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What does it mean for Haiti to be occupied by foreign armed forces ?

lundi 23 février 2026, par Robert Paris

Washington sent warships this month to deploy ’gunboat diplomacy’ while the island nation continues its freefall of violence and corruption

Early last week, U.S. warships and Coast Guard boats arrived off the coast of Port-au-Prince, as confirmed by the American Embassy in Haiti. On land in the nation’s capital, tensions were building as the mandate of Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council neared expiration.

The mandate expired Feb. 7, leaving U.S.-backed Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé in power. Experts believe the warships were a show of force from Washington to demonstrate that the U.S. was willing to impose its influence, encouraging the council to step down. It did.

This is far from the first time in history that the U.S. has asserted control over Haiti’s politics, but as the country remains wracked by gang violence, corruption, and poverty, many are left wondering how effective this latest U.S. intervention really has been.

An estimated 90% of Haiti’s capital is said to be controlled by gangs and, in 2025 alone, the United Nations estimates nearly 6,000 people have been killed and thousands injured amid rampant kidnappings and attacks — not to mention nearly half of the population is currently facing acute hunger. And with the fate of future elections still hanging in the balance, an air of uncertainty continues to hang over the troubled nation.

The Transitional Presidential Council, which Washington played a role in installing in April 2024, was intended to be a temporary entity to exercise presidential powers until either a new president was elected or the mandate expired. The council was created following a string of unprecedented political events following the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, leaving a power vacuum.

With no functioning parliament, two men claimed power in Haiti, creating widespread confusion. One of the men, Ariel Henry, eventually took over, ruling without elected institutions amid worsening gang violence and weakening state authority. It was then that the U.S. and other international institutions stepped in to create the Transitional Presidential Council, which served as the head of state until very recently.

The presidential council stepped down last weekend after intense political pressure from the United States, just days after U.S. ships arrived in the Bay of Port-au-Prince. This comes after the council’s vote to oust the prime minister was met with decisive pushback from the U.S., which views Fils-Aimé as a stabilizing force against gang violence and a potential ally.

And though widespread gang violence prevented Haiti from holding a presidential election Feb. 7 as envisioned at the start of the mandate, Washington-backed Fils-Aimé is now expected to remain in power as the country readies itself to hold general elections — for the first time in more than a decade.

A statement from the U.S. Embassy on X said the presence of American warships off the coast in recent days “reflects the United States’ unwavering commitment to the security, stability, and a brighter future for the Republic of Haiti” and that it is intended to reaffirm “partnership and support” and “ensure a safer and more prosperous Haiti.”

But experts who spoke with RS say the presence of the ships sent a stronger message that could be interpreted as a show of support for Fils-Aimé to retain power and a threat if he did not. The ships were a “show of force,” according to Robert Fatton, a political science professor at the University of Virginia and author of several books on Haiti.

Antoine Dupré :

"If one day on your shores

Our tyrants are reappearing

That their fugitive horde

"Serve as fertilizer for our fields."
Haiti : Food, care, homes

No military occupation !

NOU PA VLE RETE ANBA DJOL OKENN PEYI ETRANJE

We do not want to place ourselves under the control of foreign countries

GRO PEYI-YO KITE AYITI VIV

Let the major countries let Haiti live

REVOLISYON SEL SOLISYON

Revolution is the only solution

Haiti being militarily occupied by the most ferocious armed forces of several countries means that the world’s ruling classes are so afraid of the oppressed that the proletarians of half an island who might rebel worry them to the point of preemptive, massive military occupation. The great powers are concerned with popular reactions, not with saving victims and helping surviving populations, contrary to what they would have us believe here. If the world’s armed forces rushed to intervene, it was to prevent the power vacuum caused by the earthquake that destroyed public buildings, state buildings, and the buildings of foreign occupying forces from turning into a social earthquake. And these forces hide their fear of the Haitian people behind alleged looting, but when you’re starving, helping yourself to supplies in stores is simply a matter of survival ; it’s not a crime ! The real bandits are the great powers that have been plundering Haiti for hundreds of years, imposing dictatorships on it, and have done nothing to rid it of death squads, macoutes or others, military, paramilitary or militias.

To understand the role of foreign armies in Haiti, it’s important to remember that the American, UN, and French military interventions didn’t begin with the earthquake. They already claimed to be defending the safety of the civilian population, while ordinary people were constantly being extorted and murdered by armed groups. The true aim of foreign armed interventions, especially that of the US, was to suppress the social uprising of the working people that began in 1986, when the Haitian people rid themselves of the Duvalier dictatorship, which was supported by Western countries. Yes, the working people of Haiti experienced a revolution, attacking the barbaric "Tonton Macoutes" and overthrowing the dictatorship of "Baby Doc" Duvalier, which was backed by the US.

"The earthquake in Haiti has given rise to ’one of the greatest relief operations in the history of the United States,’ President Barack Obama said yesterday in a solemn address at the White House, alongside his predecessors, George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, whom he tasked with raising funds for the victims, while Hillary Clinton arrived yesterday in Port-au-Prince.

The US Secretary of State will attempt to address the logistical challenges posed by the distribution of international aid and seek solutions to deliver this aid to Haitians, while US military personnel are already deployed on the ground. Thus, recognizable by their black berets and red and blue patches bearing the letters "AA," paratroopers from the US 82nd Airborne Division have been positioned in large numbers at the Port-au-Prince airport since Friday.

Alongside the site’s only congested runway, some "paratroopers" have set up camp, while others have deployed in this nerve center for the delivery of aid, signaling the end of the relative anarchy that had reigned since Tuesday’s earthquake at the airport, which was deprived of its control tower.

Nearly 10,000 American troops in the area

More American paratroopers were expected to arrive throughout the weekend aboard transport planes from North Carolina, bringing the total to 3,500. With the anticipated arrival of the Marines and their three accompanying ships, 9,000 to 10,000 American troops will be deployed to Haiti and at sea starting tomorrow. — Jean Guisnel

"France weeps over the 40,000 corpses on the tiny island, and the whole world rushes to dry the Republic’s tears. But what was it like when, a few centuries ago, France shed torrents of blood to seize the Lesser and Greater Antilles ? At sea, off the coast of East Africa, lies the volcanic island of Madagascar. Fifty years ago, we saw how the Republic, now inconsolable and mourning the loss of its children, then subjugated the stubborn natives to its yoke with chains and the sword. No volcano opened its crater there ; it was the mouths of French cannons that sowed death and desolation. The fire of French artillery swept thousands of human lives from the face of the earth until this free people prostrated themselves face down and the queen of the ’savages’ was dragged, as a trophy, into the ’City of...’" Lights."

Rosa Luxemburg in "Martinique" (1902) :
Ever since imperialisms and local ruling classes have claimed to save us through military and police interventions, we are dead...

Their armed gangs kill more surely than earthquakes and cyclones !!!!

Major powers are worried about Haiti !!!

Haiti : The "humanitarian" intervention masks a war against the rebellious people

When Western states justify their military intervention, they claim to be blocked by riots of people fighting over food supplies and by looters. This is false ! The food supplies blocked at the airport are not due to bandits or riots... Haitians denounce foreign troops because they know who they are. Since 1994 for the US, since 2004 for all foreign troops, they have occupied the country, and it’s not to save them from a natural disaster ! They intervene against the population. They claim that if aid isn’t arriving, it’s due to the state of the roads. This is false ! They claim to want to save the Haitian people—this is false !

Where does the concern of the major powers towards the Haitian people come from ?

Without delay, a massive armed force (tens of thousands of soldiers) from the US, France, and the rest of the world landed in Haiti following the devastating earthquake that struck the capital, Port-au-Prince. And despite media rhetoric attempting to portray them as providing humanitarian aid, their primary task is restoring order. They are equipped for repression, not rescue. Rescue teams are hampered by the priority given to deploying the military.

From the outset, it’s impossible to hide the fact that the primary concern of the major powers is popular reaction, not rescuing victims or helping surviving populations, contrary to what they’re trying to make us believe here. While some buildings occupied by Westerners were quickly rescued, this wasn’t the case for neighborhoods inhabited by Haitians. Most people received neither food nor medical assistance.

No government forces or military participated in the initial emergency rescues carried out entirely by the local population. Some rescue teams affiliated with NGOs have still not been able to reach the area, while the armed forces present outnumber the rescue teams by hundreds of times. A hospital plane and rescue teams with dogs were refused because the deployment of Marine troops was prioritized, given the emerging popular uprisings.

The world’s armed forces rushed to intervene to prevent the power vacuum caused by the earthquake, which destroyed public buildings, state buildings, and the headquarters of foreign occupying forces, from turning into a social earthquake. Of course, the armed forces speak of insecurity, accusing Haitians of attacking shops, but when people are starving, is that really a crime ?

To understand the role of foreign armies in Haiti, it’s important to remember that the American, UN, and French military intervention didn’t begin with the earthquake. It was a product of the social uprising that swept through Haiti in 1986 when the Haitian people set out to rid themselves of the Duvalier dictatorship, which was supported by Western countries. Indeed, the working people of Haiti experienced a revolution, attacking the "Tonton Macoutes" and overthrowing the dictatorship of "Baby Doc" Duvalier, backed by the US. The regime was permanently shaken. Only recently have the major powers occupying Haiti been able to allow the Haitian army to return to its headquarters, which had been completely deserted after the revolution.

And the tens of thousands of foreign soldiers who have occupied the country since 2004 had no intention whatsoever of challenging the dictatorship and poverty that reign in one of the poorest countries in the world. No, they came to occupy this country against its population because it could threaten the Haitian government and ruling class.

This so-called "peacekeeping force" has done nothing but violently attack the population of poor neighborhoods and slums alongside local armed forces and police. During the last food riots in 2008, the ordinary people of Haiti, among other demands, called for the withdrawal of UN and foreign troops. All these armed forces did nothing against the ruling class, against poverty and exploitation. Nothing in the face of the hurricanes. The one that destroyed Gonaïves, the most revolutionary city in the country, and left its people devastated and mired in mud, without this so-called "international community" lifting a finger.

The earthquake has completely destroyed the credibility of the government, and the major powers fear that the Haitian people will seize the opportunity to get rid of their oppressors.
As for the workers here, far from falling for the hypocritical humanitarian propaganda of the great powers, they should wish for the Haitian people what their oppressors fear most : that the people liberate themselves and that the revolutionary island rise from its ashes....!

Home > 16- EDITORIALS FROM THE VOICE OF WORKERS > Editorial 17-01-2010 - The major powers are worried about Haiti !!!
Editorial 17-01-2010 - Major powers are worried about Haiti !!!

Saturday, January 16, 2010 , by Robert Paris

THE VOICE OF THE WORKERS

"Workers of all countries, unite !"

Karl Marx

How international forces repress the poor population, the film
Haiti : The "humanitarian" intervention masks a war against the rebellious people

International armed forces only monitor poor neighborhoods while the rich maintain armed gangs that loot, terrorize and murder.

The horrors of exploitation in Haiti

The food riots

Armed groups loyal to the Haitian government intervened against the population in 2004
Where does the concern of the major powers towards the Haitian people come from ?

What were the major powers doing in Haiti ?

The social revolt of the population

The Duvalier Dictatorship, the film
A BRIEF HISTORICAL REMINDER :
In 1984, and especially in 1986, the Haitian people set out to rid themselves of the Duvalier dictatorship, which was supported by Western countries. Yes, the working people of Haiti experienced a revolution, attacking the barbaric "Tonton Macoutes" and overthrowing the dictatorship of "Baby Doc" Duvalier, backed by the USA. The regime was permanently shaken. Only recently have the major powers occupying Haiti allowed the Haitian army to return to its headquarters, which had been completely deserted after the revolution.

In the aftermath of February 7th, the fall of Duvalier, groups of unemployed youth and workers, armed with sticks, machetes, knives, stones, and jerrycans of gasoline, roamed the streets in the working-class neighborhoods of cities and some rural areas, chanting and targeting the Tonton Macoutes, their homes, shops, vehicles, and the offices of the VSN, the dictatorship’s party. However, the barracks and military posts were not attacked, and weapons seized from the Tonton Macoutes and other torturers of the regime were returned to the barracks ! Meanwhile, leaders of the Duvalier dictatorship were exonerated through a very slight period of opposition, such as de Ronceray and Bazin, and notorious torturers like Ti Boulé went unpunished. The Tonton Macoute militias were attacked by the people, but neither the army nor the government did anything to systematically disarm the armed gangs of the powerful. Many neighborhood activists and members of peasant or religious associations turned to this kind of political opposition, comprised of the talkative but largely inactive, and even less socially radical, democratic petty bourgeoisie : the KONAKOM and other "democratic movements." Or the Democratic Liaison Committees or PANPRA. The movement of grassroots church committees, or Ti-Légliz, or the "Alpha missions" (meaning literacy and awareness-raising), offered a broad framework for poor youth and were more concerned with the plight of the most destitute than the democratic petty bourgeoisie, but they had no program that politically expressed the interests of the masses in the face of the military leaders and the ruling classes. The CATH union also emerged at the forefront of the "democratic sector," even though, in fact, it offered no clear prospects for the exploited. And CATH, like the rest of the political opposition, quickly became caught up in political maneuvering. As for the Stalinist party, Theodore’s PUCH, its reputation for radicalism was undeserved. Theodore systematically aligned himself with the most fashionable generals or colonels of the moment. After "acknowledging" General Namphy, defending Jean-Claude Paul, celebrating with Avril, applauding Abraham, and congratulating Cédras, Theodore ended his career by applying for the role of representative in power of the oppressors of the Haitian people, as prime minister of the military dictatorship ! He, who had earned his stripes among the activists of the uprising, accepted the position of prime minister of the dictatorship before it withdrew its offer. When the PUCH called for a "yes" vote in the referendum of March 29, 1987, many people definitively distanced themselves from it.

The failure of this Haitian revolution stemmed from the fact that the parties and social, labor, religious, and political organizations that led it, far from desiring a seizure of power by the oppressed, aimed only to bring the people back into line. They never warned the people against Duvalier’s barely reformed army. They never called on the people to unite with the rank and file, nor on the latter to disobey their superiors. They never sought to disarm the militias of the powerful. They never hoped that this revolution would challenge the ruling classes and their system of exploitation. On the contrary, all their efforts were focused on reconciling the people with the army, the people with the ruling classes. The union leaders, religious figures, social democrats, and Stalinists collaborated, ultimately bringing the demagogue Aristide to power. He completely discredited himself by becoming a puppet of the US in 1994. Whether or not Aristide remained in power, social peace was never restored. This is why American and then international troops intervened, fearing a resurgence of the Haitian revolution !

1984 : The proletarian revolution began in Haiti

1984 : More than 200 peasants were massacred in Jean-Rabel after a demonstration for access to land. The Haitian Bishops’ Conference launched a short-lived educational program throughout the country.

In 1984, for the first time since the beginning of the Duvalier dictatorship, riots broke out, and slum dwellers looted food warehouses.
Anti-government riots occurred in all the country’s major cities.

The first riots began in May 1984 in the city of Gonaïves. Despite the usual repression, the clashes and demonstrations continued. Schoolchildren and high school students protested, chanting, "Down with poverty, down with unemployment !" Repression units, the "Tactical Units," were sent from Port-au-Prince, and on November 28, 1985, the army killed three young men.

Three deaths too many, which would lead to demonstrations in various provincial cities.

Post-Duvalierism

In November 1985, a youth demonstration was brutally suppressed. There was widespread unanimity against the regime.

In Port-au-Prince, at the beginning of January 1986, school directors, including those of Saint-Louis de Gonzagues, Bird College and Sacré-Coeur, establishments frequented by the middle and upper classes, decreed a day of mourning and prayer.

Part of the bourgeoisie, through the Association of Industries of Haiti, began to speak of democracy in a communiqué dated January 11, 1986. It was followed by the Haitian Medical Association.

In Cap Haïtien, 40,000 demonstrators gathered on January 29, 1986 to demand the departure of Duvalier.

Throughout the provinces, young people stood up to the militiamen and soldiers who were shooting and killing. In Port-au-Prince, the Tonton Macoutes were concentrated and regrouped. A state of siege was declared on the evening of January 30, 1986.

Duvalier and his supporters, especially those who knew they would not have a gilded exile, were still going to try to maintain their position.

But the Duvalier dictatorship proved incapable of crushing the uprising. For the United States, which until then had been unstinting in its support, it became urgent to stop the mass movement. Duvalier had to be eliminated while the revolt remained focused on him.

In early February 1986, new riots shook the country’s main cities. On February 7, Jean-Claude Duvalier was forced to flee to France on a U.S. military plane. Political parties, now legalized, sprang up by the dozens, as did newspapers and radio stations, but it was a National Governing Council (CNG), composed of six Duvalierists, that was tasked with overseeing the transition. The October elections saw a turnout of less than 5% of registered voters. In contrast, the new constitution, adopted in March 1987, was ratified by a very large number of voters. The Tonton Macoutes disrupted the legislative elections, which finally took place in January 1988. A Duvalierist, Leslie Manigat, was elected ; in June, a military coup brought General Namphy to power, only to be ousted in September by General Prosper Avril. He resigned in April 1990. Ms. Ertha Trouillot, chosen by the twelve opposition parties, then presided over a civilian transitional government. In December 1990, regular elections were finally held. Father Jean-Baptiste Aristide (a priest expelled from his order in 1988 for his perceived far-left views) was elected president of the Republic by a large majority. In September 1991, following a bloody coup and violent repression, a military junta led by General Raoul Cédras seized power. Aristide went into exile in the United States. The US imposed an economic blockade on Haiti, further worsening life on the island. Driven by poverty, thousands of Haitians fled or attempted to flee the country. Seeking to buy time, the coup leaders evaded American orders. In September 1994, the United States, with UN approval, finally sent an expeditionary force to the island. President Aristide was reinstated on October 15, 1994. In December 1995, René Préval, a member of Aristide’s governing coalition, was elected President of the Republic and appointed Jacques Edouard Alexis as Prime Minister in 1998. In November 2000, in a country without a Parliament since 1999, Aristide returned to power after elections boycotted by the opposition and marred by irregularities.

The Bush administration chose to get rid of Aristide, whom it never liked, because he had ceased to be useful from the perspective of American interests. The political crisis that began last December, which transformed into a military crisis in early February, showed that Aristide, having lost his credibility with the population, had lost his ability to maintain order.

During his first election in December 1990, Aristide was swept up by a vast popular movement that led to his election to the presidency with over 67% of the vote. This momentum was brutally halted a few months later, in September 1991, by the military coup led by General Raoul Cédras. While Aristide had consistently celebrated "the reconciliation of the people and the army" since his election, Cédras and his clique set about demonstrating the opposite by subjecting the country to a bloody repression.

The leaders of American imperialism were not displeased to see the Haitian military wreak havoc in the working-class neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince. But the military did not simply subdue Haiti’s working class. They subjected the already depleted Haitian economy to such plunder, expanding racketeering, corruption, and drug trafficking to such an extent that it became an embarrassment even for the bourgeoisie itself, including American bosses who wanted to exploit Haitian workers in peace, earning a dollar and a half a day. The Clinton administration eventually became convinced that it was still preferable to have Aristide in power, properly disciplined and disciplined during his American exile, than a crumbling military dictatorship.

Aristide was reinstated in 1994 after the landing of 20,000 marines ousted Cédras from power. At the time, Aristide retained some credibility with the poor masses, but he worked tirelessly to extinguish all the hopes they had placed in him, doing absolutely nothing to improve the lot of the working class. On the contrary, while the regime’s elite and Aristide himself grew richer, the country, already one of the poorest in the world, sank even deeper into misery and famine. Simultaneously, Aristide increasingly relied on the police and armed gangs under his control, the "Chimères," to control the slums, terrorize, and silence the population.

The fact that leaders of the current rebellion, such as Louis-Jodel Chamblain and Guy Philippe, known for their involvement in numerous assassinations and atrocities during Cédras’s time, were welcomed as liberators in Port-au-Prince and several other cities, demonstrates the extent to which Aristide’s regime had become disconnected from the population. Certainly, many of the crowds who came to cheer them, perhaps the majority, came from the affluent neighborhoods of Pétionville, which had never accepted Aristide. But there were also people from working-class neighborhoods, applauding the former oppressors for having rid them of a regime that had become dictatorial and was widely despised.
Six years of insurrection

On February 7, 1986, after weeks of anti-government demonstrations, "President for Life" Jean-Claude Duvalier, known as Baby Doc, was ousted from power and sought refuge in France. General Namphy became president of a National Governing Council (CNG) composed of four military officers and two civilians.

On February 9, five thousand demonstrators demanded the formation of a civilian government.

On November 17, 1986, a general strike began to demand the dissolution of the CNG

On November 29, 1987, the elections were cancelled.

On January 17, 1988, elections were held under the auspices of the army. Voter turnout was low. Leslie Manigat became president.

On June 18, 1988, Namphy regained power and, on June 22, appointed a military government.

On September 10, 1988, a massacre occurred during a mass in Port-au-Prince.

On September 18, General Prosper Avril, head of the presidential guard and former confidant of BébéDoc, overthrew Namphy. Throughout the following year, General Avril survived several coup attempts and was unable to restore social peace.

In 1990, former "Tonton Macoutes" terrorized the streets of the capital. Neo-Duvalierists created the Union for National Reconciliation, led by Roger Lafontant. A wave of popular protest prevented this party from participating in the elections.

On December 16, 1990, Father Jean Bertrand Aristide, a supporter of "liberation theology," won the presidential election by a landslide and became president on February 7, 1991. He was overthrown on September 30, 1991, by a coup d’état led by General Raoul Cédras, commander-in-chief of the army.
An article from November 1991

Haiti after the coup – While diplomacy deals with Aristide, the army deals with poor Haitians

On September 29 and 30, the army high command seized power in Haiti, for the umpteenth time since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship.
But unlike previous coups, this latest one did not simply replace one general with another, one clique of officers with another. The ousted and expelled president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, is the first civilian president elected under relatively regular conditions in the nearly two centuries since the existence of the Haitian state. He was elected in December 1990, by a veritable landslide victory, supported by the poorest classes of Haitian society, the impoverished peasantry, and the slum dwellers of the city’s slums.
This young priest, courageous during the final years of the Duvalier dictatorship, from a poor background, who denounced social inequalities, poverty, and the continued presence of Tonton Macoute dignitaries at the helm of power even after Duvalier’s departure, had become, in just a few years, the hope of the impoverished Haitian masses who dreamed of change but did not yet imagine they could empower themselves to achieve it. His surprise candidacy in the December 1990 presidential election shook up an electoral campaign that the masses had previously observed with apathy. It sparked genuine electoral mobilization, thwarting manipulation and ballot stuffing in the cities and overcoming the traditional fear of the authorities in the countryside. Aristide was elected in the first round with 67% of the vote, some six times more than his closest rival, Bazin, a candidate who nevertheless had significant money and resources, and who was supported by both the Haitian bourgeoisie and Washington.
Washington and Paris, the two tutelary powers, with their constant stream of observers on the ground, immediately grasped the significance of the event, and despite their previously expressed reservations about Aristide, they were among the first to recognize the legitimacy of the new president.

Aristide, already elected, wasn’t even officially sworn in yet when the first coup attempt occurred to prevent it. On the night of January 7, a small group of civilians and military personnel, led by Roger Lafontant, Duvalier’s former Minister of the Interior and the main leader of the far-right Macouti, occupied the presidential palace and forced the interim president, Ertha-Trouillot, still in office, to resign. But no sooner had the news spread than thousands, tens of thousands of men and women left the working-class neighborhoods to surround the presidential palace and the army headquarters, to the point that the army, initially cautiously waiting to see what would happen, decided to arrest the small group of coup plotters to protect them from the popular fury.
And so, barely six months later, Aristide was brutally removed from the presidential palace, arrested but saved at the last minute by, it seems, the interventions of the French and American embassies, then sent to Venezuela.

This time, the coup plotters had prepared the ground. It wasn’t one of those coups Haiti has become accustomed to since the fall of Duvalier—without going back any further—reduced to a showdown between rival military factions and sometimes resolved after a few exchanges of gunfire. This time, the population was targeted, to terrorize them, to prevent them from reacting as they had in January. The trucks from the "military training camp" from which the coup originated, supported by SUVs filled with armed civilians firing at anything that moved, had already claimed several hundred lives when General Cedras, the Chief of Staff, announced he was seizing power.

It does not matter whether the coup was prepared and executed from the outset by the general staff or whether the latter joined the movement once the coup had been initiated by the extreme right-wing Macoute, military or civilian (several hours after the start of the shooting, speaking of their perpetrators, Cedras was still saying "the rebels").

The armed repression was massive and bloody. The number of victims is estimated at over five hundred dead, with several thousand wounded. The indiscriminate shootings of the early days by an army that was all the more savage because it was not assured of victory, were followed by a more systematic, clearly class-based repression against the poor neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince, Carrefour, Bel Air, and against the slums of Cité Soleil, Cité Carton, etc.

Initially, there were reactions in many neighborhoods of the capital and even more so, it seems, in some provincial towns. But in Port-au-Prince, systematic gunfire from armed military and civilian groups shattered any gatherings that might have converged on the city center, as had happened in January. Attempts to stop the military trucks with trenches and planks of nails were thwarted by the intensive use of firearms, which the population had not anticipated. In some provincial towns—notably Gonaïve—the resistance was more determined, sometimes forcing the military to retreat locally. But it was an unequal struggle. The population was unprepared, neither materially nor, above all, politically, to face such a violent and bloody offensive by the army.

Aristide and the army

The population had, however, demonstrated its capacity to react in January. Furthermore, the army was numerically small, with only seven thousand soldiers for a population of six million, and, more importantly, for a capital city of nearly one million inhabitants, a large proportion of whom lived in the poorer neighborhoods. At the time of Aristide’s rise to power, it was notoriously divided between cliques of officers more adept at trafficking and smuggling than at military service. Moreover, while the officer corps as a whole, as well as a segment of the troops heavily influenced by the far-right Macoute faction, harbored a visceral hatred for Aristide and the "populace" he claimed to represent, Aristide, on the other hand, enjoyed sympathy among some of the rank-and-file soldiers, generally drawn from the poor peasantry.

But neither Aristide, nor the "progressive nationalist" movements that, in the wake of Aristide’s election, were propelled into the corridors of power, sought to prepare the poor masses for the inevitable confrontations with the army. Nor did they attempt to turn the soldiers loyal to the new regime against hostile officers, even indirectly, even by simply asking the soldiers to keep an eye on the latter so that they could, if necessary, prevent them from doing harm.

On the contrary. They went to great lengths to explain that, with Aristide’s rise to power, the army had changed its character, that it was now linked to the people. Even Lafontant’s failed coup, in which the army’s role was far from glorious, served as an opportunity for Aristide to thank the army on behalf of the people for having defended democracy. Aristide was saying nothing different from the entire political establishment, or indeed, from Paris or Washington—but precisely. The man speaking was carried by the confidence, the hopes, and above all, the illusions of the impoverished majority of the population.

Even the few purges at the top of the army carried out by Aristide, or the dismissal of Chief of Staff Abraham in favor of the young Cedras, which were presented by both Aristide’s friends and opponents as highly radical measures, contributed to deceiving and disarming those who had brought Aristide to power. Wasn’t the new president demonstrating that he had more power than the general staff ? And didn’t this young generation of senior officers, members of the general staff or barracks commanders, who occupied the positions left vacant by the survivors of the Duvalier era, represent a new army, more modern, less corrupt, and more accepting of democracy ? At least, that’s what Aristide and the entire supposedly "progressive" movement stirring in his shadow kept repeating.
It was Aristide himself who thus restored the credibility of the officer corps in the eyes of the soldiers. as in the army as a whole – that is to say, its general staff – among the people.

However, on the night of July 28-29, a first alert, a first aborted attempt, was launched from the naval base in Port-au-Prince. It failed after several hours of negotiations, without Aristide or his Prime Minister Préval deigning to offer the slightest explanation for the causes of the coup and the promises they had to make to defuse it.
Aristide and Parliament.

It is true that, during the same period, Aristide and the so-called "Lavalasse" movement that supported him had other targets. The regime was heading towards an institutional crisis, pitting the President of the Republic against Parliament. The political class, traditionally as cowardly as it was ambitious, which had for a time kept its head down in the face of the landslide victory for Aristide, began to raise its head. Parliament was composed in part of spineless individuals gifted with exceptional resilience, who had managed to survive the successive military regimes of coup after coup since the fall of Duvalier (some had been in opposition to him, others, his former ministers). Facing them was a new generation of politicians, elected in the Aristide wave. These two rival components of Parliament, however, eventually found themselves united in a common hostility towards Aristide, who had little regard for Parliament and appointed a government composed of technocrats and close associates.
Aristide’s supporters invoked the will of the people, who had given Aristide a majority. Those hostile to Aristide invoked the constitution and the rights of parliament. But they all wanted their role recognized and rewarded with a ministerial post or, at the very least, with one of those political positions that allowed them to appoint relatives and friends to lucrative posts within the state apparatus or nationalized companies.

Despite their ambitions, the parliamentarians would have been too cowardly to unleash the parliamentary harassment against Aristide and his Prime Minister that took off just two or three months after Aristide’s investiture and grew increasingly intense during the summer. But these parliamentarians—petty bourgeois opportunists admiring the wealthy bourgeoisie, or bourgeois themselves—sensed the shifting winds among the privileged classes.

The vast majority of the privileged classes never forgave Aristide for stepping outside his role as "priest of the poor" (or more accurately, outside his role as a priest, period). They were even less forgiving of having been imposed on him by "the populace." While the political leaders of the bourgeoisie, with the support of the American embassy, had spared no effort for several months—all verbal, but nonetheless—to convince the generals to withdraw from the political scene and allow elections to take place, it was to ensure the accession to the presidency of Marc Bazin, a former high-ranking international civil servant, former minister under Duvalier Jr., and above all, a true bourgeois and a man of the Americans. But not to install Aristide in the presidential chair !
Once in power, however, Aristide did them no harm. He took no measures that could have curbed the appetites of a voracious privileged class, accustomed to making fortunes not through production—the productive sector being essentially in the hands of foreign capital... or the State—but through commerce, speculation on food prices, smuggling, and, more often than not, the outright plundering of state coffers. No measures were taken, not even in areas where a thorough overhaul would have been necessary from the perspective of the bourgeoisie’s own general interests (no measures, for example, to stop smuggling, denounced by a segment of the bourgeoisie that suffered from it ; no measures to end the plundering of Haiti’s electricity resources, even though capitalist enterprises not equipped to produce their own private electricity were doomed to disappear, etc.).

No action was taken even against this layer of "big shots" who dominated the countryside by seizing state lands or dispossessing peasants of their land.

Aristide therefore chose not to attempt even a simple reform of the most glaring injustices in Haitian society ; he didn’t even try to modernize the functioning of the state and the economy, unlike some "nationalist-progressive" regimes in the developing world that had attempted in the past. This is similar to certain attempts made in Haiti itself in the past, notably by Salnave, the military man who briefly seized power in Haiti at the end of the last century to try to modernize the country through a paternalistic "progressive" dictatorship, and who proved capable of using the poor to break the resistance of the privileged classes, even paying off the former when they returned.

Even what was presented as a fight against corruption within the state apparatus, or as a struggle to "de-Macoute" the civil service—a fight that was obviously well-received by the poor majority of the population and which resulted in the dismissal of a considerable number of civil servants, officials, and even employees—often served as a cover for outright economic layoffs, or simply as a way to replace the men of the previous regime with new ones, not necessarily less corrupt or less arrogant toward the poor.
But to deceive the poor, Aristide engaged in a flurry of speeches. He did the worst thing imaginable : he verbally promised measures against the privileged classes, but never took any action. He gave them the impression that the poor represented a threat to their wealth, their peace of mind, even their lives, but without giving the poor the means to defend themselves, let alone to assert their rights.
This demagogic aspect of Aristide’s rhetoric was, however, largely offset by other aspects directed toward the United States, the IMF, and the World Bank, toward which Aristide adopted a low profile. He himself, and even more so the nationalist leaders who supported him and who had previously made anti-Americanism and hostility toward the IMF the expression of their radicalism, executed a complete about-face. The American ambassador, and even more so the French ambassador, were propelled to the rank of friends of the Haitian people. Aristide’s ministers announced their desire to cooperate with the IMF to secure loans.

Even with regard to the local bourgeoisie, Aristide’s demagoguery stopped at the distinction, repeated throughout his speeches, between patriotic bourgeois—whose friendship the regime sought—and "patripoche" bourgeois. There again, it was just a clever turn of phrase...

Nevertheless, the privileged classes were not wrong to distrust, if not Aristide himself, then at least those who brought him to power. For Aristide’s election was indeed perceived by the exploited classes as their victory. This is what engendered the illusions that would so greatly contribute to their disarmament on September 28-29. But before that, the idea that they had a friend in the presidential chair, a man close enough to understand them and who had become president thanks to them, encouraged their demands.
This was true for the workers in the industrial zone who, a few weeks before the coup, began to mobilize, demanding an increase in the minimum wage of 15 gourdes—roughly the same amount as francs—per day, a meager sum in any case, but above all, eroded week after week by accelerating inflation. Oh, it wasn’t a militant mobilization, at least not yet ; it was rather the desire to express an aspiration for a president whom they believed to be a friend. And since the minimum wage depended on a parliamentary vote, in opposition to Aristide, it even became a way to support him. Nevertheless, there was a shift in the climate that employers perceived as such, immediately launching a fierce press campaign against these workers’ demands, which they claimed threatened to "ruin the economy," and threatening to relocate their capital elsewhere, to another country in Central America or the Caribbean.

In the countryside, too, changes occurred, still minor—challenges to the rights of land-grabbing gentry, delegations of peasants to the capital to complain to those in power about officials who were dispossessing them, a few land occupations—but these could only be felt intensely by the rural elite, accustomed to imposing their will on the poorest peasantry in Latin America.
And then, in the capital, there were simply these poor, unemployed, day laborers living off odd jobs, vagrants, small-time dealers, who didn’t demand much, but who dared to occupy bits of sidewalk in the bourgeois neighborhoods. This "arrogance" of the "populace" fueled the hatred of the privileged against those who couldn’t, or worse, wouldn’t "control" them.

It was the rising hatred within the bourgeoisie that emboldened the parliamentarians before it did so to the general officers recently promoted by Aristide himself, who were generally children of wealthy neighborhoods, where they owned villas and swimming pools. Significantly, however, it was against parliament that Aristide was able, on occasion, to appeal to the streets. Thus, on August 13, when the Préval government was threatened with a vote of no confidence, Aristide’s supporters mobilized several thousand demonstrators from the poorer neighborhoods to violently oppose the vote—and successfully so. Having accomplished this, some of the demonstrators attacked the headquarters of the CATH, one of the country’s main labor unions, whose leader, despite claiming allegiance to Aristide, was criticizing certain aspects of his policies. The premises were ransacked, as was that of the radical nationalist organization KID, whose leader was nevertheless one of the promoters of Aristide’s campaign.

Given the feelings that parliament and parliamentarians inspired among the poor masses, Aristide’s supporters had little difficulty mobilizing against them in the slums. Nevertheless, even though it was the slums that provided the troops, they were not mobilized to express their own aspirations or impose their own demands. They were mobilized, through obscure parliamentary maneuvers, to support a government that had done nothing for them. It is also true that parliament was merely a smokescreen. Parliament made people forget about the army. But it was from the army that the blows came.
And when the army’s time came, it benefited from the support of the bulk of the bourgeoisie, the privileged classes, the majority of whom were convinced that the chaos had to end.

Aristide’s troops—those hundreds of activists from working-class neighborhoods, whom Aristide said he wanted to form into a "Lavalas militia," and who were beginning to learn how to organize the population in order to mobilize them in defense of the Préval government—were, on the other hand, in no way prepared to train the population to defend itself against the army. This was, in part, undoubtedly linked to the level of determination of the population. But it was this way, above all, because the Aristide leaders wanted it that way.

Aristide did not suffer the same fate as Allende. It is not even out of the question that he might serve again one day. But the masses were exposed to the blows.
And now ?

Unlike many other coups in the past in the South American hemisphere, it is unlikely that the United States was behind the coup in Haiti (although the American government may have its own policies, and its various agencies others). Even if Aristide was not their preferred choice, he offered them assurances of goodwill. Moreover, his election made it possible to ensure the pseudo-democratic transition that had seemed impossible to achieve since the fall of Duvalier, which dates back to February 1986, so great was the self-serving irresponsibility of the military clans who did not want to be removed, in favor of civilians, from the positions that best facilitated the plundering of state coffers.

Furthermore, the United States, its ambassador who acts as the country’s de facto prime minister, and its experts are the first to know that the Haitian army, whose brutality does not compensate for its internal corruption and incompetence, would be no match for a genuine popular uprising. Did American leaders have reason to fear that removing Aristide would provoke a popular uprising ? One can assume that the United States, or at least its political leaders, had no desire to try that. But one can also imagine that, once the experiment has been attempted—and succeeded—the United States will learn from it and accept the situation.

While France condemned Aristide’s overthrow and called for his reinstatement—albeit verbally, but it was a start—the United States adopted a more nuanced stance, which evolved over time. It is also true that France, a small power but one whose distant colonial past fueled certain ambitions in Haiti, seemed to have placed its bets on Aristide to bolster its position against the Americans.

But it is the United States that matters. After condemning the coup and initially calling for Aristide’s return, they soon began to adopt the accusations of dictatorial tendencies leveled against Aristide. This shift mirrors the shift observed by the coup leaders themselves. Cedras has always maintained that he seized power only to prevent Aristide from establishing his dictatorship. And to demonstrate his "democratic" goodwill, he did not take the presidential seat, but instead installed the person who, according to the constitutional order of succession, should replace the president and prime minister in the event of a vacancy : the senior judge of the Court of Cassation, Joseph Nérette. And to further this charade of respect for the constitution, he forced parliament, surrounded by the army, to officially ratify the choice.

In truth, military coercion did the parliamentarians more good than it frightened them (except for Aristide’s few loyalists). In the event of unrest, they could use coercion as an excuse for having done what they wanted. While the army was massacring people in the streets, carrying out raids and arrests, the new "interim president" appointed a prime minister, a former president of a human rights league (!), who began negotiating with representatives of the political parties, none of which were banned. Rid of Aristide, the entire political scene—including Théodore, head of the Haitian Communist Party—rediscovered its purpose, began to conspire, discuss future elections, distance itself more from Aristide’s "dictatorial tendencies" than from the actual dictatorship of the army, and thus prepare a new "democratic transition" with new elections, which the army seems willing to accept.
While the United States remained committed to the economic embargo against the new government, a common ground was emerging between its leaders and Cedras to find a way to return to "constitutional order." Cedras declared himself ready to hold elections as soon as possible—it was only Aristide’s return that he categorically opposed. He knew that, on this issue, he fairly well represented the sentiments of Haiti’s privileged classes who, on the one hand, wanted the embargo lifted—the oil embargo in particular risked paralyzing all economic activity—even if it meant reinstating Aristide, but who feared even more that Aristide might return as a victor and that this return could trigger an explosion of uncontrollable anger and a desire for revenge among the poor.

Oh, Aristide, for his part, is making political concessions ! First, to the army, from whose "healthy elements" he always declares the return to democracy must be expected ! Then to the foreign powers—the United States, France, and even Venezuela, which is hosting him—in whose actions he declares he is placing his hopes. And finally, to the fears of even the privileged classes and the political class, by gradually reducing his demands, by agreeing to be subordinate to parliament, and thus virtually accepting the role of a president who merely inaugurates chrysanthemums. He is now asking for practically nothing more than the replacement of Cedras as head of the army—which, incidentally, allows him to place the blame for the military coup and repression solely on the "madness" or "ambition" of the Chief of Staff. But perhaps Aristide will even have to accept Cedras. Will he be able to return to the presidency then ?

The United States might accept Aristide’s return, which some Latin American countries, like Venezuela, strongly support. But this return must not appear as a victory for the poor masses, but rather as a gift from Western democracies.
The problem for the United States, as for the privileged classes, is not Aristide, but still and always this impoverished Haitian mass, with its immense capacity to endure misery and oppression, from which all the scoundrels, great and small, who have made fortunes off its back have so greatly benefited ; but also with its sudden, explosive outbursts of anger. As a French senior officer naively reminded us recently when questioned about the possibility of a French military intervention in Haiti to "restore democracy" : "After all, it was the Haitians who gave the French army, the best in the world at the time, under Napoleon, a truly memorable thrashing." The Haitians that French and American leaders fear are not Cedras and his army, certainly not. The entire problem for the imperialist powers is convincing this army to behave more responsibly. But above all, without harming it, because if this army collapses, how could the United States avoid military intervention, either direct or under the auspices of the OAS (Organization of American States) ?
An article from January 1992

The Haitian army, being nothing more than a collection of armed brigands driven primarily by the immediate interests of the various cliques into which it is divided—each more or less linked to similar cliques within the privileged civilian class—even if Cédras wants the "Théodore solution," he would need considerable maneuvering to impose it. The Cafeteria (Editor’s note : a military unit linked to the Tonton Macoutes, the group behind the coup) has not necessarily had its final say. And even if there are means—money, promises of promotion, perks—to defuse Major François’s opposition, he constantly breeds others like him within the ranks of an officer caste rotten to the core. Especially since this segment of the privileged class, enriching itself within or around the Tonton Macoute mafias, has just demonstrated once again, through its protests around Parliament, etc., that it does not want anyone to alter the current situation, which suits it perfectly. It only takes one of the Tonton Macoute clans to feel, rightly or wrongly, threatened with being removed from a lucrative position for its allies or henchmen in the barracks to attempt yet another armed coup.

And we saw, on September 30th, how the action triggered by a limited number of soldiers from the Cafeteria and the Training Camp (Editor’s note : the other military unit behind the coup), supported and financed by bourgeois Tonton Macoutes, drew in the entire army, and then, from there, the whole political class. Cédras, like his predecessors, prefers to follow the initiatives of the regiments most directly linked to the Tonton Macoutes, which are also often the most irresponsible, even from the perspective of the privileged class’s interests, rather than dismantle the army. And on this point, Cédras knows he can count on the understanding of American leaders. The United States would have no trouble bringing this small and uncombative army to heel, an army whose irresponsibility and corruption bother them. But it is the only army at their disposal in Haiti to control the poor. There are no others. Unless it is in a political position to intervene militarily, or to deploy troops from another nation, the United States will protect the Haitian army, that is, its general staff and officer corps. If the United States is powerless in the face of the Haitian army’s political incompetence and irresponsibility, it is because it does not want to do otherwise. And it is the same political mechanism that ensures that even the few—very rare !—intellectual leaders within the general staff, those capable of understanding that the pseudo-democratic form of government in no way threatens the role of the army—in many Latin American "democracies," starting with Venezuela and Colombia, the army plays a role in social life as overwhelming as in Haiti, if not more so—even these "intellectual leaders" always end up giving in to the most corrupt and macho elements within the army. This was demonstrated under Avril. It is being rebuilt under Cédras. The Cédras or the Avril cannot attack the François, Régala, J.-C. Paul, except with a blunted foil, without really hurting them – except by poisoning them secretly (Editor’s note : allusion to the death of J.-C. Paul, head in his time of the main barracks of the capital, notorious drug trafficker, who died of poisoning).

This is why Cédras is equivocating and trying to appease the hotheads in the army. This is also why, incidentally, the army will always be marked by the Macoute regime, subject to pressure from the far right. This is why only fools can dream of a "democratic army," and only those who want to deceive the poor can defend the illusion.

Theodore, prime minister ?

Although not certain, Theodore’s accession to the post of Prime Minister is nevertheless not implausible.

The bourgeoisie, almost entirely delighted by the coup of September 30th, is nonetheless suffering the consequences of the embargo. Oh, not personally : for those with money, there is no embargo. While the poor starve, as the price of rice, sugar, and so on has skyrocketed, the bourgeoisie have no trouble obtaining luxury foodstuffs, and if they so desire, eating caviar and drinking champagne. Not all of them are even suffering from the embargo in their businesses. For those who profit from smuggling—generally the sectors most closely linked to the Tonton Macoutes—the embargo is even a gift : it fuels smuggling, it allows them to raise prices to increase profits and shift the blame onto the embargo. Moreover, since the "Lavalas supporters" (Editor’s note : Aristide’s followers) offer only the embargo as a hope to the poor masses, the latter don’t even protest against the price increases for fear of appearing to oppose the embargo. By enduring the price hikes, the poor believe they are suffering for Aristide’s return, when in reality, they are only suffering to further enrich a number of large merchants and speculators.
Despite its advantages for some in the privileged class, the embargo is nonetheless detrimental to the businesses of all those who rely on "legal" international trade : subcontractors in the industrial zone, companies that buy or sell abroad. Furthermore, the embargo’s impact on fuel supplies makes it more difficult for all productive businesses to operate.

If, therefore, the appointment of Theodore – whose servility towards them has been evident to the privileged classes over the past five years – is likely to give the United States a pretext for abandoning the embargo, it would suit the interests of a large part of the bourgeoisie.

From the American perspective, it may seem paradoxical that Washington would accept, even sponsor, the appointment of a man who is still the secretary-general of a party that proudly proclaims itself communist, even if he promises to resign should he become Prime Minister. And Washington would surely have preferred Bazin. This old "communist" label itself—which the Americans know perfectly well means nothing, given that Théodore is even prepared to stoop lower toward the US than Duvalier did at certain times—nonetheless provides an advantage from the Americans’ point of view. They trumpet their commitment to the "democratic process." As recently as early December, Alvin Adams stated in an interview on Radio Métropole that there was no question of ending the embargo before the "restoration of constitutional order," which requires "the return of Aristide." Alvin Adams – like the State Department – would like to be able to do without Aristide, but he needs a solution that leaves him in the good role of defender of democracy, even if that word only covers a barely disguised dictatorship.

But what more could be asked of the military as a "democratic gesture" than to accept as Prime Minister a "man of the left," even a former "communist," who also has Aristide’s own endorsement ? The United States, which doesn’t need to be more royalist than the king, could then proclaim that the democratic process was back on track—and lift the embargo. Even if, "temporarily," Aristide were asked to remain abroad, as Theodore envisioned. Even if, behind the puppet Theodore, the army had a completely free hand to continue its policy of repression, as well as its lucrative little schemes.

There remains the army itself. From the perspective of the political leaders within the military, Théodore has several advantages. He was the first non-Macoute political leader to support the military coup and to hail Cédras as the "savior of democracy." This deserves recognition. Especially since it wasn’t a moment of weakness : from 1986 onward, from Namphy to Avril, Théodore had courted every general who came to power. And when he seemed to pursue an "independent" policy toward the general in the presidential chair, it was to support Colonel Jean-Claude Paul.
Furthermore, Théodore made many political concessions to the Macoute circles themselves. He was one of those who, after Duvalier’s fall, campaigned for "national unity," even explicitly stating that Duvalierists should have their place in this union.
It is not certain, however, that Theodore will be accepted by the Macoutic circles and their extensions within the army. Hence, to convince them, Theodore’s veritable declaration of love during his press conference addressed to the army. But since feelings aren’t everything, Theodore also promises the army money and greater resources.

Honorat or Theodore : in any case, power will be in the hands of the general staff.

The coming days will reveal who will impose their solution : those in the ruling circles willing to make some concessions to the "democratic process"—that is, to the American recommendation to disguise the dictatorship behind a constitutional façade—or those who refuse. This will inevitably lead to a kind of showdown between the powerful figures in power. This showdown may remain discreet, but it could also manifest itself in armed demonstrations, or even a new attempted coup. Theodore’s home was reportedly threatened for the first time by an armed military group. It seems that, despite the "assurances" he claims to have, some soldiers are not to be believed. Given the army’s state of indiscipline, even within its own high command, and even if the "assurances" come from Cédras himself, they are no guarantee of success... [...]. If the Théodore government finally takes office and the United States gives it its blessing—and if the military agrees, why wouldn’t they, since even Aristide endorses Théodore—the poor masses will then witness the full extent of democracy granted to them under the aegis of the privileged classes. The absolute power of the section leaders in the countryside ; the systematic interventions of the military in slums ; the repression, the torture, the assassinations ; the right of all those who hold a shred of power, by virtue of their uniform, their revolver, their position—or their money—to steal from and plunder the poorest. Just like before. Just like in Duvalier’s time. Except that multiparty politics will exist—but it has existed for five years already, and even the perpetrators of the September 30th coup didn’t abolish it—and that clashes, verbal or armed, in Parliament will serve as a substitute for "democracy." These cowardly, greedy, spineless parliamentarians, subservient to every passing power, are, at best, what is granted to the poor masses as "representatives of the people." And this Parliament, which, without even changing its composition, has shifted from supporting Aristide to supporting Cédras-Nérette-Honorat, is the supreme guarantor of "democracy" !
It is likely that the poor masses won’t even have the right to Aristide’s return, because a "solution" will surely be found to keep him away, held only in reserve by the imperialist powers, in case, in the future, it becomes necessary to appease the poor masses. But if, despite everything, Aristide were allowed to return and if he were not transformed into a martyr by a Tonton Macoute soldier as soon as he set foot on Haitian soil, he would in any case be a helpless hostage.

Military policy

In the shadow of the negotiations under the auspices of the OAS, the army continues its policy of repression. During the coup, the indiscriminate, widespread repression aimed to strike the masses, to terrorize them. This was intertwined with the vengeance of all the Tonton Macoute thugs who felt threatened under Aristide, even though Aristide merely made speeches against them, without actually harming them.
For the past few weeks, something else has emerged. Through arrests, house searches, and targeted assassinations of activists, a political will is manifesting itself : the will to decimate, demoralize, and incapacitate this generation of activists who emerged before and after the overthrow of Duvalier—these women and men who lead associations, neighborhood committees, and the Ti Église (a Haitian parish church), who provide the foundation for the political organizations that claim to want to change Haiti in a more democratic direction.

These few thousand young people had many successive illusions, and their determination to act had many limits. Their perspectives were vague, and generally boiled down to the conviction that the order of things under Duvalier should not return, but without really knowing what needed to be done to make that happen.

But their mere existence was a threat to the established order, to the privileged class, to the military. Not for who they were or what they said, but for what they were likely to become. And also for what they did—despite the moderate nature of their activities—because the peasant associations, the youth groups in the countryside, and the neighborhood committees in the cities represented, in themselves, a challenge to the authority of the section leaders, a threat to control embezzlement, a structure parallel to the military structures. And even though the committees and associations never gathered large numbers, were neither very active nor radical, they did, in fact, foster a climate of political discussion. The ruling class in Haiti never tolerated the development of such a breeding ground. From it could emerge activists and organizations capable of providing the poor masses with the frameworks and structures they need to defend themselves and, fearing the fears of the wealthy, to liberate themselves !

Despite the repression, this activist milieu did not disappear. But it was severely tested and, above all, lacked prospects. It believed in democracy and freedom, and this conviction gave it the courage to overthrow Duvalier. It then believed in elections, but the massacres in Vaillante Alley blocked this prospect. Disoriented, it regained hope and believed it had found a new direction when Aristide ran for office.
Aristide was elected. But—whatever one’s opinion of his six months in power—September 30th showed that this power depended on the goodwill of the army, and that, despite what Aristide himself said, it was the same army as before, ferocious against the exploited classes.

What are the prospects ?

The activists who emerged in 1986 and who weren’t so terrified by the repression that they abandoned the struggle are, in a way, at a crossroads.
Those who are frightened by the repression, who become discouraged, are, in a sense, vindicating the military, who will conclude that terror is effective. But one cannot be an activist forever without prospects. And the one offered by the Lavalas leadership is not one. Distributing leaflets, doing graffiti, etc., to support the embargo certainly requires courage from the activists who do it, and this courage deserves respect. But the embargo doesn’t depend at all on the activists. It depends on Bush’s decisions. He can abandon it whenever it suits him. To offer this to the activists is to offer them inactivity, powerlessness. Furthermore, this means using them to campaign and spread illusions among the masses—the illusion that they can trust the leaders of the imperialist world, the Bushes, Mitterrands, or Ocampos, to fulfill their democratic aspirations. But what will happen tomorrow if the embargo only results in a Theodore-Cedras government ? How can we continue to honestly justify the sacrifices imposed on the poorest in the name of the embargo ? Activists must reflect on this question. They must realize the futility of this policy. Are the masses not sufficiently mobilized or mobilizable to propose an alternative ? Perhaps. But making them believe in Santa Claus or Bush’s democratic goodwill won’t help raise awareness among the poor and, above all, in their self-confidence.

And then there’s something else. The embargo, even as presented by the Lavalas leadership, is only a means to an end. The goal is to bring Aristide back.
But even if they succeeded ?

The day before the coup, Aristide was exactly where the Lavalas supporters wanted to put him. He theoretically held power. He had the support of 67% of the electorate. And yet, the clearly expressed will of more than two million men and women—to speak only of those who voted—was trampled upon by this corrupt, undisciplined, pathetic, and ferocious army, by barely more than four thousand men, some of whom were actually Aristide supporters.

But how was this possible ? Why were four thousand men able to impose their choice of leaders on several million citizens ? And above all, how can this be prevented in the future, even in the "optimistic" event that current developments lead to the return of Aristides ?

To ask these questions honestly, and to pursue them to their logical conclusion, is to challenge the policies of Aristide and the Lavalas leadership during their time in government. It is to challenge the lie of the "people-army alliance," to challenge an entire policy that consisted of offering the poor only words of hope, while the bourgeoisie was given advantages under the pretext of winning them over to the "Aristide cause." Ultimately, the bourgeoisie financed the coup, and the poor masses, denied the means to defend themselves and whose heads were filled with a false sense of security, were unable to defend themselves.
Activists who do not ask themselves these questions, who do not dare to go all the way with these ideas and break with their past illusions, are condemned, at best, to ineffectiveness and at worst, in the event that the masses were to get into a frenzy to the point of forcing the ruling classes to bring back Aristide to calm them down, they would be active accomplices in lies to disarm them again.

To accuse the poor, present or future, of being incapable of resisting the military would be sickeningly stupid. The country’s so-called "elites" have always accused "the people" of not being ready for democracy, not being ready for development. And this kind of accusation came from this "elite," this intelligentsia, whose few most honest members have generally always fled abroad to secure a less wretched life ; and whose majority used their knowledge and positions to contribute to the privileged classes’ plundering of the people.

The only way to avoid replicating this attitude within activist circles is to clearly and consciously choose the side of the exploited classes. There is no room in Haiti, not even for a truly effective democracy, without choosing to fight to organize the exploited classes, the working class first and foremost, discreetly, piecemeal during difficult times, and increasingly openly as the poor learn to defend themselves. Even for the relative freedoms and rights granted to other peoples, we cannot rely on top-down solutions. Salvation can only come from below. The working class and the poor neighborhoods organizing for their class interests—political as well as material—and giving themselves the means to defend themselves, this is the only possible foundation for democracy.

But this cannot be achieved by incantation, by chance, in the heat of events. It requires activists who defend this policy. It requires that they have made a fundamental choice beforehand. And this choice is that of the only political strategy that stems from the idea that it is the seizure and exercise of power by the organized proletariat that can radically transform society and overthrow not only the officer caste, the Tonton Macoutes, but the entire propertied class—that is to say, the choice of Marxism and communism.

At a time when the possibility of Theodore coming to power, as well as the collapse of regimes in Eastern European countries, shows the depth of the rot reached by "official" communism, this ideology which has only kept the "communist" label to better betray its spirit, to serve the bureaucracy of the former Soviet Union, it is essential that our generation of activists, after so many illusions, errors, hesitations, uncertainties, reconnect with the ideas of class struggle, with communism, with the battles that the proletariat wages, through its advances and retreats, to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie.

And if this choice is made, even by a significant fraction of the activist community, a truly revolutionary organization serving the proletariat could emerge from the trials of repression. A revolutionary organization whose activists would retain the enthusiasm of the youth of 1986, but without their illusions and naiveté. Activists who would know that freedom and democracy are inseparable from social equality, and that this social equality will not be given to the exploited classes, but rather that the exploited classes have the power to impose it by taking control of all the wealth of this country and its use. In that case, history may hold surprises not only for the uniformed executioners, but for the entire bourgeoisie, both Haitian and international.
An article from 1993

The return of Aristide […] that is the concession that the general staff has agreed to […].

This was, in fact, the only concession. For the rest, Aristide was forced to concede on almost everything. The American press reported that, until the very last moment, Aristide hesitated to sign the agreement, so many unsavory things were being asked of him. But at the last minute, he finally gave in. To save face, he refused to meet Cédras personally. But upon his return, he will have to meet and interact daily, if not with Cédras himself, then at least with the other members of the general staff, who are equally responsible for the September 30th coup. Incidentally, the Lavalas supporters (1) present as a sign of Aristide’s future power the fact that he will be responsible for appointing the future commander-in-chief. This is an outrageous claim after what happened on September 30, 1991, under the authority of Cédras, who had already been appointed by Aristide. But in addition, Aristide would have to appoint the new commander-in-chief from among the generals of the high command, and there were only four, all equally responsible for establishing and maintaining the military dictatorship : Biambi, Duperval, Max Mayard, and Cédras himself.
On the most important issue, Aristide had already conceded long before the Governor’s Island negotiations by granting amnesty to the entire army for its coup. He only clung, for months, to the idea of expelling Cédras from the army and even from the country. This was tantamount to absolving the civilian and military leaders responsible for September 30th, because it certainly wasn’t Cédras alone, nor even flanked by Colonel François, who personally massacred the three thousand victims of the repression. But at the last minute, they even persuaded him that Cédras himself would not be dismissed, but rather "assert his right to retirement." The army thus refused to provide even a single scapegoat from its own ranks. No, on the contrary, its leaders proudly asserted that they had been right to stage the coup, thereby bringing about, to use Cédras’s recent cynical expression, a "democratic correction" to Aristide’s regime. By signing the Governor’s Island Agreement, Aristide not only absolved the army of the past coup, but he also implicitly granted it the right to bring about this kind of "democratic correction" to the functioning of the political system in the future.

Not only will the army still be there after October 30th, with the same general staff, the same hierarchy, the same rabid dogs, and therefore in a position to overthrow Aristide whenever it chooses, but it will be able to do so with the tacit approval Aristide has just given it. Furthermore, the threat of a coup will serve as justification, even for the Lavalas leaders, to oppose all demands and even to disavow demonstrations in favor of Aristide. "No provocations" so as not to give pretexts to the coup plotters. This is the name on which the opposition will be silenced. Without even having to intervene, the general staff will exert constant pressure on political life. Which will not prevent it, however much Aristide discredits himself, from intervening anyway. […]

From today onward, however, there is a pretense of recognizing Aristide as head of state. He will officially appoint the future Prime Minister, whom the American advisors have undoubtedly already chosen for him. This Prime Minister will, however, have to be approved by Parliament.
There is obviously a surreal aspect to the power theoretically granted to this collection of doormats, on which all the military have wiped their feet, called Parliament and the Senate. And let’s not dwell on the ridiculousness of all these people, fussing about, taking themselves seriously in the role assigned to them. They do, however, have a function. By pretending to increase the role of Parliament, that of the President of the Republic is diminished.

We saw how easily the army dismissed Aristide two years ago, even though he enjoyed the authority of the most widely elected president in Haiti’s history and was accused of concentrating too much power in his own hands, particularly in relation to Parliament. Well, this time, even officially, he will have only a limited role. The Prime Minister will govern. Parliament will control the Prime Minister. And of course, the army will still be overseeing everyone, under the tutelage of the United States. And Aristide will no longer be the "elected president," but the "rehabilitated" president, brought back by the grace of the United States, as conservative publications like Haiti Observateur are already keen to point out.

It doesn’t matter ; Aristide is now, once again, the president. His signature will now be required on official documents. He was even given permission to speak on national radio. Oh, with precautions, so as not to offend the military or the Tonton Macoutes : Aristide had to make his first statement since the signing of the Governor’s Island Agreement on an American radio station. But the national radio stations agreed to broadcast his speech. It’s true that he wasn’t at all aggressive toward the military coup leaders. On the contrary, he addressed the army, saying that it is "the responsibility of the current leaders of the military institution to guarantee everyone’s safety." His message was heeded : that very evening, the military, in the name of maintaining order, beat Lavalas activists and sympathizers who were demonstrating in Cité Soleil, brandishing portraits of Aristide. […]

Why did the United States sponsor Aristide’s return ?

Although the acceleration of negotiations for Aristide’s return in recent weeks is clearly the result of increased pressure from US leaders, for many poor people it is still their victory.

There is some truth in this feeling among the poor masses. Ultimately, it is the fear of the poor masses and their revolts, both in Haiti itself and, more generally, in the volatile region of the Caribbean and Central America, that makes Aristide useful to American imperialism (just as Juan Bosch is useful to them in the Dominican Republic) (2). But only ultimately, because if, in practice, the Americans have accelerated the movement for Aristide’s return, it is precisely because the masses are demobilized and Aristide’s return will only be perceived as a victory passively, and certainly not as a dangerous encouragement to join the struggle. Moreover, this is one of the reasons why the imperialist powers, who have treated Aristide as head of state from the beginning, have nevertheless been in no hurry to pressure the military to accept his return ; One of the reasons, also for adding, even now, an additional waiting period until October 30, is that the imperialist leaders want it to be done gradually, so that the masses do not emerge from their apathy.

Because if the choice to bring back Aristide was made by the Americans the day after the coup, it was obviously not to respect the feelings and interests of the poor masses but to deceive and demobilize them and avoid the danger represented by these hundreds of thousands of poor Haitians gripped by hunger, living in subhuman conditions and, moreover, terrorized by a bloody military dictatorship that is hardening day by day.

Aristide still lives on in the hearts of the poor masses of the population, despite everything. By sponsoring his return, the United States is trying to regain his credibility for maintaining order and stability in Haiti.

That’s why they used their influence to convince the army to accept the return. The UN-imposed blockade is also a means of exerting pressure. While some sectors of the bourgeoisie benefit, others suffer. The political and military crisis triggered by the September 30th coup is detrimental to business. It’s no coincidence that the meeting of political parties to give parliamentary cover to the US-dictated solution will be followed by a meeting of Haitian and American business leaders and IMF representatives with Aristide. Haiti interests them, especially because of the low wages. But for business to thrive, order is essential. And social peace is crucial : that’s what they’re asking Aristide to guarantee.

The far-right Macoutic movement and so-called progressive nationalists oppose American interference.

A civilian mission, and soon an international police force, are supposed to guarantee the smooth running of the transition period.
The civilian mission is already in place. Its members are not solely occupied with lounging by the pools of the luxury hotels where they are staying. Radio Métropole reported that it organized meetings in several provincial cities, bringing together section leaders and the officers or non-commissioned officers commanding local military posts, to convince them of the necessity of democracy. At the end of these meetings, notably in Hinche, they distributed the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the soldiers present. The latter must have appreciated this commendable educational effort. The mission was somewhat less successful in front of Saint-Jean Bosco (3) or in Cité Soleil where, although duly summoned by Lavalas officials, the international observers had to be content with watching the soldiers beat the demonstrators, while themselves being subjected to a barrage of insults.

As for the military mission, it hasn’t arrived yet. The signatories and protectors of Governor’s Island are being very discreet about it. It is expected to consist of around a thousand military personnel, from Latin American countries or perhaps Francophone countries, officially intended to ensure that the transition takes place.

Would this military presence discourage any potential coup attempts by the most hardline Macoutic factions ? Perhaps, but it’s not certain. It is at least as much intended to demobilize the poor masses, if only by reinforcing the argument : there’s no need to mobilize to protect Aristide’s return ; there are troops for that.

Meanwhile, however, the potential presence of these foreign troops is the pretext invoked by the Macoutic circles to cloak their inherent hostility to Aristide’s return in the trappings of outraged nationalism. This is nothing new. For two years, the military coup leaders, the far-right Macoutic faction, and drug traffickers have made extensive use of nationalist or Black nationalist demagoguery to deny anyone the right to interfere with their freedom to traffic and murder in their own country. All this, of course, does not prevent them from depositing their stolen money with the very imperialist power whose interference they pretend to oppose, nor from whining for its recognition.

However, the denunciation of foreign intervention is also the reason invoked by some so-called progressive nationalists, such as Ben Dupuy and more generally the Haiti Progress movement, to distance themselves from Aristide.

The poor should certainly not see these foreign troops as friends, much less protectors, even if they are officially sent to protect Aristide’s return. These troops, instruments of United States policy, are just as much enemies of the poor masses as the Haitian army.

But the verbal anti-imperialism of people like Ben Dupuy shouldn’t obscure the fact that these same people didn’t protest at all, let alone resign, when Aristide, still at the National Palace, advocated for a marriage between the army and the people. These nationalist-progressive cliques are just as responsible as the most moderate Lavalas supporters for the disastrous policies that disarmed the poor in the face of the army. And even today, by breaking with Aristide on the issue of verbal anti-imperialism, these people continue to deceive the poor, concealing their responsibility for the repression by the national state apparatus, the national army. Indeed, it is precisely in this that even their supposed anti-Americanism, even their supposed anti-imperialism, to which their progressive political identity is limited, is completely bogus. Since the American occupation troops were withdrawn from this country almost sixty years ago, it is indeed "our" national state apparatus, it is indeed "our" army, "our" political class, that have been the principal instruments of imperialism.
That is why workers, day laborers, the unemployed, the rural poor, the proletariat have nothing to expect from either the protagonists of the Governor’s Island Agreement or its most vocal opponents […]

Voice of the Workers, July 15, 1993
***
Since this text was written, the process imposed by the United States has begun. A process of democratization ?

Not even on the garden side !

Oh, the actors planned in the "democratization" scenario played their parts. Aristide, for starters, inaugurated his role as "restored president" by gracing with his presence this meeting of businessmen, organized in Miami. There, American capitalists interested in subcontracting in Haiti met with representatives of major Haitian bourgeois dynasties, such as Mews and Bigio, proud to have financed the coup, and Brandt, the "Rockefeller of Haiti," according to the Miami Herald, who reportedly spearheaded a fundraising effort among business leaders to help the coup government pay the soldiers’ salaries. The highlight of the meeting was Aristide’s embrace of the president of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce, representing all these prominent figures. These same business circles had no trouble accepting Aristide’s nomination of Robert Malval, the head of one of Haiti’s largest printing companies, as his candidate for Prime Minister.

The constitutional procedure was scrupulously respected. The Senate, then Parliament, debated Malval’s candidacy, with numerous motions and counter-motions. Malval indulged himself by giving his government a vaguely "left-wing" slant, by including some former ministers or high-ranking officials from the "Lavalas" government overthrown by the army ; by giving the Ministry of National Education to the current leader of KONAKOM, a party considered "socialist" ; and by appointing as Minister of Social Affairs a close associate of Théodore, former Secretary General of the former Communist Party.

In his inaugural address, Malval preached "national unity", "forgetting the past", "dialogue between all", before calling "on all exiles without exception to return to the country".

The call was heeded. Generals Namphy and Avril, the two military dictators of the post-Duvalier era, who had been in exile even under Cédras’s military dictatorship, returned to the country. Frank Romain, one of the leading figures of the Duvalier regime, also returned. Simone Duvalier, wife of François and mother of Jean-Claude, is leaving for Haiti. And rumors are circulating about the possibility of Jean-Claude Duvalier himself returning. Thus, it is possible that the former dictator, ousted in 1986, could be back in Haiti even before Aristide, the current president, can set foot there again.
Even behind the scenes, the "democratization" is therefore primarily benefiting the far-right Macouti faction. This was enough, however, for the United States, as soon as Malval was sworn in, to consider democracy underway, lift the embargo, and unfreeze the accounts in American banks of the most notorious figures responsible for the coup.

On the inside, this brand-new Caribbean democracy is a carbon copy of the military dictatorship. Even during the inauguration ceremony of Malval, Aristide’s designated Prime Minister, soldiers beat the few dozen young people who had gathered near the gates of the National Palace to cheer Aristide. And the few Lavalas activists, naive enough to take Malval’s call for the "return of the exiles" at face value, who decided to leave their internal exile to return to their towns or villages, were generally seized upon arrival, beaten, arrested, and sometimes tortured by the official authorities, who were now supposed to be obeying Malval and Aristide.

The American "great democracy" is quite ready to accept these imperfections in the democratic process... There are plenty of other "democracies" of this ilk in this world. However, it may be more troubled by the provocative activism of all those who, Governor’s Island Agreement or not, Cedras Agreement or not, do not want Aristide’s return, any more than they want anyone to touch their privileges, large or small, their positions, or their illicit activities.
The "attachés"—a kind of civilian auxiliary to the army—have twice expressed, in a provocative and undisguised manner, their hostility to the ongoing process. The first time was by assassinating several supporters of Evans Paul, the legitimate mayor of Port-au-Prince, during his attempt to be reinstated in office. The second time, by intervening, armed, against the peaceful commemoration of the massacre at the Saint John Bosco church, perpetrated during the Namphy dictatorship. Isméry, a prominent liberal businessman close to Aristide, was killed by several shots fired at point-blank range, and five other people present were murdered with machetes, before the assassins calmly left. All this happened in front of UN observers who, in fact, witnessed...

These are not isolated reactions from a few far-right thugs. A segment of the privileged class, starting with the military hierarchy, profits too much from smuggling, racketeering, and drug trafficking to even risk being excluded from it.

Will the United States eventually intervene, either directly or under the auspices of the UN or the Organization of American States ?

Will they simply postpone Aristide’s return until the legitimate president, exercising his fictitious prerogatives from emigration, finally reaches the end of his term ?

Faced with the clear refusal of part of the army and the far-right Macoutic to accept Aristide’s return, American leaders are speaking with increasing insistence of a "new police force", overseen by specialists from an international intervention force.

The Haitian army is small in number, poorly disciplined, with a hierarchy corrupt to the core, and largely linked to drug trafficking. But it is the only force facing the impoverished masses—with, it is true, the support of auxiliary troops under the "section leaders," the "attachés," the private militias of the powerful (4), and the far-right Macoutic movement. This is why, despite all the talk of "democratization," the United States is careful with the Haitian army, just as the army protects the far-right Macoutic movement—even though they would like to use the pretext of protecting Aristide to train it, modernize it, and make it somewhat more reliable.

The impoverished masses of Haiti cannot even hope for the right to a few democratic freedoms without the army and its auxiliaries being swept aside. At certain points during the last seven years—in the months following Duvalier’s fall, as well as later, just before Aristide’s rise to the presidency, when a spontaneous and violent mobilization of the poor neighborhoods thwarted an initial coup attempt—these masses clashed with the army and forced it to retreat. But all the institutions they trusted were conspiring to deflect their anger, to prevent them from becoming aware of the situation.

The poor neighborhoods, deceived and betrayed before being bled dry, now seem demoralized, resigned, without any prospects other than hoping, nonetheless, that Aristide will at least return, without expecting much. No one can predict when, how, or at what pace the impoverished masses will regain their self-confidence. It was their awakening that ended Duvalier’s dictatorship and ensured, for a few months, a climate of relative democratic freedom. It is their awakening that could, once again, change the balance of power, and certainly not the "democratization" sponsored by the United States.

(1) Lavalas supporter : a supporter of Aristide. The expression comes from the Creole word "lavalasse," which refers to the sudden flooding of a river, sweeping away everything in its path. One of Aristide’s slogans during his campaign was to call for a "lavalass" of votes in his favor.

(2) Saint-Domingue.

(3) Church near the poor neighborhood of Cité Soleil where Aristide had officiated. Now half-burned by arson, it was the site of several massacres perpetrated by Tonton Macoutes.

(4) Grandon : landowner or powerful notable of the countryside.

What does it mean for Haiti to be occupied by foreign armed forces ?

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