openly fight against the narrow-minded ultimacity of the bureaucracy, both within the party and before the working masses.

"But isn’t that a breach of discipline ?" a hesitant communist might ask. Of course, it’s a breach of Stalinist discipline. No serious revolutionary would break discipline, even formal discipline, unless they had compelling reasons. But someone who, hiding behind discipline, tolerates a policy whose disastrous nature is obvious, is not a revolutionary but a spineless coward, a weakling. It would be a crime for opposition communists to embark, like Urbahns and Co., on the path of creating a new Communist Party before even making serious efforts to change the direction of the old one. It’s not difficult to create a small, independent organization. But creating a new Communist Party is a gigantic task. Do the cadres necessary for such a task exist ? If so, what have they done to influence the tens of thousands of workers who are members of the official party ? If these leaders believe they are capable of explaining to the workers the need for a new party, then they must, first and foremost, put themselves to the test by working to regenerate the existing party.

To raise the question of a third party today means opposing, on the eve of a major historical decision, millions of communist workers who, although dissatisfied with their leadership, remain bound to their party by a revolutionary commitment. We must find a common language with these millions of communist workers. Despite insults, slander, and persecution, we must reach the conscience of these workers, show them that we want the same thing as they do ; that we have no interests other than those of communism ; that the path we are indicating is the only right one.

We must ruthlessly unmask the ultra-left capitulators ; we must demand a clear answer from the "leaders" to the question : what to do now ?, and propose our own answer for the whole country, for each region, for each city, for each neighborhood, for each factory.

Within the party, cells of Bolshevik-Leninists must be created. Their banner must proclaim : "Change of direction and reform of the party system." Wherever they secure a solid base, they must begin implementing the United Front policy, even on a small, local scale. Will the party bureaucracy exclude them ? Of course, but its rule under current conditions will not last long.

A public discussion, without interruption of meetings, without truncated quotations, without venomous slander, a fair exchange of opinions is necessary among the ranks of the Communists and the entire proletariat : this is how, in Russia, throughout 1917, we debated with all parties and within our own party. Through this broad discussion, we must prepare for an extraordinary party congress with a single item on the agenda : "What are we going to do ?" The left-wing opposition is not an intermediary between the Communist Party and social democracy. They are the soldiers of communism, its agitators, its propagandists, its organizers. We must turn to the party ! We must explain to it ! We must convince it !

If the Communist Party is forced to adopt a united front policy, it will almost certainly repel the fascist offensive. And a decisive victory over fascism will pave the way for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But taking the lead in the revolution will not be enough to resolve all the contradictions within the Communist Party. The mission of the Left Opposition will by no means be finished. In a sense, it will only be beginning. The first task of the victory of the proletarian revolution in Germany should be the elimination of bureaucratic dependence on the Stalinist apparatus.

Tomorrow, after the victory of the German proletariat, and even before, in its struggle for power, the shackles that paralyze the Communist International will be shattered. The poverty of ideas of bureaucratic centrism, the national limitations of its horizon, the anti-proletarian character of its regime—all this will become apparent in the light of the German revolution, which will be incomparably more vigorous than the October Revolution. The ideas of Marx and Lenin will inevitably triumph within the German proletariat.

Conclusion

A merchant was leading some oxen to the slaughterhouse. The butcher stepped forward, knife in hand. "Let’s close ranks and gore this executioner with our horns," suggested one of the oxen. "But how is the butcher worse than the merchant who led us here with his stick ?" replied the oxen who had received their political education at Manuilsky’s boarding school.
"Because then we can settle the merchant’s score !" "No," replied the principled oxen to their advisor, "you are the left-wing guarantor of our enemies, you are yourself a social butcher." And they refused to close ranks. (From Aesop’s Fables.)

"To place the annulment of the Treaty of Versailles necessarily, absolutely and immediately in the foreground, before the question of the liberation from the yoke of imperialism of other countries oppressed by imperialism, is petty-bourgeois nationalism (worthy of Kautsky, Hilferding, Otto Bauer and Co.), and not revolutionary internationalism" (Lenin, Infantile Disorder of Communism).

What is needed is the complete abandonment of national communism, the public and definitive liquidation of the slogans of "popular revolution" and "national liberation." Not : "Down with the Treaty of Versailles !", but : "Long live the Soviet United States of Europe."

Socialism is only achievable on the basis of the most recent achievements of modern technology and on the basis of the international division of labor.

The building of socialism in the USSR is not a national process that can be self-sufficient ; it is an integral part of the international revolution.

The conquest of power by the German and European proletariat is an incomparably more real and immediate task than the construction of a socialist society, closed in on itself and autarkic, within the borders of the USSR.

Unconditional defense of the USSR, the first workers’ state, against the internal and external enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat !

But the defense of the USSR must not be undertaken blindly. International proletarian control over the Soviet bureaucracy ! A ruthless exposure of its Thermidorian and national-reformist tendencies, of which the theory of socialism in one country is the generalization.

What does the Communist Party need ? A return to the strategic school of the first four congresses of the International Communist Party. An abandonment of ultimacies towards mass workers’ organizations : communist leadership cannot be imposed, it can only be won.

Abandonment of the theory of social-fascism, which helps social democracy and fascism.

Consistent exploitation of the antagonism between social democracy and fascism :
a) for a more effective struggle against fascism ;
b) to oppose social-democratic workers to their reformist leadership.

It is the vital interests of proletarian democracy, and not the principles of formal democracy, that must serve as the criteria for assessing changes in political regimes of bourgeois domination.

No support whatsoever, direct or indirect, for the Brüning regime !

Bold and devoted defense of proletarian organizations against fascists.

"Class against class !" This means that all proletarian organizations must take their place in the united front against the bourgeoisie.

The practical program of the united front must be defined by an agreement between the organizations in the presence of the masses. Each organization remains under its own banner and retains its leadership. In action, each organization respects the discipline of the united front.

"Class against class !" A tireless campaign of agitation must be waged to ensure that social-democratic organizations and reformist trade unions break with their perfidious bourgeois allies of the "iron front" and close ranks with communist organizations and all other organizations of the proletariat.

"Class against class !" Propaganda and organizational preparation of the Workers’ Soviets, as a superior form of the proletarian united front.

Total political and organizational independence of the Communist Party at all times and in all circumstances.

No combining of programs or flags. No unprincipled transactions. Total freedom to criticize current allies.

The left-wing opposition supports, needless to say, Thaelmann’s candidacy for the presidency.

The Bolshevik-Leninists must be at the forefront of the mobilization of workers, under the banner of the official communist candidacy.

German communists should take their inspiration not from the current internal regime of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which reflects the domination of an apparatus on the basis of a victorious revolution, but from the regime of the party that led to the revolution.

The liquidation of the omnipotence of the apparatus in the German Communist Party is a matter of life or death.

A return to democracy within the party is essential.

The communist workers must first obtain a serious and honest discussion within the party on matters of strategy and tactics. The voice of the Left Opposition (the Bolshevik-Leninists) must be heard by the party. After a general discussion within the party, decisions must be made by an extraordinary, freely elected congress.

The correct policy of the Communist Party towards the SAP is as follows : uncompromising (but honest, i.e., factual) criticism of the bastard character of the leadership ; a caring, fraternal attitude towards the left wing ; a willingness to make practical agreements with the SAP and to establish closer political ties with the revolutionary wing.

A complete change of direction in trade union policy :
struggle against the reformist leadership based on trade union unity.
Systematically pursue a united front policy in the enterprises. Agreements with reformist factory committees, based on a precise program of demands.
Struggle for lower prices. Struggle against wage cuts. Place this struggle on the path of the campaign for workers’ control over production.
Campaign for cooperation with the USSR based on a unified economic plan.
Development by the organs of the USSR, with the participation of interested organizations of the German proletariat, of an exemplary plan.
Campaign for Germany’s transition to socialism based on such a plan.

Those who claim the situation is hopeless are lying. Pessimists and skeptics must be driven from the ranks of the proletariat like lepers. The internal resources of the German proletariat are inexhaustible. They will find a way.

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The only way

October 1932

Foreword

The decline of capitalism promises to be even more tumultuous, dramatic, and bloody than its rise. German capitalism will by no means be an exception. If its agony is prolonged unduly, the blame—let’s not deceive ourselves—lies with the parties of the proletariat.

German capitalism emerged somewhat late and found itself without the privileges of primogeniture. Russia’s development placed it midway between England and India. In this scenario, Germany should have occupied the space between England and Russia, without, however, possessing Great Britain’s powerful overseas colonies or Tsarist Russia’s internal colonies. Germany, embedded in the heart of Europe, was faced with the necessity, at a time when the world had already been divided, of conquering foreign markets and undertaking a further partition of the colonies that had already been divided.

German capitalism was not given the opportunity to simply go with the flow, to surrender itself to the free play of forces. Only Great Britain could afford this luxury, and then only for a limited historical period, the end of which we have recently witnessed. Nor could German capitalism afford the "sense of moderation" that characterizes French capitalism, firmly established within its borders and possessing reserves in the form of rich colonial possessions.

The German bourgeoisie, deeply opportunistic in domestic politics, had to be audacious in the realms of economics and international politics, forging ahead, expanding its production immeasurably to catch up with the older nations, brandishing its sword, and launching itself into war. The extreme rationalization of postwar German industry stemmed from the need to overcome the adverse conditions resulting from historical backwardness, geographical location, and military defeat.

If the economic ills of our time are, in the end, the result of the contradiction between the development of humanity’s productive forces on the one hand, and the private ownership of the means of production and national borders on the other, then German capitalism is in the throes of the most violent convulsions because it is the most modern, advanced, and dynamic capitalism on the European continent.

The doctors of German capitalism are divided into three schools : the liberals, the supporters of a planned economy, the supporters of autarky.

Liberals would like to reinstate the "natural" laws of the market. But the sorry political fate of German liberalism reflects the fact that German capitalism was never based on Manchesterian principles : thanks to protectionism, it arrived directly at trusts and monopolies. The German economy cannot be returned to a "healthy" past, for the simple reason that such a past never existed.

"National Socialism" promises to revise the Treaty of Versailles in its own way, which practically means continuing the offensive of Hohenzollern imperialism. At the same time, it wants to lead Germany toward autarky, that is, down the path of provincialism and self-limitation. The lion’s roars here mask the psychology of a beaten dog. Trying to adapt German capitalism to its national borders is like trying to treat a man by amputating his right hand, his left foot, and part of his skull.

Curing capitalism with a planned economy means eliminating competition. In that case, one would have to begin by abolishing private ownership of the means of production. Reformers, bureaucrats, and learned professors have never even dared to imagine it. The German economy is anything but purely German : it is an integral part of the world economy. A German plan is conceivable only within the framework of an international economic plan. Planning limited to the national level would amount to abandoning the world economy, that is, it would mark an attempt to return to a system of autarky.

These three schools of thought, which are in conflict with one another, are in fact united, for they are all trapped in the vicious cycle of reactionary utopianism. What deserves to be saved is not German capitalism, but the Germany of its capitalism.

During the years of crisis, the German bourgeoisie, or at least its theorists, engaged in speeches of contrition : they claimed to have pursued a far too risky policy, taken out foreign loans quite recklessly, and developed industrial infrastructure without due consideration ; in the future, they would have to be more cautious. Today, even more so than in the past, the upper echelons of the German bourgeoisie are proponents of economic adventures, as evidenced by Papen’s program and the attitude of finance capital toward it.

At the first signs of industrial revival, the behavior of German capitalism will conform to its historical past, not to the pious wishes of liberal moralists. Profit-hungry entrepreneurs will once again crank up the steam, heedless of the pressure gauge. The hunt for foreign credit will resume its feverish character. Reduced opportunities for expansion ? All the more reason to develop monopolies. The world, gripped by fear, will witness the return of the previous period, but in the form of even more violent convulsions. Simultaneously, the resurgence of German militarism will proceed at full speed, as if the years 1914-1918 had never happened. The German bourgeoisie will once again place barons from east of the Elbe at the head of the nation. These barons are even more inclined to risk the country’s future under the banner of Bonapartism than under that of the legitimate monarchy.

In their moments of clarity, the leaders of German social democracy must ask themselves : by what miracle does our party, after all it has done, continue to unite millions of workers ? The conservatism inherent in any mass organization certainly plays a significant role. Several generations of proletarians have passed through the political school of social democracy, creating a strong tradition. However, this is not the primary cause of the vitality of reformism. Workers cannot simply abandon social democracy, despite all the crimes of that party : they must be able to educate themselves through another party. Yet, for the past nine years, the German Communist Party, through its leadership, has truly done everything in its power to alienate the masses from it or, at the very least, to prevent them from rallying around the Communist Party.

The capitulationist policy of Stalin and Brandler in 1923 ; the ultra-left zigzag of Maslow, Ruth Fischer, and Thälmann from 1924 to 1925 ; the purely opportunistic servility to social democracy from 1926 to 1928 ; the adventures of the "third period" from 1928 to 1930 ; the theory and practice of "social fascism" and "national liberation" from 1930 to 1932—these are the terms of the equation. Their sum totals : Hindenburg, Papen, Schleicher, and company.

The capitalist path offers no way out for the German people. This is the essential strength of the Communist Party.

The example of the Soviet Union shows that the socialist path is a possible solution. This is where the second source of strength of the Communist Party lies.

However, due to the conditions under which the isolated proletarian state developed, a national and opportunistic bureaucracy took control of the Soviet Union—a bureaucracy that does not believe in world revolution, defends its independence against it, and at the same time retains unlimited power over the Communist International. This is where the greatest misfortune lies for the German and international proletariat.

The situation in Germany seems designed to allow the Communist Party to win over the majority of workers in a short period of time. But the Communist Party should simply understand that it currently represents only a minority of the proletariat and commit itself firmly to the united front strategy. Instead, the Communist Party has adopted a tactic that can be summarized as follows : to prevent German workers from waging economic struggles, resisting fascism, seizing the weapon of the general strike, or creating Soviets, as long as the proletariat does not recognize the leading role of the Communist Party a priori. Political tasks are thus transformed into ultimatums.

Where does this deplorable method come from ? The answer lies in the policies of the Stalinist faction in the Soviet Union. There, the apparatus transformed political leadership into a series of administrative orders. By preventing workers from discussing, criticizing, or voting, the Stalinist bureaucracy effectively spoke to them in the language of ultimatums. Thälmann’s policy is an attempt to translate Stalinism into poor German. There is, however, a difference : the USSR bureaucracy has the state power it received from the October Revolution to carry out its diktat policies ; Thälmann, on the other hand, has only the formal authority of the Soviet Union to lend weight to his ultimatum. This is significant moral support which, while sufficient under current conditions to silence communist workers, is not enough to win over social-democratic workers. But it is precisely on the solution to this latter task that the fate of the German revolution now depends.

Following on from the author’s previous works, devoted to the politics of the German proletariat, this booklet attempts to study the problems of revolutionary politics in Germany in its new stage.

Prinkipo, September 13, 1932.

1. Bonapartism and Fascism

Let’s try to briefly review what happened and where we stand.

It was thanks to social democracy that the Brüning government obtained parliamentary support to govern through exceptional laws. The social-democratic leaders declared : "In this way, we will block fascism’s path to power." The Stalinist bureaucracy responded : "No, fascism has already won ; the Brüning regime is fascism." Both statements were false. The social democrats sought to portray their retreat from fascism as a struggle against it. The Stalinists presented the situation as if the victory of fascism was a foregone conclusion. The fighting spirit of the proletariat was being undermined on both sides, facilitating and hastening the enemy’s victory.

In the past, we characterized the Brüning government as Bonapartist (as a "caricature of Bonapartism"), that is, as a military-police dictatorship. When the struggle between the two camps of society—between the haves and the have-nots, between the exploiters and the exploited—reaches its peak, the conditions for the domination of the bureaucracy, the police, and the army are created. The government becomes independent of society. Let us recall this once again : if you symmetrically push two forks into a cork, it can balance even on a pinhead. A government of this type does not, of course, cease to be the servant of the haves. But the servant then sits on his master’s back, hammers the back of his neck, and doesn’t hesitate, on occasion, to wipe his shoes on his master’s face.

It could have been assumed that Brüning would remain in power until the very end. But during the course of events, a new link was added : the Papen government. To be precise, we must correct our earlier definition : the Brüning government was a pre-Bonapartist government. Brüning was merely a precursor. Bonapartism in its fully developed form entered the scene with the Papen-Schleicher government.

What was the difference ? Brüning swore there was no greater happiness than "serving" Hindenburg and Paragraph 48. With his fist, Hitler "supported" Brüning on the right. But Brüning leaned his left elbow on Wels’s shoulder. In the Reichstag, Brüning found a majority that exempted him from having to take the Reichstag into account.

The more independent Brüning became from Parliament, the more the top of the bureaucracy felt independent of Brüning and the political groups behind him. The final step was to sever the link with the Reichstag. The Von Papen government emerged as a miracle of bureaucratic immaculate conception. It rests its right elbow on Hitler’s shoulder. With its policeman’s fist, it defends itself against the proletariat on its left. This is the secret of its stability—that is, the reason it didn’t fall the very day it appeared.

The Brüning government was clerical, bureaucratic, and police-state in character. The Reichswehr remained in reserve. The "Iron Front" served as the direct support for order. The elimination of this dependence on the "Iron Front" was the essential reason for Hindenburg and Papen’s coup. On this occasion, the generals automatically found themselves in the leading positions.

The Social Democratic leaders paid the price for the operation. This is what happens to them in times of social crisis. These scheming petty bourgeois appear to be clear-headed when intelligence isn’t required. Today, they hide under their covers at night. They break out in a cold sweat and hope for a miracle : perhaps they’ll manage not only to save their own skins but also their comfortable furniture and their innocent little savings. But there will be no miracle...

Unfortunately, the Communist Party, too, was completely caught off guard by events. The Stalinist bureaucracy had foreseen nothing. Now, Thälmann, Remmele, and others are constantly talking about the "coup of July 20th." But how is this possible ? They previously claimed that fascism was already here, and that only Trotskyist counter-revolutionaries could speak of it in the future tense. But it now turns out that to go from Brüning to Papen—not to Hitler, but only to Papen—required a genuine "coup." The "class content" of Severing, Brüning, and Hitler "is the same," these sages had taught us. So where did the coup come from, and what was its purpose ?

But the confusion doesn’t end there. Although the difference between Bonapartism and fascism is now sufficiently clear, Thälmann, Remmele, and company speak of the fascist coup of July 20th. At the same time, they warn the workers of the imminent danger of a coup by Hitler—that is, another fascist coup. Finally, social democracy is still labeled social-fascist. The unfolding events thus boil down to the fact that different varieties of "fascism" seize power from one another through "fascist" coups. Isn’t it clear that the entire Stalinist theory was specifically designed to block people’s minds ?

The Papen government’s entry onto the scene produced an impression of strength all the greater because the workers were less prepared for it (total disregard for political parties, new emergency laws, dissolution of the Reichstag, repressive measures, martial law in the capital, and the dismantling of Prussian-style democracy). You kill a lion with bullets ; you crush a flea with a fingernail ; as for the Social Democratic ministers, you eliminate them with a flick of the nose.

Despite its appearance of concentrated strength, the Papen government, "in itself," is even weaker than its predecessor. A Bonapartist regime can only be stable and long-lasting if it brings to an end a revolutionary period, when the balance of power has been tested in confrontations, when the revolutionary classes are exhausted, while the propertied classes are not yet freed from their terror : will tomorrow not bring new upheavals ? Without this fundamental condition, that is, without the prior exhaustion of the masses’ energy in the struggle, a Bonapartist regime is incapable of developing.

The barons, the capital magnates, and the bankers, through the Papen government, are attempting to secure their positions and businesses by means of the police and the regular army. The idea of ​​handing over all power to Hitler, who relies on the greedy and unruly gangs of the petty bourgeoisie, is not at all appealing to them. Certainly, they do not doubt that Hitler will ultimately prove to be the docile instrument of their domination. But this implies upheaval, the risk of a long civil war, and significant overhead costs. It is true that fascism ultimately leads to a Bonapartist-style military-bureaucratic dictatorship, as the example of Italy demonstrates. But this requires several years, even in the case of total victory : in Germany, the time frame is longer than in Italy. It is clear that the propertied classes preferred a more economical path, that is to say the path of Schleicher, and not that of Hitler, not to mention the fact that Schleicher’s preferences are for Schleicher himself.

The fact that the neutralization of the irreconcilable camps led to the existence of the Papen government in no way implies that the forces of the revolutionary proletariat and those of the reactionary petty bourgeoisie are equal in the balance of history. The entire problem is thus shifted to the political sphere. Social democracy paralyzes the proletariat by using the machinery of the Iron Front. Through its absurd policy of ultimacity, the Stalinist bureaucracy prevents the workers from choosing the revolutionary path. With proper leadership of the proletariat, fascism would have been annihilated, and Bonapartism would have found no crack through which to infiltrate. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The paralyzed power of the proletariat has given the Bonapartist clique its deceptive appearance of "power." This is the political formula of today.

The Papen government is merely the point of intersection of two great historical forces. Its personal influence is almost nil. This is why it cannot help but be frightened by its own posturing and feel dizzy before the void surrounding it. This, and this alone, explains why the government’s actions are two-thirds cowardice and one-third audacity. With respect to Prussia, that is, the Social Democrats, the government was playing a winning hand every time : it knew these gentlemen would offer no resistance. It scheduled new elections after the dissolution of the Reichstag but did not dare postpone them. After proclaiming martial law, it hastened to explain : this was solely to facilitate a capitulation without a fight by the Social Democratic leaders.

But there is the Reichswehr ! We are not inclined to forget it. Engels defined the state as bands of armed men with material appendages, such as prisons, etc. Regarding the power of the current government, one could even say that only the Reichswehr truly exists. But the Reichswehr is by no means a submissive and reliable instrument in the hands of the group of individuals, at whose head is Papen. In fact, the government is more like a political commission attached to the Reichswehr.

Despite its overwhelming influence over the government, the Reichswehr could not claim to play an autonomous political role. One hundred thousand soldiers, however cohesive and battle-hardened (and this remains to be seen), could not command a nation of 65 million people torn apart by profound social divisions. The Reichswehr would be merely one element, and moreover, a non-decisive one, in the struggle between social forces.

In its own way, the new Reichstag reflects quite well the country’s political situation, which led to the Bonapartist experiment. This parliament without a majority, with its irreconcilable factions, is a concrete and irrefutable argument in favor of dictatorship. The limits of democracy are once again laid bare. Where the very foundations of society are at stake, parliamentary arithmetic solves nothing. It is struggle that decides.

We will not attempt to predict from afar the path that the government’s attempts at patching things up will take in the coming days. Our assumptions are, in any case, lagging behind reality, and the possible transitional forms and combinations will not solve the problem. A right-wing alliance with the center would imply the "legalization" of the National Socialists’ rise to power, that is, it would provide the most convenient cover for a fascist coup. The type of power dynamic that would initially emerge between Hitler, Schleicher, and the center-right leaders is a more significant problem for them than for the German people. Every conceivable political combination with Hitler means the absorption of the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the police, and the army into fascism.

If we accept that the center will not enter into a coalition, where a break with its own workers would be the price of its role as a brake on Hitler’s engine, then only the openly extra-parliamentary path remains. A coalition without the center will ensure the National Socialists’ dominance even more easily and quickly. If the latter do not immediately come to an understanding with Papen and do not immediately launch an open offensive, the Bonapartist character of the government will become even more apparent : Von Schleicher will have his "hundred days"... but without the preceding Napoleonic years.

One hundred days—no, we are, it seems, being too generous. The Reichswehr does not decide. Schleicher is not enough. Only the methods of a long and merciless civil war can ensure the extra-parliamentary dictatorship of the Junkers and the magnates of finance capital. Will Hitler be able to accomplish this task ? That depends not only on the good or ill will of fascism, but also on the revolutionary will of the proletariat.

2. Bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and proletariat

Any serious analysis of the political situation must start from the relationships existing between the three classes : the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie (including the peasantry) and the proletariat.

The upper bourgeoisie, powerful from an economic point of view, represents, taken in itself, only a tiny minority. To consolidate its domination, it must maintain well-defined relationships with the petty bourgeoisie and, through the latter, with the proletariat.

To understand the dialectic of these relations, it is necessary to distinguish three historical stages : the dawn of capitalist development, when the bourgeoisie, in order to fulfill its mission, needed revolutionary methods ; the flourishing and maturity of the capitalist regime, when the bourgeoisie gave its domination orderly, peaceful, conservative and democratic forms ; and finally the decline of capitalism, when the bourgeoisie is forced, in order to defend its right to exploitation, to resort to civil war against the proletariat.

The political programs characteristic of these three stages—Jacobinism, reformist democracy (including social democracy), and fascism—are, in their essence, the programs of petty-bourgeois currents. This circumstance alone demonstrates the enormous, indeed decisive, importance of the political self-determination of the petty-bourgeois strata for the fate of bourgeois society as a whole !

However, the relationship between the bourgeoisie and its main social base is by no means founded on mutual trust and peaceful collaboration. The petty bourgeoisie, as a whole, is an exploited and humiliated class. It envies the upper bourgeoisie and often hates it. Furthermore, while the bourgeoisie relies on the support of the petty bourgeoisie, it does not trust it, for it always fears, quite rightly, that the latter might overstep the boundaries established for it.

By purging the land and paving the way for the development of the bourgeoisie, the Jacobins were constantly in acute conflict with it. They served the bourgeoisie while simultaneously waging a relentless struggle against it. Having fulfilled their limited historical mission, the Jacobins fell, for the domination of capital was predetermined.

Through a series of steps, the bourgeoisie consolidated its power in the form of parliamentary democracy. Again, this was neither peaceful nor willing. The bourgeoisie was mortally afraid of the right to universal suffrage. Finally, by combining repressive measures with concessions, the lash of deprivation with reforms, it subjugated, within the framework of formal democracy, not only the old petty bourgeoisie, but also, to a large extent, the proletariat through the intermediary of the new petty bourgeoisie—the labor bureaucracy. In August 1914, the imperialist bourgeoisie succeeded, through parliamentary democracy, in leading tens of millions of workers and peasants to the slaughter.

It was the war that clearly marked the beginning of the decline of capitalism and, above all, of the democratic form of its domination. From then on, there was no longer any question of new reforms or handouts, but rather of chipping away at and reversing what had already been granted. The political domination of the bourgeoisie thus came into conflict not only with the organs of proletarian democracy (trade unions and political parties), but also with the parliamentary democracy within which workers’ organizations had been formed. Hence the crusade against Marxism on the one hand, and against democratic parliamentarism on the other.

In the past, the leading figures of the liberal bourgeoisie proved incapable of overcoming the monarchy, the feudal lords, and the Church on their own ; similarly, the magnates of finance capital cannot overcome the proletariat on their own. The support of the petty bourgeoisie is indispensable. To this end, it is necessary to alert, mobilize, rehabilitate, and arm it. But this period presents dangers. While utilizing it, the bourgeoisie fears fascism. In May 1926, Piłsudsky was forced to save bourgeois society through a coup d’état directed against the traditional parties of the Polish bourgeoisie. The affair went so far that the official leader of the Polish Communist Party, Varsky, who had moved from Rosa Luxemburg’s positions to Stalin’s and not Lenin’s, took Pilsudsky’s coup as the path to "revolutionary democratic dictatorship" and called on the workers to support Pilsudsky.

During the meeting of the Polish commission of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, the author of these lines stated the following regarding the events in Poland :

Overall, Pilsudsky’s coup appears as a petty-bourgeois, "plebeian" way of resolving the urgent tasks of a bourgeois society on the verge of collapse. This clearly aligns it with Italian fascism.
These two movements undeniably share common traits : their shock troops were recruited primarily from the petty bourgeoisie ; Pilsudsky, like Mussolini, acted using extra-parliamentary, openly violent means and the methods of civil war ; both sought not to overthrow bourgeois society, but rather to save it. While initially they revitalized the petty-bourgeois masses, they allied themselves with the upper bourgeoisie after coming to power. In this regard, a historical generalization involuntarily comes to mind, for which we must recall Marx’s definition of Jacobinism as a plebeian means of overcoming the feudal enemies of the bourgeoisie... This was during the rise of the bourgeoisie. It must now be said that, in the era of the bourgeoisie’s decline, the latter again needs "plebeian" methods to solve its tasks, which are no longer progressive but entirely reactionary. And, in this sense, fascism is a caricature of Jacobinism...
"The decadent bourgeoisie is incapable of maintaining itself in power by the methods and means of the parliamentary state it has built ; fascism, as an instrument of self-defense, is necessary for it, at least in the most critical moments. But the bourgeoisie does not like this ’plebeian’ way of solving its problems. It displays a very great hostility toward Jacobinism, which paved the way in blood for the development of bourgeois society. Fascists are infinitely closer to the decadent bourgeoisie than Jacobins are to the rising bourgeoisie. But the well-established bourgeoisie does not like the fascist way of solving its problems, because upheavals, even in the interests of bourgeois society, are not without risks for it. Hence the antagonism between fascism and the traditional parties of the bourgeoisie...
" The great The bourgeoisie doesn’t appreciate fascist methods, just as a man with a sore jaw doesn’t like having his teeth pulled. The respectable circles of bourgeois society viewed dentist Pilsudsky’s practices with hatred, but ultimately they submitted to the inevitable, albeit with threats, bargaining, and backroom deals. And so, yesterday’s idol of the petty bourgeoisie has transformed into the policeman of capital.

To this attempt to define the historical place of fascism as a political offshoot of social democracy, the official leadership opposed the theory of social-fascism. In the early days, it might have appeared as a foolish, albeit pretentious and bombastic, but harmless, notion. Subsequent events showed what a disastrous influence Stalinist theory exerted on the development of the Communist International [1].

Must we conclude from the historical roles of Jacobinism, democracy, and fascism that the petty bourgeoisie is condemned to remain, until the end of its days, an instrument in the hands of capital ? If this were so, the dictatorship of the proletariat would be impossible in a number of countries where the petty bourgeoisie constitutes the majority of the nation, and rendered extremely difficult in other countries where the petty bourgeoisie constitutes a respectable minority. Fortunately, this is not the case. The experience of the Paris Commune, at least within the confines of a single city, and then the experience of the October Revolution, on an infinitely larger scale in time and space, proved that the alliance between the petty and the large bourgeoisie is not eternal. If the petty bourgeoisie is incapable of conducting an independent policy (and it is particularly for this reason that a petty bourgeois "democratic dictatorship" is unrealizable), it has no choice but to choose between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

During the rise, growth, and flourishing of capitalism, the petty bourgeoisie, despite violent outbursts of discontent, remained relatively docilely harnessed to the capitalist system. Indeed, it was the only thing it had to do. But in the conditions of decaying capitalism, in an economic dead end, the petty bourgeoisie yearns, attempts, and tries to break free from the tutelage of the former masters and leaders of society. It is quite capable of linking its fate to that of the proletariat. For this to happen, only one thing is necessary : ​​the petty bourgeoisie must be convinced of the proletariat’s capacity to lead society onto a new path. The proletariat can inspire such confidence only through its strength, its assertiveness in action, a bold offensive against the enemy, and the success of its revolutionary policies.

But woe betide the revolutionary party if it fails to rise to the occasion ! The daily struggle of the proletariat exacerbates the instability of bourgeois society. Strikes and political unrest worsen the country’s economic situation. The petty bourgeoisie might resign itself, for the time being, to increasing hardships if its experience proved that the proletariat is capable of extricating it from its present situation and leading it onto a new path. But if the revolutionary party, despite the constant intensification of the class struggle, continues to prove incapable of rallying the proletariat around itself, agitates in vain, sows confusion, and contradicts itself, then the petty bourgeoisie loses patience and begins to see the workers as responsible for its own misfortunes. All the bourgeois parties, including the Social Democrats, strive to persuade it of this. And when the crisis reaches an unbearable level of severity, a party steps forward, with the stated aim of inciting the petty bourgeoisie to a fever pitch and directing its hatred and despair against the proletariat. In Germany, this historical function is fulfilled by National Socialism, a broad movement whose ideology is formed from all the putrid emanations of decaying bourgeois society.

The fundamental political responsibility for the rise of fascism obviously falls on social democracy. Since the imperialist war, this party’s policy has been to erase the idea of ​​independent politics from the proletariat’s consciousness, to convince them of the eternal nature of capitalism, and to bring them to their knees before the decaying bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie may side with the workers if they see in them a new master.

Social democracy teaches the worker to behave like a lackey. The petty bourgeoisie will not follow a lackey. The policy of reformism deprives the proletariat of any possibility of leading the plebeian masses of the petty bourgeoisie and, by the same token, transforms the latter into cannon fodder for fascism.

For us, the responsibility of social democracy does not exhaust the political problem. Since the beginning of the war, we have characterized this party as the representative of the imperialist bourgeoisie within the proletariat.

This new orientation of revolutionary Marxists gave birth to the Third International. Its task was to unite the proletariat under the banner of the revolution and thereby ensure it a leading influence over the oppressed masses of the petty bourgeoisie in towns and the countryside.

The postwar period was marked, in Germany more than anywhere else, by an intractable economic situation and civil war. Both the international and domestic situations imperiously pushed Germany down the path of socialism. At every turn, social democracy revealed its internal emptiness and impotence, the reactionary nature of its policies, and the venality of its leaders. What more could the Communist Party possibly need to develop ? However, after significant successes in its early years, the German Communist Party entered a period of missteps and zigzags, where opportunism replaced adventurism. The centrist bureaucracy systematically weakened the vanguard of the proletariat, preventing it from rallying the class. In doing so, it deprived the proletariat as a whole of the possibility of drawing the oppressed masses of the petty bourgeoisie into its fold. The Stalinist bureaucracy bears a direct and immediate responsibility for the growth of fascism in the eyes of the vanguard of the proletariat.

3. Is social democracy an ally of fascism or its enemy ?

It is relatively simple to understand the relationships between classes in the form of a schema established once and for all. It is incomparably more difficult to correctly assess the concrete relationships between classes in each given situation.

Currently, the German upper class is hesitating ; this is a state that the upper class, generally speaking, rarely experiences. A segment of it has definitively decided that a fascist solution is inevitable and would like to hasten its implementation. Another segment hopes to resolve the situation through a Bonapartist, military-police dictatorship. In this latter camp, no one desires a return to the Weimar "democracy."

The petty bourgeoisie is divided. National Socialism, which has rallied the overwhelming majority of the middle classes under its banner, wants to seize all power. The democratic wing of the petty bourgeoisie, which continues to rally millions of workers, would like to return to a form of democracy like that of Ebert. In the meantime, it is prepared to support, at least passively, the Bonapartist dictatorship. The social-democratic calculation is as follows : under pressure from the Nazis, the Papen-Schleicher government will be forced to restore the balance by strengthening its left wing ; at the same time, the crisis may subside ; within the petty bourgeoisie, there may be a beginning of sobering up ; the bourgeoisie may cease to exploit the workers so relentlessly ; and everything will return to normal, God willing.

The Bonapartist clique does not, in fact, desire a total victory for fascism. It has nothing against using, within certain limits, the support of social democracy. But for this to happen, it must "tolerate" workers’ organizations, which is only possible on the condition of accepting the legal existence of the Communist Party, at least to some extent. Moreover, the support given by social democracy to the military dictatorship will inevitably drive the workers into the arms of the Communist Party. In seeking support against the brown plague, the government will quickly find itself under attack from the red devils.

The official communist press argues that social democracy, by tolerating Brüning, paved the way for Papen, and that half-heartedly tolerating Papen hastened Hitler’s rise. This is entirely true. On this point, we have no disagreement with the Stalinists. But it also means that in a time of social crisis, the policy of reformism strikes not only the masses, but reformism itself. And today, we have reached a critical juncture in this process.

Hitler tolerates Schleicher. Social democracy cannot resist Papen. If this situation were to become entrenched for a long time, social democracy would then become the left wing of Bonapartism, leaving fascism to play the role of the right wing. Theoretically, it is not impossible that the current, unprecedented crisis of German capitalism will not lead to a decisive solution, that is to say, that it will end neither with the victory of the proletariat nor with the triumph of the fascist counter-revolution. If the Communist Party pursues its policy of stubborn ultimacity and thus saves social democracy from inevitable collapse ; if Hitler does not decide, in the following days, to stage a coup d’état and thus provoke the inevitable disintegration of his own ranks ; If the economic situation improves before Schleicher falls, then the combination of paragraph 48 of the Weimar constitution, the Reichswehr, social democracy half in opposition and fascism also half in opposition, might perhaps be maintained (until a new social shock which, in any case, cannot be long in coming).

For now, we are still far from that fortunate confluence of circumstances that fuels the dreams of social democracy. It is by no means guaranteed. Even the Stalinists seem not to believe in the longevity and stability of the Papen-Schleicher regime. Everything suggests that the Wels-Schleicher-Hitler triangle will collapse before it even has a chance to form.

But perhaps he will be replaced by the Wels-Hitler combination ? According to Stalin, they are "twins, not antipodes." Let’s assume that Social Democracy, without fearing the reaction of its workers, decides to sell its tolerance to Hitler. But fascism has no need of this commodity : what it needs is not the tolerance of Social Democracy but its liquidation. Hitler’s government can only accomplish its task after crushing the resistance of the proletariat and liquidating any possible organs of that resistance. Such is the historical function of fascism. The Stalinists limit themselves to a psychological, or more precisely, moral assessment of the cowardly and greedy petty bourgeois who lead Social Democracy. Can one imagine, they say, that these notorious traitors will break away from the fascist bourgeoisie and oppose it ? Such a non-dialectical method has little in common with Marxism, which starts not from people’s self-awareness or what they want, but primarily from the conditions in which they are placed and the changing of those conditions.

Social democracy supports the bourgeois regime not because of the profits of the coal and iron magnates, but because of the revenue it possesses as a party, in the person of its powerful and extensive apparatus. Certainly, fascism poses no threat whatsoever to the bourgeois regime, which social democracy safeguards. But fascism is a threat to the role social democracy plays within the bourgeois regime and, consequently, to the revenue it receives in return. While the Stalinists overlook this aspect of the matter, social democracy never loses sight of the mortal danger that a fascist victory represents for itself—not for the bourgeoisie, but for itself precisely.

When we indicated, about three years ago, that the starting point of the next crisis in Austria and Germany would, in all likelihood, be the irreconcilable antagonism between social democracy and fascism ; when, on this basis, we rejected the theory of social fascism, which, far from highlighting this imminent conflict, actually obscured it ; when we announced that social democracy, including a significant part of its apparatus, could, through the course of events, be drawn into the struggle against fascism and that this would create a favorable starting position for the Communist Party for a subsequent offensive, a great many communists—not only paid officials but also quite sincere revolutionaries—accused us of idealizing social democracy. All that remained was to remain passive. It is difficult to argue with people whose thinking stops there, where, for a Marxist, the problem is only just beginning.

In discussions, I have sometimes given the following example : the Jewish bourgeoisie in Tsarist Russia constituted the most fearful and demoralized segment of the entire Russian bourgeoisie. And yet, insofar as the pogroms of the Black Hundreds, though directed primarily against poor Jews, also affected them, they were forced to resort to self-defense. Admittedly, they did not display remarkable bravery in this regard. But with this danger hanging over their heads, liberal Jewish bourgeois, for example, raised substantial sums to arm revolutionary students and workers. Thus, a temporary, practical agreement was reached between the most revolutionary workers, ready to fight with weapons in hand, and the most terrified segment of the bourgeoisie, which had sunk into despair.

Last year, I wrote that in the struggle against fascism, communists should be prepared to make a practical deal not only with the devil and his grandmother but also with Grzesinsky. This sentence circulated widely in the Stalinist press worldwide : could there be better proof of the "social-fascism" of the Left Opposition ? Some comrades had warned me : "They will seize upon this sentence." I replied : "This sentence is written precisely so that they will seize upon it. Let them take a red-hot iron and burn their fingers ! Fools must be taught a lesson." The course of the struggle led Von Papen to imprison Grzesinsky. Did this episode fit with the theory of social-fascism and the predictions of the Stalinist bureaucracy ? No, it was in complete contradiction with them. However, our assessment of the situation fully accepted such a possibility and assigned it a specific place.

But social democracy refused to fight once again, a Stalinist will retort. Yes, it refused. Anyone who believed that social democracy would engage in the struggle independently, at the initiative of its leaders, and moreover, under conditions where the Communist Party itself was incapable of engaging in the fight, could only be disappointed. We did not expect such a miracle. Therefore, social democracy could not "disappoint" us.

We readily believe that Grzesinsky did not transform into a revolutionary tiger. However, isn’t the situation where Grzesinsky, from his fortress, sent detachments of police to defend "democracy" against revolutionary workers quite different from the situation where the Bonapartist savior of capitalism sent the same Grzesinsky to prison ? And shouldn’t we appreciate and use this difference politically ?

To return to the example given above, it is not difficult to see a difference between the Jewish manufacturer tipping the Tsarist sergeants who massacre the striking workers in his factory, and that same manufacturer secretly giving the money to yesterday’s strikers to buy weapons against the organizers of pogroms. A bourgeois remains a bourgeois. But a change in circumstances leads to a change in attitude. The Bolsheviks led the strike against the manufacturer. Subsequently, they accepted money from that same manufacturer to fight against the pogroms.

Does all that we have said mean that social democracy as a whole will lead the struggle against fascism ? To this we reply : a portion of social-democratic officials will undoubtedly join the fascist camp ; a significant portion will hide under their beds when danger strikes. And a large part of the working class will not participate in the struggle. It is entirely impossible to predict which portion of the social-democratic workers will be drawn into the struggle, at what precise moment, and which part of the apparatus they will draw in after them. This depends on a great many circumstances, including the Communist Party’s mode of action. The united front policy serves to separate those who want to fight from those who do not ; to push forward those who hesitate ; and finally, to compromise the capitulating leaders in the eyes of the workers, thereby increasing the workers’ militancy.

How much time has been wasted, needlessly, absurdly, shamefully ! And how much could have been accomplished, even in just these last two years ! Long beforehand, it was clear that monopolistic capital and its fascist army would, with fists and clubs, force social democracy into opposition and self-defense. This prediction had to be demonstrated to the entire working class, the initiative of the united front had to be taken and maintained at every new stage. Shouts and howls were useless. A sure-fire victory could be achieved. It was enough to formulate clearly and precisely what the enemy would inevitably do and to develop a practical united front program without exaggeration or empty appeals, but also without weakness or concessions. What a high position the German Communist Party would occupy today if it had assimilated the ABCs of Leninist politics and applied them with the necessary firmness.
4. Thälmann’s Twenty-One Mistakes

In mid-July, a pamphlet appeared containing Thälmann’s answers to twenty-one questions from Social Democratic workers on how to create a "united red front." The pamphlet begins with the words : "The anti-fascist united front is gaining powerful momentum !" On July 20, the Communist Party called on workers to stage a political strike. The call went unheeded. Thus, in the space of five days, the chasm separating fine bureaucratic rhetoric from political reality was revealed.

The party obtained 5,300,000 votes in the July 31 elections. By celebrating this result as a resounding victory, the party demonstrated how much the defeat had diminished its hopes and ambitions. In the first round of the presidential elections, the party had garnered nearly 5,000,000 votes. It thus gained only 300,000 votes in four and a half months—and what months they were ! In March, the communist press tirelessly repeated that the number of votes would have been incomparably greater had it been a Reichstag election, hundreds of thousands of sympathizers considering the presidential elections pointless as a "platonic" exercise. If we take this March commentary into consideration—and it deserves it—it follows that the party, in its last four months, has grown virtually nothing.

In April, the Social Democrats elected Hindenburg, who then staged a coup d’état directly against them. One might have thought that this single event would be enough to shake the very foundations of reformism. Then came the further worsening of the crisis with all its terrible consequences. Finally, on July 20, eleven days before the elections, the Social Democrats retreated ignominiously, tail between their legs, in the face of the coup d’état by the Reich President they had elected. In such times, revolutionary parties experience feverish growth. Whatever it undertakes, the Social Democrats only push the workers further away, to its left. Instead of advancing with seven-league boots, the Communist Party flounders, hesitates, retreats, and for every step forward, takes half a step back. If the party is crying victory, solely because it did not lose any votes on July 31, it means that it has definitively lost touch with reality.

To understand why and how, under extraordinarily favorable conditions, this revolutionary party condemned itself to shameful impotence, one must read Thälmann’s replies to the Social Democratic workers. It is a tedious and thankless task, but one that can shed light on what was going on in the minds of the Stalinist leaders.

Thälmann offers several contradictory answers to the question : "What is the communists’ assessment of the Papen government ?" He begins by pointing out the "danger of the immediate establishment of a fascist dictatorship." So it doesn’t exist yet ? He quite aptly refers to the members of the government as "representatives of the capitalists, the trusts, the generals, and the Junkers." A moment later, speaking of this same government, he calls it "the fascist cabinet" and concludes by stating that "the Papen government has set itself the objective of the immediate establishment of a fascist dictatorship."

By ignoring the social and political differences between Bonapartism—that is, a regime of "sacred union" founded on a military-police dictatorship—and fascism—that is, a regime of open civil war against the proletariat—Thälmann deprives himself of any possibility of understanding what is happening before his very eyes. If the Papen cabinet is a fascist cabinet, what fascist "danger" can there still be ? If the workers believe Thälmann when he claims that Papen has set himself the objective (!) of establishing a fascist dictatorship, the party will miss the highly probable conflict between Hitler and Papen-Schleicher, just as happened in the past with the conflict between Papen and Otto Braun.

To the question, "Does the Communist Party sincerely envision a united front ?", Thälmann naturally answers in the affirmative and offers as proof the fact that the communists are not making any approaches to Hindenburg and Papen. "No," he says, "we are raising the issue of struggle, the struggle against the entire system, against capitalism. And that is the most serious guarantee of our sincerity regarding a united front." Thälmann clearly doesn’t understand what this is about. Social-democratic workers remain social democrats precisely because they still believe in the progressive, reformist path of transition from capitalism to socialism. Since they know that the communists advocate the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, the social-democratic workers ask : Is your proposal for a united front sincere ? And Thälmann replies : Of course, we are sincere, because for us it is a matter of overthrowing the entire capitalist system.

It goes without saying that we are not trying to hide anything from the social-democratic workers. But in every case, one must know how far one can go and maintain a sense of political realities. Any skilled propagandist would have replied : "You are betting everything on democracy ; we believe that revolution is the only way out. However, we cannot and will not carry out the revolution without you. Hitler is now our common enemy. After we have crushed Hitler, we will take stock together and consider what real next steps to take."

The interlocutors—odd as it may seem at first glance—not only show indulgence toward the speaker, but they approve of him on several occasions. The secret to this indulgence lies in the fact that Thälmann’s interlocutors not only belong to the Anti-Fascist Action movement but also encourage workers to vote for the Communist Party of Germany. These are former members who have rallied to communism. Such recruits can only be warmly welcomed. However, passing off an explanation to workers who have broken with social democracy as an explanation to the social-democratic masses clearly reveals the fraudulent nature of the undertaking. This cheap charade is entirely characteristic of the current policies of Thälmann and his associates.

In any case, the former Social Democrats are asking questions that truly resonate with the Social Democratic masses : "Is Anti-Fascist Action an annex of the Communist Party ?" "No," Thälmann replies. "The proof ? Anti-Fascist Action is not an organization but a mass movement." As if organizing the mass movement weren’t the Communist Party’s direct task. But the second argument is even better : Anti-Fascist Action is supposedly above parties because (!) it is directed against the capitalist state : "Karl Marx, already drawing lessons from the Paris Commune, placed the destruction of the bourgeois state apparatus at the forefront of the tasks of the working class." Oh ! What an unfortunate quote ! The Social Democrats want—despite Marx—to improve the bourgeois state, not destroy it. They are not communists but reformists. Inadvertently, Thälmann demonstrates precisely what he sought to refute : the "Anti-Fascist Action" is a party subsidiary. Clearly, the official leader of the Communist Party understands neither the situation nor the political thinking of the social-democratic worker. He fails to grasp the rationale for the united front. Every word he utters is a weapon for the reformist leaders and pushes the social-democratic workers toward them.

Thälmann demonstrates the impossibility of any joint action with social democracy in the following way : "Furthermore, we (?) must clearly recognize that even if social democracy is currently showing a semblance of opposition, it will never renounce its own coalition plans, nor the idea of ​​making a pact with the fascist bourgeoisie." Even if this were true, it would still need to be demonstrated concretely to the social-democratic workers. But this is false. Even if the social-democratic leaders have not abandoned the idea of ​​making pacts with the bourgeoisie, the fascist bourgeoisie refuses to make a pact with social democracy. And this fact may be decisive for the fate of social democracy. During the transfer of power from Papen to Hitler, the bourgeoisie will in no way be able to spare social democracy from its fate. Civil war has its own rules. The domination of fascist terror can only mean the liquidation of social democracy. Mussolini began precisely this way, so he could more freely crush revolutionary workers. In any case, the "social fascists" are determined to survive. This is the most realistic policy and, at the same time, the most revolutionary in its consequences.

If, on the other hand, social democracy never separates itself from the fascist bourgeoisie (even though Matteotti did separate himself from Mussolini), shouldn’t social-democratic workers who want to participate in the Anti-Fascist Action leave their party ? This is one of the questions posed. Thälmann replies : "It goes without saying for us communists that social-democratic workers or members of the Reich Banner can participate in the Anti-Fascist Action without necessarily leaving their party." And to clearly demonstrate his lack of any sectarian spirit, Thälmann continues : "If you join us by the millions, in close ranks, we will welcome you with joy, even if, in our opinion, there is still some confusion in your minds on certain points concerning the assessment of the German Social Democratic Party." Words of gold ! We consider your party fascist, you consider it democratic, but let’s not quibble over details ! All you need to do is come to us "by the millions," without abandoning your fascist party. "Confusion on certain points" cannot be an obstacle. On the other hand, the confusion that reigns in the minds of the all-powerful bureaucrats is an obstacle at every turn.

To elaborate further, Thälmann adds : "We are not posing the problem on a party-by-party basis, but on a class-wide scale." Like Seydewitz, Thälmann is prepared to renounce party interests in the name of class interests. Unfortunately, for a Marxist, such a position is impossible. If his program were not the scientific expression of the working class’s interests, the party would be worthless.

Aside from this gross error of principle, Thälmann’s words also contain a practical absurdity. How can one avoid asking the question "from party to party," when that is precisely the crux of the matter ? Millions of workers follow social democracy. Millions more follow the Communist Party. To the question posed by social-democratic workers, "How can we achieve joint action between your party and our party against fascism ?", Thälmann responds "on a class level," not "on a party level" : "Join us by the millions !" Isn’t that a rather pathetic display of rhetoric ? “We communists,” Thälmann continues, “do not want unity at any price. We cannot, in the interest of unity with social democracy, abandon the class content of our politics… and renounce strikes, the struggles of the unemployed, tenants’ actions, and the revolutionary self-defense of the masses.” He substitutes the absurd unity with social democracy for an agreement on specific practical actions. In the name of the necessity of the revolutionary assault, he justifies the refusal to carry out joint strike and self-defense actions today. Whoever can make sense of Thälmann’s thoughts deserves a prize.

The listeners pressed on : "Is an alliance between the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party to fight against the Papen government and fascism possible ?" Thälmann mentioned two or three facts to prove that social democracy was not fighting against fascism and continued :

"Every member of the Social Democratic Party agrees with us when we assert that an alliance between the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party is impossible based on these facts, but also for reasons of principle." The bureaucrat once again takes for granted precisely what should be proven. The ultimacity becomes particularly ridiculous when, to the question of a united front with organizations representing millions of workers, Thälmann replies : the Social Democrats must at least recognize that an agreement with their party is impossible because it is a fascist party. Could Leipart and Wels be rendered a greater service ?

"We communists, who want nothing in common with the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, tirelessly explain that we are ready, at any moment, to wage the anti-fascist struggle with our Social Democratic and Reich Banner comrades, as well as with the grassroots organizations that want to fight." Where do the grassroots organizations end ? And what if the grassroots organizations submit to the discipline of the higher authorities and propose to negotiate with them first ? Finally, there are intermediate levels between the grassroots organizations and the higher authorities. Can we predict where the dividing line will lie between those who want to fight and those who refuse to fight ? This can only be decided in practice, not in advance. What sense can there be in tying one’s own hands and feet ?

A report in the Rote Fahne of July 29, devoted to the Reich Banner rallies, quotes these remarkable words from a Social Democratic section leader : "Today, the masses yearn for a united anti-fascist front. If the leaders do not heed this, I will join the united front over them." The communist newspaper reports these words without comment. Yet they provide the key to the entire united front tactic. This Social Democrat wants to fight alongside the communists against the fascists. He already doubts the goodwill of his leaders. If the leaders refuse, he says, I will go over them. Dozens, hundreds, thousands, millions of Social Democrats share this mindset. The task of the Communist Party is to show them in practice whether the Social Democratic leaders truly want to fight or not. And this can only be demonstrated through experience, a new experience in a new situation. This experience will not happen overnight. Social-democratic leaders must be tested in businesses and workshops, in cities and in the countryside, throughout the country, today and tomorrow. Their proposal must be reiterated, presented in a new form, from a fresh perspective, adapted to the new situation.

But Thälmann doesn’t want to. Based on the "fundamental differences we have outlined between the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party, we reject any negotiation with the Social Democratic Party leadership." This argument is worth noting ; Thälmann repeats it several times. But if there were no "fundamental differences," there wouldn’t be two parties. And if there weren’t two parties, the question of a united front wouldn’t arise. Thälmann is trying to prove too much. Less is more.

Doesn’t the creation of the Red Trade Union Opposition (RGO) signify "a split within the organized working class ?" the workers ask. No, replies Thälmann, citing Engels’ 1895 letter on sentimental and aesthetic philanthropists in support. Who is so maliciously feeding Thälmann quotations ? The RGO was supposedly created in a spirit of unity, not division. Moreover, workers should under no circumstances leave their unions to join the Red Trade Union Opposition. On the contrary, it would be preferable for RGO members to remain in the unions to carry out oppositional work. Thälmann’s words must sound very convincing to the communists who have set themselves the task of fighting the Social Democratic leadership. But as a reply to the Social Democratic workers, concerned with trade union unity, Thälmann’s words must sound like sarcasm. “Why did you abandon our unions and organize yourselves separately ?” the Social Democratic workers asked. “If you want to join our independent organization to fight against the Social Democratic leadership, we are not asking you to leave the unions,” Thälmann replied. It was a pointed response. “Does democracy exist within the Communist Party of Germany ?” the workers asked, changing the subject. Thälmann answered in the affirmative. And with good reason ? But immediately he continued in a completely unexpected manner : “Legally as well as illegally, especially illegally, the party must protect itself from spies, provocateurs, and agents sent by the police.” This digression was not accidental. The very recent doctrine, developed in a pamphlet by a mysterious Büchner, justified the rejection of democracy in the interest of fighting spies. Anyone who protested against the omnipotence of the Stalinist bureaucracy had to be considered, at the very least, suspect. Police officers and provocateurs from all countries are enthusiastic about this theory. They will bark louder than anyone else at the opposition, which will divert attention from themselves and allow them to fish in troubled waters.

The flourishing of democracy is also proven, according to Thälmann, by the fact that problems are addressed by "world congresses and conferences of the Executive Committee of the Communist International." The speaker neglects to mention the date of the last world congress. We can remind him : July 1928, more than four years ago. Since then, apparently, no issues worthy of attention have arisen. Why, incidentally, does Thälmann not convene an extraordinary party congress to resolve the problems upon which the fate of the German proletariat depends ? Certainly not out of excessive democracy within the party, is it ?

And the pages turn. Thälmann answers twenty-one questions. Each answer is a mistake. In total, twenty-one mistakes, not counting the minor and secondary errors. And there are many of those.

Thälmann recounts that the Bolsheviks broke with the Mensheviks as early as 1903. In fact, the split didn’t occur until 1912. This didn’t prevent the February 1917 revolution from finding Bolshevik and Menshevik organizations united in much of the country. As recently as April, Stalin was advocating a merger between the Bolsheviks and Tseretelli’s party—not a united front, but a merger of the two parties. Only Lenin’s arrival prevented this.

Thälmann states that the Bolsheviks dissolved the Constituent Assembly in 1917. In fact, this took place in early 1918. Thälmann is clearly unfamiliar with the history of the Russian Revolution and the Bolshevik Party.

But it is far more serious that he fails to grasp the fundamentals of Bolshevik tactics. In his "theoretical" articles, he even dares to dispute the fact that the Bolsheviks made a pact with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries against Kornilov. To support his claims, he provides quotations from who-knows-who, which have nothing to do with the matter. He neglects to answer the questions. Weren’t there People’s Defense Committees throughout the country during Kornilov’s coup ? Did they lead the struggle against Kornilov ? Did representatives of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and Socialist Revolutionaries belong to these committees ? Yes, yes, yes. Were the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries in power at that time ? Were they persecuting the Bolsheviks as agents of the German General Staff ? Were there thousands of Bolsheviks in prisons at that time ? Was Lenin in hiding ? Yes, yes, yes. What quotes can refute these historical facts ?

Thälmann can refer to Manuilsky, Lozovsky, and Stalin (if the latter ever speaks). But he should leave Leninism and the history of the October Revolution alone ; for him, it’s a book sealed seven times over.

In conclusion, we must raise another very important issue concerning the Treaty of Versailles. Social-democratic workers are asking whether the Communist Party is making political concessions to National Socialism. In his reply, Thälmann continues to defend the slogan of national liberation and places it on the same level as the slogan of social liberation. Reparations—or what remains of them today—are, for Thälmann, just as important as the private ownership of the means of production. This policy seems designed to divert the workers’ attention from fundamental problems, to weaken the struggle against capitalism, and to force them to look for the main enemy and the root cause of their misery outside our borders. In fact, today more than ever, "the main enemy is within our own country !" Von Schleicher expressed this idea even more crudely : we must, above all, he explained on the radio on July 26, "get rid of these dogs within !" This soldier’s phrase is excellent. We gladly adopt it. All communists should make it their own. When the Nazis divert attention to Versailles, revolutionary workers must respond with Schleicher’s words : no, we must first get rid of these dogs within !
5. Stalin-Thälmann Policy in Practice

It is in critical moments, when far-reaching decisions must be made, that tactics are truly tested. The strength of Bolshevism lay in the fact that its slogans and methods proved true when events demanded bold decisions. What value can principles have if they must be abandoned as soon as the situation becomes critical ?

Realistic politics relies on the natural development of the class struggle. Sectarian politics tries to impose artificial rules on the class struggle. A revolutionary situation implies an extreme intensification of the class struggle. It is precisely for this reason that, in a revolutionary situation, the realistic politics of the Marxists exerts a powerful force of attraction on the masses. Conversely, sectarian politics has less force the greater the pressure of events. The Blanquists and Proudhonians, caught off guard by the movement of the Paris Commune, did the opposite of what they had always preached. During the Russian Revolution, the anarchists were still forced to recognize the Soviets as the organs of power, and so on.

The Communist International relies on the masses who, in the past, were won over to Marxism and whom the authority of the October Revolution united. But the policy of the Stalinist faction currently in leadership seeks to control the class struggle, instead of giving it political expression. This is the essence of bureaucracy, and in this respect, it resembles sectarianism, from which it is clearly distinguished by other characteristics. Thanks to a powerful apparatus, the material resources of the Soviet state, and the authority of the October Revolution, the Stalinist bureaucracy was able, during periods of relative calm, to impose artificial maxims of conduct on the vanguard of the proletariat. But, insofar as the class struggle is concentrated in the civil war, bureaucratic orders increasingly clash with harsh reality. Abrupt shifts in the real situation easily disconcert the proud and vain bureaucracy. When it cannot command, it capitulates. The policy of the Thälmannian Central Committee during the last few months will one day be studied as an example of the most pitiful and shameful confusion.

Since the "third period," the fact that any agreement with social democracy was out of the question had become an absolute dogma. Not only was it inadmissible to take the initiative for a united front, as the Third and Fourth Congresses had taught, but any proposal for joint action from social democracy also had to be rejected. The reformist leaders were "sufficiently unmasked." Past experience was enough. Instead of engaging in politics, the focus should be on teaching history to the masses. Making proposals to the reformists implied admitting that they were capable of fighting. That alone was already social-fascism. This deafening melody has been poured out by the ultra-left’s barrel organ for the last three or four years. And then, on June 22nd, the Communist faction in the Prussian Parliament, to everyone’s surprise, including its own, proposed an agreement with the Social Democrats and even with the Center Party. The same thing happened again in Hesse. Faced with the danger of the Parliament’s presidency falling into Nazi hands, all sacrosanct principles were thrown to the devil. Is that surprising ? Isn’t it appalling ?

But this mortal leap is not difficult to explain. It is well known that many superficial liberals and radicals joke all their lives about religion and heavenly powers, only to call the priest when faced with death or serious illness. The same is true in politics. The core of centrism is opportunism. Under the influence of external circumstances (tradition, mass pressure, political competition), centrism is forced, at certain times, to put on a leftist display. To do so, it must restrain itself and do violence to its political nature. By pushing itself to the limit, it often reaches the extreme of formal leftism. But as soon as a serious danger threatens, the true nature of centrism resurfaces. On a matter as crucial as the defense of the Soviet Union, the Stalinist bureaucracy always relied far more on bourgeois pacifists, English trade union bureaucrats, and French radicals than on the revolutionary movement of the proletariat. At the slightest external threat, the Stalinists immediately sacrificed their ultra-leftist rhetoric, as well as the vital interests of the international revolution, in the name of friendship with such dubious and unreliable "friends" as lawyers, writers, and mere drawing-room smooth talkers. A united front from above ? Not a chance ! But at the same time, Münzenberg, the High Commissioner for Shady Affairs, clung to the coattails of liberal windbags of all kinds and radical scribblers, "for the defense of the USSR."

The Stalinist bureaucracy in Germany, like that of all other countries except the USSR, is extremely dissatisfied with the compromising way in which Barbusse is conducting the affairs of the anti-war congress. In this area, Thälmann, Foster, and company would prefer to be more radical. However, in their own domestic affairs, each of them acts according to the same pattern as the authorities in Moscow : when faced with serious danger, they abandon their vain and counterfeit leftism and reveal their true opportunistic nature.

Was the initiative of the Communist faction in the Landtag inherently wrong and unacceptable ? We do not think so. In 1917, the Bolsheviks repeatedly made the following offer to the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries : "Take power, and we will support you against the bourgeoisie, should it offer any resistance." Some compromises are acceptable ; under certain conditions, they are necessary. This depends on the objective, how the compromise is perceived by the masses, and its limits. To limit compromise to the Landtag or the Reichstag, to consider it an end in itself that a Social Democrat or a Catholic should become president instead of a Fascist, amounts to falling entirely into parliamentary idiocy. The situation is quite different when the party sets itself the task of the systematic and methodical struggle to win over the Social Democratic workers on the basis of a united front. In this case, the parliamentary agreement against the fascist takeover of the presidency would have been an integral part of an extra-parliamentary agreement for the struggle against fascism. It goes without saying that the Communist Party would prefer to resolve the problem once and for all at the extra-parliamentary level. But mere preference is not enough when the forces are lacking. The Social Democratic workers have shown that they believe in the magical power of the July 31st vote. We must start from there. The Communist Party’s past mistakes (the Prussian referendum, etc.) have considerably facilitated the reformist leaders’ sabotage of the united front. A technical agreement in parliament, or even the mere proposal of such an agreement, must help the Communist Party clear itself of the accusation of collaborating with the fascists against social democracy. This is not an action in itself, but an action that, fundamentally, must pave the way for a fighting agreement or, at the very least, for the struggle for such an agreement among the mass organizations.

It is clear that these orientations are different. The struggle with social-democratic organizations can, and as it develops, take on a revolutionary character. The possibility of drawing closer to the social-democratic masses through high-level parliamentary agreements must also be considered. But for a Bolshevik, this can only be a rite of passage. The Stalinist bureaucracy acts in the opposite way : not only does it reject any agreement for struggle, but, worse, it maliciously sabotages any agreement that emerges from the grassroots. At the same time, it proposes a parliamentary alliance to the social-democratic deputies. Thus, in times of danger, it explains that its own ultra-leftist theory and practice are worthless, and it replaces them not with the politics of revolutionary Marxism but with an unprincipled parliamentary alliance based on the lowest common denominator.

The response will be that the Prussian and Hessian episodes were an error by the deputies, which the Central Committee corrected. But firstly, since such a decision, so important from the point of view of principles, should not have been taken outside the Central Committee, the blame falls entirely on the Central Committee ; secondly, how can we explain that the "steel," "consistent," "Bolshevik" policy, at a critical moment, after months of shouting and uproar, polemics, insults, and exclusions, gave way to an opportunistic "error" ?

But the matter is not limited to the Landtag. Thälmann and Remmele have simply betrayed themselves and their school of thought on a much more significant and important issue. On the evening of July 20, the Central Committee of the Communist Party drafted the following resolution :

"The Communist Party publicly asks, before the proletariat, the Social Democratic Party, the ADGB [2], and the Afabund [3] whether they are prepared to launch, jointly with the Communist Party, a general strike for the demands of the proletariat." The Central Committee published this important and unexpected resolution in its circulars of July 26 without adding the slightest comment. Is it possible to pass a more negative judgment on the entirety of the policy pursued up to this point ? Only the day before, it was considered social-fascist and counter-revolutionary to address the Social Democratic leadership with a proposal for joint action. On this basis, communists had been expelled and the struggle against "Trotskyism" waged. How could this Central Committee suddenly, on the evening of July 26, worship what it had burned the day before ? In what tragic situation has the bureaucracy placed the party, if the Central Committee dares to appear before it with its surprising resolution, without explaining or justifying itself.

Such turning points are the touchstone of any policy. Indeed, on the evening of July 20th, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany explained to the world : "Our policy up to now has been worthless." An unintentional admission, certainly, but entirely accurate. Unfortunately, this proposal of July 20th, which reversed previous policy, could in no way have a positive outcome. An appeal to the leadership—regardless of their response—can only have revolutionary significance if it has been prepared at the grassroots level, that is, if it is based on a comprehensive policy. But the Stalinist bureaucracy repeats daily to the social-democratic workers : "We, the communists, refuse any joint action with the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party." (See Thälmann’s "response.") The unprepared, unmotivated, and unexpected proposal of July 20th had the sole effect of exposing the communist leadership, revealing its inconsistency, its frivolity, its tendency towards panic and adventurous outbursts.

The policies of the centrist bureaucracy help their adversaries and enemies at every turn. And when, under pressure and then events, a few hundred thousand workers rally to the banner of communism, this happens despite the Stalin-Thälmann policy. It is precisely for this reason that the party is uncertain about the future.
6. What is being said in Prague about the united front ?

"When, in 1926, the Communist International concluded a united front with the Social Democratic leaders," wrote the central organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Rude Pravo, on February 27 of that year, supposedly under the pen of "a worker correspondent in the factory," "it did so to expose them to the masses, and at the time, Trotsky was fiercely opposed to it. But today, when Social Democracy is discredited by its countless betrayals of the workers’ struggles, Trotsky proposes a united front with its leaders. Trotsky is now against the Anglo-Russian committee of 1926, but for an Anglo-Russian committee of 1932."

These lines bring us to the heart of the matter. In 1926, the Communist International was striving to "unmask" the reformist leaders through the policy of the united front, and that was perfectly valid. But since then, social democracy has "discredited" itself. In whose eyes ? It still represents a larger number of workers than the Communist Party. It’s regrettable, but that’s the way it is. We can therefore consider that the reformist leaders have still not been unmasked. If the united front method was good in 1926, why would it be bad in 1932 ? "Trotsky was in favor of an Anglo-Russian committee in 1932, but against the Anglo-Russian committee of 1926." In 1926, the united front was concluded solely at the top, between the leaders of the Soviet trade unions and those of the trade unions, not to develop joint practical actions while the masses were separated by borders and their social circumstances, but on the basis of a "platform" of friendly diplomatic relations, with a clear pacifist bias. At the time of the miners’ strike and then the general strike, the Anglo-Russian committee couldn’t even meet because the "allies" were each pulling in opposite directions : the Soviet trade unionists were trying to support the strike, the trade unionists to break the strikers. Significant sums collected by Russian workers were rejected by the General Council as "cursed money." Only when the strike was definitively betrayed and broken did the Anglo-Russian committee convene for a traditional banquet where empty rhetoric was exchanged. The Anglo-Russian committee’s policy thus served to conceal the reformist strikebreakers from the working masses.

Today, the situation is entirely different. In Germany, workers, both social democrats and communists, are in the same position, facing a single enemy. They are mixed together in factories, in trade unions, in social security organizations, and so on. This is not a purely verbal "platform" between leaders, but rather very concrete tasks that must directly involve mass organizations in the struggle.

A united front policy at the national level is ten times more difficult than at the local level. A united front policy at the international level is a hundred times more difficult than at the national level. Uniting with British reformists on a slogan such as "defending the USSR" or "defending the Chinese revolution" is like writing with smoke and mirrors. In Germany, workers’ organizations, including Social Democrats, are directly threatened with crushing. It would be illusory to expect Social Democracy to fight against the German bourgeoisie to defend the USSR. But it is perfectly possible to expect Social Democracy to fight to defend its mandates, its meetings, its newspapers, its coffers, and, ultimately, its own survival.

However, even in Germany, adopting a fetishistic attitude toward the united front is by no means advisable. An agreement remains an agreement. It is maintained as long as it serves the practical purpose for which it was concluded. If the reformist leaders begin to hinder or sabotage the movement, the communists must always ask themselves : isn’t it time to break the agreement and lead the masses under our own banner ? Such a policy is not easy. But who said leading the proletariat to victory was an easy task ? By contrasting 1926 with 1932, Rude Pravo only reveals his misunderstanding of both what happened six years ago and what is happening now.

The example I gave of the Bolsheviks’ agreement with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries against Kornilov also caught the attention of the "worker’s correspondent" from an imaginary factory. "At that time," he wrote, "Kerensky actually fought against Kornilov for a specific period of time and helped the proletariat crush him. Even a toddler can see that social democracy is not currently fighting against fascism." Thälmann, who is certainly no "toddler," asserts that the Russian Bolsheviks never made an agreement with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries against Kornilov. Rude Pravo, as we can see, chooses a different path. He does not deny the agreement. But, in his view, the agreement was justified by the fact that Kerensky was genuinely fighting against Kornilov, unlike the Social Democrats who were paving the way for fascism to seize power. The idealization of Kerensky presented here is entirely unexpected. When did Kerensky begin fighting against Kornilov ? At the precise moment Kornilov raised his Cossack saber above Kerensky’s head, that is, on the evening of August 26, 1917. Just the day before, Kerensky had been conspiring directly with Kornilov to crush the workers and soldiers of Petrograd. If Kerensky began fighting against Kornilov, or more precisely, did not oppose the struggle against Kornilov for a time, it was solely because the Bolsheviks left him no other option. The fact that Kornilov and Kerensky, two conspirators, broke with each other and entered into open conflict was, to some extent, a surprise. But it could and should have been foreseen, if only based on the Italian and Polish experience, that German fascism and social democracy would clash. Why would it be acceptable to make a deal with Kerensky against Kornilov while forbidding the dissemination of propaganda, the defense, support, and preparation of an agreement with social-democratic mass organizations against fascism ? Why must such agreements be sabotaged wherever they are formed ? For this is precisely how Thälmann and his associates operate.

Rude Pravo naturally seized upon my remarks about how one could make a pact for militant action with the devil himself, his grandmother, and with Noske, Grzesinsky. "Look, communist workers," the newspaper wrote, "you must, therefore, make a pact with Grzesinsky, who shot so many of your comrades in arms. Discuss with him how to fight together against the fascists, with whom he sits at banquets and on factory boards..." The whole problem is shifted onto the terrain of artificial sentimentality. This argument is worthy of an anarchist, an old Russian left-wing Socialist Revolutionary, a "revolutionary pacifist," or even Münzenberg himself. But there is no trace of Marxism in it.

Is it true that Grzesinsky was first and foremost the executioner of the workers ? Undoubtedly, yes. But wasn’t Kerensky an executioner of workers and peasants on an even greater scale than Grzesinsky ? And yet Rude Pravo retrospectively approved the practical agreement with Kerensky.

Supporting the executioner in his work directed against the workers is a crime and even treason : Stalin’s alliance with Chiang Kai-shek is one such example. But if, tomorrow, this executioner of the Chinese people were to find himself at war with the Japanese, practical agreements of combat between Chinese workers and Chiang Kai-shek would not only be permissible but obligatory.

Did Grzesinsky attend banquets with fascist leaders ? I don’t know, but I readily admit it. However, Grzesinsky later had to spend time in a Berlin prison, not in the name of socialism, of course, but because he refused to cede his place in the sun to the Bonapartists and fascists. If the Communist Party had openly declared, even just a year ago : "We are ready to fight the fascist bandits, even with Grzesinsky" ; if it had made this a rallying cry, if it had developed it in its speeches and articles and instilled it deeply in the masses, Grzesinsky would not have been able, in July, to justify his capitulation to the workers by referring to the sabotage of the Communist Party. He would have had to either commit himself even more to the struggle or compromise himself definitively in the eyes of his own workers. Isn’t that clear ?

Certainly, even if Grzesinsky had been drawn into the struggle by the logic of his own situation or by the pressure of the masses, he would have remained an extremely unreliable and disloyal ally. He would have been only concerned with moving as quickly as possible from the more or less real struggle to an agreement with the capitalists. But the masses, even social-democratic ones, once set in motion, do not stop as easily as their police-state president when he has been offended. Their rapprochement in the struggle with the communist workers would have allowed the leaders of the Communist Party to exert a much broader influence over the social-democratic workers, especially in the face of a common threat. This is the ultimate goal of the united front.

Only spineless centrists like those in the SAP could reduce the entire politics of the proletariat to agreements with reformist organizations or, worse, to the abstract slogan of "unity." For a Marxist, the united front policy is only one of the methods used in the class struggle. Under certain conditions, this method is worthless : it would be utterly absurd to try to reach an agreement with the reformists to carry out the socialist revolution. But there are situations where refusing the united front risks costing the revolutionary party dearly for many years to come. Such is the situation in Germany at present.

The united front policy presents the greatest dangers and difficulties when applied, as we have indicated above, on an international scale, where it is more difficult to formulate practical tasks and organize mass control. This is especially true in the fight against war. The chances of joint action are very slim, and the opportunities for reformists and pacifists to evade and deceive us are much greater. By this, we do not mean that the united front policy is excluded at this level.

On the contrary, we requested that the Communist International address itself directly to the Second International and the Amsterdam International with the proposal to organize a joint congress against the war. The task of the Communist International in this matter would have been to formulate the most concrete commitments possible with regard to the various countries and situations. If social democracy had been obliged to attend such a congress, the question of war could have been a sharp wedge that we could have driven into its ranks, provided we had adopted the correct political position.

The utmost political and organizational clarity is necessary, as this is an agreement between proletarian organizations with millions of members, still divided by profound principled differences. No ambiguous intermediaries, no diplomatic cover-ups, no empty pacifist pronouncements !

The Communist International, however, once again deemed it wiser to act by going against the grain of Marxism : refusing to engage in public negotiations with the reformist internationals, it entered into behind-the-scenes talks with Friedrich Adler... through a pacifist writer, Henri Barbusse, a man of utter confusion. The result of this policy was that Barbusse gathered in Amsterdam the crypto-communist organizations, the "close" and "sympathetic" organizations and groups, as well as pacifist figures from all countries. The most sincere and honest of the latter—and they were a minority—could, each individually, say of themselves : "Me and my confusion." Who needs this charade, this intellectual vanity fair, this Münzenberg-style gathering, a blatant example of political quackery ? And to what end [4] ?

But let us return to Prague. Five months after the publication of the article analyzed above, the same newspaper published an article by one of the party leaders, Klement Gottwald, which presented itself as an appeal to Czech workers of various tendencies to conclude a fighting agreement. The fascist danger threatens all of Central Europe. Only the unity of the proletariat can stop the reactionary offensive. There is no time to lose, for it is already "five minutes to midnight." The appeal is written in a very urgent tone. But it is in vain that Gottwald, following Seydewitz and Thälmann, swears that he is not defending the interests of his party but the interests of the class : such a distinction is quite indecent coming from a Marxist. Gottwald denounces the sabotage by the Social Democratic leaders. Needless to say, he is entirely right on this point. Unfortunately, the author does not speak openly about the policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany ; Clearly, he is hesitant to defend it, although he doesn’t dare criticize it. Gottwald addresses the crucial question fairly well, even if it lacks boldness. Inviting workers of different tendencies to reach an agreement in the factories, Gottwald writes : "Many of you may say : unite at the top, at the bottom we will easily reach an agreement. We believe," the author continues, "that the essential thing is for the workers to agree at the bottom ; as for the leaders, we have already said that we would even unite with the devil if he is against the rulers and for the interests of the working class. And we tell you this clearly : if your leaders renounce even for a moment their alliance with the bourgeoisie, if they commit themselves against the rulers on even a single point, we will welcome this event and we will support them in this matter."

Everything is said there, and almost correctly. Gottwald even mentioned the devil, whose name provoked the righteous indignation of the Rude Pravo editorial staff only five months ago. Gottwald has completely forgotten the devil’s grandmother. May God have mercy on her soul : we are ready to sacrifice her to the united front. Perhaps, for his part, Gottwald will agree, to console the offended old woman, to give her full and complete control of the Rude Pravo article of February 27th and of the "working-class correspondent," a hack writer.

Gottwald’s political reflections apply, we hope, not only to Czechoslovakia but also to Germany. Gottwald should have said so himself. Furthermore, the Party leadership, neither in Berlin nor in Prague, can be content with simply proclaiming its readiness to join a united front with the Social Democrats ; it must demonstrate this actively, offensively, Bolshevikly, through specific proposals and practical actions. This is precisely what we demand.

Gottwald’s article, thanks to its realistic and non-ultimatist tone, immediately resonated with social-democratic workers : on July 31, Rude Pravo published a letter, among others, from an unemployed typesetter recently returned from Germany. In this letter, one senses the democratic worker, clearly influenced by the prejudices of reformism. It is all the more important to see how the policies of the German Communist Party were reflected in his conscience. "When, in the autumn of last year," the typesetter wrote, "Comrade Breitscheid addressed an appeal to the Communist Party to undertake joint actions with the Social Democrats, it provoked a veritable explosion of fury from the Rote Fahne. The social-democratic workers then said to themselves : ’Now we know how serious the Communists’ intentions are regarding the united front.’"

This is the authentic voice of a worker. His words contribute far more to solving the problem than dozens of articles by unprincipled scribblers. Breitscheid, in fact, wasn’t proposing a united front. He was merely trying to frighten the bourgeoisie with the prospect of joint action with the communists. If the Central Committee of the Communist Party had immediately raised the issue directly, it would have placed the Social Democratic leadership in a difficult position. But the Central Committee of the Communist Party hastily put itself in a difficult position.

In the pamphlet "The German Revolution and the Stalinist Bureaucracy," I wrote specifically about Breitscheid’s declaration : "Is it not clear that we should have seized upon Breitscheid’s diplomatic and ambiguous proposal immediately, putting forward on our side a practical, concrete, and well-developed program for the common struggle against fascism, and demanding a joint meeting of the leadership of both parties, with the participation of the leadership of the free trade unions ? Simultaneously, we should have energetically disseminated this program at all levels of both parties and among the masses."

By rejecting the reformist leader’s trial balloon, the Central Committee of the Communist Party transformed Breitscheid’s ambiguous statement in the workers’ minds into a sincere proposal for a united front, and the social-democratic workers drew the following conclusion : "Our people want joint action, but the communists are sabotaging it." Could one imagine a more misguided and absurd policy ? Could Breitscheid’s maneuver have been better facilitated ? The Prague printer’s letter clearly demonstrates that Breitscheid, with Thälmann’s collaboration, fully achieved his objective.

Rude Pravo tried to find a contradiction and confusion in the fact that, while we rejected agreements in some cases, we accepted them in others, and that we considered it essential to re-define each time the scope, the slogans, and the modalities of the agreement, linking them to the specific situation. Rude Pravo doesn’t suspect that in politics, as in all other serious matters, one must know : what one wants, when, where, and how. And it’s not useless to understand why.

In our critique of the Communist International’s program four years ago, we outlined some basic rules of the united front policy. We believe it is worthwhile to reiterate them here.

"The possibility of betrayal is always present among reformists. But this does not imply that reformism and betrayal are synonymous at every moment. Temporary agreements are possible with reformists when they take a step forward. But when, frightened by the movement’s evolution, they betray it, maintaining the bloc with them is a criminal concession to the traitors and a cover-up of their betrayal.
Here is the most important rule, the immutable and constant rule of all maneuvering : never merge, mix, or intertwine your organization with another, even with the one that is currently the most ’friendly.’ Never engage in actions that, directly or indirectly, openly or covertly, subject your party to other parties or organizations of other classes, limit your freedom of agitation, or make you responsible, even partially, for the political line of other parties. Do not mix flags, let alone kneel before another flag."

Today, after the experience of the Barbusse congress, we would add yet another rule :

"Agreements can only be concluded publicly, before the masses, from party to party, from organization to organization. Do not resort to the services of dubious brokers. Do not try to pass off diplomatic agreements with bourgeois pacifists as the proletarian united front."

7. Class struggle in light of current circumstances

It is by no means out of theoretical pedantry that we have insisted on distinguishing between fascism and Bonapartism. The different terms allow us to differentiate the different concepts which, in politics, allow us to distinguish the real forces. The crushing of fascism would leave no room for Bonapartism and, we hope, would mark the direct entry into the socialist revolution. But the proletariat is not prepared for the revolution. It is the shifting relationship between social democracy and the Bonapartist government on the one hand, and between Bonapartism and fascism on the other, that will determine (without altering the fundamental problem) the path and pace of the preparation for the struggle between the proletariat and the fascist counter-revolution. Given the circumstances, the contradictions between Hitler, Schleicher, and Wels make a fascist victory difficult and offer the Communist Party a new and most precious advantage : a credit of time.

"Fascism will come to power in a cold, calculated way," Stalinist theorists repeatedly declared. This formula was meant to convey the idea that the fascists would seize power legally, peacefully, through a coalition, without needing to resort to an open coup. Events have already refuted these predictions. The Papen government came to power through a coup d’état, which it completed with the coup in Prussia. Even if we grant that the coalition of Nazis and the center will overthrow the Papen government through "constitutional" methods, this fact in itself will not solve anything. There is a vast difference between Hitler’s "peaceful" seizure of power and the establishment of a fascist regime. Fundamentally, the coalition would facilitate the coup d’état, but could not replace it. Once the Weimar Constitution is definitively abolished, the most important task remains : the suppression of the organs of proletarian democracy. From this perspective, what does the "cold road" mean ? Nothing other than the forgetting of resistance on the part of the workers. Indeed, Papen’s Bonapartist coup d’état provoked no response. Will the fascist coup also go unanswered ? It is around this question that the prediction of the "cold road" revolves, consciously or unconsciously.

If the Communist Party were an overwhelming force, if the proletariat were marching straight to power, all the contradictions within the propertied class would be temporarily erased : fascists, Bonapartists, and democrats would form a single front against the proletarian revolution. But this is not the case. The propertied classes and the parties serving them can afford to openly display their contradictions, given the weakness of the Communist Party and the fragmentation of the proletariat. The Communist Party can only strengthen itself by exploiting these contradictions.

In a highly industrialized Germany, fascism might not be so keen to assert its claims to absolute power. The German proletariat is undoubtedly larger and potentially stronger than the Italian proletariat. Although fascism in Germany is stronger and better organized than it was in Italy at the same time, the liquidation of "Marxism" must nevertheless appear to it as a difficult and risky task. Moreover, it is possible that the peak of Hitler’s political career is already behind him. The excessively long period of waiting and the new obstacle posed by Bonapartism undoubtedly weaken fascism, exacerbate internal friction, and could significantly reduce its influence. But for now, these are only tendencies that have been impossible to gauge. Only the actual struggle can answer that question. To assume a priori that National Socialism will stop halfway, without causing any difficulties, would be to show reckless nonchalance.

The theory of the "cold path" in its fully developed form is no better than the theory of "social fascism" ; more precisely, it is its inverse. Both disregard the contradictions between the main components of the opposing camp and ignore the successive stages of the process. The Communist Party is completely sidelined. It is no coincidence that Hirsch, the theorist of the "cold path," is also the theorist of "social fascism." The country’s political crisis is developing on the basis of the economic crisis. But the economy is not immutable. Yesterday we were forced to say that the cyclical crisis only exacerbates the fundamental, organic crisis of the capitalist system ; today we must remember that the general decline of capitalism does not preclude cyclical fluctuations. The current crisis will not last forever. The capitalist world’s hopes for a change in the cyclical situation are exaggerated, but not without some basis. The struggle between political forces must be integrated into the economic perspective. Papen’s program makes this all the more urgent as it assumes an upward trend in the short term.

Economic expansion becomes visible to everyone when the flow of goods accelerates and production and the number of employed workers increase. But it doesn’t begin there. Preparatory processes in the areas of monetary circulation and credit precede expansion. Capital hidden in unprofitable businesses and industrial sectors must be released and made available as cash seeking investment. The market, stripped of its excesses, bloating, and distortions, must reflect real demand. Confidence must be restored in the relationships between different businesses, and between the market and businesses. Furthermore, this confidence, so often discussed in the world press, must be fostered by not only economic factors but also political ones (reparations, war debts, disarmament, and armament).

No increase in trade, production, or the number of employed workers is currently on the horizon ; on the contrary, the decline continues. However, the processes preparing for this economic shift have clearly already played most of their role. Numerous indicators suggest that this shift, while not imminent, has indeed drawn closer. This is the assessment that can be made on a global scale.

However, a distinction must be made between creditor countries (the United States, England, France) and debtor countries, or more precisely, bankrupt countries. Germany occupies the foremost position in this second group. Germany possesses no liquid capital. Its economy can only receive impetus from external capital. But a country that is unable to repay its debts cannot obtain any loans. In any case, creditors will only open their purses when they are convinced that Germany is once again capable of exporting more than it imports, the difference being used to cover its debts. Demand for German products is expected primarily from the agricultural countries of Southern Europe. But agricultural countries, in turn, depend on the demand for raw materials and foodstuffs from industrialized countries. Germany is, therefore, forced to wait. The regenerative current will first flow through its capitalist competitors and its agricultural partners.

But the bourgeoisie cannot wait. The Bonapartist clique is even less inclined to wait. While promising not to tamper with the stability of the currency, the Papen government embarks on a massive inflationary program. Amidst speeches about the rebirth of economic liberalism, it issues administrative decrees to regulate the economic cycle and, in the name of free enterprise, directly subjects taxpayers to capitalist entrepreneurs.

The hope for a rapid turnaround in the economic situation is the central tenet of the Papen government’s program. If it doesn’t happen in time, the two billion will vanish like drops of water on a hot plate. Papen’s plan is far riskier and more speculative than the bull market currently unfolding on the New York Stock Exchange. And in the event of failure, the consequences of this Bonapartist gamble will be far more catastrophic.

The fall of the mark will be the most immediate and noticeable result of the gap between the government’s plans and the actual movement of the market. Social ills, exacerbated by inflation, will become unbearable. The failure of Papen’s economic program will necessitate a new, more effective one. Which one ? Most likely, fascism. If the Bonapartist remedy fails to cure the situation, then fascist surgery will be necessary. Social democracy will gesticulate "on the left" and implode. The Communist Party will grow, if it doesn’t hinder itself. Overall, this will signify a revolutionary situation. Under these conditions, three-quarters of the chances of victory depend on the communist strategy.

The revolutionary party must, however, be prepared for another eventuality : the sudden arrival of a turning point in the economic situation. Let us suppose that the Papen-Schleicher government manages to hold on until industry and commerce restart. Would it then be saved ? No, because the beginning of an upward trend would mean the end of Bonapartism, and perhaps not only Bonapartism.

The forces of the German proletariat are not exhausted. But they are weakened : by the sacrifices, defeats, and disappointments that have followed one another since 1914 ; by the systematic betrayals of social democracy ; by the disrepute into which the Communist Party has plunged itself. Six or seven million unemployed hang like a ball and chain around the proletariat. The decrees of Brüning and Papen met with no resistance. The coup of July 20th went unanswered.

It can be predicted with the utmost certainty that the changing economic climate will give a powerful boost to the temporarily diminished activity of the proletariat. From the moment the company stops laying off workers and starts hiring again, their confidence grows : they are needed once more. The spring that had been so tightly compressed begins to unwind. Until now, workers have only fought to regain lost positions, not to gain new ones. And German workers have lost too much. Neither emergency decrees nor the intervention of the Reichswehr will be able to stop the mass strikes that will erupt on the wave of recovery. The Bonapartist regime, which can only maintain itself thanks to "social peace," will be the first victim of this economic shift.

We are already witnessing a surge in strikes in various countries (Belgium, England, Poland, partially in the United States, but not in Germany). Assessing the development of mass strikes in light of the current economic situation is not easy. Statistics record fluctuations in the economic climate with an inevitable lag. Economic recovery must be a reality for it to be recorded. Generally, workers detect changes in the economic climate before statisticians do. New orders, or even the anticipation of new orders, the reorganization of companies to expand production, or simply the cessation of layoffs, all increase the strength of workers’ demands. The defensive strike of textile workers in Lancashire was undoubtedly triggered by a turning point in the textile industry. The Belgian strike likely originated from a further worsening of the crisis in the coal industry. The diversity of economic shocks that have given rise to the recent strikes reflects the changing nature of the new phase of the global economic situation. But generally speaking, the growth of the mass movement is an indication of a noticeable shift in the economic situation. In any case, the economic recovery, from its very beginnings, has led to a surge in mass struggles.

The ruling classes of all countries expect a miracle from industrial growth, as evidenced by the surge in stock market speculation. If capitalism were truly entering a phase of renewed prosperity or slow but sustained progress, this would obviously lead to a stabilization of capitalism, the consolidation of the bourgeoisie’s position, and, simultaneously, the weakening of fascism and the strengthening of reformism. But there is no serious reason to hope or fear that the new economic upturn, inevitable in itself, will be able to overcome the general trends toward decline in the world economy, and particularly in the European economy. Pre-war capitalism developed according to the formula of expanded reproduction ; present-day capitalism, with all its cyclical fluctuations, is merely the expanded reproduction of misery and catastrophes. The new economic cycle will inevitably lead to a redistribution of power, both within each country and within the capitalist camp, primarily between Europe and America. In the short term, the capitalist world will find itself facing insurmountable contradictions and will experience new, even more terrible upheavals.

Without risk of being wrong, we can make the following prediction : the economic recovery will strengthen the confidence of the workers and give new impetus to their struggle, but it will not succeed in giving capitalism, especially European capitalism, the possibility of a second birth.

In the context of the renewed surge of capitalism’s decline, the practical gains of the workers will, by necessity, be extremely limited. Will German capitalism, at the height of its economic resurgence, restore to workers the conditions they enjoyed before the current crisis ? Everything points to a negative answer. The mass movement, having emerged from its slumber, will have to take on a political character all the more quickly.

The first stage of industrial revitalization will be extremely perilous for social democracy. The workers will launch a struggle to regain what they have lost. The leading figures of social democracy will hope for a return to the "normal" order. They will seek above all to prove their ability to participate in a new coalition. Leaders and masses will each pull in opposite directions. To exploit this new crisis of reformism, the communists need correct orientation amidst the changing circumstances ; they must quickly formulate a practical program of action that takes as its starting point the losses suffered by the workers during the years of crisis. The transition from the economic struggle to the political struggle will be a particularly favorable moment for increasing the strength and influence of the revolutionary proletarian party.

Here, as elsewhere, the correct application of the united front policy is the condition for any success. For the Communist Party of Germany, this means above all that it no longer sits on the fence in the field of the trade union movement : it must move firmly towards the free trade unions ; bring the current cadres of the RGO into them ; undertake systematic action to gain influence in the factory committees and in the trade unions ; prepare a broad campaign under the slogan of workers’ control over production.

8. The path to socialism

Kautsky, Hilferding and others have repeatedly explained in recent years that they were never proponents of the theory of the collapse of capitalism, which revisionists once attributed to Marxists and which Kautsky’s followers now attribute to communists.

The Bernsteinians outlined two perspectives : one, unrealistic, supposedly orthodox "Marxist," according to which capitalism was bound to collapse mechanically under the weight of its internal contradictions ; the other, "real," which asserted that a gradual evolution from capitalism to socialism was possible. These two schemes, so opposed at first glance, share a common feature : the absence of the revolutionary factor. While rejecting the caricature of the automatic collapse of capitalism, which was attributed to them, the Marxists emphasized that with the intensification of the class struggle, the proletariat would make the revolution long before the objective contradictions of capitalism had caused its automatic collapse.

This controversy took place at the end of the last century. It must be acknowledged that the reality of capitalism since the war is, from a certain perspective, closer to Bernstein’s caricature of Marxism than anyone, revisionists first and foremost, could have imagined. Hadn’t they conjured up the specter of final collapse only to prove its unreal nature ? Meanwhile, capitalism appears all the closer to inevitable collapse the longer the revolutionary intervention of the proletariat in the destiny of society is delayed.

The theory of pauperization was the essential element of the theory of collapse. Marxists cautiously asserted that the worsening of social contradictions did not necessarily imply an absolute decline in the living standards of the masses. In fact, it is precisely this latter process that we are witnessing. Could the collapse of capitalism have manifested itself more brutally than in chronic unemployment and the dismantling of social safety nets—that is, in society’s refusal to feed its own slaves ?

Opportunistic resistance within the working class proved powerful enough to grant capitalism, on borrowed time, another reprieve of several decades. The result was not the idyllic peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism, but a state that closely resembles the disintegration of society.

For a long time, reformists tried to shift the blame for the current state of society onto the war. But, firstly, it was not the war that created the destructive tendencies of capitalism ; it merely revealed and accelerated them. Secondly, the war could not have accomplished its work of destruction without the political support of reformism. Thirdly, the intractable contradictions of capitalism are preparing new wars on various fronts. Reformism will not succeed in extricating itself from its historical responsibility. By paralyzing and restraining the revolutionary energy of the proletariat, international social democracy is giving the process of capitalist collapse its most blind, unrestrained, catastrophic, and bloody forms.

It goes without saying that one can only speak of the realization of the revisionist caricature of Marxism in the conditional tense, in relation to a specific historical period. However, decaying capitalism will lead—even if with a considerable delay—not to an automatic collapse, but to revolution.

The current crisis has swept away what remained of reformist utopias. Today, opportunistic practice no longer has any theoretical cover. Wels, Hilferding, Grzesinsky, and Noske scoff at the catastrophes that may now befall the masses, provided their own interests are not harmed. But the situation is such that the crisis of the bourgeois regime also affects the reformist leaders.

"State, intervene !" – the social democrats were still crying out recently as they retreated before fascism. And the state did intervene : Otto Braun and Severing were thrown to the ground. Today, writes Vorwärts, everyone must recognize the advantages of democracy over dictatorial rule. Certainly, democracy offered serious advantages, Grzesinsky thought, by experiencing prison firsthand.

From this experience, social democracy drew the following conclusion : "It is time to move to socialization !" Tarnov, only yesterday a physician of capitalism, suddenly decided to be its gravedigger. Capitalism was clearly exhausted, since it was throwing reformist ministers, high-ranking officials, and police chiefs into unemployment. Wels wrote a programmatic article : the hour of socialism has struck. Let Schleicher deprive the deputies of their salaries and the former ministers of their pensions, and Hilferding will write a study on the historical function of the general strike.

The Social Democratic leadership’s "leftward" shift is surprising in its crudeness and hypocrisy. But this in no way implies that the maneuver is doomed to failure. This party, despite all its crimes, still leads millions of workers. It will not fall on its own. We must know how to overthrow it.

The Communist Party will explain that Wels-Tarnov’s path to socialism is just another maneuver to deceive the masses, and it will be right. It will recount the history of social-democratic "socializations" over the past fourteen years. This is useful, but not sufficient : history, even the most recent history, cannot replace active politics.

Tarnov attempts to reduce the debate on the reformist or revolutionary path to socialism to the simple question of the "pace" of transformations. As a theorist, one could not sink any lower. The pace of socialist transformations actually depends on the state of the country’s productive forces, its level of culture, the amount of expenditure necessary for its defense, and so on. But transformations, whether slow or rapid, are only possible if at the head of society there is a class that has an interest in socialism, and at the head of this class, a party that does not seek to deceive the exploited and that is always ready to crush the resistance of the exploiters. It must be explained to the workers that this is precisely what constitutes the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But that is not enough. We cannot, when it comes to the burning problems of the world proletariat, forget, as the Communist International does, the existence of the Soviet Union. In Germany, the task is not to undertake the construction of socialism for the first time, but to combine Germany’s productive forces, culture, and technical and organizational genius with the construction of socialism already begun in the USSR.

The German Communist Party merely sings the praises of the USSR, indulging in gross and dangerous exaggerations. But it is utterly incapable of connecting the construction of socialism in the USSR, its monumental experiments, and its invaluable achievements to the tasks of the proletarian revolution in Germany. The Stalinist bureaucracy, for its part, is completely unable to assist the German Communist Party on this crucial issue, as its perspective is limited to a single country.

The incoherent and cowardly projects of state capitalism and social democracy must be countered with a comprehensive plan for the joint construction of socialism in the USSR and Germany. No one demands an immediate, detailed plan. A preliminary outline will suffice ; only the fundamental principles are necessary. This plan must be discussed as quickly as possible in all organizations of the German working class, first and foremost in the trade unions.

These discussions must include progressive elements among technicians, statisticians, and economists. The widespread discussions on a planned economy in Germany today reflect the impasse of German capitalism but remain academic, bureaucratic, abstract, and pedantic. Only the Communist Party can ensure that these discussions on this issue stop going in circles.

The building of socialism is already underway ; a bridge must be built across national borders. Here is the first plan : study it, improve it, refine it ! Workers, elect special planning commissions ! Mandate them to make contact with the trade unions and economic bodies of the Soviets ! Create, on the basis of the trade unions, factory committees, and other workers’ organizations, a central planning commission that will liaise with Gosplan in the USSR. Involve German engineers, administrators, and economists in this work !

This is the only correct way to approach the question of the planned economy today, in 1932 after fifteen years of Soviet power and fourteen years of convulsions of the German capitalist republic.

Nothing is easier than mocking the social-democratic bureaucracy, starting with Wels, who sang the praises of socialism. But we mustn’t forget that reformist workers take the question of socialism very seriously. Therefore, we must adopt a very serious attitude towards reformist workers. Here we find the problem of the united front in all its complexity.

If social democracy sets itself the task (and we know what to think of that) not of saving capitalism, but of building socialism, it must seek an agreement not with the center but with the communists. Will the Communist Party reject such an agreement ? Not at all. On the contrary, it will itself propose an agreement, it will demand it before the masses, just as it will demand payment of the recently issued socialist bonds.

The Communist Party’s offensive against social democracy must now be waged on three fronts. The crushing of fascism remains an urgent task. The proletariat’s decisive struggle against fascism requires a simultaneous confrontation with the Bonapartist state apparatus. For this, the general strike is an irreplaceable weapon. It must be prepared. A special plan must be developed—that is, a plan for mobilizing forces for its execution. From this plan, a mass campaign must be developed, and based on this campaign, an agreement on the conduct of the general strike must be proposed to social democracy, attaching specific political conditions to it. This proposal, taken up and implemented at each new stage, must, in its momentum, lead to the creation of soviets as the highest organs of the united front.

Papen’s economic plan, which already has the force of law, is the cause of unprecedented misery for the German proletariat ; even the leaders of the Social Democrats and the trade unions admit it verbally. In the press, they express themselves in an energetic tone unheard of from them for a very long time. There is a chasm between their words and their actions, we know, but we must take them at their word. We must develop a set of measures for a common struggle against the exceptional laws and Bonapartism. The struggle imposed on the proletariat by the entire situation cannot, by its very nature, be waged within the framework of democracy. Hitler had an army of 400,000 men ; Papen and Schleicher, in addition to the Reichswehr, had a semi-private army of 200,000 men—the "Steel Helmets"—the bourgeois democracy had the semi-tolerated Reich Banner army, and the Communist Party had the banned Red Front army : such a situation proves that the problem of the state is a question of force. One could not imagine a better revolutionary school.

The Communist Party must tell the working class : Schleicher cannot be overthrown by playing the parliamentary game. If social democracy agrees to overthrow the Bonapartist government by other means, the Communist Party pledges to support social democracy with all its might. Communists hereby commit never to using violent means against a social-democratic government, as long as it relies on the majority of the working class and guarantees the Communist Party freedom of agitation and organization. This way of framing the issue will be understood by all social-democratic and non-party workers.

The third front is the struggle for socialism. Here too, we must strike while the iron is hot and force social democracy to confront it with a concrete plan of cooperation with the USSR. What is necessary in this regard has already been said above.

Of course, these areas of struggle, which have different levels of importance in the overall strategic perspective, must not be isolated from one another, but rather intertwined. The political crisis in society demands that partial problems be linked to general problems ; this is precisely the essence of the revolutionary situation.
9 The only way

Can we expect the Central Committee of the Communist Party to embark on the correct path of its own accord ? Its entire history proves that it is incapable of doing so. No sooner had it begun to correct itself than it found itself confronted with the prospect of "Trotskyism." If Thälmann didn’t understand this on his own, it was explained to him from Moscow : the "part" must be sacrificed to the "whole," that is, the interests of the German revolution must be sacrificed to the interests of the Stalinist apparatus. The timid attempts to revise policy were put on hold. Bureaucratic reaction triumphs once again across the board.

This is certainly not Thälmann’s doing. If the Communist International were to allow its local branches the freedom to exist, to think, and to develop, they could have elected their own leadership over the past fifteen years. But the bureaucracy has established a system for appointing leaders and supporting those it has nominated through artificial publicity. Thälmann is both a product and a victim of this system.

The cadres, whose development is stalled, weaken the party. They compensate for their shortcomings with retaliatory measures. The party’s hesitations and lack of confidence inevitably affect the class as a whole. One cannot call upon the masses for bold actions when the party itself is incapable of taking revolutionary initiatives.

Even if Thälmann were to receive a telegram from Manuilsky tomorrow insisting on the need for a shift toward a united front policy, the leadership’s latest zigzag would be of little use, as it is too compromised. Correct policy requires a sound system within the party. The party’s internal democracy, currently a mere toy in the hands of the bureaucracy, must become a reality again. The party must first become a party again ; then the masses will trust it. In practical terms, this means that an extraordinary congress of the party and the Communist International must be put on the agenda.

A general discussion must obviously precede the party congress. All barriers erected by the apparatus must be removed. Every party organization, every party cell, has the right to invite to its meetings and listen to any communist, whether a party member or an ex-member, if it deems it necessary for the formation of its opinion. The press must be placed at the service of discussion : all party newspapers must devote sufficient space each day to critical articles. The special press committees, elected at the general assemblies of party members, must ensure that the newspapers serve the party and not the bureaucracy.

The discussion will undoubtedly require considerable time and energy. The party apparatus will argue that in a critical period, it cannot afford the "luxury of discussion." The bureaucratic saviors believe that in a difficult situation, the party must remain silent. Marxists, on the other hand, believe that the more difficult the situation, the more important the independent role of the party becomes.

In 1917, the leadership of the Bolshevik Party enjoyed immense prestige. Yet, throughout the year, the party engaged in a series of in-depth discussions. On the eve of the October Revolution, the party debated passionately to determine which of the two factions within the Central Committee was correct : the majority, which supported the uprising, or the minority, which opposed it. Despite the depth of the disagreements, there were never any expulsions or repressive measures. The non-party masses were invited to participate in these discussions. In Petrograd, an assembly of non-party women sent a delegation to the Central Committee to support the majority. Admittedly, the discussions took time. But in return, these discussions, conducted freely and without lies or falsification, forged a general and unwavering conviction regarding the correctness of the political line, which alone made victory possible.

How will the situation in Germany develop ? Will the small wheel of the opposition succeed in setting the large wheel of the party in motion in time ? The question is being asked. Pessimistic voices are often heard. In the various communist groups, within the party itself as well as on its periphery, there are many comrades who say : the Left Opposition has the right position on all the important issues. But it is weak. Its leaders are few in number and politically inexperienced. Can such an organization, with its small weekly newspaper (Permanente Revolution), stand up to the powerful apparatus of the Communist International ?

The lessons of these events are stronger than the Stalinist bureaucracy. We want to be, in the eyes of the communist masses, the interpreters of these experiences. This is our historical role as a faction. We do not demand, like Seydewitz and Co., that the revolutionary proletariat place its trust in us on credit. We set ourselves a more modest task : we offer our help to the communist vanguard in developing a correct political line. To this end, we are recruiting and training our own cadres. This preparatory stage cannot be skipped. At each new stage of the struggle, the most conscious and critical elements within the proletariat will rally to our side.

The revolutionary party begins with an idea, a program directed against the very powerful apparatus of class society. It is not the cadres who create the ideas, but the ideas that create the cadres. Fear of the power of the apparatus is one of the most salient features of the opportunism cultivated by the Stalinist bureaucracy. Marxist critique is stronger than any apparatus.

The organizational forms that the future development of the Left Opposition will take depend on a great many circumstances : the weight of historical blows, the resilience of the Stalinist bureaucracy, the actions of ordinary communists, and the energy of the opposition itself. However, the principles and methods we defend have been tested in the most important events of world history, in defeat as well as in victory. They will prevail.

The successes of the opposition in all countries, including Germany, are well-known. But they are happening more slowly than many of us expect. This is regrettable, but not surprising. The bureaucracy cynically presents communists who begin to listen to the left-wing opposition with the following choice : participate in the campaign against "Trotskyism," or leave the ranks of the Communist International. For party officials, their jobs and salaries are at stake, and the Stalinist apparatus is masterful at exploiting sensitive issues. But the thousands of ordinary communists, torn between their devotion to communist ideals and the threat of expulsion from the Communist International, are infinitely more important. This explains why there are so many divided, intimidated, or hidden opposition members within the official Communist Party.

This unusual combination of historical factors is sufficient to explain the slow organizational growth of the Left Opposition. Despite this slowness, the intellectual life of the Communist International is today, even more than yesterday, focused on the struggle against "Trotskyism." The journals and theoretical articles in the newspapers of the Russian Communist Party and other sections are primarily devoted to the struggle against the Left Opposition, sometimes openly, sometimes indirectly. The relentless organizational persecution waged by the apparatus against the opposition is even more symptomatic : sabotage of its meetings by brutal methods ; use of physical force in all its forms ; backroom deals with bourgeois pacifists, French radicals, and Freemasons against "Trotskyists" ; and the dissemination of venomous calumnies by the Stalinist center.

The Stalinists sense more quickly and understand better than the opposition the extent to which our ideas undermine the pillars of their apparatus. However, the Stalinist faction’s methods of self-defense are double-edged. Up to a certain point, they operate through intimidation. But by the same token, they prepare a mass reaction against the falsifications and the use of physical force.

When, in July 1917, the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary government labeled the Bolsheviks agents of the German General Staff, this infamous maneuver initially had a real effect on the soldiers, the peasants, and the backward strata of the working class. But when subsequent events clearly vindicated the Bolsheviks, the masses began to say to themselves : the Leninists were consciously slandered ; if they were persecuted so violently, it was because they were right. And mistrust of the Bolsheviks gave way to devotion and intense affection. In a different situation, we are witnessing a similar phenomenon today. Through this monstrous accumulation of slander and repressive measures, the Stalinist bureaucracy undeniably succeeded in intimidating ordinary party members for a time. But by doing so, it paves the way for the mass rehabilitation of the Leninist Bolsheviks in the eyes of the revolutionary masses. There is no doubt about it.

Certainly, we are still very weak today. The Communist Party still has the masses, but it already lacks both theory and strategic direction. The Left Opposition has already developed its Marxist orientation, but it does not yet have the masses with it. The other "left-wing" groups have neither. The Leninbund, which is trying to compensate for the lack of a serious, principled political line with the whims and personal moods of Urbans, is floundering desperately. The Brandlerians, despite the cadres they possess, are tumbling down the steps ; no tactical formula can replace the adoption of a revolutionary strategic position. The SAP has put itself forward as a candidate for the revolutionary leadership of the proletariat—an unfounded claim ! Even the most serious representatives of this "party," as Fritz Sternberg’s latest book proves, do not transcend the limits of left-wing centrism. The more they strive to create their own "doctrine," the more they prove they are Thalheimer’s disciples. This school has no more future than a corpse.

A new historical party cannot simply emerge because a number of former social democrats have belatedly become convinced of the counter-revolutionary nature of Ebert and Wels’s policies. Nor can a new party be improvised from a group of disillusioned communists who have not yet proven their right to lead the proletariat. For a new party to appear, what is needed is, on the one hand, significant historical events that shatter the backbone of the old parties, and on the other hand, a principled position developed by experienced leaders based on historical experience.

When we strive with all our might to regenerate the Communist International and to ensure the continuity of its future development, we are by no means yielding to formal fetishism. We place the fate of the world proletarian revolution above the organizational future of the Communist International. If, despite all our efforts, the worst-case scenario were to materialize, if the Stalinist bureaucracy were to lead the current official parties to their downfall, if, in a certain sense, everything had to start all over again, then the new International would find its source in the ideas and frameworks of the left-wing communist opposition.

Criteria such as "pessimism" and "optimism" are insufficient and do not apply to our political work. It transcends particular stages, defeats, and victories. Our politics is long-term politics.
Postscript

This pamphlet, whose chapters were written at various times, was already finished when a telegram from Berlin brought news of the conflict that had just erupted between the overwhelming majority in the Reichstag and the Papen government, and consequently with the President of the Reich. We will follow the concrete developments of events closely in the pages of Permanente Revolution. We only wish to revisit certain general conclusions that may have seemed questionable at the outset of this pamphlet, but which have since been confirmed by events.

1. The Bonapartist character of the Papen-Schleicher government is fully demonstrated by its isolation in the Reichstag. The agrarian and capitalist circles that are directly behind the presidential government represent an incomparably smaller fraction of the German nation than the percentage of votes obtained by Papen in the Reichstag would suggest.

2. The antagonism between Papen and Hitler is the same antagonism that exists between the agrarian and capitalist elite on the one hand, and the reactionary petty bourgeoisie on the other. Just as the liberal bourgeoisie once used the revolutionary movement of the petty bourgeoisie but prevented it by all means from seizing power, so too is the monopoly bourgeoisie prepared to take Hitler as a lackey but not as its master. Unless absolutely necessary, it will never entrust all power to fascism.

3. The fact that the various factions of the large, middle, and petty bourgeoisie are engaged in an open power struggle, without fearing an extremely risky conflict, proves that the bourgeoisie does not feel directly threatened by the proletariat. The National Socialists and the center, but also the leading figures of the Social Democrats, risked a constitutional conflict only because they were certain it would not escalate into a revolutionary conflict.

4. The Communist Party is the only party whose votes against Papen were dictated by revolutionary aims. But there is still a long way to go from revolutionary aims to revolutionary achievements.

5. The logic of events is such that the struggle for "parliament" and for "democracy" becomes, for every social-democratic worker, a question of power. This is the fundamental meaning of the entire conflict from the point of view of the revolution. The question of power is the question of unity in revolutionary actions of the proletariat. The united front policy toward social democracy must allow, in the near future, in a form respecting workers’ democracy, the creation of organs of class struggle, that is to say, workers’ councils.

6. Faced with the gifts offered to capitalists and the unprecedented attack on the living standards of the proletariat, the Communist Party must put forward the slogan of workers’ control over production.

7. The different fractions of the propertied classes can only quarrel because the revolutionary party is weak.

The revolutionary party could become infinitely stronger if it were to capitalize on the infighting among the propertied classes. But to achieve this, it is necessary to be able to distinguish the different factions according to their social composition and political methods, and not lump them all together. The theory of social fascism, which has completely and definitively failed, must finally be abandoned like a piece of old junk.

Notes

[1] Although he concealed the above-quoted speech from the Party and the Communist International, the Stalinist press launched one of its usual campaigns against him. Manuilsky wrote that I dared to "equate" the fascists with the Jacobins, who are, however, our revolutionary ancestors. The latter assertion is more or less true. Unfortunately, these ancestors have a great many descendants, incapable of using their brains. Echoes of this old polemic can be found in Münzenberg’s recent writings against Trotskyism. However, we will not dwell on them.

[2] Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (General Confederation of German Trade Unions) [1919-1933].

[3] Allgemeiner Freier Angestelltenbund (General Free Confederation of Employees) [1919-1933].

[4] The fact that the Brandlerians (see their "Tribune" in Stuttgart on August 27) are parting ways with us on this issue and supporting the charade of Stalin, Manuilsky, Lozovsky, and Münzenberg is not a surprise to us. After setting an example of their united front policy in Saxony in 1923, Brandler-Thälmann supported Stalin’s policy toward the Kuomintang and the Anglo-Russian Committee. Can they afford to miss the opportunity to rally to Barbusse’s cause ? Otherwise, their political profile would be incomplete.

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The tragedy of the German proletariat

German workers will rise again, Stalinism never will !

March 14, 1933

The most powerful proletariat in Europe, by virtue of its role in production, its social weight, and the strength of its organizations, offered no resistance to Hitler’s rise to power and the first violent attacks against workers’ organizations. This is the fact from which future strategic calculations must be made.

It would be utter nonsense to think that Germany’s future development would follow the Italian path : that Hitler would consolidate his domination step by step without encountering serious resistance ; that German fascism had many years of dominance ahead of it. No, the future of National Socialism must be determined by an analysis of the German and international situation, not by mere historical analogies. But one thing is clear from the outset : if, as early as September 1930, we were demanding that the Communist International set short-term objectives for Germany, now a long-term policy must be developed. Before decisive battles are possible, the vanguard of the German proletariat must find a new direction—that is, clearly understand what has happened, define its responsibility for this great historical defeat, chart new paths, and thus regain its confidence.

The criminal role of social democracy needs no further comment : the creation of the Communist International fourteen years ago was precisely aimed at wresting the proletariat from the demoralizing influence of social democracy. If this has not succeeded thus far, if the German proletariat has proven itself, in a very great historical ordeal, powerless, disarmed, and paralyzed, the direct and immediate blame lies with the post-Leninist leadership of the Communist International. This is the first conclusion that must be urgently drawn.

Under the treacherous blows of the Stalinist bureaucracy, the Left Opposition maintained its loyalty to the official party to the very end. The Bolshevik-Leninists now share the fate of all other communist organizations : our cadres are arrested, our publications banned, our literature confiscated ; Hitler even hastened to shut down the Opposition Bulletin, which is published in Russian. But while the Bolshevik-Leninists, along with the entire proletarian vanguard, suffer all the consequences of fascism’s first serious victory, they cannot and will not bear the slightest responsibility for the official policy of the Communist International.

From 1923 onwards, that is, from the very beginning of the struggle against the Left Opposition, the Stalinist leadership did its utmost, albeit indirectly, to help Social Democracy disorient, confuse, and discourage the German proletariat : it held back and restrained the workers, when the situation demanded a bold revolutionary offensive ; it proclaimed the approach of a revolutionary situation, when this already belonged to the past ; it made deals with the rhetoricians and chatterers of the petty bourgeoisie ; it helplessly followed Social Democracy under the pretext of pursuing a united front policy ; it proclaimed the "third period" and the struggle to conquer the streets under conditions of political decline and weakness of the Communist Party ; it replaced serious struggle with leaps, adventures, or parades ; it isolated the communists from the mass trade unions ; It identified social democracy with fascism and refused a united front with mass workers’ organizations in the face of attacks by National Socialist gangs ; it sabotaged every local initiative for a defensive united front and, at the same time, systematically deceived the workers about the real balance of power, distorted the facts, presented friends as enemies and enemies as friends, and squeezed the party more and more tightly by the throat, not allowing it to breathe freely, to speak, or to think.

In the very abundant literature devoted to the question of fascism, it suffices to refer to the speech of the official leader of the German party, Thaelmann, who, at the plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, in April 1931, unmasked the "pessimists" in the following terms, that is to say, the people who knew how to face the future : "we were not led astray by the panickers... We firmly and sensibly established that September 14 (1930) was, in a certain way, Hitler’s greatest day, and that the days that followed would be not better but worse ; this assessment that we gave of the development of this party is confirmed by events... Today, the fascists no longer have any reason to laugh." Alluding to the fact that social democracy was forming its own defense groups, Thaelmann demonstrated in this speech that these detachments were in no way distinguishable from the shock troops of National Socialism, and that they were both preparing to crush the communists.

Today, Thaelmann is arrested. The Bolshevik-Leninists find themselves, along with Thaelmann, under the blows of triumphant reaction. But Thaelmann’s policy is Stalin’s policy, that is to say, the official policy of the Communist International. It is precisely this policy that is the cause of the complete demoralization of the party at the moment of danger, when the leaders lose their heads, when party members, having lost the habit of thinking, fall into a state of prostration, and when the highest historical positions are surrendered without a fight. A flawed political theory carries within itself its own punishment. The strength and obstinacy of the apparatus only increase the magnitude of the catastrophe.

Having surrendered to the enemy everything that could be surrendered in such a short time, the Stalinists are trying to rectify what has happened through chaotic actions that only serve to highlight the entire chain of their crimes. Today, while the Communist Party press is being silenced, the apparatus destroyed, and the bloody rag of fascism flies with impunity over Liebknecht’s house, the Executive Committee of the Communist International is embarking on the path of the united front not only at the grassroots level but also at the top. This new zigzag, more abrupt than any that came before, was not, however, initiated by the Executive Committee of the Communist International on its own : the Stalinist bureaucracy ceded the initiative to the Second International. It has succeeded in seizing the instrument of the united front, which it had hitherto feared to a mortal degree. Insofar as one can speak of advantages in a situation of panicked retreat, these lie entirely with reformism. Forced to answer a direct question, the Stalinist bureaucracy chooses the worst possible solution : it neither rejects the agreement of the two Internationals nor accepts it ; it plays hide-and-seek. It has lost so much self-confidence, it is so humiliated, that it no longer dares to confront, before the world proletariat, the leaders of the Second International, those blatant agents of the bourgeoisie, those Hindenburg voters, who paved the way for fascism.

In the appeal of the Executive Committee of the Communist International ("To the Workers of All Countries") of March 5, the Stalinists do not speak of "social-fascism" as the principal enemy. Nor do they recall their leader’s great discovery : "social democracy and fascism are not antipodes, but twins." They no longer assert that the struggle against fascism requires the prior crushing of social democracy. They do not breathe a word about the impossibility of a united front from above. On the contrary, they meticulously enumerate the instances in the past when the Stalinist bureaucracy, unexpectedly for the workers and for itself, found itself obliged to propose, in passing, on the spur of the moment, a united front to the reformist leaders. Thus, in the gust of the historical storm, artificial and false theories, worthy of charlatans, are scattered.

Referring to the "original conditions of each country" and the supposed impossibility of organizing a united front on an international scale (conveniently forgetting the entire struggle against "exceptionalism," that is, the right-wing theory of national particularities !), the Stalinist bureaucracy recommends that national Communist Parties submit a proposal for a united front to the "Central Committees of the Social Democratic Parties." Just yesterday, this was called capitulating to social fascism ! Thus, the highest lessons of Stalinism over the past four years are swept under the rug, and an entire political system crumbles to dust.

The matter doesn’t end there : having just declared that it was impossible to establish conditions for a united front on the international stage, the Executive Committee of the Communist International immediately forgets this and, twenty lines later, formulates the conditions under which a united front is acceptable and permissible in all countries, regardless of differences in national circumstances. The retreat from fascism is accompanied by a panicky retreat from the theoretical tenets of Stalinism. Fragments and debris of ideas and principles are cast aside like ballast.

The conditions for a united front, put forward by the Communist International for all countries (Action Committees against Fascism, demonstrations and strikes against wage cuts), offer nothing new ; on the contrary, they are a schematic, bureaucratized reproduction of the slogans that the left-wing opposition formulated much more precisely and concretely two and a half years ago, which led to its being labeled as social-fascist. A united front based on these principles could yield decisive results in Germany ; but for this to happen, it would have to be implemented in time. Time is the most important factor in politics.

What, then, is the practical value of the proposals of the Executive Committee of the Communist International at present ? For Germany, it is minimal. The united front policy presupposes a "front," that is, firm positions and centralized leadership. The Left Opposition has, in the past, put forward the conditions for a united front as conditions for active defense, with the prospect of a move to the offensive. Today, the German proletariat has reached the stage of disorderly retreat, which does not even include rearguard actions. In these circumstances, spontaneous alliances between communist and social-democratic workers can and will form for isolated and sporadic tasks, but the systematic realization of the united front is inevitably postponed indefinitely. We must no longer harbor any illusions about it.

A year and a half ago, we declared that the key to the situation lay in the hands of the German Communist Party. Today, the Stalinist bureaucracy has let slip that key. Significant events, beyond the Party’s control, will be necessary to give the workers the opportunity to pause, regroup, reorganize, and launch an active defense. We do not know precisely when that moment will arrive. Perhaps much sooner than the triumphant counter-revolution anticipates. But in any case, those who drafted the manifesto of the Executive Committee of the Communist International will not be the ones directing the united front policy in Germany.

If the central position has been abandoned to the enemy, the surrounding areas must be reinforced, strongpoints prepared for a future concentric attack. This preparation within Germany involves a critical analysis of the past, maintaining the morale and cohesion of the vanguard fighters, and organizing the rearguard fighters wherever possible, in anticipation of the moment when isolated detachments can unite into a large army. This preparation also entails the defense of proletarian positions in countries closely linked to Germany, or its immediate neighbors : Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic States, Scandinavia, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Switzerland. Fascist Germany must be surrounded by a powerful ring of proletarian positions. Without ceasing for a single minute to try to stop the disorderly retreat of the German workers, it is now necessary to create strong proletarian positions around the borders of Germany for the struggle against fascism.

First and foremost is Austria, which is most directly threatened by the fascist coup. It can be said with certainty that if the Austrian proletariat were to seize power today and transform its country into a revolutionary battleground, Austria would become to the revolution of the German proletariat what Piedmont was to the revolution of the Italian bourgeoisie. It is impossible to foresee how far the Austrian proletariat, driven forward by events but paralyzed by the reformist bureaucracy, will go down this path. The task of communism is to assist events against Austro-Marxism. The means to this end is the policy of the united front. The conditions that the manifesto of the Executive Committee of the Communist International reiterates, so belatedly after the opposition of the Left, thus retain their full force.

The united front policy, however, presents not only advantages but also dangers. It easily gives rise to leaders plotting behind the backs of the masses, passively adapting to the ally, and opportunistic vacillations. These dangers can only be prevented by providing two explicit guarantees : maintaining complete freedom of criticism regarding the ally and restoring complete freedom of criticism within one’s own party. Refusing to criticize one’s allies leads directly and immediately to capitulation to reformism. The united front policy without internal party democracy—that is, without party control over the apparatus—leaves the leaders free to engage in opportunistic experiments, the inevitable complement to adventurist ventures.

How is the Executive Committee of the Communist International acting in this situation ? Dozens of times, the left-wing opposition predicted that, under the pressure of events, the Stalinists would be forced to abandon their ultra-leftism, and that, once on the path to a united front, they would commit all the opportunistic betrayals they had accused us of the day before. This prediction has come true, once again, word for word.

After making a perilous leap to align itself with the united front, the Executive Committee of the Communist International trampled underfoot the fundamental guarantees that alone could ensure the revolutionary content of the united front policy. The Stalinists took note and adopted the hypocritical and diplomatic demand of the reformists concerning so-called "mutual non-aggression." Renouncing all the traditions of Marxism and Bolshevism, the Executive Committee of the Communist International recommended that Communist Parties, in the event of the united front being established, "renounce attacks against social-democratic organizations during the common struggle." That’s how it was worded ! Renouncing "attacks (!) against social democracy" (what a shameful phrase !) implies renouncing the freedom of political criticism, that is, the fundamental function of the revolutionary party.

This capitulation is brought about not by practical necessity, but by panic. The reformists are coming to an agreement and will continue to do so to the extent that the pressure of events, combined with that of the masses, forces them to. The demand for "non-aggression" is blackmail, that is, an attempt by the reformist leaders to gain an additional advantage. Submitting to blackmail means building the united front on rotten foundations and giving the reformist schemers the opportunity to shatter it under any pretext.

Criticism in general, and even more so under the conditions of the united front, must, of course, correspond to the actual situation and not exceed certain limits. The absurdity of "social-fascism" must be rejected : it is not a concession to social democracy but to Marxism. The ally should not be criticized for its betrayals in 1918, but for its poor performance in 1933. Criticism, like political life itself, of which it is the voice, cannot be suspended for even an hour. If communist revelations correspond to reality, they serve the objectives of the united front, propel the temporary ally forward, and, even more importantly, provide a revolutionary education to the proletariat as a whole. The first stage of the shameful and criminal policy that Stalin imposed on the Chinese communists with regard to the Kuomintang was precisely marked by the abandonment of this fundamental obligation.

The situation is no better with regard to the second guarantee. Having abandoned any criticism of social democracy, the Stalinist apparatus doesn’t even consider restoring the right to criticism to members of its own party. The shift itself is carried out, as usual, in the form of a bureaucratic revelation. No national congress, no international congress, not even a plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, no preparation in the party press, no analysis of past political events. And this is not surprising : from the very beginning of the discussion within the party, any thinking worker would ask the people in the apparatus : why have the Bolshevik-Leninists been expelled from all the sections, why are they being arrested, deported, and shot in the USSR ? Is it simply because they dig deeper and see further ? The Stalinist bureaucracy cannot accept this conclusion. It is capable of any leap and turn, but it cannot and does not dare to accept a fair confrontation with the Bolshevik-Leninists in front of the workers. Thus, in the struggle for its survival, the apparatus undermines its new direction, ruining in advance its credibility not only with the Social Democrats, but also with the Communist workers.

The publication of the manifesto of the Executive Committee of the Communist International is accompanied by another circumstance, somewhat tangential to the matter at hand, but which sheds considerable light on the current situation of the Communist International and the attitude of the Stalinist leadership towards it. The manifesto was printed in Pravda on March 6th, not as a direct and open appeal in the name of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in Moscow, as had always been the case, but presented as a translation of a document from L’Humanité, transmitted by the TASS news agency in Paris. What an absurd and humiliating trick ! After all the successes, after the implementation of the first Five-Year Plan, after the "liquidation of the classes," after the "entry into socialism," the Stalinist bureaucracy doesn’t dare print, under its own name, the manifesto of the Executive Committee of the Communist International ! This is her true attitude towards the Communist International, this is how she really feels in the international arena.

The manifesto was not the only response to the Second International’s initiative. Through front organizations—the German and Polish Red Opposition trade unions (RGO), Antifa, and the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGT)—the Communist International convened a "pan-European, workers’, and anti-fascist congress" for April. The guest list was, as expected, vague and extensive : "businesses" (it was phrased as such : "businesses," even though communists had been excluded from almost every business in the world, thanks to the efforts of Stalin and Lozovsky), local workers’ organizations, revolutionary, reformist, Catholic, and non-partisan groups, sports organizations, anti-fascist groups, and peasant organizations. Furthermore, "We want to invite all isolated individuals who are effectively fighting (!) for the workers’ cause." Having ruined the cause of the masses for a long time, the strategists are now appealing to "isolated individuals," those righteous people who have not found a place among the masses, but who, nevertheless, "are effectively fighting for the cause of the workers." Barbusse and General Schönaich will be mobilized once again to save Europe from Hitler.

We have before us the ready-made script for one of those charlatan performances that Stalinists usually use to mask their impotence. What did the Amsterdam bloc of centrists and pacifists do in the fight against the Japanese brigands’ attack on China ? Nothing. Out of respect for Stalinist "neutrality," the pacifists didn’t even publish a manifesto of protest. Today, they are preparing a reenactment of the Amsterdam congress, not against the war, but against fascism. What will the anti-fascist bloc do with the absent "enterprises" and the powerless "isolated" members ? Nothing. They will produce an empty manifesto, if, this time, they even make it to the congress.

The penchant for "lone wolves" has two extremes : opportunistic and adventurous. Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the past extended a hand to liberals while holding a bomb in their left. The experience of the last ten years proves that after every major defeat, provoked or at least exacerbated by the policies of the Communist International, the Stalinist bureaucracy has invariably tried to salvage its reputation with some grandiose adventure (Estonia, Bulgaria, Canton). Is this danger not still present today ? In any case, we consider it our duty to raise our voices in warning. Adventures that aim to replace the action of the paralyzed masses further disorganize them and worsen the catastrophe.

The conditions of the current world situation, as well as the conditions in each country taken separately, are as deadly for social democracy as they are favorable to the revolutionary party. But the Stalinist bureaucracy has managed to transform the crisis of capitalism and that of reformism into a crisis of communism. Such is the outcome of ten years of unchecked leadership by its epigones.

There are hypocrites who say : the left-wing opposition criticizes a party that has fallen into the hands of the executioner. The scoundrels add : the opposition is helping the executioner. By combining hypocritical sentimentality and a poisonous lie, the Stalinists try to hide the Central Committee behind the apparatus, the apparatus behind the party, and to evade the question of who is responsible for the catastrophe, the flawed strategy, the disastrous regime, the criminal leadership : this is what it means to help the executioners of today and tomorrow.

The policies of the Stalinist bureaucracy in China were no less disastrous than the current policies in Germany. But there, things happened behind the backs of the world proletariat, under circumstances it did not understand. The critical voice of the left-wing opposition in the USSR barely reached the workers of other countries. The China experiment went almost unpunished for the Stalinist apparatus. In Germany, it is different. Every stage of the drama has unfolded before the eyes of the world proletariat. At each stage, the opposition has made its voice heard. The entire course of development was predicted in advance. The Stalinist bureaucracy slandered the opposition, attributed to it ideas and plans that were foreign to it, excluded all those who spoke of a united front, helped the Social Democratic bureaucracy sabotage the unified defense committees at the local level, deprived the workers of any possibility of embarking on the path of mass struggle, disorganized the vanguard, and paralyzed the proletariat. Thus, by opposing the united defense front with the Social Democrats, the Stalinists found themselves aligned with them in a united front of panic and capitulation.

And today, already facing ruins, the leadership of the Communist International fears nothing more than the light and criticism. Let the world revolution perish, but long live false prestige ! The bankrupts sow confusion and cover their tracks. Pravda considers it a "huge political victory" that the German Communist Party, while receiving the first blows, lost "only" 1,200,000 votes, despite an overall increase in voters of four million. Similarly, Stalin, in 1924, considered it a "huge victory" that the German workers, who had retreated without a fight, managed to give the Communist Party 3,600,000 votes. If the proletariat, deceived and disarmed by both apparatuses, gave the Communist Party nearly five million voters this time, it only means that it would have given it two or three times as many, had it had confidence in its leadership. He would have brought him to power, if the party had been able to show that it was capable of seizing and holding onto it. But he gave the proletariat nothing but confusion, zigzags, defeats, and misfortunes.

Yes, five million communists still managed to go to the polls, one by one. But they are neither in the factories nor in the streets. They are bewildered, scattered, demoralized. Under the yoke of the apparatus, they have lost the habit of being independent. The bureaucratic terror of Stalinism paralyzed their will, before the criminal terror of fascism took its turn.

It must be said clearly, unequivocally, openly : Stalinism in Germany has had its August 4th. From now on, the vanguard workers of this country will only speak of the period of Stalinist bureaucracy’s domination with a burning sense of shame, with words of hatred and curse. The official Communist Party of Germany is doomed. From now on, it can only lose ground, crumble, and be reduced to nothing. No artificial means can save it. German communism can only be reborn on new foundations and with a new leadership.

The law of uneven development is also reflected in the fate of Stalinism. In different countries, it finds itself at different stages of its decline. To what extent Germany’s tragic experience will serve as an impetus for the revival of the other sections of the Communist International, only time will tell. In Germany, at any rate, the sinister song of the Stalinist bureaucracy has ceased to be sung. The German proletariat will rise again ; Stalinism never will. The German vanguard workers must build a new party under the terrible blows of the enemy. The Bolshevik-Leninists will devote all their strength to this task.